

**THE INTERAGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
WARFARE:
STABILITY, SECURITY, TRANSITION,
AND RECONSTRUCTION ROLES**

Editors

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FOREWORD

The contemporary challenges underpinning interagency cooperation within the U.S. Government are not entirely new. For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services—all those involved in providing for the common defense—have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. This new century's post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), international system and security environment have placed additional strains on the U.S. Government's interagency processes.

U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

While the present volume represents a significant effort towards addressing the current interagency problems, much more discussion is required. The baseline goals of this partnership effort between the Bush School and the Strategic Studies Institute are to generate knowledgeable interaction and chart a way forward for government, private sector, and academic actors to reexamine interagency reform as a precondition for achieving real change. Such an initiative could not be more relevant or time sensitive.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

PREFACE

The interagency process was the focus of a Capstone project and Research Symposium at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University during the 2006-07 academic year. The Bush School's Capstone seminar is a semester-long graduate course in the Master's Program in International Affairs that provides a research experience for students in the final semester of the 2-year program. As part of their leadership development, the students operate in teams to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client. In this case, the client was the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. Our thanks to Colonel Richard Lacquement and Dr. Janine Davidson for sponsoring our Capstone interagency project.

The Capstone was entitled "The Interagency Process in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments." With topics ranging from provisional reconstruction teams in Afghanistan to strategic communication to leadership education, the student papers are included in this monograph, making valuable contributions to this critical dialogue.

In concert with the Capstone interagency project, the Bush School and the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a research symposium to outline interagency policy issues and craft recommendations. The symposium, entitled "The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions," was held

on April 5-6, 2007, at Texas A&M University. Present were more than two dozen military officers, national security scholars, and practitioners who have been on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of whom are heavily involved in interagency analysis. The majority of the concerns, questions, and ideas discussed during the symposium are articulated and expanded upon in the following chapters.

Let me thank the Director of the Strategic Studies Institute, Professor Douglas Lovelace, for sponsoring the interagency research symposium. Thanks also go to the Strategic Studies Institute staff memberes Dr. Dallas Owens, Colonel Trey Braun, and Colonel Greg Cusimano for their efforts in conference planning. Special thanks go to Ms. Marianne Cowling and Ms. Rita Rummel for their professional and selfless editorial support in publishing this volume. The symposium participants, including experts from both the policy community and academia, all contributed their ideas for addressing the pressing issues surfaced in this book. Let me also thank our graduate students – Patrick Baetjer, Chris Cline, Carlos Hernandorena, Brian Polley, Kate Rogers, Amanda Smith, and Tyson Voelkel – and especially Jay Boggs, who served as the symposium’s assistant director. In addition, our Bush School staff performed numerous tasks in planning and executing the conference. Thanks to our superb staff members, Michelle Sullens, Joe Dillard, Laura Templeton, and Mary Hein, for their professionalism in arranging all administration and support.

Finally, to the readers of this volume, we thank you for your interest and ideas. Please do take the time to provide feedback to the Strategic Studies Institute from the field and from your personal reflections on these critical issues. We have been as comprehensive as time has allowed. We fully realize, however, that much

work remains to be done to improve U.S. and coalition efforts across the globe in aligning and integrating the interagency process in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. We look forward to hearing from you.

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INTRODUCTION

Jay W. Boggs

Too many American military personnel, diplomats, and government officials are returning from Iraq and Afghanistan claiming that success in bringing stability to those two countries has been minimal and difficult to sustain. Continually cited as a fundamental obstacle to U.S. progress is the interagency process controlling the interaction among the various deployed military services and government organizations. Flaws in the way the different components align their objectives, resources, and strategic thinking lead to limited communication and integration when conducting daily operations. Extremely complex and asymmetric environments in counterinsurgency warfare in the current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan require a more cooperative and efficient interagency system to synchronize all elements of U.S. power and ensure success.

If the interagency process is in such obvious need for adjustment and so vital to current efforts, why is it so difficult to instigate the necessary reforms? The answer emerges from the vast multitude of contradictory organizational perspectives and cultures. The challenging task is to analyze this issue broadly and in a comprehensive, unbiased manner. In the research symposium “The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions” held at Texas A&M University in April 2007, jointly sponsored by the Bush School Capstone team and the Strategic Studies Institute, attendees sought to isolate the core policy issues and generate long-term proposals to foster leadership and decisive action. To guide their

research and discussion, the following five questions were examined in detail:

1. What are the roles and missions of U.S. military and government agencies in stabilization and reconstruction efforts as part of counterinsurgency warfare (historical background from case studies)?

2. What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations?

3. What are the military and civilian leadership functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post-conflict environments?

4. How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in the short term and the long term?

5. Does the U.S. Government have a means for measuring the effectiveness of civil-military coordination?

In order to better frame the symposium and this book, the articles have been organized into four different parts. The goal of Part I, Issues and Challenges in Support and Stability Operations, is to outline the key concepts and introduce the primary factors which affect the interagency process and its role in stability operations. Recent government efforts at reform such as Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 and National Security Presidential Directive-44 are detailed. While some initiatives have experienced success and some progress has been achieved, the consensus is that too many obstacles remain to reform the interagency framework easily, cheaply, or expeditiously.

Part II, Case Studies and Field Experiences, provides insight into the lessons learned from current and historical instances of stability operations. American practices in Iraq, the development of provincial

reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, the U.S. model of reconstruction in postwar Japan, and an international experience combating an insurgency are discussed. While such case studies reveal much about the nature of interagency alignment and effective operational techniques, they also demonstrate that there is no magic checklist that can be applied to every contingency. Yet, these field experiences serve as necessary templates and references so that policymakers can direct their strategies and avoid repetition of mistakes.

Part III, Learning, Innovation, and New Initiatives, introduces a number of new proposals to effect change in the interagency process. There is a significant effort underway in Washington to create awareness of this issue and press Congress to enact forceful legislation. Similar to Goldwater-Nichols, the Project on National Security Reform seeks to expedite the cultural transformations needed to alter the way departments and agencies communicate and think across functional areas and organizations so as to align and integrate policy and operations.

Part IV, Leadership, Education, Training, and Development for Interagency Operations, and the concluding chapter address roles of education and development for achieving significant and permanent change in the interagency process and in the organizational players themselves. Organizational reform of this scope can be secured only with dynamic leadership on all levels. The U.S. Government must nurture and develop military and civilian leaders who can think beyond their own institution's parameters and can approach problems with a strategic, interagency mindset. The chapters in this section elaborate upon a number of the promising, nascent leadership and training initiatives emerging in the military services and U.S. Government.

Part I:

**Issues and Challenges
in Support and Stability Operations**

CHAPTER 1

CHALLENGES IN SUPPORT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS: WHY EACH ONE IS DIFFERENT

Dennis C. Jett

Any discussion of how the U.S. Government should respond when confronted with a complex contingency operation (CCO) in a post-conflict situation faces two obstacles—the past and the future. The past is a problem because the lessons supposedly learned from the last operation may not be applicable to the next one. The first part of this chapter will discuss why lessons learned from the past may not result in problems avoided in the future. As Yogi Berra might have said, prediction is very difficult, especially about the future. So the second part of the chapter will discuss the range of scenarios that might be encountered and the factors that can have the most influence on their outcome. How the CCO will be conducted will depend on the ability of the decisionmakers to deal with those factors.

It has often been said that generals train to fight the last war. The implication is that focusing on the past leaves them unprepared for the future. Lessons can be learned from any military operation, but assuming the next one will be similar to the last one is often a mistake. Lessons learned can constrain thinking about future contingencies rather than help prepare for them if the implicit assumption is that the past will be repeated. It is useful therefore to think more freely about the types of situations that might be encountered and what kind of responses they might require.

It should also be recognized that planning has its limits and often has more to do with the immediate past than the distant future. Political leaders, when describing the actions taken by their governments, will occasionally admit, "Mistakes were made." They will seldom say, however, that those mistakes were the result of the failure of their policies or judgment. Instead, they will blame those who try to implement poor decisions rather than blame those who made the decisions.

As a result, bureaucratic reform and reorganization are often promised as the means through which a repetition of the failure will be avoided. However, when reforms are proposed and the bureaucracy is reorganized, it often does not matter whether the changes implemented make any meaningful improvements. The reasons for the reform are to deflect criticism from political opponents, shift the focus of the news media elsewhere, and placate public opinion in the wake of a policy failure. Whether the government is really better prepared to respond to the situation is something future policymakers will have to worry about. The immediate problem, i.e., the bureaucratic problem, has been solved and responsibility for the failure avoided.

The State Department's talk about "transformational diplomacy" is a case in point. The thrust of this putative reform effort is that American foreign policy will become more popular with audiences abroad if our diplomats are moved closer to the people, i.e., from huge embassies in the capitals to small offices in the outlying areas. But would moving diplomats around in such a fashion really change public opinion about American policy? There are nine cities of a million or more in the United States. Would a foreign diplomat in each one

of them transform American public opinion about the policies of the country the diplomat represents? Or is this bureaucratic reorganization merely a reaction to the failure of current American policy and the inability of Washington to admit that?

The current administration is hardly the only one that deals with failure through bureaucratic subterfuge. Reacting to the difficulties encountered in Somalia and Bosnia, and to a degree of success in Haiti, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 in May 1997. PDD-56 was supposed to "improve the political, military, humanitarian, economic and other dimensions of the U.S. Government's planning for interventions that are identified as complex emergencies."¹ It was also supposed to correct "the lack of meaningful coordinated planning" which "produced setbacks" whenever Washington attempted to manage such emergencies.² PDD-56 was not designed to make policy or decisions but was created instead to guide the process of integrating the government's response once the decision to intervene had been made.³ To accomplish this, the Directive set up an Executive Committee of assistant secretaries from the various departments involved that was to be a standing crisis action group.

However, the Executive Committee mechanism set up by PDD-56 was little used in the remaining years of the Clinton administration. It fell short of what was promised when the PDD was signed because, according to one analyst, of "a lack of NSC staff follow-up and enforcement" in the face of domestic agency resistance. He added, "It nonetheless raised awareness of problems in coordination and did result in a useful series of interagency education and training events."⁴

Another writer described the failure to implement PDD-56 differently. He attributed the failure to

continued congressional pressure over who would make decisions about when and where to deploy American forces, and to organizational friction at the departmental level, that combined to produce a style of presidential decisionmaking relying on a small group of key advisors.⁵ Some officials in government at the time have a still different explanation. They claim that not using the PDD-56 structure stemmed simply from the fact that interagency cooperation and personal relations between key policymakers became so much better that no real need for the formal PDD-56 mechanism arose.⁶

Whatever the reason for the lack of use of the structure established by PDD-56, the Bush administration lost no time in getting rid of the directive. The general approach of the new administration seemed to be to reject whatever policy was being followed by its predecessor. Thomas Friedman, in his column in the *New York Times*, referred to this approach as ABC—Anything But Clinton—when it came to the Middle East.⁷ ABC was initially applied across the board in other foreign policy areas such as North Korea, while also downplaying the types of threat that PDD-56 was conceived to meet.

While PDD-56 was formally rescinded shortly after the new administration took office, it was not replaced with an alternative approach for several years, not even when a true CCO first arose. When it came to the initial decisions about post-war Iraq, they were made by a secretive, little-known group. At least that is the assessment of Lawrence Wilkerson, Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff and a former Army colonel. Wilkerson added that the official ultimately responsible for ensuring at least some level of interagency coordination and cooperation on vital

national security issues, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, “was simply steamrolled by this cabal.”⁸

Whether the work of a cabal or not, the results of the decisions taken on Iraq have been a disaster and may well be regarded collectively as the biggest foreign policy mistake ever made by any administration. In another column in October 2006, Friedman mused that Barnes & Noble bookstores would have to open a whole new section that might fill the entire basement just to contain the books being written about the fiasco that Iraq had become.⁹ The expenditure in lives and money, the absence of weapons of mass destruction, the increasingly diminished chances for Iraq to become a functioning democracy, and the lack of any contribution toward making America more secure and achieving its goals in the war on terror will provide the material for many more books yet to come.

And what was Washington’s response to these colossal failures of policy and judgment—to rearrange the bureaucratic deck chairs on the Titanic once again. In December 2005, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 which empowered the Secretary of State to “improve coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”¹⁰

NSPD-44 did not end the problems in Iraq or make any noticeable change in the government’s ability to deal with post-conflict situations. As the *Washington Post* reported on March 22, 2007: “The U.S. Government was unprepared for the extensive nation-building required after it invaded Iraq, and at each juncture where it could have adjusted its efforts, it failed even

to understand the problems it faced, according to the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction." In a stinging, wide-ranging assessment of U.S. reconstruction efforts, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., said that in the days after the invasion, the Defense Department had no strategy for restoring either government institutions or infrastructure. And in the years since, other agencies joined the effort without an overall plan and without a structure in place to organize and execute a task of such magnitude.

Lines of authority remained unclear in the reconstruction effort. With a demand for speed and a shortage of government personnel, much of the oversight was turned over to contractors doing the work. There was little coordination among the various agencies. The result was a series of missed opportunities to address the unraveling situation.¹¹

While NSPD-44 failed to solve the problem, it did create a new bureaucratic entity within the State Department, the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Coordinator was never given the budget nor the authority to accomplish all the lofty goals envisioned. His primary activity seems to have been conducting bureaucratic planning exercises.

In one of them, a matrix of essential tasks to be undertaken in the first 2 to 3 years of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization was drawn up. This list of essential tasks runs some 50 pages. Saying a 50-page to-do list is comprised of "essential" tasks does not inspire confidence that this particular planning exercise had much to do with the real world. The tasks involved read more like what is required to turn a war-torn country into Switzerland and would take decades to accomplish rather than the 2 to 3-year period S/CRS says is its planning horizon.

The practice of looking to solve a problem through bureaucratic measures rather than well-considered policy, effective interagency coordination, and realistic resourcing has not abated in the wake of NSPD-44 and despite over 4 years of experience in Iraq. On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq. In addition to a troop surge to improve security, the new policy included economic, political, and diplomatic elements. Instead of focusing on large infrastructure projects, the emphasis of American efforts was shifted to technical assistance programs to increase the capacity of Iraqis to plan and shape their country's development.

The current coordinator, Ambassador David Satterfield, told a Senate committee on March 2, 2007, that at the center of this effort was the expansion of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which are comprised of representatives from the military, the State Department, the Agency for International Development (AID), and other agencies.¹² An article in the *Foreign Service Journal* does not give much reason to think this strategy will be any more effective than previous ones or that the problems of interagency coordination are being resolved. It notes that "establishing the teams in Iraq has been challenging, in part because of high-level wrangling between State and the Defense Department over who would provide security, support, and funding. No memorandum of understanding was in place to delineate each agency's responsibilities."¹³

It was not only the logistics of the PRTs that were unclear, but also what they were supposed to accomplish other than giving the appearance of action and initiative to the President's plan. The article goes on to say:

A common refrain from Foreign Service members speaking about their experiences in new PRTs is that they have felt like “pins on a map,” sent out so officials in Washington could say they were there. They felt “cut off” and were not given clear instructions on their role or on how the chain of command between civilian members was to be defined and function.

Part of the challenge to the State Department has been to find the personnel to fill the expanded number of PRTs. State had to ask the Pentagon to come up with military or civilian personnel that could fill about 120 of the 350 new positions required. The Pentagon agreed to do so, but only on a temporary basis.¹⁴ Arguments about 120 positions may seem strange, given the Defense Department’s \$400 billion budget and the 2.5 million members of the armed forces and reserves it has at its command. State has only 6,500 Foreign Service officers, and USAID only about 1,000, and both groups have to be spread around the globe. Before we become too critical of the Department of Defense, however, we should keep in mind that the 120 positions in question call for considerable seniority, politico-military skills, and technical skills often involving foreign language requirements. These are the very sorts of skills needed by the military itself, and they are in increasingly short supply, especially if long and repetitive tours are to be avoided.

At least Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates were able to work out a temporary solution to this staffing problem. Not all the disputes between these two departments have worked out so well. In fact, the conclusion one would draw from recent history is that while everyone agrees that an effective mechanism for interagency coordination is desirable, it is not easy

to achieve and often does not work. In the midst of a CCO, it is difficult for any bureaucrat to surrender turf or budgetary appropriations. What may seem easy in a planning exercise in Washington becomes more difficult in the field under actual conditions.

Washington politics, whether it is relations between the executive and legislative branches or relations between departments, conspires against efforts to convert the lessons learned from the last CCO into a structure that will make the response to the next CCO better. Reorganizing the bureaucracy in order to avoid taking responsibility for errors in judgment is not limited to the next operation.

That process continues with the current CCO in Iraq even though the war is well into its 5th year. *The Washington Post* reported in April 2007 that the White House wanted to name a high-powered czar to oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to reorganize management of the conflicts. They approached three retired four-star generals, all of whom declined to be considered.¹⁵ One of the generals explained his decision as follows:

Cabinet-level agencies, organizations, and their leadership must buy into the position's roles and responsibilities. Most important, cabinet-level personalities must develop and accept a clear definition of the strategic approach to policy. . . . There is no agreed-upon strategic view of the Iraq problem or the region. We have never gotten it right in Iraq. These huge shortcomings are not going to be resolved by the assignment of an additional individual to the White House staff.¹⁶

The State Department's former coordinator put it more succinctly: "An individual can't fix a failed policy."¹⁷ And neither can bureaucratic reorganization by itself, whether in the midst of a CCO or after it is over.

Because the past may not be the best guide to the future, it might be best to consider the full range of possible scenarios rather than training to fight the last war. One other cautionary note would be to avoid an excess of ambition in considering what tasks to undertake. As noted earlier, the S/CRS's 50-page matrix of "essential" tasks is neither essential nor doable in a 2 to 3-year time frame.

The aim in most post-conflict situations should be to keep the country together long enough to have a legitimate government take over. The emphasis should be on security, meeting basic human needs, and encouraging a political process that puts a legitimate government into place as quickly as possible.

Iraq provides many examples of how not to conduct a CCO. A stunning example of being distracted by the irrelevant is the inclusion by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, among his most significant accomplishments "the lowering of Iraq's tax, the liberalization of foreign investment laws, and the reduction of import duties."¹⁸ Bremer would have better served U.S. interests by spending the time he worried about taxes and import duties on the implications of throwing former Ba'ath Party members out of the Iraqi government and disbanding the Iraqi army. Through these two actions, Bremer effectively converted a disorganized and low level of resistance into a full-blown insurgency and civil war.

Hopefully, the tendency to prepare for the last CCO will be avoided as well as the imperial overreach that characterized what happened in Iraq. Instead, each situation should be assessed to see what the U.S. Government really has to do and what can best be left to the international community. United Nations (UN)

peacekeepers are cheaper than American soldiers or civilians and bring with them the legitimacy of the international community.¹⁹ While some would argue that the UN is an ineffective instrument of U.S. policy, there is something to be said for sharing not just the cost, but the responsibility, for the outcome of a CCO with more than a rump coalition of the coerced and co-opted. This is particularly true, as we shall see, in a situation where the peace has been imposed rather than negotiated.

To assess each situation that might involve a CCO requires considering the nature of the conflict, the nature of the peace, and the critical factors that can prevent the peace from becoming permanent. In this regard, there are two kinds of war, four kinds of peace, and three critical factors to worry about.

The two kinds of wars are a war between two countries and a war within one country. The combatants, weapons, stakes, and victims are different in each case. Intrastate wars are also far more common today and create much more complex contingency operations than the interstate kind.

A war between two countries is usually over territory. It involves the armed forces of those two countries, which generally have some level of training and discipline, and they employ a wide range of weapons. They tend to inflict casualties on the other side's army and usually do not specifically target civilians. When a ceasefire is achieved, the main task of the CCO is to provide the time for a process that results in negotiating where the border should lie. Through monitoring the ceasefire and taking other confidence-building measures—steps to be performed by outside forces that are not parties to the conflict—the former combatants can have the opportunity to settle the underlying issues without resorting to more fighting.

In a civil war, however, the situation is much more complex because far more is required of outside forces that intervene. The stakes in this kind of war are political power. The combatants are the army defending those in power and the insurgent forces trying to wrest power away. The rebels, and frequently the national army, have little training, discipline, or equipment beyond AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. They frequently attack civilians because civilians do not shoot back and are an essential part of the political legitimacy of the other side. Because of these characteristics, civil wars create the humanitarian crises associated with CCOs.

Since the stakes are political power, the fighting can continue as long as neither party will capitulate. If a ceasefire is achieved, the intervening powers often must disarm most of the former combatants and assist their reintegration into civilian society. A new national army needs to be created out of some of the remnants of the opposing forces. A political process, usually culminating with elections, must be carried out to establish a legitimate government. At the same time, economic reconstruction must be initiated and basic humanitarian aid provided.

Whether between states or within one, wars end in one of four ways—(1) when one side wins, (2) when peace is imposed by an outside power, (3) when a peace is negotiated between the parties in good faith, or (4) when one is negotiated in bad faith. A clear military victory is difficult in a civil war because as long as one side is willing to resist, it does not take much for a low-level insurgency to continue. The problem with political power is that it is hard to divide, especially in a country where both the economy and the political institutions are underdeveloped. Each side knows that it will end up either in power or out of luck. There is

little space in the political institutions or in the economy left to inhabit for the losers of a civil war.

In a war between two countries, the fighting tends to be shorter and more intense, but may not be any more conclusive. When both sides realize their goals cannot be militarily achieved, it can lead to a “hurting stalemate” that provides room for the international community to negotiate a ceasefire. A peace imposed by an outside power is possible only if that power has the strength and the interest to stop the fighting. In many third world conflicts, the international community bemoans the fact that a humanitarian disaster has occurred, but does not have the political will to end the war. That requires the willingness to take, as well as inflict, casualties.

Often handwringing is preferable to taking decisive action when the problem is remote and little understood by the voters back home. The current situation in Darfur is a case in point. Three years after Secretary Powell declared that genocide was being committed, the killing continues and the international community has done little to stop it. An African Union force has been sent in, but it is too small and weak and lacks the mandate to impose a peace. While there is mounting sentiment in the United States to do something about Darfur, concern has not yet reached the level of actually provoking action other than speeches by U.S. Government officials. Given the burdens of the commitments to the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is unlikely American troops will be sent to intervene even if the humanitarian disaster gets worse. For the moment, the policy seems to be one of asserting that there is less violence, and therefore genocide is no longer occurring.²⁰

In addition to the frequent lack of willingness to both take and inflict casualties, the problem with imposing a peace is that those who do the imposing inherit ownership of the situation. Secretary Powell once referred to the "Pottery Barn rule" in regard to Iraq.²¹ The principle that "if you break it, you own it" continues to apply in an imposed peace. Ending the war leaves the intervention force responsible for the peace and the process that follows to make the peace permanent. If it is a political process, the losers can always claim the process was manipulated by the occupying power and is therefore illegitimate. The exit strategy is never completely under the control of the intervening force.

If a peace is negotiated, it can lead to a mechanism for determining the border in a war between two countries or for determining a legitimate government in the case of an internal struggle for political power. In both cases, the parties have to be willing to accept an outcome that may not give them everything they were fighting for. So a peace negotiated in good faith can, when it comes to actually implementing the terms of the peace agreement, result in one side or the other demonstrating bad faith.

When it comes to dividing territory, it can be more politically expedient to live with an indefinite ceasefire than to accept a line on the map that cannot be sold to the local public. In the case of political power, the sides have to be willing to surrender their military power and take their chances in a political process that could leave them with little or nothing. They would not be the only politicians to believe a free and fair election is only one that their side wins.

Finally, once the peacekeepers are on the ground, they cannot control everything regardless of whether

they are first-rate troops from first world countries or third-rate ones from the third world. Three critical factors come into play which can be influenced but not controlled completely. Are the combatants willing to accept peace and the risks that go with it? Are the parties fighting over who will control lucrative natural resources? And do the neighboring states, regional powers, and others want peace, or are they more interested in a proxy war for their own purposes? If the parties see the peace only as a useful respite, or if they are unwilling to accept any outcome that does not leave them in power, the peace will not endure. If the country's natural resources generate large amounts of cash, as oil and diamonds do, then there will be the incentive and the means to resume the fighting. And if the neighboring states, regional powers, or other countries see it in their interest to undermine the peace, then they can easily make it possible for the combatants to continue the struggle.

It would be instructive to look at the kinds of war, the kinds of peace, and the critical factors in terms of a particular case. Iraq is not a typical case and does not neatly fit into the categories outlined above, but it is the most complex contingency operation currently underway. While the Coalition forces wanted to take and control Iraq's territory, the purpose was not to keep any portion of that territory, but to instead to bring about regime change. That mission was accomplished, but as the occupation dragged on, the political process put in place was not accepted by all the Iraqis and some outsiders. The peace that the Coalition continues to attempt imposing has not held, and there does not seem to be any political process underway that would result in a negotiated cessation of hostilities. So U.S. forces and the dwindling number of Coalition partners

are stuck trying to impose a peace on factions that are willing to continue fighting for their own aims.

That a great deal of oil is present in Iraq is not helpful. There are almost no functioning democracies among countries whose economy depends on exporting oil. The opportunities for corruption are simply too great and too tempting. Democratic government means spreading the oil wealth around. An authoritarian government can make sure it enriches only the privileged few. Britain and Norway, both oil exporters, had strong democratic institutions *before* oil exports began. No country has had much success in developing democracy and exporting oil at the same time.

Iraq is thus left with parties that will not accept the prospect of having little political power; with a resource that provides an incentive for continuing the fighting; and with neighboring states, notably Iran and Syria, that would not mind seeing the conflict continue. We shall have to wait and see whether an additional 22,000 U.S. troops can change any of those factors.

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CHAPTER 2

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-56: A GLASS HALF FULL

John F. Troxell

In October 1993 the American people awoke to the morning broadcast of horrific scenes of the bodies of American service members being dragged through the streets of the far-off city of Mogadishu. A failed effort on the part of an elite unit of Army Rangers to capture Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid resulted in widespread carnage, leaving 18 American dead, 74 wounded, and perhaps as many as 1,000 Somalis killed. The story has since been immortalized in the book and subsequent movie, *Blackhawk Down*. David Halberstam referred to this crisis as a “major league CNN-era disaster.”¹ It led President Bill Clinton to announce to the nation that the effort in Somalia, after an initial reinforcement, would be completely withdrawn in 5 months. Two months after the disaster, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin left the administration. It has since been learned that the Somalia debacle also fed the appetite of Osama bin Laden to drive the United States from the Middle East. One positive outcome of the U.S. experience in Somalia, however, was that it challenged the interagency to reexamine its policymaking procedures.² The eventual outcome of this effort was Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), codifying the Clinton administration’s policy on managing complex contingency operations.

PDD-56, however, did not work, as attested to by

the growing demand for reform of the interagency process surrounding the assessment of ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The purpose of this chapter is to explain why the directive did not work and what the challenges for interagency coordination are in consideration of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the continuing conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. To accomplish this purpose, the author will first clarify terms; describe the prelude to PDD-56 in the post-Cold War world; and examine the provisions, intentions, and ultimate fate of the document. Next, the attempts of the Bush administration to deal with interagency coordination, particularly as lessons from Iraq have begun to accumulate, will be analyzed. Finally, the principal shortcomings in the current efforts and suggestions for the way ahead for the interagency process will be discussed.

Fixing the interagency along the lines proposed by PDD-56 addresses only half of the problem. PDD-56 and a host of follow-on adjustments and initiatives have done a good job of focusing on the challenge of better planning. But better planning without the capacity or capability to execute the plan is fruitless. In fact, it might be better to have properly structured and trained capability, even in the absence of a coordinated plan, than to have a well-coordinated plan in the absence of capability. The author will therefore argue that the predominant focus on improving the interagency has been misplaced. As a nation, we have been reluctant to adequately resource measures for furthering our interests in the 21st century security environment. The key to success in the future is resourcing the measures needed to address the challenges of nation-building, and the shortest route to creating those capabilities is through the military, not the interagency.

Clarifying Terms.

Interagency coordination is important even in intense combat operations, but the primary concern of interagency operations is lower on the spectrum of conflict scale. The terminology used to describe these operations is vast and ever changing. It has ranged from the broad categories of smaller scale contingencies, to military operations other than war, to post-conflict operations, to humanitarian interventions. More specific definitions have included peace operations, the formulation under the Army's doctrinal response to Somalia, and more recently stability operations, which subsumed peace operations as one of the 10 broad types.³ PDD-56 was directed at complex contingency operations defined as peace operations. The most recent policy pronouncements from the Bush administration include Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," and National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization." The DoD Directive defines SSTR as operations which "lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests." But the document then goes on almost exclusively to discuss stability operations which are designed or established to "maintain order in states and regions." NSPD-44 does not include a definition for reconstruction and stabilization.⁴

Thankfully, others have stepped in to clarify the definitional jumble. U.S. Army Colonel Bryan Watson, in a recent paper published by the Strategic Studies Institute, has offered useful definitions. Stabilization

is defined as the effort to create a secure and stable environment and to provide basic human needs of the population. It is most closely linked to the immediate conclusion of major military operations and is partially aimed at preventing the conditions that could fuel a continuing insurgency. Reconstruction, on the other hand, represents a shift toward creating self-sustaining political and economic institutions that will ultimately permit competent self-government. Colonel Watson concludes that military capabilities under military control are more suited for stabilization, whereas reconstruction is more suited for civilian agencies and intergovernment organizations (IGOs) and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).⁵

The key point is that the most problematic operations, those that have received so much study and attention, are those operations and crisis situations that require the blending together of both military and traditional civilian capabilities and spheres of operations in the gap between conflict and peace. The military can win the wars, and humanitarian, relief, and diplomatic entities can operate in the “neutral” or “humanitarian space” to further the peaceful development of states and their integration into the international community. But how should the government go about winning the peace? How do we successfully transition from stabilization to reconstruction? One recent study has concluded, “No military solution is possible absent a political and economic solution, and the persistent conditions of insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and economic development.”⁶ To be successful in the 21st century security environment, the U.S. Government must develop a conceptual framework and then resource the needed capabilities to operate in this dangerous middle ground.

Prelude to PDD-56.

The United States has never been good at coordinating and applying all of the elements of national power in a synchronized fashion. General Albert Wedemeyer, author of the World War II victory plan, argued that “our failure to use political, economic, and psychological means in coordination with military operations during the war also prolonged its duration and caused the loss of many more American lives.”⁷ For most of the Cold War period, we have been able to muddle through and avoid irreversible disasters. But we owe to fallen heroes like those of *Blackhawk Down* and to the service members and civilians on the front lines in Afghanistan and Iraq the debt of being better prepared for the next stabilization and reconstruction mission.

According to Michele Flournoy, the principal author of PDD-56, “One of the most powerful lessons learned during the 1993 operation in Somalia was that the absence of rigorous and sustained interagency planning and coordination can hamper effectiveness, jeopardize success, and court disaster.”⁸ Somalia was not the first post-Cold War stabilization and reconstruction operation, and regime change did not begin with the operations to oust the Taliban or Saddam Hussein. In December 1989 the United States forceably removed the regime of Manuel Noriega from Panama in the largely successful Operation JUST CAUSE. The follow-on stabilization phase, Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, however, was another matter. Planning was incomplete and haphazard; there were insufficient civil affairs, engineers, and military police for the rebuilding effort; and interagency cooperation

was poor because many of the agencies were excluded from the DoD planning effort.⁹ Real scrutiny of the problems associated with operations in Panama may have been diverted by the focus on the Persian Gulf only 8 months later, or because of the absence of a “Blackhawk Down” type incident. However, the Clinton administration’s political misfortune following Somalia led to a major institutional improvement in the conduct of interagency operations.¹⁰

The after-action review (AAR) process associated with Somalia was intense, representing real bureaucratic battles within the interagency community and within DoD. The Army was largely successful in deflecting attention away from its performance. The most critical lesson from the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) II peace enforcement mission, according to the Army, was the need to improve the interagency planning process (the Army was preparing to publish Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, a new doctrinal statement which would address its revealed shortcomings).¹¹ The Army’s focus on the interagency was basically well-advised, and Flournoy, as the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead, recognized it as such. Flournoy was intent on developing an integrated interagency planning process that would both help define the strategy and highlight policy disconnects for decisionmakers.¹² The military was also keen on developing improved coordination procedures with the interagency and proceeded to take the lead in numerous developmental efforts. One of the most important such initiatives was the establishment of the U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. This small but highly effective body played a key role in the eventual development of the interagency planning process that became imbedded in PDD-56.

The first post-Somalia test case was Haiti. Atlantic Command (USACOM) was responsible for planning Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and, along with DoD, conducted extensive interagency coordination. USACOM's Haiti Planning Group prepared a detailed "Interagency Checklist for Restoration of Essential Services."¹³ The Haiti Executive Committee (ExCom) was established and developed the first ever interagency political-military plan (POL-MIL plan), which articulated the mission and an interagency strategy. The POL-MIL plan was rehearsed prior to the launch of the U.S.-led multinational force.¹⁴ Other interagency planning activities included those of Southern Command, under General Wesley Clark, who was quite active in attempting to institutionalize interagency planning conferences; General Anthony Zinni, as the Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force from 1994 to 1996, sponsored interagency planning exercises in the Pacific; and General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR), sponsored the major implementation force (IFOR) rehearsal at Aachen, Germany, complete with the full range of interagency partners.

One of the noted success stories related to conducting detailed interagency planning activities, complete with a POL-MIL plan, was the U.S.-supported United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). UNTAES was established on January 15, 1996, with a mandate to demilitarize the Eastern Slavonia region, including the city of Vukovar, which had been overrun by Serbian forces several years earlier. Under the leadership of Jacques Klein, a senior American Foreign Service Officer, UNTAES was able to demilitarize the region, monitor the safe return of refugees, and conduct local elections. The territory

was peacefully returned to Croatian control in January 1998. The planning process outlined in the soon-to-be published PDD-56 was instrumental in the success of this operation.¹⁵

The final post-Somalia, but pre-PDD-56, interagency planning effort that had an impact on the publication of PDD-56 was never executed but proved useful nonetheless. In the late spring and early summer of 1996, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was pushing to conduct contingency planning in preparation for a peacekeeping mission to Burundi. The Tutsi/Hutu conflict that had produced the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was reappearing in neighboring Burundi. The Clinton administration, in contrast to its reluctance to get involved in Rwanda, was a strong supporter of this effort in the Security Council. A team of military and interagency leaders and planners was sequestered at the Army War College with the task of developing a POL-MIL plan for intervention in Burundi. The detailed planning effort revealed the extensive force package required to achieve a relatively uncertain outcome. The military balked, and the decision was made not to intervene.¹⁶ It was the detailed POL-MIL interagency planning process that generated consensus behind the no-go decision.

Concurrent with the last of these military/interagency planning efforts, the Joint Staff, sensing a lack of guidance on the subject, and not to be outdone by the Army's publication of FM 100-23, published Joint Pub 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, in 1996. The document discussed interagency processes and players, outlined the principles for organizing interagency efforts, and assigned roles and responsibilities for joint task forces (JTFs). Although the publication was a welcome

addition, it did not “adequately explain methods for interagency planning, coordination, and execution.” Thus, DoD and other agencies reiterated the need for the sort of policy guidance that would eventually find expression in PDD-56.¹⁷

Presidential Decision Directive-56.

The military was seeking three goals in its efforts to transform the interagency process. Fundamentally, it wanted to infuse better planning in interagency operations, and thus it supported the adoption of the military planning process. Second, it clearly recognized the need for unity of effort. And finally, the military remained concerned about mission creep and wanted to delineate those tasks that should be specifically in the purview of other civilian agencies. With the possible exception of the third issue, the desire to avoid mission creep, all of these objectives made perfect sense and dovetailed with the needs of the interagency planning community.

PDD-56 was approved and promulgated by the Clinton administration in May 1997. The stated intent of the directive was to establish a specific planning process for managing complex contingency operations, and identify implementation mechanisms to be incorporated into the interagency process with the ultimate goal of achieving unity of effort among U.S. Government agencies and international organizations. The planning process and implementation mechanisms selected closely mirror major military innovations and thus reinforce claims that PDD-56 attempted to impose a version of the military planning process on the interagency. This is perfectly understandable given that a core competency of the military is planning, and

that few, if any, other government agencies have any specific operational planning experience. Consequently, the structure of the plan and the supporting activities enumerated in PDD-56 adopted the best practices of the military.

Unity of effort was to be achieved by the appointment of an Executive Committee (ExCom) appointed by the Deputies Committee. The ExCom was responsible for the day-to-day management of U.S. participation in a complex contingency. The ExCom was to use an integrated interagency plan to identify critical issues, establish priorities, evaluate agency concepts of operations, and conduct the AAR.¹⁸

The PDD required that a political-military implementation plan be developed. Commonly referred to as the POL-MIL plan, it was developed using the generic political-military scheme as a template. This template was modeled after the five-paragraph military operations order, covering at a minimum the situation, assessment, national interests, mission statement, objectives, concept of operations and organization, various tasks, and participating agencies' mission area plans.¹⁹ Unity of effort is a desired outcome of the pol-mil planning process. This planning process clearly supports two of the military's most important principles of war. The first is *objective*: direct every operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The second is *unity of command*: for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.²⁰

The next two elements of PDD-56 focused on critical practices drawn from the reinvigorated Army training regime at the National Training Centers and the Battle Command Training Program: rehearsals and AARs. PDD-56 directs the Deputies Committee to rehearse the pol-mil plan. ExCom members present the elements

for which they are responsible to include all applicable supporting agency plans. After the conclusion of the operation, the ExCom is also charged with conducting the AAR. This after-action review, a comprehensive assessment of interagency performance, will include a review of interagency planning and coordination, as well as problems in interagency execution. Appropriate lessons learned will be captured and disseminated throughout the interagency community to ensure that future operations do not repeat the same mistakes.²¹

The final stipulation directs the National Security Council (NSC) to work with various educational institutions to develop an annual training program aimed at mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) to train them in the development and implementation of pol-mil plans. The intent is to create a cadre of trained professionals who are familiar with PDD-56's integrated planning process, and thus able to improve the government's ability to manage future operations.²²

Throughout, the military played a major role in the development of various aspects of the planning process outlined in PDD-56. Since planning is a core competency of the military and the military's focus is on operational preparedness, it was only natural that best practices from the military would migrate into the interagency planning and implementation process. The military also formalized the inclusion of the POL-MIL plan in their own plans and orders process. According to Joint Pub 3-08, "Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I," dated March 17, 2006, "The commander will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POL-MIL plan, when provided, and will disseminate that guidance to the

joint force in Annex V, the Interagency Coordination Annex of the combatant commander's OPLAN."²³ Thus the Pentagon formally recognized the importance of including civilian agency requirements in the deliberate planning process.

Interagency Planning Post-PDD 56.

Michele Flournoy, in a recent evaluation of PDD-56, acknowledged that the directive had never been fully implemented, although in those cases in which it was applied, it generated useful planning processes and tools. She went on to say that "the process produces more than just a set of documents: it allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles."²⁴ The innovative aspects of PDD-56 made substantial progress in building institutional planning capacity, but pockets of resistance to interagency planning remain, reflecting both an anti-planning bias on the part of some agencies and an overestimation of the effort needed to conduct a full-fledged planning effort.²⁵ The lack of a "planning culture" outside the DoD represents a significant challenge to institutionalizing a standard planning paradigm. "Whereas military officers are taught to see planning as critical to success in operations and trained in its finer points," a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report titled *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols* concluded, "The notion is largely foreign to other agencies like the Departments of State and Treasury."²⁶ These civilian agencies also tend not to have dedicated planning staffs or expertise.

The Bush administration had originally decided to develop a National Security Policy Directive (NSPD)

to replace PDD-56, and initial reports indicated that it would propose some useful enhancements to the interagency planning process. A new PDD-56 was postponed, however. In the case of Afghanistan, according to Flournoy, there was no person or entity in charge of interagency planning and coordination.²⁷ Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shared the view that the Afghanistan reconstruction effort had been mishandled by the State Department, resulting in a dysfunctional division of authority between State and the Pentagon.²⁸

The Bush administration's long-advertised successor to PDD-56 – National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization" – was finally issued on December 7, 2005. Its purpose was to "promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization" operations.²⁹ It establishes a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for reconstruction and stabilization to oversee and help integrate all DoD and civilian contingency planning. It specifies that the State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should take the lead in integrating the efforts and capabilities of the interagency for reconstruction and stabilization purposes. S/CRS is also tasked with developing strategies and identifying states which may become unstable, a proactive and preventative approach not found in PDD-56. Finally, S/CRS is tasked with developing a civilian response capacity for these types of operations. Several of the "military" aspects of PDD-56 are missing: no specifics about a POL-MIL plan or associated template, no mention of a rehearsal, and no guidance for a training program. The AAR is also absent, but NSPD-44 does direct the identification and

subsequent incorporation of lessons learned. PDD-56 had a strong military flavor; NSPD-44, in contrast, has a distinctly foggy-bottom taste.

As lessons from Iraq begin to accumulate, there is a great deal of focus on interagency planning. According to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “A lot of Defense Department folks wonder where the rest of the government is in this war. There is clearly a need for greater interagency collaboration.”³⁰ Contrary to popular belief, however, there was considerable interagency planning and post-conflict planning associated with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Numerous military and other interagency personnel were very active. The problem was not the lack of planning, but generally poor assumptions about conditions in Iraq and about uncooperative or unfocused indigenous leaders.³¹ From this perspective, Paul Bremer concluded, “We planned for the wrong contingency.”³² Certainly the planning process, although not nonexistent, was flawed. This deficiency was addressed by the Iraq Study Group, as well as other commissions.³³ At the core was the challenge to harmonize planning, which for civilians and military, Bryan Watson concluded, “means two different things.” Watson continues:

The military planning process starts with an objective, is handed over to the many layers of the military planning machine adding in resources, strategy, intelligence, training, and gaming. Given the objective, the military will come up with a plan to achieve it. The civilian planning process up until now has been much more ad hoc and more conceptual in nature. The planning process tends to concentrate more on developing the objective — what it should be — and less on the exact details of how to get there. As a result, post-Iraq reform proposals attempt to meld the two approaches — informing the military planning process with the subtleties of reconstruction challenges, and operationalizing civilian planning.³⁴

Before leaving the issue of interagency planning, we should revisit one area that seems to warrant further consideration. PDD-56 and its immediate successor NSPD-44 have focused on interventions, stabilization operations, and reconstruction operations abroad. In fact, PDD-56 specifically stated that it did not apply to domestic situations. The aftermath of 9/11 and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security have opened up an entirely new arena in which coordinated interagency operations are critical. Joint Pub 3-08 splits its crisis response coverage between domestic and foreign operations. The potential exists to adopt or, at a minimum, consider a new planning model, the National Response Plan (NRP) and its associated Emergency Support Function (ESF) annexes. The NRP, last updated May 25, 2006, forms the basis of how the federal government coordinates with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector during domestic incidents. The ESF annexes describe the primary means through which the federal government provides assistance to state, local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions of primary federal responsibility. They represent an effective mechanism for grouping capabilities and resources under the functions that are most likely to need to be performed during actual or potential incidents where a coordinated federal response is required. The ESF scheme provides a modular structure for identifying the precise components that can best address the requirements of a particular incident.³⁵ The new strategy development framework being developed by S/CRS, which includes the delineation of Major Mission Elements, has some features similar to the ESF approach.³⁶

Challenges for the Interagency Process and the Way Ahead.

Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.

Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld

There's nothing wrong with [doing] nation-building, but not when it is done by the American military.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

The interagency planning effort that began with PDD-56 and continues to evolve and strengthen is focused on the development of the ends (the strategic objectives) and the ways (how to accomplish those ends). But without the means (capabilities and capacities to execute the plan), the planning effort is nugatory. The major cause of poor performance in complex interagency operations is the lack of adequate means; as one security analyst has noted, "The real shortfall in the interagency process is the lack of adequate capacity to conduct operations outside Washington."³⁷

There are only two sources for the capabilities and expertise needed to bring to bear all of the elements of power to help right a failed state: civilian and military. However, most civilian agencies in the U.S. Government lack rapidly deployable experts and capabilities. Civilian agencies lack an operational culture and organization; consequently, even if tasked to perform a critical mission, they lack the personnel who are trained and ready for these missions. They also lack the authorities and resources to rapidly deploy them and to quickly establish programs in the field.³⁸ Findings from a Post-Conflict Strategic Requirements Workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College concluded that the lack of quick response capability

by civilian agencies would ensure that the military would have to bear the brunt of all essential tasks in a stabilization and reconstruction operation.³⁹ The lack of civilian partners creates mission creep, as military personnel conduct tasks for which they are ill-suited or ill-prepared. It is precisely this concern with mission creep that made the military such eager partners with the PDD-56 effort. As one study has noted, the military has always been a partner that cannot afford to forget its primary mission—defending the nation:

Incomplete or failed integration of non-DoD agencies into the development of strategy and plans for responding to complex contingencies [could] also result in demands for the military to perform tasks outside its range of skills and competencies. Deficiencies in the interagency process could extend the military's involvement in an intervention beyond the need for unique military personnel and assets to cope with the complex emergency.⁴⁰

DoD, on the other hand, has the capability and certainly the capacity to deploy that capability virtually anywhere on the globe almost overnight. But there is a cultural bias on the part of the military, nicely summed up by Colin Powell while still Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Let me begin by giving a tutorial about what an armed force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have the mission to fight and win the nation's wars. Because we are able to fight and win the nation's wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these other new missions

that are coming along—peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief—you name it, we can do it. . . . But we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of the focus of why you have armed forces—to fight and win the nation’s wars.⁴¹

Because of the lower priority of lesser contingencies, the Army has planned poorly for stabilization operations and is not properly resourced or structured to handle these increasingly relevant missions. One study prior to 9/11 noted that “neither budgets nor forces have been designed to take into account the sober fact that during the last decade any major deployment of military force to resolve a crisis . . . has ended by creating new long-term force requirements to keep the situation stabilized. . . .”⁴² A more recent study draws the same general conclusion that the Army mortgaged its ability to conduct stability operations and deliver the required enduring results. Also worrisome is the claim that the Army’s projected Modular Force transformation in effect discounts the importance of stabilization operations, and fails to provide the modular and scalable force pool of stabilization capabilities that are required.⁴³

DoD seems a little schizophrenic on the issue. On the one hand, it has recently issued DoD Directive 3000.05 “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” which explicitly defines stability operations as a core U.S. military mission to be given priority comparable to combat operations.⁴⁴ At the same time, in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), DoD presents a strong case that resources should come from the increasing interagency and coalition partner capacities. An example would be the effort to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stabilization and reconstruction capability

and a European constabulary force.⁴⁵ There is certainly nothing wrong with encouraging partners to do more, with burden-sharing having long been a divisive element of our alliance politics. But this suggestion was from former Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who some have claimed supported a strategy of nation-building “lite,” involving a rapid transition to local control.⁴⁶

Efforts to create expeditionary civilian capability have proliferated recently. One of the first was the call for a postwar Reserve Corps in legislation sponsored by Senator Richard G. Lugar. The intent is to deploy civilian experts in civil affairs, law enforcement, engineering, economic development, and government operations as quickly as possible after the fighting ends, thus allowing U.S. military forces to be withdrawn sooner.⁴⁷ Another proposal is the Active Response Corps, a State Department effort to increase the surge capacity within the Department to support stabilization and reconstruction missions. The initial goal is to expand this capability to 30 personnel by the end of 2007.⁴⁸ These efforts should not be belittled. Capacity from any source is to be welcomed, but efforts that provide such small increments of capability may generate more difficulty deploying, integrating, and sustaining them than they are worth. In addition, the stance taken by the Defense Science Board seems on track in this regard when it concluded that “the rest of the Executive Branch has made very little progress toward the development of operational capabilities applicable to stability operations; and the Congress has not provided Departments other than Defense with appropriate authorities and resources in order to develop these capabilities.”⁴⁹

The capability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction operations resides predominantly in the military. “The creation of greater civilian nation-

building capacity would not let the armed forces off the hook,” military historian Max Boot has observed. “No matter how much civilian management improves,” he continues, “the bulk of the manpower for any nation-building assignment would still have to come from the Pentagon. The armed forces need to do a much better job of preparing for such work. . . .”⁵⁰ The military has civil affairs, engineers, military police, medics, and the full gamut of logistical expertise. This expertise is organized and prepared to rapidly deploy and is equipped to operate in the dangerous conditions between peace and war that often characterize stabilization and reconstruction operations. Eventually the operation can transition to civilian capability, but only after security has been established, largely as a result of the early and effective deployment of military forces organized for the stabilization and reconstruction mission. DoD Directive 3000.05 explicitly places a priority on stability operations and capabilities, meaning the military’s long-standing cultural aversion to the use of U.S. military power for nation-building should no longer be a factor. The QDR recognizes the need to rebalance the mix of joint capabilities and forces. This rebalancing effort should be in the direction of creating robust stabilization and reconstruction forces along the lines originally proposed by the National Defense University (NDU) study on *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. This study called for the organization of two stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) division equivalents within the U.S. military that would plan, develop doctrine, train, and exercise for S&R missions.⁵¹ The details of the organization are open to debate, but the need for a dedicated capability within the military also corresponds with the strategic argument put forward by Thomas Barnett in the *The Pentagon’s New Map*

(2004). Barnett presents a convincing case that the United States needs to transform toward a bifurcated military: one that specializes in high-tech, big-violence war, and one that specializes in relatively low-tech security generation and routine crisis response.⁵²

Conclusion.

Trends in the global security environment suggest that stabilization and reconstruction operations are likely to be a major component of U.S. strategy in the coming decades. Success in these operations requires what the QDR refers to as “unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all of the elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.”⁵³ Unified statecraft obviously implies interagency collaboration, and thus the planning framework originally presented by PDD-56 and since modified will continue to be of prime importance. The military aspects of the framework will also likely endure as the military planning culture will continue to drive the planning process toward acceptable and feasible ways to accomplish the interagency-derived national objectives.

The most robust planning procedure will not result in success unless the necessary means are available to execute the plan. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are so distinct from warfighting operations that they require special organizations and capabilities. The military will always be the predominant supplier of these capabilities, and it will require a cultural change on the part of the military to fully accept the dictates of DoD Directive 3000.05, which puts stability operations on the same level as “fighting and winning

our nation's wars." DoD and the Army will need to develop programs, organizations, and plans to be more effective in the stabilization and reconstruction environment. PDD-56 represents a glass half full concerning successful interagency operations. Its realistic planning framework needs to be coupled with adequate and dedicated means to top off the glass and allow the United States to be successful in this new and complex security environment.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

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CHAPTER 3

A “PEACE CORPS WITH GUNS”: CAN THE MILITARY BE A TOOL OF DEVELOPMENT?

H. Allen Irish

The violent politics of the 20th century was dominated by great powers, states like Nazi Germany or the former USSR that were too strong. Today, it is instead weak or failing states that are the source of international troubles like poverty, disease, refugees, human rights abuses, and, as has been vividly clear since September 11, 2001, terrorism.¹

Francis Fukuyama

In the aftermath of what at first appeared to be successful and relatively painless “regime changes,” the unanticipated demands of stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of major combat operations, as well as the strategic consequences of possible post-conflict failure, have become painfully evident. As a result, the national security community has devoted substantial intellectual energy to analyzing the challenges inherent in the aftermath of conflict and developing new organizations, doctrine, and techniques to address them.

At the same time, similar strategic challenges that exist at the other end of the conflict spectrum—those occurring before conflict—have received somewhat less attention.² A cursory review of the recent conflicts in which the United States has chosen or been forced to intervene reveals that nearly all have roots in

instability and a lack of economic and social maturity that consigned those nations to the status of “fragile states.”³ Many scholars have suggested that the biggest challenges the United States and the international community face in this century are those posed by the failure of much of the world to achieve a level of stability that is typically an outcome of development.⁴

Although the United States and most other mature societies devote substantial resources to bilateral and multilateral initiatives to further the economic and societal development of fragile states, the U.S. military has had relatively little involvement in international development and has generally not sought a greater role in such activities. In part, this reflects the view of many military and civilian actors either that there is no appropriate role for the military in international development or that involvement of military personnel in such activities should be an exceptional occurrence. This author argues, however, that increased military involvement in support of this strategic objective as part of a “whole of government” approach would not only further the interests of all parties, including—and particularly—the military itself, but would enhance the military’s capacity to handle the more difficult challenges of post-conflict reconstruction.

The Strategic Importance of International Development.

International development in a form that is recognizable today began in the aftermath of World War II, primarily in support of European reconstruction.⁵ Although initiatives such as the Marshall Plan focused on postwar reconstruction, they contained many of the elements that later became common in most assistance programs, such as a focus on economic development.

Gradually, as Western Europe and Japan recovered in the war's aftermath, the focus of such programs shifted to countries that had never achieved industrialization or developed a market economy, particularly the nations that emerged from the European colonial empires to achieve independence during the generation following World War II.⁶

As the theory and practice of international development have matured, our approach has evolved significantly, with less emphasis on centrally controlled, large-scale "macro" projects, such as dams and large industrial facilities, and more on dispersed "micro" projects.⁷ As one development practitioner observed, "The primary trajectory [of international development] has been along a path that began with centrally-planned, state-dominated strategies to market-led polycentric approaches with the state as coordinator and regulator rather than as the sole or predominant actor."⁸ However, there is no consensus among development agencies and practitioners on how best to succeed, and, particularly in view of the failure of many development schemes to ameliorate intractable poverty in many developing nations, many observers have concluded that international development, as currently practiced, often does more harm than good.⁹

In light of the mixed success of international efforts to promote economic and social development outside the Western democracies, many have questioned not only the efficacy of U.S. efforts, but also the appropriateness of pursuing such goals with taxpayer dollars. Indeed, what is the strategic rationale for doing so? The *National Security Strategy* (NSS) establishes global economic and social development not merely as a worthy goal, but as a national objective. As the NSS notes, "Helping the world's poor is a strategic priority

and a moral imperative. Economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected.”¹⁰ In the same vein, the most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) argues that “by alleviating suffering and dealing with crises in their early stages, U.S. forces help prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis. They also demonstrate the goodwill and compassion of the United States.”¹¹

This is not merely empty rhetoric—the United States has historically devoted considerable national treasure on behalf of this policy objective. As noted by former U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator Randall Tobias, “The United States’ FY 2008 State and USAID foreign assistance request is \$20.3 billion, a \$2.2 billion or 12 percent increase over FY 2006 enacted levels. Given current budget pressures, this increase reflects the importance this Administration places on foreign assistance, not just as a moral obligation to alleviate suffering, but as a foundation of our national security strategy.”¹²

The Military’s Historical Involvement in Development.

Although they have not generally viewed them as central to their mission, the armed forces, particularly the Army, have long been involved in activities that fall within the ambit of “development.” Like Molière’s “Bourgeois Gentleman,” who was surprised to learn he had been speaking in prose, military actors have been involved in conducting development assistance without being aware that they were doing so.

The Army itself was established and funded in large part to assist in the nation’s economic development,

particularly along the country's western frontier as it advanced toward the Pacific. The 19th century Army took the lead in accomplishing such nation-building tasks as exploration, road construction, compilation of scientific records, aiding overland travelers, and improving river transportation. Army posts fostered settlement by providing security. In the absence of a mature civil service, soldiers often provided basic governmental services such as mail delivery, agricultural support, and maintaining weather records.¹³ These activities were not incidental to the Army's mission, but the result of a fully considered policy and rationale for maintaining a regular army of any size.¹⁴

As the United States became increasingly engaged in overseas conflicts, it fostered efforts to improve conditions in countries where the military operated and, when the United States was an occupying power, often did so beyond minimalist legal and moral requirements. As one study observed, "The American officers in control of Havana, Manila, and other cities occupied by the Army engaged in efforts to promote public health, judicial reform, tax equalization, honest government, and public education. . . ." ¹⁵ While some of the impetus for these activities was to support counterinsurgency efforts, much of it reflected the progressive and reformist American character.¹⁶

This pattern of military involvement in development activities, such as providing improved infrastructure, governance, education, etc., continued during and after numerous conflicts, including World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and those in Central America.¹⁷ Particularly in the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan, our efforts went far beyond those required by international law, reflecting a fundamental

desire to remake those societies more in our image. In Vietnam, in particular, fostering that country's development was a key component of U.S. strategy. This led to the establishment of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which supported the goal of fostering South Vietnam's economic and social development as a principal means of defeating the Viet Cong insurgency by capturing the populace's "hearts and minds."¹⁸

In the aftermath of Vietnam, however, counter-insurgency and stability operations fell from favor, and the Army put relatively little concerted effort into maintaining doctrine and capabilities. Even so, virtually every contingency operation beginning with Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada confronted the military with the need to address post-conflict economic, governance, rule of law, and other development challenges.¹⁹ Despite this, political and military leaders invariably continued to view these tasks as exceptions to the rule that the military does not do "nation-building." As a result, the military typically addressed these post-conflict challenges in an improvised, ad hoc manner.

The inevitable requirement to address fundamentally political questions in such operations further exacerbated this reluctance to develop post-conflict doctrine and capabilities.²⁰ Even the inadequate planning for post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq was founded on the assumption that the duration of the uniformed military's role in the reconstruction of those countries would be brief, and that civilian agencies would assume responsibility in short order.

In the Aftermath of Afghanistan and Iraq: A New Reality.

Well-documented difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the initial maneuver phases of the wars have focused new attention on post-conflict operations and their critical nature. The President issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), which designated the State Department as lead agency for such operations, instructing it to “prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities” in coordination with other executive branch agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD).²¹ The directive instructs the interagency “to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.”²² The principle underlying this approach is that such states must not come to be “used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”

This policy directive, along with DoD’s new directive on stability operations, has generally been interpreted as a reaction to deficiencies in post-conflict capabilities exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan.²³ However, this policy guidance has implications for the U.S. military and the foreign policy apparatus that go well beyond operations following major combat. The central operating premise of U.S. foreign policy has always been that deterring conflict is preferable to having to deal with it once it has broken out. Given that fragile and unstable states are viewed not only as the primary locus of conflict in the world but also as the principal source of terrorism and other asymmetrical

threats, the imperative to mitigate such instability and fragility is obvious. While the NSS, as well as NSPD-44, acknowledges the need to foster the development of such states as a means of reducing that threat, the means of doing so and the division of labor among the instruments of national power is unclear.

If one accepts the premise that furthering the development of fragile and unstable states enhances U.S. national security and is an appropriate national objective, what is the appropriate role for DoD and, in particular, the uniformed military? Given that the military's participation in international development has heretofore largely been peripheral, would increasing its involvement be desirable from the perspective of either the military or the development community?²⁴ Let us examine these issues.

From the military's perspective, it has generally viewed involvement in stability operations, including humanitarian or development activities, as, at best, a distraction from core warfighting competencies.²⁵ Operation DESERT STORM's rapid, high-intensity conventional operations, followed by prompt redeployment, represented the military's preferred mode of employment. Despite this preference, in the years following DESERT STORM, an unwelcome reality asserted itself. The nation called upon the military, particularly the Army, to undertake a virtually continuous series of unconventional or peacekeeping operations of one kind or another, including Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As one writer noted,

This trend was a source of great angst among senior military leaders and aggravated [their] long-standing cultural aversion to the use of U.S. military power for nation-building. These operations represented everything military commanders hope to avoid: extended and open-ended deployments, ambiguous political and military objectives, no clear signs of military victory, and

indifference among Americans at home for their sacrifice. The increasing frequency of these missions around the world, however, was dismissed as an aberration rather than a forewarning of the future security environment and the role of America's Army.²⁶

More significantly, the nongovernmental development community has, for its own reasons, expressed concern about military involvement in development or relief operations and has promoted international guidelines that disfavor such involvement.²⁷ This is somewhat grounded in legal and moral concerns, but is also likely to have been motivated by a generalized antimilitary disposition in many development organizations and partly by apprehension about the emergence of another "competitor" entering the fray.²⁸

Regardless of what may motivate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to oppose military involvement in relief and development activities, the principal rationale they offer for doing so is contained within the concept of "humanitarian space." In this view, humanitarians adhere to a fundamentally different set of principles than do military or governmental actors (primarily neutrality and impartiality). Because they do not seek to achieve a governmental or political objective, they seek operational independence, or humanitarian space, in which to accomplish their work.²⁹ Indeed, many relief and development organizations steadfastly oppose the use of the term "humanitarian" in reference to military actions, or even those of governmental organizations.³⁰ Such organizations premise their particular use of the term "humanitarian" on the requirement for such organizations to maintain a strictly neutral posture, providing aid to any who need it without reference to political consideration.³¹

Military and other governmental organizations that are involved in development and relief activities do so not out of altruism or individual benevolence on the part of the individuals involved. Rather, they intend their efforts to support in some manner U.S. foreign policy objectives. As noted by USAID official Michael Miklaucic,

For a variety of reasons, [humanitarian] space—which provides a comfort zone for contemporary humanitarian and development workers—is shrinking. In particular, we at USAID can no longer find comfort in this declining neutral space—because since 9/11 U.S. foreign assistance has been aligned closely and self-consciously with U.S. foreign policy, and U.S. national security policy in particular.

Miklaucic goes on to state,

Although this may appear to be an anomaly related to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in fact consistent with the history of U.S. foreign assistance. Since the Marshall Plan was established in 1947 U.S. foreign assistance has been an element of U.S. national security policy. The first recipients of Marshall Plan assistance were not the defeated and destroyed axis countries or our closest World War II allies, but rather Greece and Turkey, which were both facing internal communist threats. As the Cold War emerged U.S. foreign assistance was often used to shore up allied countries in the developing world to keep them from alliance with the Soviet Union.³²

The observation that the United States promotes development, at least in part, to further its own national security objectives neither implies nor concedes that such relief activities or development projects are in any way morally or practically inferior to those delivered by humanitarian organizations. However, with regard to the contention by NGOs and others that aid given to

advance political ends—particularly that provided to help achieve tactical military objectives—is somehow not “humanitarian,” it is important to consider whether political motivation of the part of the benefactor either taints the aid in the eyes of the recipient or vitiates its humanitarian effect.³³

Although, as noted, Congress provides USAID with substantial budgetary resources, USAID is, in contrast to DoD, an extremely small agency in personnel terms, and its personnel have little, if any, role in the direct provision of development assistance provided by it. Rather, its role is more properly characterized as management and oversight.³⁴ It actually delivers virtually all of its development assistance through so-called “implementing partners.” These are frequently NGOs whom USAID either hires as contractors to accomplish specific tasks or funds through cooperative agreements or grants.³⁵ The Agency has traditionally accomplished its work through a relatively decentralized process conducted with great autonomy by local USAID missions, although that is changing somewhat.³⁶ In contrast, to the extent that military personnel have been involved in development assistance, they have largely done so either as direct providers or through hiring local national contractors.³⁷

Toward Full-spectrum Stability Operations?

Afghanistan and Iraq have persuaded the military as well as most international organizations and NGOs that they must—albeit reluctantly—accept that military forces will necessarily be present and be engaged in development-like activities in the aftermath of war. For most in the military, as well as other national security agencies such as the State Department and USAID, the context in which this new emphasis on stability

operations has developed has led to a general conflation of stability operations with “post-conflict” operations.³⁸ The new DoD directive on stability operations appears to reflect, to some degree, that assumption. Although it defines “stability operations” as those “military and civilian activities conducted *across the spectrum from peace to conflict* to establish or maintain order in states and regions (emphasis added), most of its references to specific tasks characterize them in such terms as “rebuilding” or “reviving.”³⁹

Given the historical disinclination on the part of all parties to employ military forces to accomplish such tasks other than incidentally to the aftermath of combat or during peacekeeping operations, is there, and should there be, a significant stability operations role for military actors in preconflict settings? This question is particularly provocative in cases where the military would be working in support of civilian agencies already conducting development assistance activities. Certainly, greater military involvement in development outside of post-conflict settings would be controversial among NGOs and civilian agencies.

Absent the compelling factor of large numbers of personnel performing traditional military roles, civilian organizations would view a larger military role in development with suspicion, particularly since to the extent the development community has reluctantly accepted military involvement in relief and development activities, it has done so primarily in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴⁰ Even so, the concept of any military involvement in “humanitarian” work or acting as a direct provider of aid, even in those situations, remains controversial among NGOs. However, while many civilian organizations acknowledge the need for military involvement in a post-conflict context, they

generally maintain their opposition to the military acting as a direct provider of aid.⁴¹ Given that much of the development community would have misgivings about greater military involvement in development in other-than-post-conflict settings, it is important to consider whether the advantages of such involvement would outweigh such potential opposition. Finally, assuming greater military involvement in this area is indeed desirable, in what manner would the U.S. foreign assistance framework best incorporate military assets?

Although DoD has historically consumed the lion's share of the national security budget, the situation is quite different when looking only at the foreign assistance component. The majority of the State Department's Fiscal Year 2008 budget request of approximately \$36 billion goes to Bilateral Economic Assistance.⁴² In contrast, DoD currently spends a very small amount on comparable programs directed toward humanitarian assistance and development, such as the roughly \$103 million requested for the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program in its FY08 budget.⁴³ Comparing budgets, however, does not reveal the fundamental difference in how the agencies approach this issue.

As previously noted, USAID conducts most development activities through third parties, and its role, and indeed that of the United States which underwrites the assistance, is presumably less important than the beneficial effect of the assistance itself.⁴⁴ The U.S. Government, as benefactor, is presumably content to empower other organizations, which typically have their own agendas and organizational objectives, on the premise that doing the good deed is more important than getting the credit.⁴⁵

DoD, on the other hand, typically conducts its small-scale humanitarian/development activities, such as OHDACA or the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), either in support of the combined forces commander (e.g., Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan) or as a component of a larger theater security cooperation program (TSCP) conducted by a Combatant Commander. Because the stated purpose of TSCP, in particular, is engagement with military and civilian authorities, there is logically more focus on its public diplomacy aspects—the interaction with the local government and the people themselves.⁴⁶ In TSCP doctrinal terms, these activities support the “shaping of perceptions” and “building of relationships with friends and allies.”⁴⁷

This distinction between the work of development agencies, where development itself is the primary objective (the “end” in an ends-ways-means construct), and the work of military forces, where the primary objective is to engage with the host nation's society or government, perhaps suggests that the military should emphasize the public diplomacy benefits more so than the development outcome itself.⁴⁸ In public diplomacy, receiving the credit for a positive development outcome is indeed the strategic objective.⁴⁹ This is a false dichotomy, however, since both the development outcome and the communications effect are strategic in nature. But despite the two-fold benefit that could result from using military assets in development activities, the Combatant Commands have not widely done so, other than incorporating rudimentary humanitarian assistance activities, such as medical inoculations, into theater security cooperation programs.⁵⁰

Synchronizing the Three “Ds.”

The United States has heretofore failed to exploit fully all the capabilities it can bring to bear on the task of fostering development around the world. In light of the strategic requirement to strengthen fragile states in order to prevent them from becoming failed states, the United States should not only apply all of the relevant instruments of national power to this task, but should also do so in a coordinated and synchronized way. In this regard, Canada’s approach to this issue can be instructive.

Canada, as a small nation, cannot duplicate U.S. military or diplomatic capabilities, but, like the Nordic countries, it has chosen to exercise influence through such initiatives as peacekeeping. In keeping with this policy preference, Canada has held responsibility for the operation of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan since August 2005. It is in that context that Canada’s “3-Ds” – defense, development, and diplomacy – approach has manifested itself.⁵¹ This strategy, also characterized as the “whole of government” strategy, essentially seeks to integrate and utilize these three principal elements of national power to achieve strategic objectives. This concept is not entirely new, resembling in some ways the emerging approach to effects-based operations, which seeks to expand the planning and conduct of operations from a predominantly force-oriented, military-on-military approach to one that incorporates all elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic, or DIME) and directs them against an adversary’s nodes using system-of-systems PMESII analysis.⁵²

The Netherlands is employing a similar approach in its Afghanistan role. The Dutch, who operate a PRT in

Uruzgan Province, have consciously adopted the 3Ds approach.⁵³ A recent conference held in the Netherlands on this topic issued an excellent compilation of the elements of the 3Ds approach. These recommendations set out an integrated and collaborative approach to development that emphasizes interagency cooperation and specifically urges against organizational stove-piping. Additionally, the Netherlands organizes its PRTs around the central proposition, "Be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary."⁵⁴

This approach, even as adopted by countries that have traditionally had less contentious relationships with the development community than has the United States, has raised concerns among NGOs. For example, the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) expressed a familiar NGO doubt about the implications of the new "integrated" model for "international cooperation in situations of conflict." In the CCIC's view, "Integration of humanitarian assistance within military and foreign policy challenges fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence, and threatens the effectiveness of life-saving assistance."⁵⁵

In the U.S. approach to integrating the three "Ds," however, the dynamic between civilian and military elements has all too often been one of competition, not cooperation. For example, although the coalition had established a relatively successful template for PRTs in Afghanistan (with military commanders augmented and supported by civilians), when the concept was proposed for Iraq, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice strongly advocated that Iraqi PRTs be led and predominantly staffed by State Department civilians, particularly in the operational and functional positions, but the process has been marked by interagency

disputes.⁵⁶ By all accounts, the performance of PRTs in Iraq has been deficient.

For example, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Stewart Bowen, issued this evaluation of Iraq PRTs:

As reported during numerous interviews with civilian officials and military officers directly involved with managing the PRT program, a basic problem had been the poor working relationship between the [Embassy's National Coordination Team] and [military] elements. Contributing factors included [State's] inability to fill staff positions; program leadership and control issues, including employment of civil affairs assets; and disagreement over the PRT mission.⁵⁷

This reference (along with many others) to the problems with State-led PRTs in Iraq is not intended to apportion blame between the State and Defense Departments, but rather to highlight how far the United States must go to build interagency cooperation and implement a true 3-Ds approach.⁵⁸

Given such recent difficulties in integrating the 3-Ds in a post-conflict environment, is there hope that these capabilities can be successfully applied to preconflict challenges in a way that takes advantage of the comparative advantages of each element of national power? Indeed, given a historical lack of enthusiasm on the part of both DoD and Department of State (DoS) for pursuing a "whole of government" approach to stability operations, do military assets possess special capabilities that provide them a comparative advantage in development activities?

There are indeed several important advantages that the military possesses in a post-conflict setting that apply throughout the entire spectrum of conflict:

military personnel are subject to military discipline, can be involuntarily mobilized and deployed to insecure environments, and have the capability to operate independently once there. That it is difficult to require civilian personnel—including Foreign Service officers—to serve for extended periods in unpleasant and dangerous settings is the major impediment to a larger civilian role in stability operations.⁵⁹ Secretary Rice has adopted as one of her major initiatives the concept of “transformational diplomacy.” Among other things, transformational diplomacy seeks to reposition State Department employees away from European capitals to places where their skills are needed more.⁶⁰ To date, however, for a variety of reasons, it is unlikely that significant numbers of civilians (whether from DoS or other agencies) could be involuntarily dispatched to insecure pre- or post-conflict arenas.⁶¹

An Operational Concept for a Military Role in Development.

With the acknowledged strategic goals of fostering international development and poverty reduction, it makes no sense to abstain from using the most robust element of national power assuming there is enough of it. Given that using military resources could have synergistic effects by both promoting development and creating a full range of political, military, and economic effects, under what operational concept could military assets be employed? The military possesses a number of quite relevant capabilities, some of which have self-evident application in stability operations in general and development in particular.⁶² Specifically, engineers and medical units have robust capabilities that they have applied to developing infrastructure and delivering humanitarian medical

services. To the extent that warfighting requirements permit, such assets can be (and have been) deployed in support of U.S. engagement with developing nations.⁶³ However, in addition to units with capabilities that can translate from warfighting to development, the Army and Marines both maintain a relatively robust civil affairs capability fundamentally designed for stability operations, including having doctrinal capabilities that explicitly support development activities.⁶⁴

Despite these capabilities, military assets in general and civil affairs units in particular, have not been extensively utilized in Phase 0 stability operations. A number of organizational, conceptual, and legal factors are responsible for this under-utilization.⁶⁵ Much of the relevant force, particularly for civil affairs, resides in the Reserve component, and many commanders view it as difficult to access, particularly for other than short-duration training deployments.⁶⁶ Additionally, although Combatant Command (COCOM) staffs have some level of civil-military expertise and typically have habitual relationships with reserve civil affairs organizations, this organizational construct has not heretofore resulted in large numbers of detailed, executable civil affairs plans that are focused on development activities.

There are a number of other structural and conceptual problems that have impeded using civil affairs and similar forces to support development activities. The way in which USAID has traditionally accomplished its development assistance mission has frequently not meshed well with DoD's highly centralized and detailed planning and execution culture. Well-staffed COCOM's have responsibility for all military operations taking place in large geographic areas, while international development is highly

decentralized, with the U.S. Ambassador, USAID mission chief, and other members of the country team directing activities in their country. That the U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance has only recently put in place a requirement that, for the first time, country teams develop plans in conformance with a national-level strategic framework highlights how fragmented foreign assistance has traditionally been.⁶⁷

Those familiar with military planning processes would undoubtedly be astonished to learn that we have heretofore conducted a strategically important and costly governmental function like foreign assistance without formal strategic guidance or a requirement for detailed planning. Indeed, because of their fundamentally different structures and ways of pursuing U.S. foreign policy objectives, effecting the critical connections between Defense and State in planning, coordination, and execution of specific projects has often been difficult.⁶⁸

This disconnect is particularly problematic in that most discrete TSCP activities are generated through a system under which the U.S. ambassador requests military support, whether for military-to-military activities or otherwise.⁶⁹ Although the assignment of an Office of Military Cooperation or attaché to the country team adequately supports traditional security assistance activities, there is generally no comparable established mechanism to integrate military capabilities into development planning or execution.

Beyond these structural problems, many argue that such development activities are not a core military competency, and that there is neither a need for nor a comparative advantage to using military assets in that capacity. While that observation might well be true of traditional warfighters, the presence of special purpose

units, particularly civil affairs, which are doctrinally capable of supporting development, undercuts this contention.⁷⁰ Indeed, the relevance of civil affairs to a development mission is reflected in the fact that its personnel frequently refer to themselves as a “peace corps with guns.” Moreover, employing civil affairs and similar assets in support of country development strategies not only brings additional capabilities to bear, but also has the important collateral benefit of providing engaged participants, particularly those from special purpose forces, with much needed experience.⁷¹

As part of the transformational diplomacy initiative to reform how the United States conducts foreign assistance, the State Department is proposing to implement, at least in theory, a “whole of government” approach.⁷² Although post-conflict challenges engendered new DoD policy support for stability operations, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will eventually wane. Given the strategic importance of reducing poverty and fostering development, it would be regrettable if DoD, as it did after Vietnam, seeks to avoid these challenges and return to business as usual following the current conflicts.⁷³ Despite only intermittent and unfocused use of the military in support of international development efforts in the past, this area is ripe for greater utilization of military – particularly civil affairs – forces.

Conclusion.

Given that the importance of improving conditions in lagging parts of the world, such as Africa, is not seriously disputed, why is the United States not pursuing, or at least seriously considering, a

“whole of government” approach to development?⁷⁴ Unfortunately, the disputes over roles and responsibilities in international relations have proven to be an impediment to cooperation. DoD is seeking new authorities to conduct operations that State views as infringing on its primacy in conducting foreign affairs, such as an expansion of DoD’s recently gained authorities under Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act and its efforts to gain additional authorities.⁷⁵ While appropriate new authority for DoD to conduct its operations, including humanitarian operations, is necessary and useful, interagency cooperation, rather than competition, between DoS and DoD would further both their interests.

There have been reports of unhappiness at the ambassadorial level as well.⁷⁶ Senator Richard Lugar’s committee conducted an examination of this issue during the last Congress and found a number of areas in which there was friction between State and Defense.⁷⁷ Obviously, antagonism between these important agencies is counterproductive and must be avoided or at least minimized. A role for the military in international development will be, by necessity, small, and this chapter does not advocate a primary role for the military, or even for civil affairs forces. However, given that the military will inevitably conduct such operations in post-conflict settings or peacekeeping operations, participation in Phase 0 operations will provide the experience and understanding to its specialized troops that they need in order to accomplish these difficult tasks effectively. The “whole of government” approach logically applies at all points of the conflict spectrum. Although the military often speaks of “force multipliers,” the counterproductive focus on who is in charge of stability operations quite clearly fails to qualify as one.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Francis Fukuyama, "The Art of Reconstruction," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 28, 2004, p. A`12.

2. Current military doctrine divides military activities into six phases beginning with Phase 0 and extending through Phase 5 (the six phases are characterized as follows: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority). The focus of this chapter will be on activities that would be conducted during the shaping phase (Phase 0). U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006, p. xxi. Joint doctrine instructs Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) to

shape their [areas of responsibility] through theater security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. TSCPs (Theater Security Cooperation Plans) provide frameworks within which combatant commands engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, theater security cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention. Developmental actions enhance a host government's willingness and ability to care for its people.

Ibid., p. VII-1.

3. "Fragile state," as defined by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), refers generally to "a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states." However, as the trajectory of the state in question is more important than its relative position, USAID suggests that it is "more important to understand how far and quickly a country is moving from or toward stability than it is to categorize a state as failed or not. Therefore, the [USAID] strategy distinguishes between fragile states that are vulnerable from those that are already in crisis." "Vulnerable" refers to states "unable or unwilling to adequately

assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations and where the legitimacy of the government is in question." USAID also establishes a further category entitled states "in crisis," which refers to states "where the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory or is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory, where legitimacy of the government is weak or nonexistent, and where violent conflict is a reality or a great risk." *Fragile States Strategy*, Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2005, p. 1.

4. This observation is not intended to conflate stability with development, but the available scholarship suggests that progress in economic and social indices is strongly correlated with increased stability and vice versa. As former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios observed, "We all know that development assistance is only a means to an end, which is sustainable development based on economic growth. The key to growth is local private investment, and the keys to local private investment are political stability, good governance, and good business conditions." Andrew S. Natsios, "Keynote Address," lecture, Corporate Council on Africa, September 14, 2005, www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6GLNRB?OpenDocument/, accessed April 27, 2007. Brookings Institution scholar Susan Rice goes a step further, arguing that poverty itself is a threat to national security, because it "dramatically increases the risk of civil conflict, and war zones provide ideal operating environments for international outlaws. Poverty [also] erodes weak states' capacity to control their territory and resources, creating vacuums easily exploited by transnational criminals and terrorists." Susan E. Rice, "The National Security Implications of Global Poverty," lecture, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, MI, January 30, 2006. For a review of the factors that have caused numerous nations in the so-called developing world to fall into failed or fragile state status, see Robert H. Dorff, "Democratization and Failed States," *Parameters*, No. 26, Summer 1996, pp. 17-31.

5. The Economic Assistance Act of 1948 established the Economic Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan). Public Law 472, 80th Cong., 2d sess, April 3, 1948. Over the 4 years of its formal operation, Congress appropriated \$13.3 billion for European recovery. The Brookings Institution, in ranking the U.S.

Government's "50 Greatest Endeavors of the Past Half Century," counted U.S. support to Western Europe's postwar economic recovery and its ensuing political stability as the greatest of the achievements listed. Brookings also notes two other key international financial instruments that would help in restoration that were established as part of the Bretton Woods agreement in July 1944: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now known as the World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States contributed nearly \$6 billion to the start-up of those institutions, an enormous sum at the time. See www.brookings.edu/gs/cps/research/projects/50ge/endeavors/europe.htm/, accessed May 7, 2007.

6. This chapter generally uses the term "developing nations" to refer to the unstable and/or lower income countries toward which the bulk of nonmilitary international assistance is directed. Others have advanced terms for poor and/or fragile states such as "the Rest" (William Easterly, note X), or Barnett's "The Non-Integrating Gap." Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, New York, NY: Berkeley Publishing Group, 2004, or "low income countries under stress" (The World Bank). The United Nations Development Program ranks nations in its Human Development Index according to such indices as health and access to education, with countries ranked as high, medium, or low in "human development." United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty, and the Global Water Crisis*, New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2006. In characterizing countries, it is important to recognize that low incomes and instability, while generally correlated, should not be conflated.

7. The discipline of development management is itself quite controversial. There are many theories and approaches to how a nation or a society "develops," and the practice is generally acknowledged to be more art than science. There is, in fact, no universally accepted term for the concept, which is variously identified as "development cooperation," "official development assistance," "foreign aid/assistance," etc. It is frequently referred to—sometimes disparagingly—as "nation-building."

8. D. W. Brinkerhoff and J. M. Brinkerhoff, "International Development Management: Definitions, Debates, and Dilemmas,"

Institute for Global and International Studies (IGIS), Working Paper Series, 2005, available at www.gwu.edu/~igis/Working%20Paper%203.pdf, accessed May 11, 2005.

9. There are many studies of shortcomings, fraud, and waste in development practice, along with recommendations for more effective approaches to international development. Among these is William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good*, New York, The Penguin Press, 2006; and Michael Maren, *The Road to Hell. The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity*, New York, The Free Press, 1997.

10. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006, p. 31.

11. Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, February 6, 2006, p. 12.

12. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, Testimony of Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID on FY2008 Foreign Assistance Budget, March 28, 2007.

13. See, for example, M. L. Tate, *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999; Forest G. Hill, "Government Engineering Aid to Railroads before the Civil War," *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer, 1951, p. 235.

14. Onewell-documented account of the military's involvement in nation-building west of the Appalachians indicates that the Army's development role "was not accident; it was policy." The author writes that

Secretary of War John Calhoun was a man with a broad continental vision who followed in the footsteps of Thomas Jefferson. Calhoun, in the War Department, was an articulate and forceful advocate of exploration, surveys, and improvements of transportation and

communication. His views were embodied in the General Survey Act of 1824, a law that authorized surveys for a national network of transportation routes and became the basis for the [Army Corps of] Engineers to get involved first in development of canals and wagon roads, and later in railroads.

Frank N. Schubert, "American Military History: Approaches and Issues," Paper presented at the Teaching American History program, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, Green Bay, WI, August 2003, p. 26, www.uwgb.edu/teachingushistory/images/pdfs/2003_lectures/schubert_essay.pdf, accessed April 27, 2007.

15. John M. Gates, *The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare* [book on-line], Wooster, OH: College of Wooster, 2002, accessed 20 April 2007, available from www.wooster.edu/history/jgates/book-contents.html/.

16. As Gates observed, "The initiation of all such [economic and social development] work could easily have been postponed until the inauguration of a civilian government, whether independent or colonial, and it certainly would have been deferred had officers not been imbued with reformist zeal comparable to that manifested by contemporary civilian activists." *Ibid.*, n. 8.

17. For a detailed account of military involvement in development activities, see James Dobbins *et al.*, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003, www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1753, accessed October 2, 2006. See also Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, in which he provides innumerable examples of military involvement in a wide variety of activities that fall within the ambit of development.

18. Civil affairs personnel in Vietnam, as part of this change in orientation, moved away from post-combat "restoration" activities and began to focus on "something closer to long-range 'development' concerns." Sandler, p. 360. Lieutenant General William Peers, the commander of I Field Force, also observed that merely minimizing the effects of the war on the populace was

not his real priority, but rather it was “building a society,” which he viewed as improving, among other things, South Vietnam’s “administrative establishment, the economy, the sociology, the education, and all of the things that really go into making up a living society.” *Ibid.*

19. For example, Lawrence Yates relates that during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the combined task force (CTF) conducted a number of unanticipated development activities, such as “reactivating the Somali police force, politically empowering local elders, [and] sanctioning various civic action projects.” In response, “civilian and military critics in the United States denounced these actions as ‘nation-building’ and ‘mission creep’.” However, CTF commander Lieutenant General Robert Johnston justified each of the controversial undertakings as a necessary step toward achieving his original mission. Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations*, 1789-2005, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006. The term “nation-building” is itself both a widely used and ill-defined term. Colonel William Rigby suggests that it “seems to be one of those terms that everyone understands yet no one can define.” He then characterizes it as

the sum of activities undertaken diplomatically, economically, militarily, and informationally to bring a failed state or nation to a position of independent capability to provide for its people in terms that are clearly understood by the international community. To wit, a peaceful society based on a respect for the rule of law, with a respect for human rights and political freedom, with a functioning representative government, sustainable economy, and safe basic infrastructure.

William A. Rigby, *Nation-Building: An Essential Army Task*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 7, 2003.

20. Even as senior military officers have been reluctant to become drawn into politically charged post-conflict operations, the military’s involvement in politically oriented tasks has likewise been contentious with many civilian leaders, who view it as being somehow inconsistent with civilian control of the military. As

Nadia Schadow observed, "US civilian leaders always have been reluctant to give the military control over governance tasks, which are fundamentally political in nature. The military's conduct of governance operations seemed to challenge the principle of civilian control over the military, an ideal fundamental to the creation of a standing American army." Nadia Schadow, "War and the Art of Governance," *Parameters*, Vol. 33, Autumn 2003, pp. 85-94. However, military actors implement policy decisions made by civilian leaders constantly, and the fact that the implementation involves tasks that might also be performed by civilian actors does not challenge the authority of civilian political leadership. This is analogous to the execution of many civil construction projects by the Army Corps of Engineers, activities that, in many countries, are conducted by civilian agencies. In short, no one seriously views the planning and construction of a dam for civilian purposes by a military agency as a challenge to civilian control of the military.

21. George W. Bush, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, Washington, DC, December 7, 2005.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

23. *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction, SSTR, Operations*, Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 28, 2005.

24. The "development community" includes not only USAID, but also various IOs and, in particular, NGOs. While these international organizations (IOs) and NGOs are independent entities, much of their funding comes from the U.S. Government. In particular, many NGOs have a relationship with USAID or other U.S. Government agencies under which they have been provided grants or engaged in contracts to perform certain tasks. As such, these "implementing partner" NGOs are functioning as agents of the United States.

25. This cultural bias in the military has been observed by Erik Swabb, who wrote,

there is a strong cultural bias in the military against irregular warfare. Many officers view it with apathy. Firefights are still put on a pedestal because they offer the truest test of a soldier's training and fulfill a certain image of combat. It is hard to attain the same level of pride in counterinsurgency where success often means avoiding the use of force. The attitude is still prevalent that "real soldiers" do not engage in civil affairs, even though it creates goodwill and yields information about insurgents.

Erik Swabb, "Train Soldiers to Win Hearts and Minds," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 20, 2006, p. 9.

26. Brian G. Watson, *Reshaping The Expeditionary Army To Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB621.pdf, accessed April 27, 2007.

27. As used in this chapter, the development community refers to a variety of NGOs, national Official Development Agencies (ODAs) such as USAID and the United Kingdom's Department for Foreign Development (DfID), and IOs and agencies focusing on development such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), along with International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. The so-called "Oslo Guidelines" provide that use of military assets in humanitarian actions should be considered a "last resort" and should be requested "only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only [where] the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset must therefore be unique in capability and availability." UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, New York, March 2003.

28. A number of studies have observed the "clash of cultures" between military forces and civilian NGO personnel. For example, military officers have historically viewed relief workers ". . . as young, liberal, even anti-military, academic and self-righteous, and who come to an area for a short time to 'do good' without

fully considering the consequences." Tjallie A. M. Scheltinga et al., "Cultural Conflict within Civil-Military Cooperation: A Case Study in Bosnia," *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*, Vol. 13, No.1, Spring 2005, p. 58. See also Donna Winslow, "Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises International," *Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 2002, www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol7_2/Winslow.htm, accessed April 25, 2007; Nicolas de Torrente, "Humanitarian NGOs Must Not Ally With Military," *European Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2006.

29. International legal scholar Daniel Warner expresses the concept of humanitarian space as that of "[i]mpartiality, neutrality, and independence [which] are predicated on separating the humanitarian from the political. One acts within the humanitarian space in the midst of, but separate from, the political." Daniel Warner, "The Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide," *International Review of the Red Cross*, No. 833, March 3, 1999, p. 109-118. Warner advances the theory that under the Realist tradition, as exemplified by Hobbes, Machiavelli, Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Kissinger, politics is required to be "dirty." According to Warner, this school believes that a "political" action "must be tainted since the very arena in which the action is taking place is fallen."

30. A typical recitation of this view was advanced by the NGO "Save The Children," which argued, in discussing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,

The fundamental distinction between relief operations conducted by military forces and humanitarian activities is the motive behind them, and the way in which this motivation governs the process of delivery. [NGOs] seek to deliver aid because people need it, and aim to do so in a manner that meets immediate needs while also maximizing longer-term prospects. Militaries undertake such action as a means of winning "hearts and minds," i.e., on the basis of whether the beneficiaries will be of political assistance.

Gerard McHugh and Lola Gostelow, *PRTs and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan*, London: Save the Children, 2004. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

Societies have set forth ten humanitarian principles in its *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief*. This widely accepted document, which currently has over 400 non-governmental signatories, emphasizes as its overarching principle that humanitarianism is neutral and impartial and is not to be politically motivated, www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/, accessed April 27, 2007.

31. The perceived conflict between these “humanitarian” principles and the pragmatic need to operate in the same space with military personnel engaged in similar activities has generated a great deal of angst among humanitarian and development NGOs. For example, in addressing the presence of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, the NGO Save the Children raises two principal concerns expressed by Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHAs) who are faced with the presence of PRTs in their space: “First, is [the principle of] opposition on the part of many NGHAs to a structural association between humanitarian and military entities. Second is practical opposition to the use, by military forces, of those relief activities, including ‘hearts and minds’ operations, that are similar to the work undertaken by humanitarian agencies.” *Ibid.*, p. 4.

32. Michael Miklaucic, “The Declining Neutral Space – USAID and the Military,” 2005 USAID Summer Seminar, Washington, DC, August 1, 2006, www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/session_080106.html/, accessed April 28, 2007.

33. This is not to suggest that political motivations cannot at times effectively render an activity something other than “humanitarian.” For example, if aid in some form is delivered to a local chief or other powerful person as a de facto bribe for his own selfish purposes, then the act, while potentially useful in gaining that person’s cooperation or acquiescence, cannot truly be considered humanitarian in nature. Of course, in corrupt societies, it is not unheard of that NGOs have sometimes made similar calculated payments in kind as a cost associated with being able to accomplish their own missions.

34. As the General Accounting Office has observed, “USAID has evolved from an agency in which U.S. direct-hire staff directly implemented development projects to one in which U.S. direct-

hire staff oversee the activities of contractors and grantees." In 2002, for example, USAID had only 681 "direct hires," i.e., actual employees of various descriptions working overseas, and actually had no personnel whatsoever in the majority of the countries where it provided assistance. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Strategic Workforce Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges.*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, August 2003. Moreover, USAID provides very little of its aid to recipient countries as direct budget or program support. As Steven Radelet explained,

During the 1970s and 1980s, a significant share of U.S. aid was [provided directly to recipient governments]. The United States moved away from this approach because of valid concerns that recipient governments were managing the money poorly, with poor accounting standards, weak or nonexistent auditing, widespread corruption, and other problems. This was especially the case during the period of widespread macroeconomic imbalances, large budget deficits, and runaway inflation that characterized most developing countries in the 1980s, when fiscal discipline was very weak.

Steven Radelet, "Strengthening U.S. Development Assistance," in Lael Brainard, ed., *Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.

35. U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: USAID Relies Heavily on Nongovernmental Organizations, but Better Data Needed to Evaluate Approaches, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2002.

36. USAID has recently begun a process under which most missions are being required to submit "operational plans" which detail how the mission intends to spend the money allocated to it. Parrie Henderson O'Keefe and Kevin Covert, "The New Foreign Assistance Framework: What Does It Mean for U.S. Government Implementing Partners?" presentation at Society for International Development, Washington, January 24, 2007, www.sidw.org/newfaframework, accessed April 15, 2007.

37. U.S. Central Command humanitarian assistance guidance provides that “DoD [humanitarian assistance] authorities are not grant authorities. While contracting out certain efforts may be appropriate, DoD’s role shall not be reduced to simply providing funding. At a minimum, U.S. forces will engage in preparing initial and final assessments, as well as conducting periodic monitoring and quality control of the project and work to ensure there is local recognition of DoD’s effort. Humanitarian Assistance Program Manager, U.S. Central Command, *Guidance for Planning and Execution of Humanitarian Assistance Programs in the United States Central Command Area of Responsibility*, January 23, 2006.

38. In the aftermath of initial operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been intense scrutiny both in the agencies and in various “think tanks,” such as the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, of how the government should be organized for stability operations. This has resulted in numerous conference reports, academic papers, etc. This chapter has previously discussed NSPD-44 and DoD Directive 3000.05. Additionally, in the aftermath of Iraq, the State Department established an organization to address shortcomings in interagency operations. That office, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, better known as S/CRS, is a small organization established to be a “crisis-response” coordinator, one which has a clear focus on post-conflict operations and is not designed or intended to address stability operations in other than post-conflict settings. Its stated mission is “to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm/, accessed April 25, 2007.

39. Specified stability operations tasks include helping to “rebuild indigenous institutions . . . revive or build the private sector,” and “develop representative governmental institutions. DoD Directive 3000.05, para. 4.3.

40. In those places, it is important to note, not only has a relatively small proportion of the total force taken on such roles as its *primary* function, but the security situation is so problematic

that it would have been virtually impossible for civilian providers to fill the void that would exist if the military had not undertaken that role.

41. For example, while the Oslo Guidelines direct that “humanitarian work, in support of the United Nations . . . *should be performed by humanitarian organizations*,” it goes on to state that “[i]nsofar as military organizations have a role to play in supporting humanitarian work, it should, to the extent possible, *not encompass direct assistance*, in order to retain a clear distinction between the normal functions and roles of humanitarian and military stakeholders, emphasis added.” “Direct assistance” is defined as “face-to-face distribution of goods and services.” *Oslo Guidelines*, p. 3.

42. Over \$20 billion of the State Department’s FY 2008 Budget request is comprised of various programs characterized as “Department of State and USAID Bilateral Economic Assistance,” with another \$1.5 billion allocated to “Multilateral Economic Assistance.” These accounts contain a number of substantial items that are clearly not development-focused, such as \$4.5 billion requested for Foreign Military Financing (FMF). However, the assistance portion of the budget is large in comparison to the amount requested for operations, given that the Department is requesting only \$5 billion to operate embassies and consulates worldwide.

43. Office of the Under Secretary Of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates – FY 2008*. www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2008_greenbook.pdf, accessed April 24, 2008. Also, there is a nearly \$1 billion request for funding of the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program, CERP, in the FY08 Global War on Terror Request, but the CERP concept has not yet been extended beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/2008_Budget_Rollout_Attachment.pdf, accessed April 24, 2008.

44. Although Section 641 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requires that all aid programs be identified appropriately overseas as “American Aid,” USAID itself has acknowledged that “[b]eneficiaries of U.S. aid receive billions of dollars of foreign assistance every year, often with little to no awareness that the

assistance is provided by the American people through USAID." However, better labeling of aid as having been supplied by the United States was instituted following the U.S. tsunami relief effort in Indonesia. A State Department study determined that although "favorable opinions of the U.S. [had been] at record lows in many Muslim countries in early 2005, favorability of the U.S. nearly doubled in Indonesia, from 37 to 66 percent, thanks to the massive delivery of . . . 'well-branded' U.S. foreign assistance." *Federal Register*, Vol. 70, No. 165, August 26, 2005, p. 50183. As a result, USAID amended its regulations to require addition of a prominent USAID "logo or seal," in addition to the grantee's logo, along with the tagline indicating that aid is "from the American people." Of course, since the tagline is in English and USAID typically has no presence at the point of assistance, it is unclear how much credit the U.S. Government receives from the beneficiaries as compared with the implementing partner. As might be expected, some NGOs oppose this idea, arguing "that the most effective way to promote sustainable development is to foster the local ownership of programs, and that if America's strategic goal is promoting security and reducing poverty, then the focus should be on empowering effective local change agents, not on getting credit for U.S. taxpayers." Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet, eds., *Too Poor for Peace? Global Poverty, Conflict, and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p. 26. The authors indicate that branding "risks undermining the effectiveness of development and democracy programs, because local communities need to feel like they are building something themselves, not be reminded at every turn that their destiny depends on the grace of the United States." *Ibid.*

45. This is not altogether a bad thing, as was observed by Harry Truman, who said, "It is amazing what you can accomplish if you do not care who gets the credit." Indeed, USAID missions themselves often provide potential partners with guidance on how to secure funding from USAID. For example, the USAID mission in Jakarta issues a pamphlet entitled "Doing Business with USAID," which includes, among other guidance, instructions on how to submit unsolicited proposals under the heading, "I have a great idea that USAID should do—how do I submit my proposal?" [indonesia.usaid.gov/\(S\(pqxxo45uemcfe45qxcc3ceg\)\)/proxy/Page.aspx?p=DoingBusiness&language=en/](http://indonesia.usaid.gov/(S(pqxxo45uemcfe45qxcc3ceg))/proxy/Page.aspx?p=DoingBusiness&language=en/), accessed April 28, 2007.

46. Although the “defense support to public diplomacy is still vaguely defined . . . emergent doctrine is correct to point out the importance of strategic communication activities in implementing theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs). *Information Operations Primer*, Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, January 2006, www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/IO-Primer-AY06.pdf, accessed April 30, 2006.

47. Joint doctrine, in discussing security cooperation, indicates that it is intended, among other things, to “build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests.” The guidance goes on to clarify that this includes not only military engagement, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Joint Publication 3-0, para. I-13.

48. See Note 46.

49. These efforts are specifically intended to shape perceptions and influence the behavior of both adversaries and allies. Without an understanding of who produced the specific outcomes achieved, there would clearly be no impact on the perceptions of the intended audience. *Ibid.* p. IV-27.

50. Jefferson P. Marquis *et al.*, *Assessing the Value of U.S. Army International Activities*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2006 (Hereafter RAND, *Assessing the Value*).

51. Julian Wright, Conference Report: “Canada in Afghanistan: Assessing the 3-D Approach,” Institute for Research on Public Policy, May 14, 2005. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also conditionally endorsed the “whole of government” approach, but characterizes the three legs as security, political, and economic affairs. OECD Development Assistance Committee, *Fragile States: Policy Commitment and Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations*, Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, March 20, 2007.

52. PMESII is an acronym standing for political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information. See Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Directorate, “Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations,

Operational Net Assessment, Supplement Two," Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, Standing Joint Force Headquarters, February 24, 2006.

53. See Bert Koenders, Minister for Development Cooperation, "Afghanistan: A Balanced Approach," speech delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, April 16, 2007.

54. The 10 elements of the so-called Rotterdam recommendations are as follows: 1. Agree on strategy; 2. Integrate planning; 3. Strive for flexibility regarding personnel and funding; 4. Exchange lessons learned; 5. Be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary; 6. Diversify civilian input; 7. Strive for complementarities between international organizations; 8. Engage in conflict prevention; 9. Step up public diplomacy; 10. Avoid stovepipes. Centre for European Reform and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Joined Forces: The Quest for Synergy between Defence, Diplomacy, and Development*, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, January 25-26, 2007, www.minbuza.nl/binaries/en-pdf/rotterdam-recommendations.pdf, accessed April 25, 2007.

55. Erin Simpson and Brian Tomlinson, "Canada: Is Anyone Listening?" *The Reality of Aid 2006*, London, UK: IBON Books 2007, www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_aid_2006_roa_canada_chapter.pdf, accessed May 1, 2007.

56. Robert Perito, *Briefing: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, February 2007.

57. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report 06-034, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*, Washington, DC, October 29, 2006.

58. See Robert D. Kaplan, "Smoke and Mirrors. What the State Department Is Not Accomplishing in Iraq," *Atlantic Monthly*, October 29, 2006, www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704u/iraq-state-department, accessed March 1, 2007; Greg Grant, "Tension Builds in Iraq," *GovExec.com*: December 1, 2006, www.govexec.com/features/1206-01/1206-01na1.htm, accessed May 1, 2007.

59. See Helene Cooper, "Few Veteran Diplomats Accept Mission to Iraq," *New York Times*, February 8, 2007, select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F60917FC3A5B0C7B8CDDAB0894DF404482, accessed February 10, 2007; Thom Shanker and David S. Cloud, "Military Wants More Civilians to Help in Iraq," *New York Times*, February 7, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/02/07/washington/07military.html?ex=1328504400&en=55c41300bd433f32&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss, accessed February 7, 2007.

60. "Transformational diplomacy requires having the right people with the right skills in the right place at the right time. Even more than in the past, this means often putting State personnel in more dangerous and less developed locations, affecting employees and their families personally and professionally." U.S. Department of State, "The Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2008." p. 22, www.state.gov/documents/organization/79834.pdf, accessed May 4, 2007. The Congressional Research Service provides additional detail:

Transformational Diplomacy includes global repositioning of State Department personnel largely from Europe and Washington, DC, to designated critical locations in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East. Implementation would create regional public diplomacy centers in Europe and the Middle East. Localization of diplomacy would include American presence posts operated by a single diplomat working in key population centers of a country. Enhanced language and technology skills would expand U.S. diplomacy effectiveness. Diplomats would be trained in public diplomacy skills, and encouraged to engage and promote democratic principles at posts, rather than just report on the culture in which they are living.

Clare Ribando and Bruce Vaughan, *Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 20, 2006, fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/78333.pdf, accessed May 4, 2007.

61. One of the key recommendations of the Iraq Study Group stated, "If not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed

assignments.” James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton *et al.*, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, New York: Vintage Books, December 2006.

62. For an analysis of the types of units and capabilities needed for a hypothetical “Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command,” see Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2004, p. 53.

63. RAND, *Assessing the Value*.

64. Current Civil Affairs doctrine identifies numerous Civil Affairs “core tasks” that are germane to international development activities, including “nation assistance,” which is defined as operations in support of a host nation to promote “sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.” U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2006, p. 3-15. Moreover, at the operational and strategic levels of command (brigade and civil affairs command), unit tables of organization include not only command and control structures, but also teams of senior officers who are required to have expertise in such things as rule of law, economic development, public health, and governance.

65. Current personnel requirements in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly for civil affairs support, are clearly exceptional and, of themselves, would provoke substantial institutional resistance to additional taskings. To avoid the complications posed by current operations, this chapter addresses this issue in the context of a post-Iraq steady-state military.

66. The civil affairs force is comprised of four reserve component (RC) Civil Affairs Commands, which control six brigade headquarters and 26 battalions, whose strength totals about 5,600 service members. In contrast, there is one newly activated civil affairs brigade (95th), which at present controls two battalions. See R. Christian Brewer, *U.S. Army Civil Affairs and the Fate of Reserve Special Operations Forces in Support of Current*

and Future Operations, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, March 19, 2004, p. 2.

67. Former Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator Randall Tobias recently indicated that USAID would be introducing a new Strategic Framework for foreign assistance that would “strategically link transformational development objectives with appropriated funding sources and activities.” Ambassador Tobias indicated that at the country level, the Strategic Framework will serve as a “roadmap” resulting in “integrated, coherent country operational plans that indicate, for each activity, the partner, the amount of money, the expected output, and ultimate outcome that will contribute to established goals,” and stipulated that only approved plans would be funded. Ambassador Randall L. Tobias, U.S. Director of Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, *FY 2007 Budget Hearing for USAID Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs*, April 26, 2006, www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2006/ty060426.html/, accessed May 7, 2007. See also Parrie Henderson O’Keefe, “The New Foreign Assistance Framework: What Does It Mean for U.S. Government Implementing Partners,” Presentation to Washington, DC, Chapter of Society for International Development, January 24, 2007, www.sidw.org/newfaframework/, accessed April 30, 2007.

68. USAID is working to enhance cooperation with the military, and has recently established an Office of Military Affairs under its Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA).

69. As noted in one study, an area that challenges the combatant commander is the

translation of the theater strategy into bilateral or multilateral activities conducted within the countries of the region. . . . In order for this to occur an organizational structure must exist that identifies country requirements and translates the combatant commander’s strategy into an executable plan that accomplishes both the foreign country’s needs as well as U.S. interests. The closest organization that exists is the Ambassador’s country team and the Security Assistance Offices. . . .

Gregory L. Hager, *Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans*, Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, May 3, 2004, pp. 1-30.

70. Current Army civil affairs doctrine refers in many places to activities and functions in support of development, including economic development, rule of law activities, etc. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 2006.

71. Indeed, given the strategic importance of maintaining a capable civil affairs/stability operations force for difficult post-conflict environments, it is evident that the necessary skills and experience are best acquired in presumably less demanding pre-conflict settings. Part of the rationale, then, of employing special purpose forces like civil affairs in support of Phase 0 development activities is to build and enhance their capacity to conduct post-conflict stability operations. This author's more than 20 years of experience in civil affairs units at all levels strongly suggests that a robust and genuine engagement in meaningful peacetime operations will attract, rather than deter, the type of personnel who should enter civil affairs, and will motivate those personnel to develop the strong functional skills that are needed in support of post-conflict SSTR operations.

72. The Department of State and USAID's unified foreign assistance budget request for FY 2008 proposes to "integrate [foreign assistance] planning based on the totality of U.S. Government resources." This is characterized as a "Strategic Principle" that is required to avoid "fragmentation of foreign assistance across multiple agencies, offices, and bureaus [resulting in a risk of] uncoordinated strategies, inadequate accountability, and the misdirection of resources." U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, FY 2008 Budget Request*, February 14, 2007, www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2008/fy2008cbj_full.pdf, accessed May 7, 2007.

73. The demands of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past five years have clearly stressed the reserve civil affairs force. As a result, there has been little focus on employing civil affairs and other reserve forces in support of shaping operations, even though the forces that would likely be used for such operations

would be accessed under different legal authorities than those used in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such shaping activities, in this author's view, would not significantly detract from the ability of the force to support ongoing major combat operations, if at all.

74. The United States is planning to create a new unified Africa Command which will have as part of its charter humanitarian assistance and development. Stephanie Hanson, "The Pentagon's New Africa Command," *Council of Foreign Relations Backgrounder*, May 3, 2007.

75. Proposed legislation, "Building Global Partnerships Act of 2007" (Title XV of the 2008 Defense Authorization Bill), which provides new authorities for a variety of activities, including "humanitarian operations," was sent to Capitol Hill on May 2, 2007, www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/BGPA.pdf.

76. Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Military Blurring Embassy Missions Abroad," *International Herald Tribune*, December 20, 2006.

77. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign*. S. Prt 109-52., 109th Cong., 2d Sess., December 15, 2006.

PART II:
CASE STUDIES AND FIELD EXPERIENCES

CHAPTER 4

THE PERILS OF PLANNING: LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

Joseph J. Collins

For planners and bureaucrats, Afghanistan and Iraq appear to present a puzzle.¹ In Afghanistan, on one hand, we had little time for planning; we did lots of innovative things on the cheap; our small, international force has taken relatively few casualties; we have had strong local and international support; and, even with recent setbacks by most accounts, a good outcome is possible and even likely.² On the other hand, in Iraq, we had over a year to plan; our national policy has been expensive and often unimaginative; a relatively large, primarily American force has taken over 30,000 casualties; we have had severe and continuing problems with local and international support; and the outcome is still very much in doubt. In terms of international legitimacy, Afghanistan—a war of necessity for the United States—deserves an “A” grade, while the conflict in Iraq—a war of choice—in its best moments has been a “C-”.

A wag might conclude from the above recitation that Americans should avoid planning at all costs. It brings bad luck, stifles creativity, and interferes with our penchant for achieving success through our normal standard operating procedure: the application of great amounts of material resources guided by brilliant improvisation and dumb luck.

This conclusion would, however, be flawed. As President Dwight Eisenhower was fond of saying, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything." Our problem in Iraq was not too much planning, but not enough of it. Problems in planning contributed to serious shortcomings connected with Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. With 3 years of hindsight, it is clear that these shortcomings included:

- A series of unchecked, sensitive assumptions that overemphasized potential Iraqi gratitude and patience, but underestimated the problems of occupying a fractious Muslim country the size of California;
- Ineffective civil and military plans for stability operations;
- The provision of inadequate forces to occupy and secure Iraq, which encouraged the initiation of an insurgency;
- Inadequate military reaction to rioting and looting in the immediate post-conflict environment, which further encouraged lawlessness and insurgency;
- Slow civil and military reaction to the growing insurgency;
- Problematical funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed services and basic reconstruction, both of which were a partial antidote to insurgency;
- Failure to make effective use of former Iraqi military forces, which, when coupled with deep de-Ba'athification, further alienated the Sunni minority and deprived the government of skilled technocrats;
- Slow and, at first, ineffective development of new Iraqi security forces;

- Inability to provide enough trained civilian officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct effective stabilization and reconstruction activities; and,
- Slow creation of an interim Iraqi authority that could have minimized the perception of occupation and enhanced the perception of liberation.³

Successful innovation and favorable circumstances on the ground made the war in Afghanistan easier than the one in Iraq, but the planning problems in both cases have had much in common with other complex contingencies, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. All of these cases have demonstrated the limitations of stove-piped, single-agency planning systems. In the future, we will have to conduct planning in a dynamic security environment marked by numerous challenges, and will accordingly need to be highly adaptive. Not only must we do better in mid-range interagency planning, but we will also have to develop and refine new capabilities to deal with the nonmilitary aspects of contingencies. In turn, this will require changes in the organizational cultures of the armed forces and the Department of State. The first step in understanding this challenge will be to appreciate the environment in which it will take place.

Security Environment.

First, U.S. conventional military power is unparalleled. No country or nonstate actor in its right mind seeks conventional battle with the United States. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated that the armed forces, with minimal allied help, can attack a

significant opponent at a 1:6 force ratio disadvantage, destroy its forces, and topple a mature, entrenched authoritarian regime, all in a few weeks. Unfortunately, however, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM also showed that victory in war today is much more dearly obtained than success in an initial military operation.

For our enemies, guerrilla tactics and terrorism – pre-conflict, post-conflict, and extra-conflict – are the order of the day. At the same time, the U.S. armed forces, generally oriented on conventional operations, have been slow to adapt to this new kind of war, a problem we have seen many times in our history, albeit under different circumstances. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, it took over a year to adapt to the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction in a counterinsurgency environment.

Not only are American planners often surprised by the “What kind of war is this?” questions, but they also have not done well in thinking beyond the last bullet of what appears to be the climactic battle of a war. Once enmeshed in post-conflict stability operations, the United States has had great difficulty in establishing effective unity of effort and coherent chains of command. In the Cold War and thereafter, the United States has consistently done poorly at bridging the wide gap between success in battle and victory in war.

Second, in recent years, the United States has entered into conflicts only in areas that were undergoing some sort of humanitarian crisis, which has been a focal point of the war effort or a critical factor in winning the support of the local populace. In these operations, winning the war and solving the humanitarian crisis both had to be first-priority activities, especially since the armies of developed nations have the will and

technology to assure the welfare of civilian populations. A humanitarian disaster – a tragedy in its own right – could create the perception of a Pyrrhic victory or an insensitive policy. Intense news media scrutiny, moreover, raises the stakes for democratic nations.

The military has also become a player in what are normally civilian activities such as humanitarian assistance, stabilization activities, civil governance, and reconstruction. Military units, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and elements of international organizations work in close and, at times, uncomfortable proximity. The dividing line between civil and military enterprise is further blurred by the presence of government contractors who may be performing formerly military functions or conducting humanitarian activities similar to those of more politically disinterested NGOs.

Third, in Afghanistan and Iraq, unlike in Bosnia and Kosovo, there was no discrete, post-conflict phase. In both of the current conflicts, conventional war A was followed immediately by unconventional war B. In turn, war B was complicated by the need to conduct simultaneous stabilization and reconstruction activities. Neither soldiers nor diplomats were ready for this development. To be ready in the future, they will have to change how they organize, plan, and train for conflict.

Fourth, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgents decided after a few months that they had to defeat reconstruction in order to force the evacuation of coalition forces and discredit the people who worked with the coalition. In both conflicts, counterinsurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction have become strands of the same rope.

Fifth, for the soldier, the news media and information systems have gone from merely intrusive to omnipresent. In this respect, conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq are much more affected by the media than the small wars of the early 20th century.⁴ Today, the ugly realities of irregular warfare continuously stream into Western living rooms. Senses of gain or loss and effectiveness or ineffectiveness of operations, are magnified by the work of relentless journalists, whose editors freely admit that “if it bleeds, it leads.” Activities such as police training or well digging lose out to grisly combat scenes.⁵

The nature of media coverage makes policy execution more difficult and time-sensitive. With intense media scrutiny, democratic governments have to get it right early and keep things moving in a positive direction. Where democratic governments once had years to experiment with solutions to the sticky problems of irregular warfare, today they have months or weeks before the steady drumbeat of “all is lost” begins to sound.

None of these facts about the media have been lost on our adaptive enemy. Empowered by the Internet and bad intentions, the creation of mayhem and bad publicity for the Coalition is not a by-product of enemy action, but its objective. While we are stuck in the mindset of doing good and then trying to get appropriate publicity, the media-savvy enemy concentrates on providing self-serving footage that everyone from ABC to al-Jazeera finds irresistible. Indeed, the Internet and the 24/7 media environment have provided the modern-day insurgent or terrorist a potent weapon, one strong enough to humble a nation that, ironically, is home to both Hollywood and Madison Avenue. Al-Qaeda is in no small way the evil spawn of globalization and the Internet.

One scholar compared the terrorists' use of the Internet to Napoleon's *levee en masse*, where commercial presses galvanized public support for France and allowed Napoleon to effectively mobilize the entire French nation. Here's how the 21st-century *levee en masse* works in Iraq:

Insurgent attacks are regularly followed with postings of operational details . . . and tips for tactical success. Those who use insurgent chat rooms are monitored by the hosts, and, if they seem amenable to recruitment, contacted via email. Insurgent sites contain everything from practical information for traveling to Baghdad to morale boosters for those currently involved in the struggle. Videos of killings by the "Baghdad Sniper" or [others] . . . are posted on the web. Cyber-mobilization has changed the face of war, making it harder for the United States to win in Iraq. . . .⁶

Clearly, better mid-range planning is essential for a media and information environment that empowers the terrorist and the insurgent and is intolerant of missteps by great powers. More than ever, protracted conflict favors the insurgent and the terrorist. As one Taliban leader noted, "The Americans have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time."⁷ Democratic powers need wise policy and decisive execution if they are going to succeed in stability operations. In effect, they have to be good enough to win a protracted conflict in an unprotracted time frame.

These problems are not likely to go away. While some strategists believe that the United States will and should turn its back on irregular warfare and stability operations,⁸ the future is likely to present a set of such challenges that will require significant institutional and cultural adaptation. In the next decade, the United States—in addition to maintaining readiness for conventional wars—must:

- Continue stability operations and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan and Iraq for at least another 5 years;
- Execute counterterrorist operations activities in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia;
- Support future peace operations in the Middle East and Africa (Gaza? Golan Heights? Lebanon? Darfur?);
- Be ready to manage system shocks from regime failure or radical changes in some hostile regional powers (North Korea? Cuba?);
- Deter or manage traditional threats or future peer competitors, deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and,
- Improve homeland defense against terrorist groups, including those who might use weapons of mass destruction.

In the next decade, the need for effective joint, combined, and interagency planning and policy execution will remain salient. Major institutional planning changes will require complementary changes in training, resource allocation, and organizational cultures.

Improving Mid-Range Planning.

The U.S. Government has already begun upgrading mid-range planning. The aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), saw the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, a Homeland Security Council, and a National Counterterrorism Center, as well as a set of intelligence community reforms. There are joint interagency coordination groups in many combatant command headquarters. The Department of State now has a senior Coordinator for Reconstruction and

Stabilization to improve planning, and it has changed personal assignment patterns to better support national priorities, interagency activities, and the war on terrorism. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has created an “Office of Military Affairs” to improve its connectivity with the Pentagon and its various field commands.

In the Department of Defense (DOD), a new directive on stability operations is being implemented under the close supervision of energized defense policy executives. Preparation for stability operations has been put on a par with preparation for combat. The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) also emphasized stability operations and preparation for irregular warfare. Special Operations forces will be dramatically increased.⁹ In Iraq and Afghanistan, amid all the strife and bad news, there have been highly successful improvements in counterinsurgency—including a new, joint Army and Marine Corps manual—and security assistance operations. Military, diplomatic, and USAID teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq are working together much more closely than even a year ago. In the long stretch of history, however, these recent improvements will be recorded as the first baby steps in improving our national capabilities to deal with failed states and complex contingency operations.

The following eight recommendations will build on these improvements and help planning in the future. First, we need a new charter for complex contingency planning. The Clinton administration’s oft-ignored bible on political-military planning for complex contingencies, Presidential Decision Directive-56, was headed in the right direction. Early in the first term of President George W. Bush, the Pentagon blocked a National Security Council (NSC) staff

attempt to publish a new contingency planning policy document, all in the name of preserving the freedom of action of cabinet officers and keeping civilians out of the contingency planning business. More input into contingency planning from civilians, of course, is not the problem; it will be a key part of the solution. We do not need to protect stove-piped systems, we need to strive for more integration in policy formulation and execution.

War plans are rarely briefed outside military channels. Inside the Pentagon, only a handful of civilians have access to them. This prohibition may make sense for major conventional war plans, and it certainly makes sense for security purposes. However, when conflicts continue even after the last hill is taken, when they include activities such as stabilization and reconstruction that we want civilians to lead, there must be a broader sharing of contingency planning responsibilities. The 2006 QDR's recommendation for a new interagency document called "The National Security Planning Guidance" is clearly a step in the right direction.¹⁰ The QDR calls on this new document to "direct the development of both military and nonmilitary plans and institutional capabilities. . . . [It] would set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies."

Second, every executive department should insist on interagency experience for its most senior civilians and make it a prerequisite for promotion to the senior executive in civilian agencies or the Foreign Service. Interagency experience should count as the equivalent of joint experience for military officers. Too often, the best and brightest avoid interagency assignments where the hours are terrible and the rewards are less

than those at the home agency. Too many inexperienced junior personnel occupied the NSC staff in the last two administrations. NSC personnel at the director level should optimally be members of the senior executive service or at least colonel or GS-15 level personnel. The first step to improve interagency planning would be to improve the quality of agency personnel across the board and increase the number of the best and brightest who have lived and worked in the interagency world. The U.S. Government should also follow through on its plans to create a corps of civilian and military National Security officers who will become the masters of interagency work. Plans are also in train to create a consortium among the government's higher learning institutions to ensure a better focus on the needs of interagency work.

It is often said that we need a Goldwater-Nichols type of reform for the interagency community.¹¹ This is a worthy ideal, but one must ask whether this landmark legislation for DoD sets the bar too high. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986 were stewing for almost 40 years and were enacted only after a series of disappointing operations where it was clear that America's military power was unequal to the sum of its parts. Moreover, Goldwater-Nichols concerned a department that is firmly under the command of one powerful secretary. It also concerned a relatively small number of congressional committees.

A Goldwater-Nichols reform for the interagency would involve a wide array of departments and agencies, and dozens of congressional committees, each of which is as resistant to diminutions of its power as any cabinet department is. Finally, if one takes the thought of a Goldwater-Nichols reform literally, there would be a shift of power from the

cabinet departments to “the interagency”; that would mean shifting power away from confirmable cabinet officers to appointive NSC staff personnel who are not accountable to Congress. Such a shift would undermine hundreds of laws that empower cabinet officers and ensure that many bucks stop before they get to the President’s desk. Such a shift could create situations where responsibility for policies becomes fuzzed over. While a literal Goldwater-Nichols for the interagency may be a bridge too far, it has the right spirit. Improving interagency policy decisionmaking and execution is clearly within our capability, whether we pursue radical systemic change or step-by-step improvements.

Third, in a related vein, we need a better system for exporting interagency groups to the field. Interagency coordination in Washington is possible, but in the field during complex contingencies, the U.S. Government habitually has either (1) a system in which one cabinet department is nominally in charge, such as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, or the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, or (2) a more cooperative system, such as we have today in Kabul and Baghdad. This cooperative system features a senior military officer and a senior diplomat working together, with neither having overall charge of U.S. policy, and both answering to their respective superiors. Today, in both Kabul and Baghdad, the arrangements are working well, but better arrangements may be possible. Getting this system right should be the subject of war games and experiments conducted by cooperating agencies and supervised by Joint Forces Command and the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The United States is not likely ever to have a “viceroys” system, but more effective, efficient, and predictable arrangements

that offer more unity of command are possible. We cannot afford situations where difficult personalities or ad hoc arrangements on the ground or in Washington stand in the way of effective national policy. While all potential solutions to this problem are subject to criticism, we are today practicing turf-fight avoidance and not talking about this critical issue. Experiments and scholarly investigation may well lead to solutions or at least a set of mutually acceptable expectations.

For its part, S/CRS at State—which will have the national lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations—must have an Active and a Reserve response corps, full of interagency and civil specialists. This will take hundreds of millions of dollars per year, which Congress has thus far been unwilling to appropriate. In the future, S/CRS should be able to draw on the entire government as well as on the private sector to build a tailored multifunctional team for any specific mission. If the U.S. Government fails to build this capability, there is little reason to maintain S/CRS and the entire conceptual system that has been built up around it, because it will remain a hollow shell, an office with an impressive name but lacking resources.

Fourth, all improvements to interagency advice and policy implementation will require cultural and organizational change. To start, the military establishment needs to focus its planning and training more on victory in the total war, and less on success in climactic battles. It is folly to pretend that success in a “final” battle will lead directly to victory. Particularly in cases of regime change or failed states, post-combat stability operations (*Phase 4* in war plan lingo) will be the key to victory. They are every bit as important as the ability to move, shoot, and communicate in battle, the normal preoccupations of the soldier. However,

studies of post-combat planning in Iraq show that Phase 4 planning did not receive the attention it demanded. Washington deserves the lion's share of criticism for Iraq planning failures, but there were glaring holes in the military planning effort as well.¹²

Occupation, stabilization, reconstruction, and other issues associated with state-building must be better integrated into the curriculum of staff and war colleges. Language and cultural studies are already becoming more important for military officers. War games and experiments also need to focus more on stability operations. None of this is meant to imply that the military should take over critical post-combat activities from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The opposite is the case: State and USAID need to be resourced, organized, and directed so that they can fulfill the awesome responsibilities that they have been assigned.

Fifth, the Department of State and USAID personnel and organizations need to become more operational, that is, able to lead in the management of grand enterprises in unsafe and austere environments. General Tommy Franks's memoirs contain the right thought: after the battle, you need lots of "boots" but also lots of "wingtips" on the ground.¹³ Absent the wingtips, the boots in Iraq have had to do much more than they should under optimal circumstances. This problem continues to the present day, where, for lack of civil presence, there is still too much military supervision of reconstruction and civil governance activities. In Afghanistan (and now in Iraq), the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which include military, diplomatic, and USAID personnel, have mitigated the "too many boots, too few wingtips" problem that hampers coalition operations in Iraq.¹⁴

The personnel strength of State and USAID is clearly inadequate to meet their expanded roles in the war on terror.

At the national level, the Bush administration is grappling with this problem and has designated S/CRS to be the national lead. The administration must now follow through and ensure that this good idea is realized in a powerful center of excellence. This office should also become the centerpiece for interagency planning and exercises throughout the government. Interagency staffing has begun and should be increased. It needs a healthy budget, which will be a problem in a poorly funded department that is usually focused on current policy, not mid-range contingency planning. S/CRS is a toddler. This administration and its successor must ensure that it matures into a robust adult.

There is a danger here in encouraging all of the cabinet departments to get involved in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction activities. At times, this has represented real value added. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, long focused on projects at home and in bases abroad, has done superb work in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other departments, however, have not been so lucky. Many of them are not manned to do these tasks and have fewer usable assets than one might imagine. Others are likely to lack cultural or historical perspective and rush in to try to do things American style. Others have and will fall victim to departmental SOPs, reflecting the old saw: "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."

In Iraq and Afghanistan, participation by cabinet departments with a domestic focus has been a mixed blessing. Many well-intentioned efforts have ended up poorly coordinated or out of synch with cultural conditions. A number of show projects have had

little to show for their efforts. Better coordination by State and USAID, and better peacetime preparation, is needed before agencies that do not have overseas missions are ready to take their game on the road. Stabilization and reconstruction operations should not become an interdepartmental pick-up game.

Sixth, for the State Department and USAID to become more operational, they must be better funded across the board. Today, State and USAID spend (on all of their functions, including security assistance) less than one-tenth of what the Pentagon does on its many missions. There are less than 8,000 Foreign Service officers in State and USAID combined. With this elite small force, our diplomats and development specialists have to cover their extensive Washington headquarters, as well as over 120 countries and 265 diplomatic and consular locations. State and USAID's chronic underfunding is the single greatest impediment to effective planning, developmental assistance, reconstruction, and stabilization. State cannot be equipped only with good ideas, while Defense has all the money and most of the deployable assets. This is a prescription for an unbalanced national security policy.

As long as there are few "wingtips" on the ground, the "boots" will be forced to move into the vacuum. As long as State is a budgetary midget, it will play second fiddle to the Pentagon colossus. If we want to fix planning and execution for complex contingencies, we must fund State and USAID as major family members and not poor cousins of the Pentagon. At a minimum, over the next 5 years, the Foreign Service personnel strength of State and USAID should be raised by 50 percent and the entire budget of state and USAID should be doubled, across the board.

Priorities for new spending should be given to public diplomacy, stabilization and reconstruction activities, and development assistance focused on preventing state failure in the developing world.

Seventh, to get better at planning and executing complex contingencies, we will have to untangle the legal and regulatory impediments that hobble the Departments of State and Defense. This will be especially important now, if State begins to operate in the field on large-scale post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction problems. Many of these legal provisions serve only to protect congressional committee prerogatives. Still others are meant to prevent human rights abuses or serve some other valid purpose. How else can you explain that one group at State is in charge of refugee affairs, but USAID is charged with looking after internally displaced people? Why, given the importance of law and order to development, is USAID forbidden from funding and managing police development programs, a major element in restoring stability in failed states? It is tempting to say that these dysfunctional legal or regulatory provisions should be waived or eliminated. This should be done, however, only after a full assessment of the rationale behind each of them.

Eighth and last, to gain legitimacy and promote better burden sharing, the United States should make its most powerful allies full partners in complex operations. We have run two operations in which many allies were brought into the plan *after* the action began. This did no great damage in Afghanistan, where the international perception of legitimacy has been high. Indeed, NATO has moved into the lead in Afghanistan, having transitioned from peace operations into combat a year ago. In Iraq, however, the United

States continues to pay a stiff price for its excessively narrow focus in 2003. History will judge the wisdom of that decision, but, in the future, bringing the allies in before the takeoff may make for a rougher flight but a smoother landing.

Afterword.

As this volume goes to press, all of the modest steps we have made as a nation to prepare better for complex contingencies are in serious trouble. Congress has refused to adequately fund some of them, and our leadership has not fought the good fight to get it to do so. S/CRS, for example, remains the national leader for stabilization and reconstruction in name, but it is still a woefully weak office. It has the lead, but not the assets, to get the job done. Some experts in Washington already wonder out loud: After S/CRS is declared defunct or overcome by events, what comes next? Other national security experts believe that the issues surrounding state-building and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction are—because of problems in Iraq—old hat and no longer crucial. As one told me, “We won’t step on that rake again.” They believe—like candidate George W. Bush in 2000—that the United States can turn its back on state-building and stability operations and simply choose not to become directly involved. Indeed, some recommend that we return to concentrating on high-tech conventional operations, and once again direct the preponderance of defense spending toward the Navy and the Air Force. This group desperately wants to focus like a laser beam on conventional conflict and conflict scenarios in East Asia.¹⁵

At the same time that the forces of bureaucratic interest have begun to question our efforts at

improving our governmental capabilities for complex contingencies, the war in Iraq grows in unpopularity. After every unpopular and costly war, the United States has suffered a self-inflicted “never again” syndrome. After the Korean War, we turned our back on even the possibility of limited warfare and created a strategy of massive retaliation. This was one of the great bluffing strategies of all times, but one that, in the end, had to yield to a strategy characterized by more flexible options. After Vietnam, we buried our understanding of counterinsurgency so deep that we still haven’t unearthed it completely. Needless to say, this pattern of “learning” is dysfunctional and inefficient. It is not in the national interest to fail to understand and adapt to the environment that one lives in.

Post-Iraq, my worry is that the forces of bureaucratic politics will meld with a natural tendency to look at tough wars and say “never again.” A new administration, probably with some perceived blessing from public opinion polls, could defund our small steps toward improving our capabilities to address irregular warfare and its aftermath; disestablish S/CRS; cut money for foreign assistance; and erase increases to Army and Marine end strength and to special operations forces. A new team could wipe out all efforts at making State, USAID, and DoD adapt to the reality of a world of failed and failing states. In place of improving our national capabilities for irregular warfare and stabilization and reconstruction activities, we might even buy more high-tech conventional weaponry or increase our investment in domestic social programs.

It is my fervent hope that the readers of this chapter will fight ostrich-like attempts to turn back the clock to the day when so-called experts proclaimed that superpowers “do not do windows,” pretending that

the United States can exist in splendid isolation from parts of the developing world that desperately need our leadership and our help.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. This chapter is a longer and updated version of "Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq" that appeared in *Joint Force Quarterly*, Vol. 41, 2d quarter 2006, pp. 10-14. It was strongly influenced by my personal experiences as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 2001-04, as well as subsequent study and teaching at the National War College.

2. For a positive view of stability operations in Afghanistan, see Joseph Collins, "Afghanistan: Winning a Three Block War," *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, Winter 2004, pp. 61-77. For a negative view, see Kathy Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, May/June 2004, pp. 35-46. A recent evaluation of stabilization and reconstruction activities can be found in Barnett Rubin, *Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy*, Council Special Report No. 12, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2006.

3. A large set of new books has informed my research on Iraq, the best of which are Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, New York: Pantheon Books, 2006; Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, NY: Penguin Press, 2006; and Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III*, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006. For the much neglected Iraqi leadership perspective, see Kevin M. Woods *et al.*, *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from Saddam's Senior Leadership (JCOA)*, U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2007, esp. pp. vii-xi, 175-184. This project was based mainly on 700 captured documents and interviews with over 25 top Iraqi national security officials.

4. Even without CNN and other news media outlets, misbehavior and scandal in past conflicts caused problems for the military. See Max Boot, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2002, pp. 120-125, for the story of how U.S. war crimes in the Philippines embarrassed

the armed forces and helped end the early 20th-century military operations there. However, the media's daily impact on today's operations has no precedent.

5. For an unusually frank and expansive discussion of this reality by a newsman, see Howard Kurtz, "As War Dragged On, Coverage Tone Weighed Heavily on Anchors," *Washington Post*, October 8, 2007, pp. C6-C7.

6. Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: The New *Levée en Masse*," *Parameters*, Summer 2006, p. 85.

7. Lieutenant General David Barno, USA retired, "Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency," *Parameters*, Summer 2006, p. 24.

8. One example of this "never again" thinking can be found in the writing of airpower advocate Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF, "America's Asymmetric Advantage," *Armed Forces Journal*, September 2006, pp. 20-27. See also my reply arguing for a full-spectrum force, "From the Ground Up: We Need a Balanced Total Force," *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2006, pp. 44-47. Dunlap's rejoinder to my piece appears on p. 48 of the same issue.

9. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2006, pp. 1-26, 43-45, 75-91.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

11. See the ongoing study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*, "Phase 1 Report" and "Phase 2 Report," Washington, DC: CSIS, 2005, for Phase 1, available at csis.org/isp/bgn/index.php?option=com_csis_pubs&task=view&id=62, and for Phase 2, available at csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task/view/id,1849/.

12. The best published research is Nora Bensahel, "Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraq Reconstruction," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2006, pp. 453-473. Another excellent account of Phase IV planning and execution

problems can be found in Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, pp. 138-163, 457-496.

13. General Tommy Franks, *American Soldier*, New York: Regan Books, 2004, p. 422.

14. On PRTs in Afghanistan, see Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters*, Winter 2005-06, pp. 32-46; and Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, USIP Special Report No. 152, United States Institute of Peace, October 2005, pp. 1-16.

15. See Dunlap, pp. 20-27.

CHAPTER 5

U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2006: OBSTACLES TO INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

Carlos Hernandorena

In the aftermath of major combat operations launched by U.S. and coalition forces in October 2001 during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the United States and other participant nations were presented with the daunting task of rebuilding the fractured Afghan state. Following the rapid collapse of the Taliban and the destruction of al-Qaeda training camps, the United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1386 on December 20, 2001. Resolution 1386 sought to support Afghanistan's new interim government by establishing security in Kabul through the creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Efforts were soon made to expand the scope of ISAF into the Afghan countryside as a means of stabilizing the war-torn nation.¹ Afghanistan remained unstable due to lingering elements of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, which began waging an active insurgency against coalition forces and the Afghan Interim Authority. Additionally, tribal factionalism, powerful warlords, and the lack of any established legal system posed other challenges to peace in the region.² Coalition and ISAF forces found themselves fighting an insurgency while carrying out Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.

As a result of the security threats posed to both military and civilian personnel involved in recon-

struction missions and of burden-sharing inequities among coalition partners, U.S. officials developed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2002 and established the first teams by early 2003.³ Consisting of both civilian and military personnel from different government agencies, PRTs were designed to spread the “ISAF effect” through a combination of quick impact reconstruction projects, security sector reform, and the extension of the Afghan Central Government’s influence, all under the protection of embedded military forces. Initially, the United States set up the first few PRTs along with coalition partners such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. As the PRT program took off, the United States began to hand over some PRTs to coalition allies and ISAF participants.⁴ Eventually, by late 2006, all PRTs in Afghanistan were placed under ISAF control.⁵

The civil-military and interagency aspects of PRTs make them a unique case study. In order for PRTs to function the way they were intended, high levels of coordination between team components were needed, yet not always present. Assessing the manner in which different agencies as well as civilian and military personnel interacted, especially within a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, provides an excellent entree to improving future interagency teams.

Although opinions vary greatly regarding the effectiveness of PRTs in Afghanistan, much of the literature concerning the teams views them as having had a positive impact in the region. A report written by the USAID claims that “provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions and empowering local leaders

who support the central government.”⁶ Another report written by a specialist on support and stability operations affirms that PRTs, while plagued with difficulties, made a number of helpful contributions by providing “a positive international presence in places where there otherwise would have been only combat forces conducting kinetic operations.”⁶ Indeed, many experts on SSTR believe that PRTs were and continue to be a useful option for countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq with the proviso that certain changes be made to maximize the efficacy of the teams and overcome some of the challenges they face.

While the broad debate over PRT effectiveness is important, the key purpose of this chapter is to focus more narrowly on obstacles to interagency cooperation in the U.S. PRTs during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, specifically during the period 2003 to 2006. This chapter assumes that PRTs were useful tools in Afghanistan and models to improve upon for the future. As previously stated, there are various opinions regarding the usefulness of PRTs in Afghanistan and their potential in future SSTR roles. There has also been considerable discussion of the interplay between the PRTs and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) operating in the same regions. These are all important issues that must be resolved; however, an assessment of interagency cooperation is particularly salient.

An analysis of interagency cooperation within PRTs in Afghanistan is essential for determining the optimum structure and guidelines of future PRTs or other interagency organizations operating in COIN environments. Considering the high probability that future U.S. operations may involve support, stability, and reconstruction functions, we would be remiss to disregard the lessons presented in cases

such as Afghanistan. The United States must prepare itself to conduct SSTR operations in any threatening environment in which insurgencies, terrorism, and other dangers constitute a genuine menace to the military and civilian agencies aiding in reconstruction. An example of this need can be seen with the current deployment of PRTs in Iraq where efforts are being made to ameliorate dire security threats to rebuilding efforts there.

The U.S. Army's new COIN field manual, FM 3-24, contains a section dedicated solely to explaining the importance of interagency coordination for successful COIN operations. It states that:

the integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and Home Nation government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come from many backgrounds. They may include military personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must make decisions and solve problems in a complex and extremely challenging environment.⁷

This quotation shows the importance of PRTs in establishing a joint mechanism for dealing with situations such as Afghanistan, where security threats must be met with a multifaceted approach involving military and civilian resources. Most importantly, in the Army's COIN manual explicates persuasively the critical nature of interagency cooperation between the various entities involved in support and stability operations in a COIN environment.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Development History.

The concept of PRTs was not introduced at the outset of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. It took more than a year from the initial stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM before the integrated civil-military units designated as PRTs were deployed.⁸

Planning for civil-military cooperation, deemed essential for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from the beginning, coincided with the initial preparations for military operations against the Taliban. The military coordinated with a number of humanitarian agencies to prepare for the rebuilding efforts which would be needed after the conclusion of major combat operations. One author describes events as follows:

Humanitarian agencies, including InterAction the World Food Program (WFP), were invited to participate in a Coalition Coordination Council, based with the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, which was created to enhance coordination between coalition partners, UN agencies, and the nongovernmental health agency (NGHA) community.⁹

As preparations continued for military operations in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, the commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), relayed orders to establish the Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). This task force consisted of a command and control unit designed to direct the actions of all civil affairs teams operating in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and to establish the precursors of PRTs.¹⁰

Shortly after the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, the CJMOTF established the coalition's first

civil affairs teams in country. Labeled Coalition Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs, or “chiclets”) consisting of outposts of approximately 12 U.S. Army civil affairs soldiers, they were deployed with the intent of winning the “hearts and minds” of the local populace. As Afghan reconstruction expert Robert Perito explains, personnel of the CHLCs were assigned the “task to assess humanitarian needs, implement small-scale reconstruction projects, and establish relations with the United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and nongovernmental organizations already in the field.”¹¹

The Army civil affairs personnel composing CHLCs fulfilled a role as noncombat troops with unique Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Their background was primarily as reserve unit soldiers with considerable experience in the civilian realm. These “citizen-soldiers” were called to active duty already possessing a vast array of specific knowledge and training in law enforcement, cultural affairs, labor, education, logistics, health care, and various other areas of civil service.¹² The purpose of these civil affairs members operating in CHLCs was to provide Army commanders in the field with readily available and deployable sources of civilian technical skills that could be adapted to minor reconstruction projects throughout the Afghan countryside.¹³

In November 2002, the deployment of CHLCs was soon followed by a plan to create Joint Regional Teams (JRTs). During a series of meetings in Kabul attended by NGOs, diplomats, UN representatives, and ISAF and coalition military personnel, the concept of JRTs was outlined. During these meetings, participants determined that remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, in addition to increased infiltration of hostile

forces across the Afghan-Pakistani border, posed a significant threat to personnel involved in support and stability functions. Participants were, of course, briefed on the conceptual phasing of the overall reconstruction effort. According to a report by Barbara Stapleton of the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Phases I and II involved the toppling of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, Phase III related to stabilization efforts, and Phase IV was labeled the reconstruction phase.¹⁴

To accommodate reconstruction efforts while simultaneously addressing legitimate security concerns, a Joint Regional Team (JRT) initiative was designed with three parts: (1) mobile Civil Affairs Teams (CATs); (2) a civil-military operations center headquarters; and (3) a contingent of combat troops to provide force protection. The JRTs had four primary functions. The first consisted of coordinating the activities of the numerous entities involved in reconstruction, ranging from NGOs to the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). Second, JRTs would identify possible reconstruction projects that could further improve Afghan civilians' opinion of coalition and ISAF forces. Third, the teams would conduct individual village assessments to determine the needs of the local populace. Fourth, JRTs were expected to liaise with regional commanders on matters relating to security and reconstruction efforts.¹⁵

When the idea of JRTs and their intended mission was developed and presented to Hamid Karzai, the interim president of the Afghan Transitional Authority, in December 2002, he expressed eagerness to have the teams deployed as soon as possible. Karzai did, however, present the United States and its allies with one request: he asked that the title of the teams be changed from Joint Regional Teams to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs. The Afghan president

felt that the concept of regional teams promoted factionalism, bolstering the idea of regions controlled by warlords. Shifting from the term regional to provincial implied that the purpose of the teams was to “provide support to the government (as opposed to regional powerbrokers or warlords) and to denote reconstruction as the principal activity of the teams.”¹⁶

The first PRT was formed in the city of Gardez in February 2003. Soon after, teams were deployed to the cities of Bamian, Konduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, and Herat.¹⁷ By October 2005, there were 22 PRTs operating inside Afghanistan, with 12 of them controlled by U.S. forces. The other PRTs remained under the control either of members representing the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) or of ISAF, led by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members.¹⁸

U.S. PRT Model and Mission.

The U.S. Government embraced three primary goals for PRTs, the first of which involved enhancing security. The United States, in conjunction with its coalition partners, hoped to create a secure environment in which U.S. Government agency representatives, international aid organizations, NGOs, and UN assistance programs could work to develop Afghanistan’s infrastructure. PRTs were intended to achieve this by helping “defuse factional fighting, support deployments by the Afghan National Army and police, conduct patrols, and reinforce security efforts during the disarming of militias.”¹⁹

The second PRT goal called for a strengthening of the Afghan central government’s reach. President Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government was weak,

possessing little influence outside the capital of Kabul. The U.S. PRTs' mission stipulated that the teams work in conjunction with local provincial leaders on promoting local elections and undertaking quick-impact projects. These projects, designed to better the Afghan people's everyday life, were expected to improve the population's perception of the central government and thereby solidify Kabul's influence over the Afghan countryside.

The third goal aimed to facilitate reconstruction in Afghanistan. PRTs were called upon to provide direct aid for small reconstruction projects and, more importantly, to help representatives from different U.S. agencies implement civilian-funded projects. Additionally, PRTs were expected to work cooperatively with international aid organizations and NGOs. These groups, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, possessed greater experience in certain areas of development, a deeper understanding of local customs and culture, and better access to some volatile regions of the country because of their perceived impartiality.²⁰

While all three goals were valued as critical components for effective support and stability operations in the region, many countries adopted different priorities for operating PRTs in Afghanistan. The U.S. PRTs worked primarily toward extending the influence of the central government's authority and on quick-impact reconstruction projects. The United Kingdom (UK), on the other hand, focused less on physical reconstruction efforts and worked harder to promote security sector reform and defuse factional fighting between Afghan tribes.²¹

Each coalition partner involved in Afghanistan's reconstruction followed a particular structural model

for its PRT. Different states varied the proportion of military and civilian personnel in the teams, leadership roles, PRT mission statements, and rules of engagement (ROE). According to a special report written by the United States Institute of Peace, "The size and composition of U.S. PRTs vary depending on maturity, local circumstances, and the availability of personnel from civilian agencies. Combined Forces Command (CFC) does, however, have a model, which U.S. PRTs generally emulate."²²

As of 2006, American PRTs consisted of some 82 personnel give or take. The teams were led by an Army lieutenant colonel who commanded the approximately 82 other civilian and military members. Civilian components included a representative from the State Department, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), although in some cases contractors filled in for USAID officials.²³ PRTs also incorporated a member of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI), in most situations an officer from the Afghan National Police, and three or more local interpreters.

The military component of the PRT represented a number of specialized Army units. An Army officer, normally a ranking lieutenant colonel along with his command staff, always commanded the teams. Each PRT, depending on regional demands, was expected to have two Army civil affairs teams; a military police unit; a psychological operations unit (PSYOP); explosive ordnance/demining unit (EOD); intelligence team; medics; force protection unit, normally composed of a 40-man infantry platoon; and administrative support and personnel.²⁴ Each of these PRT elements played different roles in promoting the team's mission and its interaction with the local civilian population.

The U.S. PRT commander's duties included, first and foremost, acting as a liaison with key Afghan government and civilian personnel. Considering that the primary mission of PRTs in effect an extension of the Afghan government's control over its territory, constant communication with key local officials remained critical for efficient coordination. The commander maintained contact with provincial governors, police chiefs, mayors, and any other influential figures such as tribal leaders who possessed influence over the region. Because international organizations (IOs) and NGOs often worked in U.S. PRT areas of operations, the commander, while not required to, regularly acted as a liaison with and between these groups as well. The commander also routinely attended meetings of the Provincial Development Council, where development projects were coordinated with local Afghan officials, and Combined Forces Command (CFC) coordinated military operations with combat units located within the PRTs' vicinity. Finally, the commander chaired the team's Project Review Committee, which reviewed and decided which projects to undertake and fund.

According to Robert Perito, PRT State Department representatives "have no standard job description," but served primarily as political advisers to PRT commanders and Afghan provincial governors. They also operated as members of the Project Review Committee and often acted as a key source for reporting PRT activities to the U.S. embassy in Kabul. In many cases, State Department officers represented the PRTs' principal source of information regarding local culture and politics.

The representative from the USAID was tasked with acting as the team commander's and Afghan provincial governor's main adviser on topics related

to development. Much like State Department officials, USAID members reported directly to the U.S. embassy in Kabul on the local government's suitability and capacity for development projects. Representatives also worked as key members of the Project Review Committee and directly interacted with Army Civil Affairs Teams and local NGOs to maximize the impact of development projects.

USDA representatives were selected from a number of different specialties, ranging from veterinarians to soil specialists. According to a report from the USDA website:

Representatives served as agriculture advisors working actively with the PRT Commander, aid organizations, and the national and local governments to enable, support, and foster reconstruction of the Afghan agricultural sector and to help build the ability of the central government to support and provide services to the agricultural sector.²⁵

USDA projects included cotton and soybean variety trials, animal health issues, water management and irrigation systems, farm planning, and livelihoods alternative to opium poppy production.²⁶

Along with the PRT commander, Army Civil Affairs "A" Teams constituted one of the more important military elements involved in actual Afghan reconstruction efforts. These teams, comprised of four soldiers each, were tasked with assessing the needs of the local population and feasibility of providing for those needs. Each team had a different role to play:

["A" teams conducted] assessments of reconstruction needs and contracting with Afghan firms to build schools, clinics, bridges, and wells. Civil Affairs "B" Teams operated the PRTs' Civil Military Operations Center

and coordinated with the UNAMA regional office and international NGOs engaged in providing humanitarian relief and development assistance.²⁷

Obstacles to Interagency Coordination within U.S. PRTs.

PRTs were designed and structured to integrate military and civilian agencies so they might coordinate a joint effort in establishing security, extending the influence of the Afghan central government, and promoting reconstruction. In order to achieve this goal, close cooperation between the military and the various civilian entities proved critical for accommodating to the diverse security, political, and cultural environments present throughout Afghanistan. FM 3-24, the Army's new guidebook for COIN, states: "Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power."²⁸ Considering that PRTs implement such a strategy, it is imperative to identify any obstacles that hamper or retard the teams' ability to accomplish their mission.

An assessment of civil-military coordination within U.S. PRTs from 2003 until early 2006 revealed an interagency process that varied in its levels of effectiveness.²⁹ PRTs were designed to be flexible so they could adapt optimally to the different needs of the 34 Afghan provinces. This adaptability also subjected PRTs to different province-specific challenges, making it difficult to identify broad common problems that affected most U.S. PRTs' interagency coordination. Additionally, after-action interviews of civilian and military PRT members conducted by the United States

Institute of Peace,³⁰ far from identifying manifest, universally agreed-upon problems, revealed a diverse array of opinions on the quality of cooperation between team members. Such lack of clear consensus was probably owing to a high turnover rate for PRT personnel. In spite of these challenges, an assessment of U.S. PRTs identified five frequently noted impediments to the smooth working of the interagency process within these teams.

The first factor causing difficulties for interagency coordination in U.S. PRTs was the lack of clear guidelines and goals for key PRT personnel. As previously mentioned, the teams were structured to be flexible and adaptive to regional needs. In order to maintain this flexibility, the designers of the PRT concept believed that creating a static set of guidelines would prevent teams from sustaining the malleability necessary for adapting to their region-specific operational needs.³¹ One author, however, describes how this mentality adversely affected team coordination:

Absent an established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise. This was problematic because military officers and civilian agency personnel came from different “corporate cultures” and had different, sometimes competing mandates. Without an interagency pre-agreement on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions, it took time and trial and error to achieve a common understanding of mission priorities.³²

More often than not, PRT personnel, especially representatives from civilian agencies, found themselves in-country with little understanding of the specific role they were expected to fulfill. The fact that other team members often proved incapable of

providing new arrivals with operational guidelines due to the uncertainty of their own specific PRT roles exacerbated the situation.

While adaptability remained an important feature for PRTs, the lack of individual mission descriptions sacrificed productivity and cohesion between team members. A Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who spent 4 months stationed in the Parwan PRT as the State Department representative commented that his initial deployment to Afghanistan was devoid of any operational instruction. During an interview with the United States Institute of Peace, he stated that “nobody really gave me any guidance. I was just basically cut loose and told ‘Okay, you’re at the PRT’ and that was about it. Nobody told me anything. I had no idea what my function, what my role was going to be.”³³ Under these circumstances, a key member of an interagency team spent the first few weeks of a relatively short deployment uninformed of his duties and incapable of fulfilling a meaningful role within his PRT.

Not all civilians assigned to PRTs experienced the same lack of instruction. Analysis of other State Department and USAID representatives’ interviews demonstrated that, in some cases, individuals did receive limited instruction from their respective agencies, or from the PRT commander, regarding the functions they should carry out. Civilian team members also attempted to identify their roles through research and communication with acquaintances possessing PRT experience. The fact remains, however, that an established system for disseminating guidelines and individual mission statements did not exist; an authoritative source of institutional memory and guidance was absent due to the novelty of PRT operations in Afghanistan.

The second obstacle adversely impacting inter-agency coordination in U.S. PRTs was the rigid military-oriented structure of teams. A U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, or major in the case of smaller-sized teams, always commanded American PRTs.³⁴ Officially, PRT doctrine dictated that civilian representatives from the State Department and USAID take the lead on political and reconstruction issues, while the commander had authority over matters related to security. Yet, according to a USAID interagency report, "PRT culture, people, and resources were predominantly military."³⁵ This factor created a sense of military dominance which, in some instances, caused interagency cooperation to suffer. The combination of a lack of mission guidance, along with the predominance of military staffing, created a situation in which personalities played a disproportionate role (especially the personality of the PRT commander) in determining the direction of PRT efforts.³⁶ In a situation where the vast majority of the team was comprised of military personnel, and most of the resources came from the Department of Defense (DoD), it became very easy for a commander to feel the unit's focus and projects should be military in nature.

Civil-military tensions ran highest during the initial stages of PRT development. As previously mentioned, a limited or complete lack of guidance on mission and individual roles resulted in considerable friction between military and civilian personnel. One author explained the friction as follows:

Many of the State Department personnel and other civilians on the team had military experience, but this did not reduce civil-military tensions. On the contrary, some of the harshest criticisms of the military personnel on PRTs came from retired military members of the team.

During one of the author's trips to a PRT, a member of the team confided, "Those briefing slides look good, but this place is completely dysfunctional." Civilians complained that the military personnel on the PRTs were reluctant to support them and treated them as outsiders.³⁷

In a June 2006 Interagency Assessment written by USAID, its authors determined that situations, such as the one referred to above, in which the PRT commander failed to reflect "non-DoD" team components' views and advice in leadership decisions caused the overall mission of the team to suffer.³⁸

PRTs not only had to contend with civil-military tensions within the teams, but in some instances their attachment to larger combat maneuver units created external influences that negatively impacted a wider interagency process. PRTs, depending on their location and the security environment they operated in, often worked alongside larger combat units or task forces. The teams were expected to coordinate with these larger units in order to supplement their force protection and work jointly to diffuse regional political challenges. The combat maneuver units also provided additional military cover that allowed PRTs to function in wider areas of operations or in regions with greater security threats. These relationships, however, were not always cooperative or cordial. Robert Perito states that "in some cases combat units looked down on PRTs and treated their civilian affairs teams and National Guard units as [bogus soldiers] who required protection. In extreme instances, tension between soldiers in PRTs and those in combat units precluded cooperation."³⁹

The case of a PRT Civil Affairs (CA) member – who was a retired Foreign Service officer, spoke Farsi, and had previous operational experience in Afghanistan – illustrates the interagency difficulty between some teams and their associated combat units. Assigned to

the PRT located at Herat for a few months, this CA member's role was to act as a political and cultural adviser to the team commander and other civil affairs members. Task Force Saber, a combat unit charged with disarmament efforts and general security of the area, was also present in the region. In a situation such as this, the military officer in charge of the task force outranked the PRT commander. As the CA member described the situation to interviewers, the task force commander assumed a very active role in the political affairs of the region, which was dominated by the volatile warlord, Ismael Khan. According to United States Institute of Peace interview transcripts, the task force commander, lacking any civil affairs advisers of his own, refused to accept any counsel from the PRT CA cultural and political specialist and ignored advice from other civil affairs members when it came to selecting reconstruction projects.⁴⁰

It is important to note, however, that there were many cases in which the high proportion of military staff and resources in PRTs did not hamper interagency coordination. In these instances, PRT commanders went out of their way to integrate civilian personnel in key decision processes and project implementation. The important factors to consider in these cases are that U.S. PRTs were always led by military personnel, and insufficient guidance existed for directing commanders to integrate civilian team members into key decisionmaking processes.⁴¹

The third challenge that threatened the U.S. PRT interagency process involved poor tour synchronization and team deployment policies. The sudden and ad hoc nature of PRT development resulted in considerable personnel gaps, poorly established team member relationships, and periods of relative disjointedness

among PRT staff. The combination of teams being assembled in theater, in addition to different tour lengths for the various civilian agencies involved, ultimately had a degrading effect on interagency coordination.⁴²

The matter of tour lengths influenced the deployment lengths of civilian personnel to PRTs in Afghanistan. The basis for acquiring civilian representatives was a volunteer system. The Department of State, USAID, and USDA could not force employees to accept a posting in a hazardous working environment such as Afghanistan. In the initial stages of PRT development, keeping tour lengths as low as 3 to 6 months acted as an enticement for volunteers who might not want to spend longer periods of time in country.⁴³ However, some locations with higher insurgent activity were viewed as hardship posts, and civilian agencies found it difficult to find people willing to spend more than 3 months at these PRTs. One State Department representative who served two 90-day tours on PRTs in Jalalabad and Tarin Kowt explains:

I basically went to places that nobody else wanted to go, and actually places I didn't want to go. So, that's why I went 90 days. But they prefer at least six months and would really like to have you for a year. It was either me at 90 days or nobody. So they took me. Ninety days was their bare minimum.⁴⁴

Both civilian and military team members regularly admitted that 90-day deployments were too short to establish effective working relationships. They described a turbulent environment in which PRT staff cycled in every 3 to 6 months, at a time when team members finishing their deployments were up to speed and had a unified vision of the way to proceed with PRT

projects. The replacement of these members with new ones forced many teams to start from scratch, thereby nullifying much of the progress previously achieved.⁴⁵

Poor tour synchronization among the civilian agencies also led to gaps within key PRT positions. Numerous cases existed in which for a period teams lacked State Department, USAID, or USDA representatives because former members finished their tours and departed, but were not immediately replaced by their agencies. One PRT commander interviewed commented on this challenge: "There was no consultation about which State officers would be posted at what PRTs, and on what schedule. This resulted in gaps at critical times."⁴⁶ In these situations PRT commanders often scoured the ranks of military personnel with civil affairs training to fill in civilian gaps and took the lead on political and reconstruction issues.⁴⁷

Michael J. McNerney, Director of International Policy and Capabilities in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, stated that toward the end of 2003 plans were made to extend civilian representatives' tours to 1 year.⁴⁸ Yet, a review of over 50 PRT members' tour length from different agencies showed a wide span of deployment lengths ranging from 3 months to 1 year, with the average being around 6 months. The deployment of military personnel and commanders appeared far more consistent, with most tours lasting approximately 1 year.

The creation of PRTs in theater was another critical factor related to U.S. PRT deployment. As new PRTs emerged to spread the "ISAF effect," U.S. team members were simply assigned to their new postings and rarely, if ever, had any contact with other PRT

components until they arrived on site. Consequently, there were periods of lost productivity and a lack of civil-military coordination as teams took time to build internal relationships and align their individual mission roles with that of the team's overarching mission. A lack of civilian representatives with interagency team experience and understanding of the military further retarded initial cooperation.⁴⁹

Lack of prior training for civilian agencies and key military figures composing PRTs represented the fourth obstacle to interagency cooperation. In the case of U.S. PRTs, no training regimen was implemented for State Department, USAID, or USDA officials prior to their deployment.⁵⁰ One of the primary complaints of these officials was that they received little if any instruction on how to operate within a military-dominated or interagency environment. Additionally, the Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Army provided minimal guidance or instruction about the cultural and sociopolitical surroundings in which civilians and military PRT personnel were expected to operate.

The integration of numerous agencies into a team of individuals expected to coordinate with one another required that the different components have a basic understanding of each other's institutional culture and standard operating procedures. Thrusting civilian representatives with poor understanding of the armed forces into a military-dominated group such as a PRT often resulted in poor understanding and communication between team members. The same rang true for military personnel with no experience working with civilians. Fortunately, a good portion of the civilian representatives assigned to U.S. PRTs had either prior military service or working experience with military

personnel.⁵¹ Most PRT commanders also possessed backgrounds working in joint operating environments with civilians. In spite of this fact, no predeployment training existed for civilian representatives lacking in civil-military work experience. One State Department official who served on a PRT commented that “getting some sort of acquaintance with military structures and military operations would be very useful. There are a lot of acronyms that fly around and a lot of things that are just common language for everybody involved with the military and really alien for people who aren’t.”⁵²

Civilian and military PRT members also complained about the lack of language and cultural training they received prior to their assignments. Civilians and military civil affairs members often acted as political and cultural advisers to team commanders and were expected to use their knowledge to recommend reconstruction projects that would be beneficial to the local Afghan populace. A poor understanding of the local culture or lack of basic native language skills not only impaired the ability of PRTs to function within Afghanistan, they ultimately had a negative impact on interagency cooperation within PRTs. One commander assigned to the PRT in Jalalabad claimed that when he inquired about a pre-command course to prepare him for his role, he was told there would be no predeployment training and that, in fact, no such course existed.⁵³

State Department representatives vented similar frustrations with their agency’s failure to institute a language or cultural training regimen prior to their assignments. True, many PRT Department of State representatives were selected based on their prior backgrounds, experience in the region, and linguistic abilities, and in some cases former Foreign Service

Officers were brought out of retirement to serve on PRTs. But when interviewed by the United States Institute of Peace, a high percentage of these representatives stated they wished the Department of State had provided them with more time and resources to either learn or brush up on language skills and cultural aspects of Afghanistan. One representative from the State Department described his predeployment language training as 2 weeks of self-taught practice and a Rosetta Stone audio guide.⁵⁴ Ultimately, the absence of sufficient training designed to increase PRT members' understanding of the cultural environment in which they operated compounded the problems PRTs faced in achieving interagency coordination.⁵⁵

The fifth impediment to interagency coordination confronting U.S. PRTs involved the inadequate staffing and resources provided by civilian agencies. The Department of State, USAID, and USDA proved incapable of supplying sufficient representatives with proper backgrounds to satisfy the increased demand PRTs created. As we'll see below, civilian agencies also fell short in supporting their representatives with necessary logistics and resources to effectively carry out their missions. These two factors increased friction between the civil and military camps and impeded team coordination.

Many of the USAID, State Department, and USDA representatives were described as being inexperienced junior officials or Personal Services Contractors hired because of staffing shortages.⁵⁶ PRTs lacked senior-level civilian professionals with experience operating under diverse cultures and within interagency teams, thus creating gaps between the military and civilian personnel. A PRT interagency assessment by the USAID explains this disparity:

Military and civilian representatives were doing extraordinary work under very difficult conditions. They were smart, energetic, and dedicated. However, junior or non-direct hired staff civilian representatives often lacked experience with and knowledge of their own agencies. By comparison, most military counterparts had 16-20 years experience prior to PRT command.⁵⁷

Because of this experience gap, military commanders in some cases felt their civilian representatives were unqualified, and therefore excluded them from the decisionmaking process and project implementation. At the same time, civilian representatives, with minimal training and poor logistical support from their respective agencies, found it difficult to establish their credibility and promote their ideas no matter how energetic and well-meaning the representatives were.

Even when civilian agencies were capable of providing PRTs with representatives, they lacked the necessary funding and resources to adequately support their staff in the field. In the initial stages of PRT development, neither the State Department nor USAID supplied their team representatives with independent funding for reconstruction projects. DoD provided all the financing for reconstruction projects using Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and Commander Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. By 2004, however, funding availability for PRTs improved in the civilian agencies, and Department of State and USAID began supplying their representatives with independent financial resources.⁵⁸ Even with the addition of separate funding, however, civilian representatives still depended on the PRT military component to provide transportation, interpreters, and other essential operational resources.⁵⁹

One civilian PRT member stated in an interview, “I do wish the Department of State provided more than just one person. I think that we’d be more effective if we had our own interpreters, our own transportation, and some programming funds to be able to bring to the table.”⁶⁰ The added burden of providing resources for civilian representatives, which should have been supplied by their corresponding agencies, sometimes frayed interagency cooperation between military and non-DoD personnel.

With respect to the five obstacles to interagency coordination in the U.S. PRTs discussed above, it is important to note that they were not present in every situation. There were cases in which PRT commanders eagerly integrated civilian agencies in the decisionmaking process and accepted counsel on cultural and political matters. Additionally, in spite of an absence of clear guidelines, on certain occasions U.S. PRTs had no trouble discerning the roles different agency representatives needed to fulfill. There were also instances in which civilian representatives had extensive backgrounds in Afghan culture and language abilities, proving indispensable to the team’s mission. An analysis of PRT assessments based on interviews with former team personnel, however, revealed that on a number of occasions, the challenges discussed above did create significant barriers to effective interagency cooperation, hampering the overall mission.

Recommendations.

Establishing operational guidelines to create seamless cooperation between the different components of U.S. PRTs is a far more daunting task than identifying the challenges that obstruct team coordination. Yet,

there are reasonable solutions to mitigating many of the complications that plagued the interagency process within American PRTs in Afghanistan. These solutions involve a mix of different approaches including changes to team command structure, the implementation of individual mission/role guidelines, various predeployment training programs, increased participation and resourcing by civilian agencies, and judicious imitation of aspects of other nations' PRT models that had proven to be particularly successful. Fortunately, several of the recommendations to follow have been anticipated in the organization of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq after 2006, but we shall lay out here the main recommendations along with their rationales for the sake of a comprehensive view.

The first recommendation for improving coordination within U.S. PRTs is the creation of leadership opportunities for civilians. Allowing both military and civilian personnel to command PRTs, depending on the conditions of the region, would make for better tailoring of the command structure. Leadership positions for civilians could also address the prevalent complaint concerning PRTs' lack of senior-level officials with extensive experience.⁶²

One of the key advantages of PRTs was their adaptability. The concept that teams would remain flexible and mold their missions and operational procedures to fit the various cultural and political environments present in Afghanistan proved essential for effectiveness. Yet, this flexibility did not seem to apply to leadership. It makes perfect sense that military commanders take the leading role in a PRT's activities in regions afflicted with high levels of insurgent activity and with poor security conditions. Under these circumstances, it is critical for the team's

focus to remain on the security of its members and of the Afghan populace within its area of operations. In environments where security is less of a concern, however, a civilian team leader could prove more effective in promoting the PRTs' mission and improving interagency coordination. This rationale is supported by one author who believes that establishing civilian command of PRTs allows the entire team to align its focus along the same axis, establishing more unified operational policies and team coordination.⁶³

There are additional advantages to creating leadership opportunities for civilian PRT members. Having a civilian leader within a military-dominated structure could act as a balancing factor. As previously mentioned, PRT staff and resources were predominantly supplied by DoD, thus aligning PRT culture with the military and, in some cases, marginalizing civilian representatives.⁶⁴ Placing a non-DoD official in charge of the civil-military teams in regions where the security environment allows could be a more efficient way to promote interagency cooperation. One former PRT member mirrored this sentiment:

I think you need, [for] understanding the challenge, senior level, experienced managers to be assigned for the civilian leadership piece and civilian leadership on interaction with the local government as well as on a PRT. Any other additional staff needs to be subordinate to a civilian leader who can then be the counterpart to the military liaison. I think that would go a long way towards managing relations, managing priorities, and working towards how you can deconflict and develop complementary approaches between the civil affairs teams of the military and the civilian agencies.⁶⁵

While PRT resources and personnel would still be overrepresented by the military, the decisionmaking process would be mainly under the auspices of a

senior civilian representative, most likely from the Department of State. This PRT structure would create a far more uniform dispersal of influence between civilian and military components, forcing the different members of the team to coordinate their efforts in order to accomplish their mission.

Another advantage to be attained by creating U.S. PRT leadership positions for civilians is the recruiting potential within non-DoD agencies. The possibility of a command role on teams designed for SSTR operations could entice senior-level civilians with extensive experience to seek assignment in the U.S. PRTs, especially if it is a way to get promoted. The context in which civilians view their assignments to PRTs is essential. If most civilians, especially senior-level officials, see deployment to PRTs as having a negative or irrelevant impact on their future career advancement, they will remain unwilling to accept such hardship posts. Placing State Department or other nonmilitary staff in charge of PRTs, however, could make assignment to the teams a coveted position because of the leadership experience gained while in Afghanistan. Having a greater number of qualified and experienced civilian personnel within U.S. PRTs would remove a significant obstacle hindering interagency coordination. Doing so would also aid in establishing a higher degree of confidence team members have in each other's ability to fulfill their individual roles, thus increasing their willingness to cooperate with one another.

Lessons from the German PRT model, which operated out of Konduz, provide useful insight in a PRT structure under civilian leadership. The German provincial reconstruction team possessed a design considerably different from the U.S. model. Termed a "heavy PRT" by Colonel Gerd Brandstetter, an

International Fellow from Germany in the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005, the German team, with 400-plus personnel, was almost five times the size of the “light” American PRTs.⁶⁶ Brandstetter describes the PRT at Konduz as an “interministerial venture between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC), and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).”⁶⁷ A separate, “robust” contingent of German civilian representatives supplemented the large military task force responsible for protecting and facilitating PRT mission goals.⁶⁸ Due to a more relaxed security environment in the region, the German PRT at Konduz, in contrast to the U.S. model, had a senior member from the MoFA in command of the team. This leadership structure made the German military commander, who took the lead on all operational facets linked to security issues, subordinate and responsible for coordination with the MoFA in all PRT-related matters. Ultimately, the German PRT leadership structure, in conjunction with the support of civilian components, allowed the team in Konduz to foster strong interagency coordination among team members in spite of a strong military presence.⁶⁹

A second recommendation that could prove useful in establishing better interagency cooperation in U.S. PRTs is to establish specific guidelines that explain the roles, missions, and authority of individual team members.⁷⁰ A Foreign Service Officer who spent over a year deployed in Afghanistan explains:

A lesson learned right up front is, if you’re going to have these types of entities like a PRT, . . . people need to be fully briefed up on the interagency, the role of the PRT, what they do and don’t do, have the documentation,

understand what the expectations for these bodies are, and . . . right up front, before either getting deployed or going out to visit, have a sense of what a PRT strategy is.⁷¹

While it remains important for PRTs and their methods of operation to be adaptable to regional demands, keeping the roles of team personnel obscure and unclearly outlined does more harm than good. The confusion and uncertainty many PRT members, especially civilian representatives, suffered from during their initial tours in Afghanistan, which wasted time, resources, and hampered interagency coordination, must be improved. Disseminating guidelines prior to deployment that delineate the duties each PRT component is expected to fulfill and the specific areas for which it has responsibility is a means for doing so.

Such guidelines would have a strongly positive impact on the interagency process of U.S. PRTs. They would eliminate much of the confusion team members experienced when first deployed to PRTs. While it is always somewhat bewildering to begin work within a new environment, especially one as alien and complex as Afghanistan, having a clear notion of your mission and role provides a platform from which to operate. When PRT representatives deployed to their teams without understanding their functions, they were, in some cases, marginalized by other PRT components. If all agencies provide their representatives with a clearer understanding of their team functions, however, the different PRT components are far more likely to coordinate effectively.⁷² Even if the different demands PRTs must meet in the various regions of Afghanistan make it necessary to evolve individual missions, it is easier to do so when team members have a fundamental understanding of their roles within the PRT.

Interagency predeployment guidance would also inform many of the civilian PRT representatives of the authority they possess within the team. From the initial stages of PRT development, representatives from the Department of State and USAID were expected to take the lead in all matters related to governance and reconstruction. Yet, according to a government report, "Very few PRT staff, civilian or military, understood or had seen U.S. national policy guidance on their roles within the PRT."⁷³ As a result, on several occasions military personnel construed the civilian team components as advisors rather than decisionmakers. Civilians, unaware that U.S. policy put them in charge of reconstruction and governance matters, found it difficult to overcome such impressions, and accordingly were not in a position to take proactive charge of their portfolios. Disseminating clearer guidelines to all U.S. PRT components prior to their deployment would prevent the misinterpretation of team members' roles within the civil-military group. Civilian representatives would be able to assume responsibilities aggressively in their respective areas of expertise while working closely with the military commanders, ultimately developing interagency cooperation as individual missions were aligned within a unified team strategy.

Significant joint predeployment training for U.S. PRTs is the third recommendation intended to improve interagency coordination among team components. Michael McNerney, who worked on Provincial Reconstruction Team policy for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, states that "military and civilian personnel should be educated, trained, and equipped for stabilization and reconstruction missions in tandem, and not 6 weeks before deployment but over their entire careers."⁷⁴ One of the major complaints

from former PRT members interviewed by the United States Institute of Peace involved the lack of training available to them prior to their deployment. Both civilian and military personnel stressed the importance of receiving training on the cultural background of Afghanistan; instruction on languages such as Pashto, Dari, or Farsi; and guidance on how to operate within an interagency environment.⁷⁵ Requiring all members to undergo such training, especially as a team, would provide significant enhancements to their ability to coordinate with each other once in theater.

Training together as a team prior to deployment would assist in developing good working relationships between team members. It takes time and a concerted effort from all parties to develop trust and proper communication between individuals—factors critical to good interagency coordination. Expecting these relationships to blossom immediately when PRTs are assembled in theater is wishful thinking. Requiring that team members train and deploy together would allow individuals to gain insight into the capabilities of other PRT components, so they would know how best to communicate and interact with them prior to conducting operations.

PRT representatives not only need to establish individual bonds with other team members, they must gain at least a rudimentary understanding of how agencies other than their own operate and are structured. By training alongside the military, civilian PRT representatives would gain a basic understanding of the military chain of command, standard operating procedures, and lexicon. Military personnel can gain valuable insight into their civilian counterparts' operational strengths and limitations, as well as important interagency work experience. Numerous

sources point out the British and some ISAF models for emulation in respect to joint predeployment training. Prior to the United Kingdom's establishment of a PRT at Mazar-e-Sharif, both civilian and military members were subjected to joint training before being deployed and supported as a team.²⁴² According to a U.S. Government report, some ISAF countries "identify PRT members as much as a year in advance and have the members undergo significant training together."⁷⁶ This critical preparation allowed British and ISAF PRT components to attain substantial understanding of the structure and abilities of the different agencies involved, resulting in high levels of interagency coordination.⁷⁷

Joint training and deployment for U.S. PRT members also creates a partial solution to the challenges posed by poor tour synchronization. Eliminating the ad hoc manner in which PRTs were assembled by sending the team in as a group and requiring all personnel to undergo predeployment training would reduce much of the confusion experienced by members when first arriving in theater. In order to complement PRT joint deployment, civilian and military tours need to be standardized and made uniform as a way to prevent premature rotation of personnel as well as gaps in key staffing positions.⁷⁸

Perito states that "at a minimum, State Department and USAID representatives should receive a predeployment introduction in Dari or Pashto, briefings on Afghan society and culture, and orientation on the unique requirements of working with the U.S. military."⁷⁹ The availability of cultural and language training to operate more effectively in the diverse regions that compose Afghanistan would create greater trust in State Department and USAID representatives assigned to U.S. PRTs. Making these individuals indispensable

to the PRT commanders, as well as to the Army civil affairs component, would increase their willingness to actively integrate civilian representatives into the team's decisionmaking deliberations, especially in matters related to governance and reconstruction.

Efforts were made by the U.S. military to institute a PRT predeployment training regimen in late 2004. PRT commanders began receiving unit-sponsored training, and the military, in collaboration with the National Defense University, initiated development of a leadership PRT instruction program. Similar efforts need to be undertaken by civilian agencies. The State Department, USAID, and USDA should strongly consider both creating their own agency-specific programs and sending their representatives to military training programs. The Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, established in 2004, should make an effort to become the driving force in the integration and adoption of civil-military training programs for future PRT deployments.⁸⁰

The fourth and final recommendation is to substantially increase of civilian involvement in and support for PRTs. Implementing training programs in addition to staffing and supporting PRT operations demands a significant increase of funding and personnel from civilian agencies. Undoubtedly, financial and budgetary constraints on the State Department, USAID, and USDA make this goal difficult to achieve, yet increased civilian participation remains essential for the continued improvement of interagency coordination within PRTs.⁸¹ Additionally, the costs of training are relatively inexpensive compared to the financial and political costs incurred when opportunities are lost and mistakes are made because of dysfunctional PRTs.

When civilian agencies failed to produce adequate numbers of representatives to staff PRTs in Afghanistan, other team components had to fill the void. A representative from the Department of State assigned to the Herat PRT illustrated this problem:

Every PRT is supposed to have one civilian each from the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture, in addition to one Afghan Ministry of Interior representative. My PRT didn't have any of those people, so USAID, in the absence of any of their employees, would delegate their duties to State, so the whole time I was there, I was also wearing a USAID hat.⁸²

Relegating important duties to representatives who are not specifically trained for such work can be unproductive and cause disruptions in interagency coordination. Civilian agencies must make an extra effort to provide sufficient personnel to PRTs so that teams consistently have the correct staff to fulfill all the roles necessary to accomplish the team's mission.

In addition to producing enough personnel to staff PRTs, civilian agencies need to supply their representatives with ample resources so that they are not dependent on the team's military component for logistical support or funding for reconstruction projects.⁸³ Civilian PRT members often found themselves at the mercy of the military staff for transportation and other needs that should have been delivered by their respective agencies. This resulted in a disproportionate level of military influence within U.S. PRTs. Agricultural specialists deployed to PRTs, for example, received no funding whatsoever from the USDA. They were reduced to soliciting financial resources from the Commanders Emergency

Response Program Fund (CERP) which necessitated the military commander's approval.⁸⁴ Providing civilian representatives with control over the majority of resources assigned for quick-impact PRT projects would improve full-spectrum performance, as well as interagency cooperation, within the military-dominated teams.

The British PRT model illustrates how civilian control of reconstruction funds improves team cooperation. While the UK's PRT located at Mazar-e-Sharif was under the command of a military officer, a civilian representative was in control of the majority of funding resources. According to Michael McNerney:

The UK military relied on its government's Department for International Development for funding assistance projects. While this limited the military's freedom of action, it may well have been a blessing in disguise. UK military personnel coordinated closely with their civilian agency counterparts in order to access their funding.⁸⁵

In the case of U.S. PRTs, the majority of readily accessible resources dedicated for reconstruction projects should be provided or placed under the control of USAID or State Department representatives.

It is important to mention that USAID staff deployed to PRTs did have easy access to the considerable resources of the Quick Impact Program (QIP), a funding mechanism with \$137.3 million designed to support reconstruction projects in the USAID representatives' areas of operations.⁸⁶ In spite of QIP, projects funded with USAID money were difficult to get authorized and progressed considerably slower than assistance projects financed through DoD CERP funds.⁸⁷ One former PRT member claimed that during his 6-month deployment to Afghanistan "not one red cent" of USAID money

was spent.⁸⁸ It does little good for civilian agencies to provide resources such as those in the QIP when their representatives cannot easily access or employ them to accomplish their missions.

The foregoing recommendations by no means cover all the efforts that must be made to improve cooperation within U.S. PRTs. They do, however, suggest means for overcoming some of the major obstacles that hampered interagency coordination within U.S. PRTs operating in Afghanistan from 2003 until early 2006. Creating leadership positions for civilians, establishing clear guidance on individual team member roles, requiring joint predeployment training, increasing civilian participation in PRTs, and emulating best practices from other nations' PRT models where applicable are all realistic and achievable objectives that would provide tangible benefits for future cooperation within U.S. PRTs.

Recent PRT Developments.

The use of PRTs to aid in SSTR operations has not diminished since the 2006 time frame that this case study is based on. In fact, efforts have been made to expand the number of PRTs operating in Afghanistan using NATO and coalition forces. As of 2006, all PRTs supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM were placed under ISAF command, subject to management by NATO and coalition forces.⁸⁹ PRTs are also being deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As of November 2006, there were 10 operational PRTs located throughout Iraq, with plans for an increase in their numbers.⁹⁰ In January of 2007, President Bush, during his address to the nation presenting "The New Way Forward" in Iraq, called for a doubling of PRTs

deployed in Iraq.⁹¹ Owing to the increased demand for PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq, some changes have been made to U.S. PRT structure and deployment policy, based on lessons derived from the experiences of earlier teams. Reviewing some of these key changes provides insight into the U.S. Government's efforts to improve interagency coordination within PRTs.

One of the most notable differences between earlier U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan and current ones operating in Iraq is the leadership and civil-military composition of the teams. As previously discussed, PRTs in Afghanistan had an Army lieutenant colonel commander and were predominantly staffed by military personnel. According to a senior program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, PRTs in Iraq are "led by a senior State Department official and composed primarily of civilian personnel."⁹² The 10 new teams sent as part of President Bush's expansion of the PRT program will be embedded with U.S. Army brigade combat teams (BCT) so as to receive necessary force protection. The military commander of the BCT will assume charge of all matters related to security while the PRT's civilian leader will have control on all economic and governance issues.⁹³

The change in PRT command and personnel composition shows a genuine attempt to integrate civilian agencies and their representatives into the civil-military teams. Providing larger numbers of civilian staff and placing a senior State Department official as head of the PRTs illustrate how attempts have been made to institute a uniform level of influence within the team. Under this new structure, interagency cooperation should increase because military personnel will have little choice but to coordinate with their civilian bosses, while civilian agencies must continue to rely on the military for protection.

Another major change is the creation of joint training programs for DoD staff, reservists, contractors, and other interagency personnel. New PRTs deployed to Iraq will be created in stages. Prior to assignment of the majority of personnel, a “joint management” team consisting of 40 different civilian representatives will assess the various needs and environmental conditions of the PRT site so that the team can be tailored to meet regional demands. Moreover, these teams “will undergo predeployment training together.”⁹⁴

This prior preparation is a 16-day predeployment training and processing program hosted at three different venues. The first 5 days are spent at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute (FIS) in Washington, DC, training for PRT interagency coordination. This is an 18-module instructional course designed by the many U.S. agencies with representatives present in Iraqi PRTs. During this session, PRT members are exposed to lessons from past team deployments; Iraqi culture and history; the PRT role, mission, and strategy; and additional instruction on interagency coordination, including simulation exercises.

Training at FIS is followed by 5 days at the Diplomatic Security Training Center exercising on the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Course (FACT). According to the DoD predeployment training itinerary, “This course is expected to meet the needs of personnel traveling overseas by featuring practical, hands-on training in surveillance detection, counterterrorism vehicle operation, explosives and weapons familiarization, and emergency medical training.”⁹⁵

The final two stops for PRT personnel are the Army Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement

Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, where team members are processed, medically validated, supplied equipment, and given environment and cultural awareness training. The last part of predeployment training and processing is spent with the National Coordination Team in Baghdad. This 3- to 5-day orientation session covers assignment responsibilities, debriefing of current conditions in the region, and a description of administrative support.⁹⁶

This training regimen represents a giant leap forward in comparison to what was available for earlier PRT personnel deployed to Afghanistan. The program reflects much of the previously recommended training, including instruction on interagency coordination, cultural history, and guidance on individual as well as PRT roles and missions. All these training endeavors, if executed properly, will aid the interagency process in future U.S. PRTs.

The true impact of these changes to PRT structure and deployment policy has not yet been felt, making an assessment of their effectiveness difficult. The PRT interagency training schedule described above, for example, received its first candidates as recently as March 2007. Yet, the signs are encouraging. A combination of increased civilian participation, manning, and resources in U.S. PRTs; improved training; leadership positions for non-DoD staff; and more efficient deployment policies all suggest that PRT development as related to interagency coordination is headed in the right direction. It is imperative that different agencies continue to study how these recent changes affect cooperation among current and future PRTs, as a prelude to making further changes.

Conclusion.

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations will continue to play a prominent role in the future of U.S. foreign policy. The current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a need to adapt SSTR operations so that they can function in hazardous COIN environments which pose multiple threats to civilian and military personnel. Establishing seamless and effective interagency cooperation is a key, if not the most important, component to adapting SSTR functions for high-risk locations. Identifying, analyzing, and incorporating lessons from previous experiences, such as those of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan, represent a critical tool for improving future interagency teams conceived to operate in COIN environments.

The U.S. PRT experience in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2006 reveals several serious impediments to cooperation between team members. First, the failure to provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities individual team members are expected to fulfill creates confusion, drains resources, and obstructs team members' ability to coordinate with one another. Second, giving any one agency, in this case the military, a disproportionate share of influence and resources can lead to a credibility gap and the marginalization of other team representatives. Third, assembling teams in theater, deploying team components at different times, and misaligning tour lengths impair relationship-building and cause team disjointedness. Fourth, the failure to provide sufficient interagency, language, and cultural training results in some team members being unprepared to operate in a multiagency and culturally diverse environment. Fifth and finally, inadequate

participation and logistical support on the part of civilian agencies overburdens other team members, results in operational gaps, and causes an imbalance within the civil-military team structure. These factors all negatively impacted U.S. PRTs' ability to maximize team cooperation. However, such impediments are not terminal. They can be resolved through the implementation of the four recommendations made earlier. Expending resources to solve the problems that hamper PRT interagency cooperation may be expensive; however, these costs are far less than those incurred when the duties PRTs are expected to meet are not performed correctly and the overall mission fails to be completed.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

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31. These interviews were conducted by the staff of the United States Institute of Peace's Professional Training Program which includes U.S. and foreign diplomats, government officials, military personnel, law enforcement professionals, and leaders of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, as well as civic activists and tribal leaders in conflict zones. The goal of this program is to integrate training seminars and workshops that real-world practitioners can use to improve their skills and management capabilities. (See the United States Institute of Peace website, www.usip.org/training/index.html, accessed April 25, 2007.)

32. Dziedzic and Seidl, p. 4.

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41. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #1.

42. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 14.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
44. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #3.
45. *Ibid.*, Interview #6.
46. *Ibid.*, Interview #31.
47. *Ibid.*, Interview #51.
48. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 15.
49. McNerney, p. 37.
50. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 11.
51. Perito, "U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," pp. 13-14.
52. Information gathered from various interviewee biographical sketches in United States Institute of Peace Interviews.
53. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #4.
54. *Ibid.*, Interview #40.
55. *Ibid.*, Interview #6.
56. For instance, the concept of honoring and respecting elders is very important to the Afghan population and was a cornerstone of many relationships built in Afghanistan. Learning these cultural nuances allowed U.S. representatives to form a positive bond with the Afghan people that was critical to PRT missions.
57. Perito, "U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," p. 11.
58. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 15.

59. McNerney, p. 41.
60. Perito, "U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," p. 13.
61. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #4.
62. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 17.
63. Sedra, p. 10.
64. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 10.
65. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #31.
66. Brandstetter, p. 12.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
68. Perito, "U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," p. 3.
69. Brandstetter, pp. 9-14.
70. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 13.
71. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #31.
72. Providing guidelines does not mean a set of rigid roles which PRT members must stick to. It is critical that, when guidance is given about the duties a PRT representative is expected to fulfill, additional instruction about maintaining team flexibility be given as well. Army Colonel (retired) Joseph R. Cerami, a professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, explains that giving strict guidelines can sometimes lead to an attitude of "not my job." This problem must be addressed by educating future PRT representatives on the adaptive and flexible nature of PRTs and their members in addition to providing guidelines of basic team roles.

73. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 13.
74. McNerney, p. 45.
75. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #5.
76. McNerney, p. 45; and USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 17.
77. USAID Interagency Assessment, p. 17.
78. United States Institute of Peace Interviews, Interview #16. An example of PRT predeployment training conducted by other nations can be seen with the New Zealand PRT. It spent 5 weeks in Tekapo, New Zealand, conducting advance combat training, group exercises, and taking classes on Afghan culture. James Heffield, "PreDeployment Training in Tekapo," New Zealand Defense Force, www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/deployments/afghanistan/articles/2006/20060912-pdtt.htm, accessed April 25, 2007.
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82. Perito, "U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," p. 14.
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94. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

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CHAPTER 6

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS IN RECONSTRUCTION OF POST-WORLD WAR II JAPAN

Katherine Rogers

As a world superpower and arguably a global hegemon, the United States has become increasingly involved in nation-building efforts since the end of the Cold War. In these efforts, U.S. forces have encountered recurring problems, including destroyed physical infrastructure, dysfunctional institutions, and violent opposition. An inability to cope with these problems would both prevent U.S. forces from gaining an opportunity to leave “gracefully” (i.e., without creating a failed state and without appearing to lose the conflict) and cause a loss of legitimacy for any U.S. occupation. To avoid this dilemma, successful state-building is imperative.¹

The U.S. Government has successfully dealt with the issues of nation-building in the past, most notably in the case of post-World War II Japan. In 7 years, the occupying force under General Douglas MacArthur transformed a nation broken by over a decade of militarism into an economically successful, peaceful democracy. At least, it looks that way in retrospect. This chapter looks at the entirety of the occupation of Japan, examining both the achievements and the complications that occurred.

The first section describes Japan’s condition immediately following the war. The second section

describes the creation of initial policy for Japan and the interagency cooperation from which it emerged. The third section examines the unique structure of Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers' General Headquarters (SCAP GHQ) and its function in executing policy, while the fourth section describes the achievements that resulted from SCAP's policy execution. The fifth section examines some complications that occurred during the occupation, and the final section suggests some lessons learned from the experience.

JAPAN'S CONDITION AFTER THE WAR

At the end of the war, Japan was utterly devastated. Some 65 percent of Tokyo lay in ruins from American firebombing, and only two million citizens remained of the city's original population of seven million.² Nagasaki and Hiroshima had suffered massive structural damage, loss of life, and debilitating radiation sickness from the atomic bombs. The nation lay drained of resources after 13 years of constant military action, having gained little from such conflict and lost much. Japan had lost the goodwill of its neighbors, while the loss of the territories occupied during the 1930s had cut off access to vital natural resources. Since Japanese textile and food production supplied only a fraction of the public demand, millions of people faced starvation.³ Nine million citizens were homeless as a result of Allied bombing campaigns, and a further three million were stranded overseas.⁴ Economic infrastructure was crushed, with coal production one-half the wartime production rate and steel production one-fourth the rate of the wartime peak.⁵

As a result of the pitiful state of affairs in Japan at the end of the war, the country found itself completely

at the mercy of the Allied victors. The population was thus willing to accept the long occupation necessary to achieve stability and promote nation-building.⁶ For its part, America saw the continued threat of communist expansion in China and Korea as an incentive to invest in a lengthy occupation. David Edelstein remarks that occupation interests do not always include nation-building. However, in this case the Americans found themselves with two distinct occupation responsibilities. First, the international politics surrounding the occupation dictated the demilitarization of Japan. Second, the need for continued support from Japan, which the Americans desired in anticipation of a future conflict with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), dictated the requirements for nation-building and democratization. These coincident needs provided the time for the United States to succeed in the reconstruction of Japan.

INITIAL OCCUPATION POLICY

The Allies laid out their official goals for Japan during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The resulting document, known as the Potsdam Declaration,⁷ listed five major steps the Japanese would have to accept as part of their unconditional surrender: (1) disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power; (2) return of occupied territories as specified in the Cairo Declaration;⁸ (3) justice to war criminals; (4) strengthening of democracy; and (5) economic demilitarization.⁹ Additionally, Japan had to accept military occupation by the Allied forces until it met all conditions of the surrender.

The U.S. State and War Departments played large roles in establishing these goals, both before and

after the Potsdam Conference. The State Department formulated the Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East in 1943 to analyze possible occupation solutions in Japan. The Committee consisted of representatives from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and other divisions with interests in the area, including the new research division. They considered such issues as the optimal composition of occupation forces, the meaning of "unconditional surrender," the postwar objectives of the United States in Japan, and the role of the Emperor in postwar Japan. By February 1944, the War and Navy Departments began to consider these policy questions as well, and asked the Department of State for definitive policy statements regarding some 20 questions that required answers prior to Japan's surrender. These questions overlapped many of the same issues the State Department had studied during previous months.¹⁰

The War Department also conducted independent studies on occupation policy issues. General John F. Hilldring, Director of the Army's Civil Affairs Division, began preparing Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive 1380/15 as early as January 1944. On July 4, 1945, Brigadier General George Lincoln ordered the Policy Section of the War Department to prepare a study on the post-defeat control of Japan and Japanese territory for the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The study was completed on July 9, just in time for the Potsdam Conference.¹¹

In November 1944, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy agreed to appoint a committee to "coordinate the views of the three Departments in matters of common interest."¹² The following month, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) came into existence. Subcommittees like the Pacific Far Eastern

Subcommittee prepared and sent recommendation papers requesting comment to the JCS, and then to the Committee itself for approval. After approval, the Joint Chiefs implemented the recommendations.¹³ Over the course of the reconstruction of Japan, the SWNCC approved many documents instrumental in the rebuilding process.

One recommendation paper, the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" (SWNCC150/4), proved particularly useful. SWNCC150/4 reiterated the goals laid out in the Potsdam Declaration and detailed methods for achieving these goals. It was the first document MacArthur received that gave him guidelines for his role as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). SWNCC 150/4 directed the Supreme Commander to work toward two ultimate U.S. objectives for the Japanese occupation: (1) to ensure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world, and (2) to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people.¹⁴

In essence, SWNCC 150/4 construed the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration as means to these ends rather than goals in and of themselves. The document then gave the Supreme Commander more specific instructions as to the extent of Allied authority

for military occupation, relations with the Japanese government, military disarmament, treatment of war criminals, economic demilitarization, promotion of democratic processes, resumption of peaceful economic activity, and payment of reparations.¹⁵ Many of these instructions established specific SCAP policies. These directions included orders to dissolve "ultranationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional, and commercial societies and institutions," to "favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry," and to make reparations "through the transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese economy or the supplying of the occupying forces."¹⁶ Further examination shows that SCAP followed these directions to the letter in its operations.

Although the three military departments had considerable clout in creating policy, one might argue that the JCS had more influence in shaping actual events as they unfolded in Japan. Within the military chain of command, the Joint Chiefs were lodged between the President and the Supreme Commander, so that MacArthur took his marching orders from them. Shortly after issuing SWNCC 150/4, the Joint Chiefs issued a parallel document called the "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper" (JCS 1380/15). This top secret directive informed MacArthur of "the authority which you will possess and the policies which will guide you in the occupation and control of Japan in the initial period after surrender."¹⁷ JCS 1380 fleshed out the "recommendations" of SWNCC 150/4 in the same way that SWNCC 150/4 had more fully developed the

basic concepts expressed in the Potsdam Declaration. For example, where SWNCC states that “Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility,”¹⁸ JCS 1380/15 elaborates as follows:

5b. Except as indicated in paragraph 7c below, in no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in the activities of the other organizations enumerated in paragraph 5g below, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation.¹⁹

This degree of detail, as well as the direct address of MacArthur in the second person (as opposed to speaking indirectly of the “Supreme Commander”), may have made the military commander more comfortably secure since the wording resembled a set of orders more closely than a policy recommendation. By 1946, the SWNCC began filtering its “recommendations” through the JCS, presumably to obviate such duplicate effort.²⁰

ORGANIZATION IN THEATER

Any examination of policy in theater must include the role of the U.S. military. The military, and General MacArthur in particular, dominated the operational implementation of occupation policy. Initially, this resulted from the necessity of having military forces present to conduct the war against and later the

occupation of Japan. However, in the first year of the occupation, the State and War Departments solidified the military approach with an agreement on the division of labor in Japan. In a memo to President Harry Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes suggested that the State Department bear primary responsibility for the formulation of occupation policy, including chairmanship of the SWNCC, while the War Department take responsibility for execution and administration. The memo also suggested requiring all other agencies to assist the War Department in finding "suitable civilian personnel to complete the necessary field staff to discharge the War Department responsibility for government in these Occupied Areas by assignment of their existing personnel and facilities, by assistance in recruiting specially qualified persons, and in all other practicable action."²¹ The President approved this memo, encouraging other agencies to fall in line. In part due to this memo, the reconstruction of Japan remained a military mission for all 7 years of the occupation, rather than transitioning to civil authorities. This historical precedent directly contradicts current opinions that the job of nation-building traditionally belongs to civilians.

The main responsibility for managing the occupation in theater fell to General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. MacArthur also headed the Far East Command of the Army (also called Army Forces Pacific). To wear his two hats efficiently, MacArthur ordered his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland, to draw up a new organization plan. Owing to the dual mission of occupying and reconstructing Japan, Sutherland split off from the projected Civil Affairs section (G-5) a separate SCAP General Headquarters (GHQ),²² while

preserving the Far East Command (FEC) GHQ. Both headquarters would be under MacArthur and the same Chief of Staff, but would operate more or less independently of one another. FEC GHQ would bear responsibility for the bulk of military occupation and security responsibilities. On the other side, SCAP GHQ would manage the many processes associated with nation-building. The majority of the regular Army worked in FEC GHQ, while SCAP GHQ consisted mostly of reserve officers with a civilian perspective. This organizational structure largely removed the career military from the process of democratization, and eased the inherent tension between the necessary autocracy of military culture and the requirements of a budding democracy. SCAP GHQ initially consisted of nine sections (Economic and Scientific, Civil Information and Education, Natural Resources, Public Health and Welfare, Government, Legal, Civil Communications, Civil Intelligence, and Statistics and Reports) and they were collectively responsible for the overwhelming majority of accomplishments in reforming and rebuilding Japan.²³

POLICY IN THEATER

Francis Fukuyama describes successful American nation-building as occurring in three phases. In the first phase, the United States solves immediate problems of physical infrastructure through the infusion of security forces, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance in restoring physical infrastructure (e.g., water, electricity, sanitation, etc.). The second phase begins once a viable level of stability is restored, and focuses on building self-sustaining state institutions. Finally, in the third phase, the United States helps the state institutions

provide public services including public education and protection of property rights. American values may dictate the inclusion of civil liberties and democratic processes in the newly developed institutions during the final phase.²⁴

We may recall the original five goals of the occupation, stated in the Potsdam Declaration, as follows: (1) disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power; (2) return of occupied territories as specified in the Cairo Declaration; (3) justice to war criminals; (4) strengthening of democracy; and (5) economic demilitarization. Of these, the first three dealt with the aftermath of World War II, and the latter two encompassed the three steps described in Fukuyama's concept of nation-building.

Once deep into in the reconstruction process, SCAP discovered that the disarmament of the military and removal of militarists from power, although two means to the same end, required vastly different approaches. As a result, one branch of the organization dealt with demobilization of the military and repatriation of Japanese military and civilians from abroad, while another branch dealt with the weeding out of aggressive retrograde forces within the government under the larger goal of strengthening democracy; similarly, demilitarizing the economy became one of many goals in the reorganization of economic institutions to promote democracy.²⁵


Disarming the Military.

SCAP delegated the initial demobilization of troops to the Japanese War and Navy Ministries which, by December 1, 1945, had completely demobilized the 2.2 million men on the main islands. After that point,

the main task of demobilization was the repatriation of approximately 6.5 million Japanese residing in the former colonies, as well as the return of some 1.25 million foreign nationals found residing in Japan at the end of the war. By early 1948, virtually all of the Japanese expatriates had been returned to the home islands, with the exception of some 765,000 Japanese citizens in Soviet-controlled areas. By May 1949, Soviet ships officially ceased returning such dispossessed Japanese citizens to Japan, with Japanese records today still unable to account for some 375,000 of them. The loss of these Japanese, presumed dead, represented a stark contrast between the performance of the Americans and that of the Soviets in repatriation efforts. Repatriation of foreign nationals back to their homelands (predominantly Koreans) largely ended in 1947.²⁶ A large portion of the Korean population chose to remain in Japan, a fortunate decision as conditions deteriorated on the Korean peninsula. However, the large foreign national population later caused security concerns for SCAP.²⁷ By 1948, at least half of the Koreans in Japan were under leftist influence, mirroring the political polarization on the Korean peninsula.²⁸

Return of Occupied Territories.

Territorial changes occurred in accordance with the Cairo Declaration, with all changes accomplished by 1947 except for certain small islands in the Pacific such as the Ryukyus. Japan ceded Manchuria to China and liberated Korea. The loss of these territories, although sought by the Allies, deprived Japan of many of the natural resources it had access to during the war and severely handicapped the recovery of the Japanese economy.²⁹



Map 1. Japanese Empire before and after Enactment of Cairo Declaration³⁰

Justice to War Criminals.

To try Japanese war criminals, the allied nations chartered the War Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal presided over the trial of 28 men on counts of waging war against China and the allied nations; ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs); creating or executing a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression; and deliberately and recklessly disregarding their duty to take adequate steps to prevent atrocities. Defendants included four former premiers, three former foreign ministers, four former war ministers, two former navy ministers, six former generals, two former ambassadors, and three former economic and financial leaders, but

did not include the Emperor or any members of the Imperial family. The absence of the Emperor from this list has been a cause of criticism on many fronts, but the United States decided on a pragmatic basis that preserving the legitimacy of the Imperial house would serve the occupation better by garnering support for U.S. measures than by hanging the royals from the gallows. All of the putatively sane defendants who survived the trial were sentenced to death or extended prison terms. Of the seven men sentenced to death, all bore responsibility for mass-scale atrocities, most prominently the Rape of Nanking.³¹

In 1937, during the Japanese offensive against Nanking, several prominent Nanking civilians established a “safety zone” of neutrality which both China and Japan agreed to respect so long as the zone did not harbor soldiers of the opposing force. However, despite their government’s acquiescence in the agreement, Japanese troops entered the city on December 13 of that year. Over the next 6 weeks, Japanese soldiers murdered an estimated 200,000 Chinese civilians and POWs, many of whom were taking refuge in the recognized safety zone.³² Tillman Durdin reported to the *New York Times* that “all the alleys and streets were filled with civilian bodies, including women and children.”³³

A contemporary account of the trials expressed disappointment that they did not elicit widespread feelings of shame or guilt in the Japanese population for initiating the war.³⁴ Moreover, the trials did not cast a hoped-for shadow on the legitimacy of the former regime. On the contrary, wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo salvaged his reputation as a loyal Imperialist by accepting full responsibility for the war, thus indirectly absolving the Emperor.³⁵ The Nuremburg Tribunals in

Europe and the Far East Tribunals in Japan were some of the first examples of international law enforcement on the issue of wartime atrocities. The Allies conducted the tribunals without judicial precedent, solely on the conviction that some crimes were of such unspeakable enormity, they could not in good conscience be allowed to go unpunished³⁶ As a deterrent or political lesson, the trials may have failed to serve their purpose, but as a precedent for enforcement of such international law in the future, the trials succeeded admirably.

Strengthening Democracy.

SCAP made its greatest effort in strengthening democracy through its revision of the Japanese Constitution. The revised constitution, written by Americans and forced through the Diet, made four major changes to the Japanese government.³⁷ First, it changed the upper house of the Diet to an elected body. Second, it moved executive power from the Emperor to the cabinet, as designated by the Diet. Third, it endowed Japanese citizens with civil rights, similar to those granted to Americans in the Bill of Rights. Finally, the constitution forswore the use of war as a prerogative of the state.³⁸ These revisions still remain in the Japanese constitution. Of course, many other programs contributed to the democratization of Japan, since improving the democratic foundations of Japan proved a multifaceted endeavor. In addition to revising the constitution, the Allies focused their efforts on educational reform, reorganization of economic institutions, labor reform, and agrarian reform, and certainly on removing the militarists from government and positions of influence, effected through a carefully executed purge.

Government Purge.

As laid down in SWNCC 150/4, many of the reforms, including the purge, were instituted by the Japanese government with SCAP oversight. The Japanese government even established the procedures for conducting the purge. Basically, the government required any person to whom the purge might apply to complete a 3-page questionnaire. A series of boards then screened the 2,308,863 completed papers and purged approximately 220,000 individuals.³⁹ The purge affected significantly more people than Washington anticipated. Richard Finn attributes this surprise to the inevitable communication errors that occur when policymakers are not involved in policy execution. The purge also resulted in the expulsion of 80 percent of the Diet and half of Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara's cabinet, almost crippling the government.⁴⁰

Educational Reform.

The purge also extended to the educational field, where the removal of certain teachers complemented an overall policy of eliminating all militaristic and ultranationalistic influences on the education system. As part of educational reform, SCAP also worked to simplify the Japanese writing system and standardize the education program nationwide. However, the postwar recession limited the money the government could spend on education, infringing to some extent the degree to which reforms could be effected. Some of these programs found resonance in the Japanese government itself, such as institution of compulsory education at the elementary and middle school levels.⁴¹

Other reforms, like the attempt to create general education programs at the university level, found little support in the Japanese educational establishment. Akihiro Itoh draws a distinction between voluntary, piecemeal reforms and externally imposed reforms. He notes that those of the former category tend to succeed, while those of the latter tend to lag and create conflicts within the system.⁴² In educational reform, as in other areas, a lack of cultural understanding impaired the extent to which the American occupation could make an impact.

Economic Reorganization.

To democratize the economy, SCAP initiated a number of measures aimed at disbanding the *zaibatsu*, or large family-controlled banking and industrial conglomerates that monopolized large portions of the Japanese economy. SCAP proceeded along four paths to reach this goal: (1) dissolution of *zaibatsu* holding companies; (2) dissolution or reorganization of companies whose relative size restricted competition; (3) enactment and enforcement of anti-monopolistic practices; and (4) decentralized distribution of securities seized by the government from *zaibatsu* in enforcement of anti-monopoly laws.⁴³

These efforts might have achieved the desired goal in a nation that truly desired a capitalist economy, but conservative Japanese economists strongly supported the *zaibatsu*.⁴⁴ They saw the conglomerates as necessary for economic growth, much like proponents of big business in the United States. It may surprise Americans that liberals also supported the *zaibatsu*, but wished to nationalize them in the manner of a socialist government. As a result, in spite of American anti-monopoly efforts, the *zaibatsu* effectively reappeared

under the guise of *keiretsu* shortly after the occupation ended.⁴⁵

Labor Reform.

To promote labor reform, SCAP encouraged the organization of unions and implemented protective legislation. Initially, SCAP encouraged the expansion of organized labor across the board. However, a series of strikes in the fall of 1946 and the growing presence of communist sympathizers in the upper ranks of labor unions led to the creation of regulatory laws to prevent organized labor from paralyzing the nation on a repeated basis. Public safety employees were denied union rights, and administrative employees in public service were barred from striking.⁴⁶

By 1948, the Japanese government had passed legislation creating a comprehensive system of labor standards. The Labor Standards Law established "minimum standards for hours of work, rest periods, vacations with pay, safety, and sanitation for all nonself-employed industrial workers in Japan."⁴⁷ Another law provided worker's compensation to over six and a half million laborers. These laws and the inspectors that enforced them improved labor standards throughout the country. It must be noted, however, that although the improved standards promoted the egalitarian way of life espoused by the American occupation, they also put a serious strain on the already troubled Japanese economy by increasing the cost of labor.⁴⁸

Agrarian Reform.

SCAP policy for agrarian reform tried to promote democracy by eliminating the feudal system commonly

seen in Japanese agriculture. They effected this change by buying land from large landowners and selling it to the tenants that farmed the land. The government also fixed cash rents at low levels, which encouraged landowners to sell land rather than continuing to rent it to tenants. As seen in Figure 1, the policy achieved tremendous success, reducing the overall land tenancy from nearly half of all cultivatable land before the war to approximately 10 percent in 1950. Tsutomu Ōuchi suggests that this trend quieted rural political movements, which were largely supported by tenant farmers concerned about losing land access. The dissipation of this political force removed a support base for socialist and communist movements in rural society.⁴⁹




Figure 1. Proportions of Owners and Tenants, and Changes in the Tenancy Rate.⁵⁰

All of these actions, while promoting economic and political democracy, impaired the recovery and growth of the Japanese economy. Additionally, SCAP used capital for many of Japan's restitution payments that was needed to underwrite heavy industries that formerly enabled war. Needless to say, the diversion of such capital further stunted Japan's economic recovery.

In addressing the concerns of the Potsdam Declaration, SCAP provided a good measure of stability within Japan. Similarly, the new constitution went a long way toward building a self-sustaining government, and the various reforms put the government on the path to providing a range of public services. However, SCAP addressed all of these issues simultaneously, rather than sequentially, as Francis Fukuyama has recommended. This methodology led to several notable complications.

COMPLICATIONS

Although the Allied occupation of Japan serves in many ways as a positive example of nation-building, SCAP also encountered some serious difficulties during its 7 years of reconstructing Japan. The difficulties SCAP had to cope with include the influence of communists in unions, the negative effects of pro-democratic policies on the struggling economy, miscommunications and disagreements between MacArthur and policymakers in Washington, and the general problem of imposing what might be termed a Western cultural applique on a completely different society.

Unions and Communists.

SCAP initiated all of the policies mentioned in the previous section more or less simultaneously. As a result, labor unions began to form in 1946, while the economy was still recovering from the after-effects of war and the shock of SCAP's other reforms. In the fall of 1946, with rampant inflation and unemployment, labor unions negotiated wage increases in dozens of industries. In retrospect, one can see the inevitability that the communists in Japan would take advantage of a dissatisfied proletariat. They did so with a vengeance, organizing the diverse labor unions under a single leader and turning their demands on the government. Events escalated over the course of the fall and winter. The Japanese government, deprived of its secret police and fearing the labor unions meant to revolt, refused to negotiate. The unions responded with a threat of a general strike. Ultimately, MacArthur brokered an agreement between the government and the unions, in which the unions would refrain from striking, and the government would raise the living wage by 42 percent. All of this occurred by proxy, without MacArthur so much as leaving his desk, and only the respect the Japanese people had for him prevented disaster.⁵¹

Democracy vs. Stability.

In the 3 1/2 years following the war, MacArthur accomplished all of the tasks laid out by the Potsdam Declaration and gained the adoration of the Japanese people. Shinto had been the state religion of Japan until 1945, and the Emperor was revered in that religion as one of a pantheon of gods.⁵² Thus when the Emperor deferred to MacArthur, the Japanese people logically assumed that MacArthur was a god as well. MacArthur

had experience with Eastern philosophy, having served under his father in Tokyo during his early career and having spent several years as the commanding general in the Philippines. He meticulously played the role of the aloof ruler he believed appealed to the Japanese psyche.⁵³ During MacArthur's time in Japan, the Emperor and the Prime Minister were the only Japanese he saw in an official capacity. He refused to leave Japan for the duration of his tenure as SCAP. The Japanese responded by treating MacArthur with a reverence previously reserved for the Imperial family itself. MacArthur received almost 500,000 letters from the Japanese public during the occupation, many of which addressed him in the formal style of Japanese previously used only for the Emperor.⁵⁴

As the de facto ruler of Japan, MacArthur exhibited tireless enthusiasm and dedication to the cause of Japanese democracy. In the first 6 months of the occupation, he ordered the removal of the censorship system, the release of political prisoners, the installation of women's suffrage, and the abolition of child labor.⁵⁵ Such dedication was very much in keeping with the spirit of reconstruction at the time. The Potsdam Declaration, SWNCC 150/4, and JCS 1380/15 each emphasized democratic development in all areas of life.

By the end of 1948, however, most of the programs resolving issues from the war were complete, and many of the programs for promoting democracy were well entrenched. At this time, Washington began to feel pressure to relieve the U.S. tax burden and make Japan economically self-sufficient. Japanese production and trade had recovered at disappointing rates through 1949, while postwar inflation raised costs at a staggering rate. During the period between September 1945 and August 1948, prices in Japan rose more than

700 percent. To remedy this situation, Washington appointed the Young Mission.

The Young Mission consisted of some half-dozen economists from various government agencies, including the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board, which prior to this point had influenced reconstruction very little. The Mission traveled to Japan in early 1949, spending 18 days examining the economic situation in the country and writing a report of their findings, all without the help of SCAP economists stationed in Tokyo. The Mission recommended a 180-degree change in economic policy, one reflecting a change in azimuth from promoting democracy in Japan to reducing the tax burden in the United States. But the economists at SCAP convinced MacArthur that the existing approach was showing positive results. MacArthur backed them up, rejecting the report entirely. Washington overruled MacArthur, and ordered the change in policy.⁵⁶ This event marked the first serious divergence of interests of the United States and Japan.

Accounts differ on whether the change of policy improved the Japanese economy. Joseph Dodge, President of the Detroit Bank, arrived in Japan to oversee implementation of the new policy. He set a fixed exchange rate between the dollar and the yen and enforced Washington's demand for a balanced budget. This method might have improved the performance of the Japanese economy, given the chance; however, the start of the Korean War in June 1950 generated an enormous new demand for military supplies to which the Japanese eagerly catered. In the second half of 1950, Japan accumulated a surplus in its international accounts for the first time in the occupation.⁵⁷ The Korean War saved the Japanese economy.

The End of MacArthur.

MacArthur was to disagree with Washington on other policy issues. Because of the economic redirection, MacArthur largely lost control of the reconstruction. As the de facto leader of Japan, he was entitled to these disagreements, but as a military officer, he could not legally carry disagreement to the point of insubordination. He ventured two more serious disagreements with Washington. One involved the treatment of the Chinese government in exile on Formosa, which he thought the United States should support on principle in spite of countervailing political considerations. The other involved the war in South Korea, concerning which a congressman publicized compromising correspondence with MacArthur after a Presidential Directive had forbade MacArthur from taking a public position at variance with official policy. Historian D. James Clayton largely attributes the escalation of the Truman-MacArthur controversy, as it later became known, to "failures in communication and coordination within the chain of command."⁵⁸ This failure resulted partially from the physical distance between Truman and MacArthur. They met face to face only once, at Wake Island on October 15, 1950. Consequently, rather than a warm relationship built on close familiarity, trust, and acquaintanceship, communication and relations between the two men was marked by stereotypical preconceptions derived from third-party information.⁵⁹

The series of disagreements between MacArthur and Washington finally led Truman to dismiss MacArthur for insubordination. The dismissal came while the Americans and the Japanese were in the midst of negotiating the terms of agreement on the peace

treaty, and the sudden departure of MacArthur came close to breaking Japanese faith in the United States. The dearth of communication between Washington and Tokyo and the resulting lack of trust jeopardized the success of the occupation.

Cultural Misunderstandings.

SCAP experienced cultural misunderstandings with the Japanese throughout the course of the occupation. Some of these misunderstandings had comical results, while others proved seriously troublesome. Theodore Cohen relates one such incident:

Not knowing the tastes of the Americans, the Japanese devoted themselves to a serious study of them. At one small party (small because of a tiny budget) given for four of us by the two labor bureaus of the Welfare Ministry in February 1946, three of the bureaucrats plied us with whisky, beer, and sake while asking questions about our hobbies and likes. Gradually, as the Japanese became drunker, our responses became more imaginative. When all but one of the Japanese were *hors de combat*, apparently asleep under the table, we said our farewells to the last surviving host. We had not gone more than a hundred meters in our jeep when one of us discovered he had forgotten his overseas cap. We turned around, and he was back within minutes at the room we had left. There were our “drunken” hosts, suddenly sober, sitting around the low banquet table and comparing notes on their departed guests. I don’t know who fooled whom more that evening.⁶⁰

Americans did not always put as much effort into understanding their counterparts. In November 1946, the Hoover Mission made a series of recommendations to liberalize and de-rigidify the Japanese governmental bureaucracy. However, the

Americans failed to comprehend the educational elitism among government bureaucrats and the feudal nature of supervisor-employee relationships in Japan, attempting instead to install with no cultural filtering such American concepts as “equal opportunity for promotions” and the “nobility of service to the public.” As a result, the Mission’s recommendations were “almost totally irrelevant.”⁶¹ Cohen remarked, “I sometimes thought that if the Mission had been sent to the Arctic Circle instead, it would have come up with the same prescription for the Eskimos, seals, and seagulls.”⁶² Another mission, tasked with making recommendations for reforming the Japanese education system, generated a report which “sometimes offers more insight into U.S. education than into Japanese.”⁶³ This mirror-imaging, culturally illiterate approach to recommendations and reforms appears repeatedly throughout the occupation, frequently undermining U.S. initiatives. The Americans attempted to minimize such adverse effects by acting through the Japanese government, using persuasion and influence rather than by issuing directives. However, the inherent power imbalance between the Americans and the Japanese frequently rendered this approach ineffective.

Findings and Recommendations.

The case of Japan as described in the foregoing pages has given rise to several significant findings that may have relevance in other nation-building endeavors. First, interagency cooperation in Washington creates clear policy, but only cooperation between Washington and the theater results in clear policy execution. Second, efforts to create stability and democracy simultaneously can interfere with each other. Third,

extended occupations increase the probability of success but are difficult to sustain. Fourth, although the U.S. Government recognizes the importance of cultural fluency and understanding in successful nation-building, it lacks the will to gather the intellectual capital needed to provide that cultural understanding. Finally, the expected role of the military in nation-building operations has varied over the course of the last 60 years, but successful nation-building will always require deep military involvement, and with it close cooperation between civilian and military efforts.

Due to interagency cooperation in Washington, the two major documents dictating initial policy, SWNCC 150/4 and JCS 1380/15, agreed with one another and with the Potsdam Declaration on policy in Japan. However, since none of the people in SCAP were privy to the discussions and considerations that created these documents, SCAP had to extrapolate from Washington's policy vision. In an ideal world, some of the people intimately involved with formulating policy would sit down with people coordinating the execution effort and talk through the strategy and philosophy behind the policy directives so that the coordinator could execute policy within the frame of reference policymakers originally intended. In the real world, however, where policymakers and executors seem inevitably to inhabit separate worlds, one can achieve approximately the same results by sending liaison teams to the theater to ensure consistency between strategy, policy, and operations. Washington did send liaisons to Japan, but their roles involved offering technical expertise in economics, politics, or agriculture rather than the broader interpretive role I suggest. For this purpose, the military structure was inadequate because a soldier expects his subordinates

to take orders without question. Successful policy execution, however, requires a unity of vision with the policymakers, not just with the executor.

Another complication in the Japanese occupation stemmed from attempting to achieve stability and democracy simultaneously. As seen in the case of the labor strikes, policies that promote democracy can interfere with stability. Conversely, measures to promote stability can stifle democratic growth. Although it offends American sensibilities, stability should precede democracy. The basic needs of humans for security, food, water, medicine, and shelter supersede liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The creation and maintenance of stability and democracy often require an extended occupation. The occupation of Japan lasted 3-4 years longer than originally anticipated. However, maintaining support for an occupation that lasts the greater part of a decade challenges the governments of both the occupied and occupying nations. David Edelstein notes a paradox in nation-building, namely, that it requires a lengthy occupation to work, but that extended presence of external influences often precipitates nationalist movements against the foreign occupation.⁶⁴ The occupying government also has trouble rallying domestic support for long occupations. After the initial enthusiasm for national defense fades, wives want their husbands back, mothers want their sons back, and taxpayers want their money back. Governments anticipating the need for an occupation should consider this dilemma beforehand. Further, the political interests that necessitated the occupation will probably also lead to a semi-permanent posture necessitating American troops on the ground even after occupation. Some 65 years after the end of the occupation of Japan,

U.S. forces are still stationed in Okinawa and Japan. Similarly, South Korea has hosted American military bases since the beginning of the Korean War in 1951, though admittedly these troop presences are no longer for the purpose of enforcing occupations. Instead of looking for ways to minimize occupation time, policymakers should focus efforts on maintaining support for an occupation in both countries involved. By rallying support, policymakers can better buy time to create the stability necessary to minimize the need for an indefinite foreign troop presence.

Some might question America's ability to create either stability or democracy in failed or defeated states today. The use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly ended the war in the Pacific decisively and demoralized the Japanese people. These two results put the Americans in an enviable situation at the beginning of the occupation. However, revisionist studies argue that Japan may have surrendered by the end of 1945 even if the Americans did not use the atomic bombs.⁶⁵ Under interrogation, Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, stated, "Our decision to seek a way out of this war was made in early June before any atomic bomb had been dropped."⁶⁶ It is impossible to gauge the success of an occupation in this hypothetical situation, but the question merits consideration.

As to the elusive character of the Iraqi insurgency, it could be that this resistance resulted from the invasion's lack of "legitimacy."⁶⁷ By way of contrast, in Japan, the Emperor, a revered leader, accepted American occupation. He had legitimacy not only as a political leader, but as an object of religious veneration. Public support for the Emperor translated into support for the American occupation. In newer nation-states

like Iraq, where the newly installed government has less legitimacy than tribal relationships and patronage networks, American occupations have far less chance of enjoying public support. In such a situation, legitimacy must come from other sources. Occupations can foster legitimacy at the global level through multilateral efforts or at the local level by gaining the support of local leaders. Either way, policymakers need a modicum of cultural understanding to anticipate the beneficial effects that support from various factions can have on the overall legitimacy of the occupation.

Cultural understanding is perhaps the most important factor in occupation success, and the least often taken into consideration. Ironically, policymakers understood this necessity beforehand both in Japan and in Iraq, but the resources simply were not available.⁶⁸ In the 1940s, very few Americans had experience with Japanese language and culture. Similarly, today very few Americans have experience with Arabic, Dari, or Pashtu. Until the U.S. Government decides to make development of this intellectual capital a priority, cultural barriers will continue to frustrate nation-building efforts.

Such barriers inhibit cooperation between civil and military elements of occupation forces as well as between occupation forces and local government. The military in nation-building operations produces important effects ranging from those by the generals on high, down to those such as the cultural sophistication of the foot soldier on the ground. Policymakers face the temptation to use military forces for occupation operations simply because the Army has the men on the ground at the moment. But soldiers on the ground are not reconstructors. In Japan, SCAP solved this problem by utilizing civilian resources *within* a military hierarchy.

The themes seen throughout the occupation of Japan resemble the headlines of newspapers in the last 4 years. Conflict between creating stability and implementing democracy, tension between the need for a long occupation and the temptation to cut and run, and efforts to increase cultural understanding have all been hot topics during the war in Iraq.⁶⁹ The role of the military and the structure of interagency communication have also required closer consideration in recent years, especially with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the consequent rearrangement of the bureaucracy.

Our analysis of these themes leads to three critical policy recommendations:

- Institute incentives for cultural fluency in the government and military, and practical means for those involved to achieve such fluency.
- Create liaisons between Washington and the occupation authority in theater tasked specifically with ensuring that in-theater decisions coincide with national security policy and underlying strategy.
- Focus on rallying public and multinational support for extended occupations, not minimizing occupation duration.

These three recommendations should find application in any nation-building endeavor, whether in a completely subjugated country or in an environment of limited warfare and counterinsurgency. The need for interagency cooperation between Washington and the theater and within the theater, the vital importance of stability, and the perennial need for communication are universal desiderata. Indeed, they are as applicable today as they were 60 years ago.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 6

1. State-building is defined as “the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.” Fukuyama asserts that the sense of shared history and culture implied in the word “nation” makes the term “nation-building” a misnomer, but one commonly used in the United States. Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004, pp. ix, 99. In recognition of this common usage, the words state-building and nation-building will be used interchangeably in this chapter.

2. Edwin A. Locke, “Notes on the Current Situation in Japan,” October 19, 1945.

3. *Ibid.*

4. James Dobbins *et al.*, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003, pp. 26-28.

5. Locke, “Notes.”

6. The necessity for a lengthy occupation to achieve stability is argued by David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 50-51.

7. Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, “Potsdam Declaration,” National Diet Library, www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html, accessed April 26, 2007.

8. The Cairo Declaration stated that it was the purpose of the Allied Powers,

that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be

expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "Cairo Declaration," National Diet Library, www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c03.html, accessed April 15, 2007.

9. To ensure these changes, the Declaration also mandated the occupation of Japan by Allied forces until such times as Allied conditions were met.

10. Hugh Borton, "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, February 1966, JSTOR, links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-9118%28196602%2925%3A2%3C203%3APFTOOJ%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R, accessed April 21, 2007. Applies to all preceding information in the paragraph.

11. The Potsdam Conference was held July 17 to August 2, 1945.

12. Borton, "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan."

13. SWNCC Secretariat of Operations, "SWNCC M/I 44," April 9, 1946.

14. Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, SWNCC 150/4/A)," National Diet Library, www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/022_2/022_2tx.html, April 15, 2007.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, JCS 1380/15)," National Diet Library, www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/01/036/036tx.html, accessed April 16, 2007.

18. Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, SWNCC 150/4/A.

19. Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan, JCS 1380/15.

20. SWNCC secretariat of operations, SWNCC M/I 44, April 9, 1946.

21. James Byrnes, memorandum for the President, April 18, 1946.

22. The original plan was to add G-5 Civil Affairs to the staff already consisting of four Assistant Chiefs of Staff: G-1 Personnel, G-2 Intelligence, G-3 Operations, and G-4 Supply. Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, New York: The Free Press, 1987, p. 82.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Fukuyama, p. 100.

25. Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan: Second Phase: 1948-50*, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950, p. 60.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

27. Maps in "Employment of Japanese Police" prepared by the Public Safety Division of the Military Intelligence Section, General Staff GHQ SCAP, June 1, 1950, identify ethnic Koreans and Communists as "Dissident Elements."

28. Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992, p. 238.

29. Edwin W. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1948, p. 37.

30. Edited from Noriko Aso, "The Japanese Empire, 1943," University of California Santa Cruz, ic.ucsc.edu/~naso/hist159b/

presentations/maps/japanese_empire_map.htm, accessed April 15, 2007.

31. Ming-Hui Yao, "Basic Facts on the Nanjing Massacre and the Tokyo War Crimes Trial," New Jersey Hong Kong Network, *archives.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html#CRIMES*, accessed April 15, 2007.

32. This estimate probably understates the carnage, as it "did not include those bodies burned or thrown into the Yangtze River or otherwise disposed of by the Japanese army." Hua-Ling Hu, *American Goddess At the Rape of Nanking: The Courage of Minnie Vautrin*, Carbondale, IL: Fordham University Press, 2005, pp. 71-79.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

34. Fearey, p. 19.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

36. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal cites Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907; and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46 and 51 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 as legal precedents on the definitions of war crimes. The Avalon Project, "Judgment: The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity," Yale Law School, *www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judlawre.htm*, accessed April 25, 2007.

37. Finn, pp. 93-97.

38. Comparison of Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "The Constitution of the Empire of Japan" National Diet Library, *www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html*, accessed March 5, 2007; and Katsutoshi Takami, Reference Service Planning Division, "The Constitution of Japan," National Diet Library, *www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html*, accessed March 5, 2007.

39. Finn, pp. 84-85; and Fearey, p. 27.

40. Finn, p. 86.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134.
42. Akihiro Itoh, "Higher education reform in perspective: The Japanese experience," *Higher Education*, Vol. 43, 2002, pp. 10-13, www.springerlink.com/content/v7867t1263621461/fulltext.pdf, accessed April 30, 2007.
43. Fearey, p. 60.
44. Martin Bronfenbrenner, "The American Occupation of Japan: Economic Retrospect," *The American Occupation of Japan: A Retrospective View*, Grant Goodman, comp., New York: Paragon Book Gallery, Ltd., 1968, p. 20.
45. Fukuyama, pp. 85-86.
46. Fearey, pp. 77-81.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
49. Tsutomu Ōuchi, "The Japanese Land Reform: Its Efficacy and Limitations," *Developing Economies*, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1966, p. 130, www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1746-1049.1966.tb00776.x, accessed April 29, 2007.
50. *Ibid.*
51. Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, pp. 285-288.
52. "The God Emperor," *Time Magazine*, May 21, 1945, www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,852228-1,00.html, accessed April 26, 2007.
53. Cohen, p. 68.
54. Letters from the Japanese public often expressed gratitude for MacArthur's beneficent interest in Japan. Many of these letters accompanied gifts of thanks, asked to bear the general's child, or offered invitations to gatherings. Sodei Rinjirō, *Dear General*

MacArthur: Letters from the Japanese during the American Occupation, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001, pp. 120-122.

55. Cohen, pp. 62-63.

56. *Ibid.*, Ch. 22.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 439-440.

58. D. Clayton James, *Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Korean War*, Boulder, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1982, p. 4.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7.

60. Cohen, p. 108.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 382.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 382.

63. Gary DeCoker, "Review on *Education Reform in Postwar Japan: The 1946 U.S. Education Mission* by Gary M. Tsuchimochi," *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 48, No. 3, p. 398, JSTOR www.jstor.org/view/00270741/di995110/99p0258i/2?frame=noframe&userID=a55b2e34@tamu.edu/01cce4406800501bd976d&dpi=3&config=jstor, accessed May 2, 2007.

64. David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, pp. 50-51.

65. Barton J. Bernstein, "Compelling Japan's Surrender Without the A-bomb, Soviet Entry, or Invasion: Reconsidering the U.S. Bombing Survey's Early-Surrender Conclusions," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, June 1995, p. 101.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

67. Legitimacy--the right to hold and use power, as decided by the population over which power is exercised.

68. Some 2,000 Americans served in the Allied Translator

and Interpreter Service (ATIS). Of these, the majority were first-generation children of Japanese immigrants. Peter Dunn, "The Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) in SWPA during WWII," *home.st.net.au/~dunn/sigint/atis.htm*.

69. "Brent Scowcroft endures special criticism from Kaufman for having valued stability over democracy promotion in both the Soviet Union and the Middle East." Colin Dueck, "Doctrinal Faith," *National Interest*, May 1, 2007, *www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14146*, accessed May 2, 2007. Margaret Wertheim, "Virtual Camp Trains Soldiers in Arabic, and More," *New York Times*, July 6, 2004, *www.tacticallanguage.com/tacticaliraqi/press-nytimes-2004-07-06.htm*, accessed May 2, 2007; Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Jeff Zeleny, "Bush Vetoes Bill Tying Iraq Funds to Exit," *New York Times*, May 2, 2007, *www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/washington/02policy.html?hp*, accessed May 2, 2007.

CHAPTER 7

AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: SRI LANKA'S EXPERIENCE WITH AN ENDURING INSURGENCY

Patrick B. Baetjer

The most obvious question for policymakers with regard to Sri Lanka is: Why should the U.S. Government look to that country for lessons in counterinsurgency warfare? The author will argue that the Sri Lankan experience holds a number of insights for the United States on several levels. The Sri Lankan government has battled a pernicious separatist insurgency in the northern part of the country since the 1970s. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or simply the Tigers as they are commonly known, have claimed to speak for the entire ethnic Tamil community and seek the establishment of a distinct Tamil state.

The Sri Lankan experience is not one widely studied by students of counterinsurgency warfare. The U.S. campaigns in Vietnam and the Philippines are sometimes looked at, but the British efforts in Malaysia and the French efforts in Algeria are considered the classic examples of counterinsurgency operations.¹ Indeed, the Pentagon reportedly has taken to showing the documentary film *Battle of Algiers* to a number of civilian staffers and military officers charged with addressing problems within Iraq. This focus on Algeria and Malaysia reveals two significant points. First, the United States has a tendency to draw counterinsurgency lessons from the experiences of

other Western governments, seemingly ignoring the lessons learned by non-Western governments. Given that the United States has repeatedly stated that the Iraqi insurgency will ultimately be defeated by Iraqis themselves, it follows that the United States ought to look for lessons from non-Western governments who have had to fight insurgencies within their own borders.

Second, the focus on past Western efforts, especially those of the French in Algeria, misses one key point. Rarely have Western efforts been successful over the long term. In Algeria, the French were able to dismantle much of the National Liberation Front only by turning to tactics such as torture and mass intimidation that ultimately undermined their own position and led to their withdrawal. The French learned that certain tactics that might be effective in the short term ultimately alienated the population, thus causing them to lose the larger and more significant battle, that for “hearts and minds.” In a similar vein, analyses of the U.S. occupation of Iraq have suggested that some U.S. forces used tactics that may have alienated segments of the Iraqi population.

To some extent, the French government and colonial administrators did not fundamentally understand Algerian culture. The colonial French sought to turn everyone who lived beneath the Tricolor into a Frenchman in both speech and outlook, with little regard for the indigenous culture.² While the United States has not sought to impose American culture on Iraq, it has revealed either an ignorance of Iraqi and Arab culture or at best a shallow understanding of it. This aspect is where looking at the Sri Lankan experience will be of particular value. Though the Tamils and the majority Sinhalese often claim distinct histories, they

share enough of a mutual past to be instructive for the various counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere that involve a common people.

Furthermore, Sri Lanka like Iraq is extraordinarily complex, both ethnically and socially. There exist multiple ethnic groups beside the Sinhalese and Tamils, as well as several religions, from Buddhism to Hinduism to Islam. Further complicating the social structure is the continued existence of the caste system, which provides a further divide beyond ethnicity and religion. The Sri Lankan experience in addressing these divides within the insurgency context thus provides lessons for the United States, which is engaged in nation-building, support and stability operations, and counterinsurgency warfare in a number of places such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In all such contexts, we face a number of bewildering social, ethnic, and religious divides. In Iraq alone, the United States has encountered dichotomies between Shi'ites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds, various tribes, and emerging political forces, with different identities asserting primacy at different points in time.

With regard to Iraq, there are other similarities to the Sri Lankan experience that provide the United States with fresh insights into its own counterinsurgency efforts. Like the Sunni insurgency based primarily in al Anbar Province, the Tamil Tigers are readily identifiable with a particular geographical region of Sri Lanka, but both the Sunni insurgents and the Tigers have the capability to strike nationwide. Sunni insurgents have successfully attacked in Baghdad, while Tigers have carried out operations in the heart of Colombo.

Both the Tamil insurgency and the Sunni insurgency have an international component, though it is veiled. There is evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni

insurgents receive funding and weapons from abroad, and that sympathetic populations in other countries contribute a measure of support. There is some evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni insurgents may receive funding from front companies or charities that ostensibly advertise themselves as humanitarian relief organizations when, in fact, some of their funds end up supporting insurgent violence. Each insurgent group also has well-developed networks abroad that serve to disseminate information and may act as recruiters.

The counterinsurgency campaigns in both Iraq and Sri Lanka have been characterized by intense crackdowns interspersed among chummy efforts to woo supporters away from the insurgency through various development and aid initiatives. In Sri Lanka, this pattern was seen following the disastrous December 26, 2004, tsunami, which largely devastated the Tamil regions to the north. What started off as promising cooperation between government authorities and the Tamils eventually disintegrated back into armed conflict. Given the intensive U.S. focus on providing aid services and development projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, these efforts hold important lessons. Before these lessons can be distilled from the Sri Lankan experience, however, it is necessary for us to understand Sri Lankan society in a historical context as well as the development of Tamil identity.

Sri Lanka: The Legacy of Colonialism.

Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, first encountered Europeans in 1505 when the Portuguese arrived. The native Ceylonese people had numerous contacts with the Dutch and the Portuguese throughout the 1700s. Originally heavily influenced by the

Portuguese traders and explorers, Ceylon then became a Dutch territory before it was taken over by the British in 1796. It was technically made a British crown colony in 1802 by the Treaty of Amiens but was not truly colonized until 1815, when it was placed under the control of the British East India Company. The British government, however, forced a joint administration of the colony upon the company in exchange for a guaranteed monopoly of the island's cinnamon production.³

The year 1815 marked the beginning of a concerted British effort to establish unchallenged control of Ceylon. The kingdom of Kandy, both a region and a people, had been co-opted by the British to some degree in order to facilitate British commercial interests in the island. The Kandyan chiefs went before the British colonial administrators, asking to have the king, a highly unpopular figure, replaced. The British exploited this opportunity, convening a Kandyan "Convention" in which the monarch was removed and greater direct British control was assumed. This was hardly what the Kandyan chiefs envisioned. Chaffing under the control of the British, the Disawa of Uva, a local ruler named Keppetipola, led a Kandyan rebellion in Vellassa in 1818. While colonial rebellions were hardly unique within the British Empire, the Kandyan rebellion represented one of the few revolts that nearly succeeded in beating British forces. The British were able to recover enough leverage to impose martial law and largely end the rebellion.⁴

The British instituted the plantation system in Ceylon to exploit the island's natural resources as efficiently as possible, much as they did in their other colonial possessions. The establishment of the plantation system, however, disrupted the traditional

societal structure. The different Ceylonese ethnic groups stayed largely within their own regions, and the informal allocation of land for agriculture was concluded through oral agreements. The plantation economy was extraordinarily labor intensive, forcing plantation managers to attract labor from other parts of the island. This led to a large influx of migrant Tamil workers not only from other parts of Ceylon, but from India as well.⁵

The plantation economy began to dissolve the barriers dividing Ceylon's ethnic groups, barriers further weakened by the Royal Commission of 1833. The British, as elsewhere, had exerted control over the Ceylonese in part by playing one ethnic/cultural group against another, e.g., the Sinhalese against the Tamils. These divides existed prior to the arrival of the British, with a long-standing dispute over which, the Sinhalese or the Tamils, are actually the primeval indigenous people of Sri Lanka. The dispute continues to this day. The Tamils argue that the Sinhalese arrived in the 3rd century B.C. as Buddhism was introduced.⁶ Sinhala history is largely based on the Pali Chronicles, the *Dipavamsa* and *Mahavamsa*, recorded by Buddhist monks in the 4th and 6th centuries. Despite the ongoing debate over the degree to which the monks intended the works as entertainment as opposed to serious history, many Sinhalese regard the chronicles as definitive in describing the Tamils as invaders and bandits, not indigenous inhabitants.⁷ As early as 1799, the British acknowledged the truly divided nature of Ceylon. Sir Hugh Cleghorn, the 1st Colonial Secretary of Ceylon, wrote:

Two different nations, from a very ancient period, have divided between them the possession of the island: the

Sinhalese inhabiting the interior in its Southern and Western parts from the river Wallouve to that of Chillow, and the Malabars [Tamils] who possess the Northern and Eastern Districts. These two nations differ entirely in their religions, language, and manners.⁸

In 1833, W. M. G. Colebrooke and C. H. Cameron headed up a Royal Commission that examined the British administration over the island. Colebrooke and Cameron unexpectedly came to what were regarded as fairly radical conclusions. Instead of administering the colony along ethnic and cultural lines, they divided Ceylon into five provinces. Further, they suggested that the salient features of the colonial system—mercantilism, monopolistic practices, and discriminatory administrative procedures—be eliminated. According to one historian, “Many of the proposals were adopted and helped set a pattern of administrative, economic, judicial, and educational development into the next century.”⁹

Despite the adoption of a number of Colebrooke and Cameron’s recommendations, British administration of the island could hardly be considered progressive, and the colonial administrators took a number of steps to further consolidate control of Ceylon. Because of the decline of cinnamon’s profitability, coffee rose to become the dominant crop, with a profitable coffee boom in Ceylon from 1839 to 1847. Once the British recognized the lucrative nature of coffee, they moved to bring larger tracts of land under their control.¹⁰ In 1840, colonial administrators passed Crown Land Encroachment Ordinance No. 12 which, in effect, claimed the Crown’s right to appropriate any land the authorities deemed was being “wasted” or not cultivated to its full capacity. In effect, this ordinance rendered at a stroke thousands of Ceylonese people

landless, as they had to prove, in official English terms of reference, that they owned the land they tended. As indicated earlier, ownership tended to be conveyed by oral agreement. The Crown thus came into “legal” possession of an additional 50,000 or so acres.¹¹

Coffee would prove to be a transient boom. In 1869, a leaf disease struck the Ceylonese coffee industry, destroying it almost entirely over a 15-year period. British entrepreneurs countered this setback by moving to tea cultivation. Growing tea, however, requires even greater amounts of labor. As improbable as it may seem, tea cultivation led to a relative labor shortage, a dilemma the British sought to resolve by encouraging another large wave of Indian Tamil emigration. Indeed, the 1911 census found that Indian Tamils comprised some 12 percent of the Ceylonese population, or roughly 500,000 people.¹² The British saw the Indian Tamils as somehow different from indigenous Tamils. Significantly, however, the Tamils themselves, almost all Hindus, did not draw the sharp distinction between Indian and other Tamils as did the British, though they were aware of differences within the greater Tamil community.¹³

The plantation system had earlier created a vast influx of migrant Tamil workers. The next wave of Indian Tamil immigrant workers further swelled the Tamil population, creating additional tensions between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities, which competed for the same employment. The Tamils and Sinhalese apparently were grouped in separate, ethnically homogeneous enclaves, maintaining the historical ethnic divide that the British had capitalized upon during the first years of colonization.¹⁴

Despite the influx of labor and Ordinance No. 12, the British continued to seek greater amounts of land

to cultivate tea. The colonial authorities now focused on one of the few areas that still resisted assimilation – Ceylon peasant agriculture. While Ordinance No. 12 allowed for land to be seized that was either not used or, in the authorities' view, underutilized, this had little effect on cropland the Ceylonese used for themselves. In the midst of the decline in profitability of coffee, the British had imposed grain taxes on the Ceylonese farmers' worth between 1/14th and one-half of the crop's total value.¹⁵ Realizing its financial potential, a number of the Ceylonese farmers then began to grow coffee in addition to grain. As the coffee industry collapsed, these farmers could no longer pay the grain tax, enabling the British to seize even more land in the 1880s. Though the Ceylon elite successfully campaigned to have the law repealed in 1892, the British had by that time advanced their land consolidation program even further.¹⁶

With the English hold on Ceylon tightening, the British began to mandate the institution of British laws in some areas of Ceylon life and to establish at least the appearance of Ceylonese participation in the administration of the colony. In a move that would have significant repercussions later in the country's history, the British established the Charter of Justice in 1833 that enshrined English as the colony's language.¹⁷ Patchworklike, the British kept some of the Tamil laws, the Thesavalamai, but not others, such as those of the Muslim Tamils in Puttalam. In some cases, the supposedly enlightened British enforced laws that were far more retrograde than the Ceylonese laws. For instance, English law mandated women's inferior status in marriage and property rights, whereas Tamil and Sinhala law recognized women as independent and able to control their own property.¹⁸

In an effort to give the colonial administration greater representation among the indigenous population, the colony's ruling body, the Executive Council, appointed the Legislative Council with the idea that it would act as an advisory body. In 1833, three of the 15 council members were native Ceylonese, representing the low-country Sinhalese, the Burghers, and the Tamils. The attempt to bring more Ceylonese into the colonial administration accelerated in 1844 when the Ceylon Civil Service was opened to all Ceylonese who had acquired an English education.¹⁹ Nevertheless, higher education remained forbidden to the Ceylonese, with the notable exceptions of law and medicine, and these attempts to co-opt Ceylonese elements into the colonial status quo had little effect on eliminating the continued existence of the caste system in indigenous society.²⁰

As the 19th century came to a close, the British colonial efforts had had several significant effects on Ceylon society. First, the ability to speak English and the possession of an English education were keys to elite membership and to employment within the colonial administration. This emphasis on English would later play a significant role in the complaints of the Tamils. Second, the plantation system ossified already existing divides between ethnic groups, especially the Sinhalese and the Tamils, which had been exacerbated by earlier British divide-and-rule tactics. The cultivation of tea led to waves of Indian Tamil immigration that would later play a significant role in the Tamil claim that they were not being appropriately represented. As one author noted, "Rather than jelling identities, the lasting effect of colonial rule in the 19th century was to propagate the idea that identities were fixed and stable, and that one could not jump from one to another."²¹ Instead of forming a unified nation, indigenous practices coupled

with British colonial machinations created a number of lasting disparate identities.

The Move Towards Independence, 1900 to 1948: Societal Fissures Widen.

Though an overriding sense of Ceylonese nationalism was noticeably absent among the populace given the number of disparate identities, the appointment of three Ceylonese members to the Legislative Council was a nod to elite sentiment that they should have some say in the colony's affairs. In 1918, Sir William Manning was appointed the British governor of Ceylon. Manning returned to the old system of divide-and-rule, this time through political manipulation. The British, and Manning in particular, feared that the emergence of the Ceylon National Congress political party might be the harbinger of nationalist aspirations within the country. In order to head off this perceived threat, Manning took steps to form minority political identities among the Kandyan Sinhalese and the Tamils, while seeking to split the Ceylon elite. The British, ironically, ended up elevating the Kandyan Sinhalese in the colonial administration system, despite the fact that the low-country Sinhalese were the ones who were Western educated.²²

An even greater irony is that the Ceylon National Congress was hardly a major political player and certainly not a source of national unification. The Congress largely represented the Ceylonese elite. Manning's efforts to establish political identities as a way for ethnic minorities to combat the Congress was not only unnecessary, but, even more problematic, it established parties for ethnic groups that would claim the right to influence and political power disproportionate to the size of the Ceylonese populations they represented.

Eventually, the British shifted their support from the Kandyan Sinhalese to the Westernized low-country Sinhalese, and Manning's efforts to foment political and societal divisions by boosting ethnic minority parties bore fruit. As early as 1905, the Tamils had formed what would likely be considered a political action committee today, the Jaffna Tamil Association, which was open to all Tamils and pushed for greater political power for Tamils.²³ Yet Manning's efforts contributed to the ethnic minorities' perception that they were somehow being left out. The Ceylon Tamils, in complete contradiction to what the British censuses showed, claimed until the 1920s that the Tamil population was as large as that of the low-country Sinhalese and the Kandyan Sinhalese.²⁴

Manning further sought to play on this ethnic divide by overseeing a reformed Legislative Council in 1921 that increased the Sinhalese representation to 13 members while the Tamil representation remained at three seats, leading to Tamil protestations.²⁵ One Tamil, Sir Ponnambalan Ramanathan, submitted a memo to the colonial administrators on April 1, 1922, requesting that minority views be heard and ethnic representation be respected. This was exactly the vehicle that Manning needed to entrench ethnic minorities within the system as a check to the Sinhalese despite the fact that the minorities represented so few people. The governor backed Ramanathan's memo, and in 1923 the Legislative Council featured eight Tamil seats and 16 Sinhalese seats, even though the Sinhalese comprised some 67 percent of the population and the Tamils only 11 percent.²⁶ Manning helped foster a political culture that would endure, encouraging the oftentimes unrealistic expectations and aspirations of the Tamil community. One scholar noted:

Although elites of all communities shared a common outlook, from 1931 onwards tensions arose about the safeguards and alleged discrimination in the distribution of resources and language. The quest for entitlements through representation, legislation, or violence shaped the contours of identities in the years that preceded violence.²⁷

Despite Manning's best efforts to maintain British dominance over the politics and resources of Ceylon, the damage that World War II wrought on the British Empire weakened British control. The shock of the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, as well as the anti-colonial ferment that emerged from the conflict, convinced the English they would have to give Ceylon its independence. Yet Manning's patronage of the ethnic minority parties lingered on in the political system the British left behind. The British hoped to ensure the strength of the minority parties by allotting seats through a combination of geography and splitting constituencies. Furthermore, a key provision in the constitution held that a two-thirds majority of the Ceylonese "legislature" was required in order to amend the constitution.²⁸ The British were certain that the Sinhalese could not muster that many votes, given the prominence of the minority parties in the House.

In 1946, an English report concluded that English would no longer be the official language of the Ceylonese government and that instead the official languages would be the Tamil and Sinhala languages. While perhaps the British understood this as a move towards decolonization, they did not understand the unifying and integrative role the English language had come to play in the nation. Understanding English was key to attaining a government post—the Ceylonese

elite spoke English and viewed the attempt to discard the language as an attack on their status and privilege within society.²⁹ The elite continued to use English, but the differential use of the language elsewhere would have a significantly adverse impact on the relations between the Tamils and the Sinhala majority population on down the road. It was in the context of overly influential ethnic minority political parties, a rigid and inflexible set of social identities long reinforced by the colonial experience, and a political culture that viewed politics merely as a mechanism for distributing national resources to narrow constituencies, that the British granted Ceylon its independence on February 4, 1948.

Post-Colonial Flashpoints: Disenfranchisement, Misrepresentation, and the Dominance of the Sinhalese.

Though the resplendent independence celebrations created a façade of unity among the Ceylonese initially, the society remained divided. Fractures continued between the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the various other ethnic groups. As one historian argues:

The Sinhalese and Tamils are separate and distinct nations. Because of their particular historical past, and because of national-ethnic differences and the occupation of separate homelands, each possesses separate and distinct national consciousness and owes its loyalty first to its own homeland, and then to Sri Lanka.³⁰

Disagreements also arose among Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim believers, cutting across ethnic communities. Furthermore, though elites no doubt would have existed with or without the British presence,

the colonial administration had created a Westernized elite that favored the Sinhalese. One of the first acts of independent Ceylon would cause further ruptures within society.

In 1948, the government passed Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18, enumerating the ways that a person in Ceylon could become a citizen with full rights. The Ceylon Citizenship Act offered two tracks to citizenship: either a person had to show proof that he or she had descended from a family who had long been established on Ceylon, or a person had to register with the authorities. The difficulty was that both tracks required documentation as well as literacy. With one stroke, this immediately rendered thousands of Indian Tamil workers noncitizens since most were unable to read and write. Without citizenship, these workers were unable to vote.³¹

Effectively, the law cemented within the political game the rule that political parties would strive for their own narrow ethnic goals to the exclusion of the others. From the outset of independence, rather than rejecting the ethnic politics that Governor Manning had introduced, Ceylon wholeheartedly embraced them. One historian noted, "The laws . . . had ruptured the possibility of stronger interethnic and class alliances by excluding the entire state Tamil population from participating in the polity."³² The two dominant Sinhalese parties, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP), strove to outdo one another through increasingly inflammatory rhetoric. Ironically, by disenfranchising so many Tamils, the Sinhalese inadvertently gave some credence to the Tamils' exaggerated claims of discrimination and poor representation. At one point, a Sinhala spokesman announced, "The Tamil people

must accept the fact that the Sinhala majority will no longer permit themselves to be cheated of their rights.”³³

Yet the Tamils were also let down by their own supposedly representative bodies and officials. Two trade unions, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC) and the Democratic Workers’ Congress (DWC), often spoke up for Tamil rights. With the establishment of the two-track system for citizenship and thus voting rights, the unions initially told the Tamil workers to boycott the registration system as a form of protest. Confusingly, however, the unions eventually backed registration applications from upperclass Tamil merchants.³⁴ Thus, the working Tamils, primarily those employed on the plantations, were disenfranchised to a degree by heeding the advice of the trade unions who were supposed to be representing them.

The adoption of the national flag in 1948, seemingly a minor issue compared to the disenfranchisement of Tamils, contributed further to their sense of alienation. Tamil kings had often used the image of a bull to represent their kingdom; Sinhalese kings utilized the visage of a lion. The flag that was adopted, which looks nearly the same as today’s flag, featured a lion placed prominently at the center of the flag with two stripes on the periphery. The two stripes represented the Muslim and Tamil communities, a symbolic affirmation of their secondary status within the dominant Sinhala society.³⁵

Some historians assert that Sinhala colonization of traditionally Tamil homelands increased rapidly after 1948. There is evidence to suggest that some 200,000 Sinhalese families spread out over 3,000 square miles of land in the primarily Tamil district of Batticaloa, thus effecting a land grab. These historians allege that as much as one-third of Batticaloa district was absorbed

into the Amparai district, a largely Sinhalese area.³⁶

The head of the Federalist Party, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, pushed for working class Tamil rights in the late 1950s. Chelvanayakam's campaign, however, was short-lived. Even within the Tamil community, there existed social and geographic cleavages. Chelvanayakam was persuaded to drop his support for working class Tamil rights in 1957 when the central government agreed to several demands by the Jaffna Tamils. The Tamil community within Jaffna had asked that the central government recognize the Tamil language, create regional governing councils, and promise to forgo aggressive settlement by Sinhalese and other ethnicities in traditionally Tamil areas. With the recognition of these demands, Chelvanayakam agreed to drop his campaign on behalf of working Tamils.³⁷

From the outset of independence, the Sinhalese nationalists strove to assert Sinhala dominance and to enshrine Buddhism and Sinhala authority within the constitution. The various ethnic minorities sought to block these efforts, and tension between the communities boiled over into ethnic riots in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1983, and 1987. Despite the constitutional efforts of the British to protect minorities and Manning's legacy of elevating ethnic minorities, the Sinhala nationalists finally succeeded in achieving a number of their goals with the 1972 constitution. The document, which formally changed the nation's name from Ceylon to Sri Lanka, gave Buddhism a special place in Sri Lankan life, and recognized the moral authority of the Sinhala population.³⁸

More importantly, the 1972 constitution established the Sinhala language as the official language of Sri Lanka. Despite the 1946 report suggesting that the

official administrative language revert back to the Tamil and Sinhala languages, English had continued to be used by the elites and Sri Lankans in the civil service.³⁹ The constitution also created the parliament, which the Sinhalese controlled and developed into the supreme legislative and decisionmaking body in the political system.

The measures in the 1972 constitution had a dramatic effect on the Tamil population. The Tamils, despite the large numbers of illiterate Indian Tamils on the plantations, had been overrepresented within the civil service due to their intense efforts to learn the English language. No longer would knowledge of English guarantee Tamil jobs and influence within the civil service. Tamils in the civil service were given 3 years within which to learn Sinhala before facing dismissal. One estimate puts the number of Tamils employed by the government at 30 percent of the 82,000 government employees shortly after independence. This number had shrunk to 6 percent of 225,000 state employees by 1970.⁴⁰ Further, when the parliament became the supreme body, the Tamils felt marginalized within the political system. The Sinhalese had finally gained control of two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, meaning that they no longer needed Tamil support to legislate.⁴¹

The Sinhala government undertook three additional measures that exacerbated tensions with the Tamil community. Sri Lanka nationalized the numerous plantations that were a source of employment for a number of Tamils. Some within the Tamil community believed that the nationalized plantations instituted discriminatory hiring practices to the detriment of the Tamils. Second, the Sri Lankan government, in an agreement with India, undertook a program between

1981 and 1984 to repatriate people that it did not consider Sri Lankans. In a case of "ethnic cleansing," 445,580 people, mostly Tamils, were forcibly repatriated to the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.⁴² Following the outbreak of ethnic riots in 1987, tens of thousands of additional Tamils fled for Tamil Nadu and Western countries. Third and last, it was alleged that in the late 1970s and 1980s, Colombo instituted a weighted system for admitting students into the universities. The Sinhalese majority, in an effort to combat the overrepresentation of Tamils within the civil service, established a system by which Tamils had to score higher, sometimes significantly higher, on university entrance exams than their Sinhalese counterparts. A number of these aggrieved students formed the precursor organization that ultimately became the Tamil Tigers.⁴³

In the wake of independence, the Sri Lankan government, especially the majority Sinhalese, possessed the opportunity to reach across religious and ethnic lines to strengthen national unity. Given the relatively peaceful manner in which British colonial administrators handed political control over to the Sri Lankan elite, a Sri Lankan national identity emerged mostly among the elites, but not among the greater populace.

Further, whether it was the historical separation of ethnic communities along with the British colonial legacy or the awakening of Sinhala nationalism, the Sri Lankan government began to take noticeable steps to marginalize the Tamil community. While it is undeniable that the Tamils exercised undue influence in the political system through the British constitutional checks, over-representation in the civil service, and Governor Manning's efforts to split the phantom Sinhala opposition to British rule, Sinhala actions

went too far. The Ceylon Citizenship Act, the 1972 constitution, the nationalization of the plantations, and the forced repatriation of thousands of Tamils deeply alienated the Tamil community.

This sense of alienation led to violent opposition from segments of the Tamil community as early as the 1970s, particularly in the Jaffna region. The 1972 constitution and the 1977 election proved to be catalysts for the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that the Sri Lankan government has fought ever since.

The Rise of the Tigers: The Growth of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

With the Tamil community extremely dissatisfied with the 1972 constitution, Tamil politicians, especially those associated with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), began agitating for the creation of a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka. Significantly, the exclusion of Tamils from the education system helped to galvanize the TULF. One Sinhalese Sri Lankan professor, C. R. de Silva, acknowledged:

The Tamils of Sri Lanka have developed feelings of nationalism on their own and the question of educational opportunity only aggravated the conflicts that had arisen owing to questions of language and employment. Nevertheless the question of University admissions is clearly one which mobilized the youth in Jaffna and prodded the [TULF] leadership to declare in favour of a separatist state.⁴⁴

In the 1977 general election, the TULF issued its Vaddukoddai Resolution, declaring that the Front would campaign on secession and on holding a

referendum on the secession question among the Tamil populace. TULF candidates won overwhelmingly in Tamil areas and proclaimed a *fait accompli*. Thus, instead of then pushing for some kind of referendum on the question of secession, the TULF declared that their electoral victory was in and of itself approval of their secession platform. The official website of the Tigers reads, "These elections were effectively a referendum [in which] the Tamil-speaking people voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession."⁴⁵ The Sri Lankan government responded by requiring all members of parliament to swear an oath that they would not advocate secession.

The LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976, by Velupillai Prabhakaran from the nucleus of the Tamil New Tigers group he had founded in the early 1970s. The group launched its first official attack in September 1978 with the bombing of an Air Ceylon passenger jet.⁴⁶ Prabhakaran, reportedly a charismatic figure who inspires near-worship among his followers, grew up in the Tamil town of Velvettiturai, long regarded as a smuggler's haven. Prabhakaran added to his infamy by personally carrying out a number of killings and bank robberies, including the heist of 500,000 rupees and jewelry estimated at 200,000 rupees from the People's Bank at Puttur in Jaffna in March 1979.⁴⁷ The LTTE engaged in particularly intense periods of fighting from 1983 to 1989, in the mid-1990s, and from 2005 to today.

In 1980, the Tigers published a Marxist-Leninist document that sought to cast their struggle in terms of class conflict as well as national liberation. The document, "Towards a Socialist Eelam," appears to have had significance at the time, but since the end of the Cold War, the LTTE has largely dropped all

communist rhetoric or justifications for their actions in favor of self-determination arguments.⁴⁸

The Tigers also claim that Tamils were discriminated against in the recruitment of the Sri Lankan security services; that the Sinhalese government has undertaken an intense and officially sponsored campaign of colonization of Tamil areas much like the conservative Israeli settlers movement in Palestinian areas; and that beginning in the late 1970s large numbers of Tamil youths were detained without legal representation and tortured, all under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.⁴⁹ LTTE arguments aside, the Prevention of Terrorism Act has been heavily criticized by such groups as Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

The Tigers seek to establish a separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka and assert their right to do so under the United Nations (UN) Charter which guarantees the right of a people to political independence. Vital to this claim is the assertion that Tamils are a distinct people with a unique cultural heritage and history that differentiate them from the rest of Sri Lankans. The Tigers also claim the right to secede under a concept known as reversion of sovereignty in international law. They thus assert that the British colonial administrators acknowledged until 1833 that the Tamil people were a separate nation and that this can be seen in several British documents, including the Cleghorn Minute of 1799 and the Arrow Smith Map of 1802.⁵⁰ The Tigers also point out that the British retained aspects of Tamil law and instituted measures to prevent discrimination against the Tamil people in the constitution of 1948. To the Tigers, the 1972 constitution claimed legitimacy over the whole of Sri Lanka, but violated all of the past precedents

that acknowledged the distinctiveness of the Tamil people, their laws, and their customs. In their view, the government claim of sovereignty over all of Sri Lanka was flawed from the outset.

The Tigers seek to bolster a Tamil sense of nationalism and national pride—they can provide a source of respect for Tamils who feel alienated by the Sri Lankan government or who have experienced heavy-handed tactics by government security services. The organization seeks a Tamil *eelam*, or homeland, and even features a constitution and manifesto.⁵¹ Like most insurgents and terrorist groups, the LTTE claims that its move toward violent armed struggle was necessary because the government illegally prevented the Tigers from achieving their goals within the political process and because the government resorted to attacking the Tamil community.

The Organization and Operation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

It is widely acknowledged that Prabhakaran rules the LTTE with an iron fist. He has forcibly suppressed rival violent and nonviolent Tamil organizations that have sprung up since the Tigers were founded. Prabhakaran has established strict discipline among the Tiger ranks, brutally weeding out the uncommitted and preventing the Sri Lankan government from exploiting clandestine spies within the Tamil organization, greedy fighters willing to become turncoats, or malcontents. The LTTE has killed dissident Tamils in Canada and France, and is not above intimidating a dissident's family within Sri Lanka. The leader maintains a highly effective central intelligence organization which reports regularly on the state and affairs of the organization's

members. It is believed that there are 8-10 thousand LTTE members in Sri Lanka, of which approximately 3-6 thousand are trained in conventional or asymmetric insurgent tactics.⁵²

Though the Tigers' website cites the TULF as its ancestor, in reality the TULF was founded as an organization for moderate Tamils in 1975 and differed greatly in its refusal to use violence. Sensing a rivalry, Prabhakaran launched several devastating attacks on TULF, largely eliminating them. Today, the remnants of the TULF are known as the Tamil National Alliance, which gained 22 seats in parliament in 2006. The Tamil National Alliance has little independence from the LTTE and operates as its legislative proxy in parliament.⁵³ The Tigers have repeatedly devastated other rival Tamil groups, including killing most of the 300 fighters of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and their supporters in 1986, as well as moderate Tamil groups.

Like most insurgent organizations, details on the recruitment, indoctrination/training, equipment, funding, public relations, and tactics of the Tigers are scarce. Regarding recruitment, it does not appear that the LTTE routinely drafts or dragoons young Tamils as is the case in some African conflicts. In May 1999, the Tigers attempted to establish a Universal People's Militia comprised of all Tamils over the age of 15 in certain LTTE-held areas,⁵⁴ but the unpopularity and lack of success of the effort seems to have discouraged further attempts at drafting Tamils. The Tigers are adept at using mass gatherings or social events to portray their struggle as just, capitalizing on group dynamics to generate enthusiasm for their cause. The group will hold Pongu Tamil festivals in an effort to use the passions of frenzied crowds to recruit new members.⁵⁵

The organization attracts Tamils from all walks of life, but especially seeks to recruit young educated Tamils. Recruits with specific skill sets are put to work in areas where they fit best. For instance, one analyst states that graphic artists have been put to work making maps. University students, particularly those in engineering, have been approached to modify or improve existing military devices for future attacks. Tigers not trained as fighters, however, often join the armed units in the field in order to remove the dead LTTE fighters or at least clothe them in civilian dress to further undermine the reputation of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA).⁵⁶

Tamils as young as 14 have been recruited, but generally those between the ages of 14 and 16 are believed to be kept at logistical bases and do not fight until 16-18.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, a variety of human rights organizations, as well as the Sri Lankan government, accuses the Tigers of training a number of child soldiers. At least one expert contends that a special unit, the Leopard Brigade, is comprised entirely of children and is among the more tenacious Tiger elements. Some analysts assert that between 1995 and 1996, one-half of the new Tamil recruits were between the ages of 12 and 16. According to an SLA intelligence report in 1998, 60 percent of Tiger recruits were younger than 18, and 60 percent of those killed since April 1995 were child soldiers.⁵⁸ Regardless of age, new recruits sign the constitution and pledge loyalty to the LTTE above family and all others.

The LTTE appears to be extraordinarily adept at indoctrinating and training its members. It has taken on the appearance of a professional military organization, putting future fighters through a rigorous physical training regimen and instructing recruits in the use of a

variety of weapons. Tamil theorists instruct recruits in the Tiger ideology and in the abuses of the Sri Lankan government, especially the security services. These sessions are supplemented by the use of a specific genre of action movies, like the Rambo series and certain Clint Eastwood movies, as one analyst notes, in order to instill the belief that smaller forces can win against all odds.⁵⁹ Their training camps reportedly resemble college campuses. Male and female members typically wear cyanide capsules around their necks, not only as a way to prevent their interrogation if captured, but as an outward sign of their total devotion to the cause. Curiously, female Tigers often carry two cyanide capsules.⁶⁰

Significantly, in the past the LTTE has received training from a number of international and transnational actors. From 1976 to 1986, a limited number of Tigers received training in Tyre, Lebanon, from the Palestinian groups Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).⁶¹ India provided weapons and training to a variety of Tamil groups, including the LTTE, after the 1983 massacre of Tamils in Colombo (to be discussed below). India, in an effort to placate its own Tamil population, reacted to the anti-Tamil Sinhala violence by arming the Tamils until the Indian-Sri Lankan agreement in 1987. India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) brought Tamil militants to India for training in 32 Tamil Nadu camps, with the Tigers training at Salem, Madurai, and perhaps some at the high-level facility at Dehra Dun. Indeed, by 1985 the number of Indian-trained Tamils reached parity with or exceeded the number of soldiers in the SLA.⁶² While this relationship with the Indian government has ceased, the LTTE is believed to be in contact with Sikh separatists, Kashmiri fighters, and some 20-plus

separatist groups in Tamil Nadu, and it is quite possible that training and weaponry are exchanged. In the 1990s, the Tigers received global positioning system (GPS) training in Sudan as well as political training in South Africa by the African National Congress, and at least one analyst suggests that Norwegian naval personnel may have provided training in underwater sabotage techniques in Thailand.⁶³ Finally, one observer alleges that the LTTE and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) have had a relationship, with the Tigers training the PKK in suicide operations and the PKK allegedly providing the LTTE with *Stinger* anti-aircraft missiles.⁶⁴

In terms of equipment, analysts conclude that the LTTE has found weapons suppliers in South Africa, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Afghanistan, North Korea, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Lebanon, and that the plastic explosives for its bombing and suicide bomber campaigns likely come from the Ukraine.⁶⁵ The Tigers have stolen weaponry on several occasions, including 60 tons of explosives destined for Bangladesh's armed forces that were provided by Ukraine, as well as some 324,000 mortar rounds in Mozambique that were supposed to go to the South Lebanese Army in 1997.⁶⁶ Thailand assured the Sri Lankan government that it would crack down on LTTE activity when it discovered in May 2000 that a Tamil sympathizer was involved in the construction of a submarine at the Phuket shipyard, destined for the Tamils.⁶⁷ In late summer 2006, several Tamils with close ties to the LTTE were arrested in New York not only for trying to bribe U.S. officials into removing the State Department's designation of Tamil Tigers as terrorists, but also for trying to buy a variety of weapons, including missile launchers and surface-to-air armaments.⁶⁸

One expert describes Prabhakaran as a managing director of a corporate organization complete with financial offices overseen by the equivalent of Chief Financial Officer K. P. Kummaruppa in Thailand. The official website of the LTTE, the Tamil Eelam homepage, lists telephone numbers and addresses in London, along with a number of ways parties can contribute financially.

Sources of funding for the LTTE range from legitimate to illegal. Legitimate business enterprises include farming; cultivation of tea; operation of bus companies, print shops, and photo studios; and operating factories that produce jam, soap, soft drinks, and a number of other items.⁶⁹ Evidence suggests that the LTTE has invested heavily in legitimate shipping enterprises, with ships legally registered and insured. Some analysts contend that these ships, in addition to carrying legal items, act as transportation for contraband to LTTE areas, frequently making unscheduled stops en route to their destination. The Tigers reportedly receive increasing amounts of funds from overseas, especially from the Tamil diaspora.⁷⁰ Large Tamil communities exist in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada, the Nordic countries, and Malaysia, though reports suggest that some Tamil communities are subjected to extortion and protection rackets from Tiger associates, and are thus unwilling contributors. A RAND report indicated that the LTTE may raise as much as \$650,000 a month in Switzerland, \$1 million a month in Canada, and \$350,000 a month in the UK. Prior to the Tigers' designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, there were several serious U.S.-based contributors, including one California doctor who reportedly gave up to \$100,000 at a time.⁷¹ Analysts disagree over how much of the LTTE's funding comes from abroad, but

the group has an estimated annual budget of \$100 million, with somewhere between 60 and 90 percent coming from overseas donors. What analysts do agree on is that in the wake of the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks in the United States, countries around the globe were more willing to clamp down on LTTE fundraising activities, making it more difficult for the group to raise funds.

With regard to illegal sources of funding, the Sri Lankan government claims that 75 percent of Tamils carrying drugs do so on behalf of the Tigers. In May 2003, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration intelligence chief Steven W. Casteel contradicted the traditional U.S. line that Tamils were not involved in the drug trade. Citing new evidence, Casteel asserted that Tamils had been involved in narcotrafficking as early as the 1980s. Reportedly, the Tigers sponsor two Toronto-area gangs, VVT and AK Kannan, who act as narcotics distributors and local muscle. There is some evidence to suggest that the LTTE may be involved in human smuggling, which can net up to \$32,000 per person. If the individuals cannot pay, they are often forced to work for the LTTE wherever they have been transported, often to Europe or Canada.⁷² Within Sri Lanka, the LTTE robs banks to fund their operations, and it imposes "taxes" on items like cigarettes imported into their areas of control.

The LTTE public relations campaign is well honed for foreign audiences. The Tamil Eelam website shrewdly employs language like "self-determination" and "human rights" in order to garner foreign sympathy. They have created multiple webpages, most likely in an effort to avoid being completely shut down by Sri Lankan efforts and to convey an exaggerated impression of popularity. The Tigers operate a domestic

radio station, the Voice of the Tigers, as well as a satellite television station. Within Sri Lanka, the Tigers have, at times, been counterproductively dogmatic and repressive in areas they control or have controlled. For instance, when the LTTE controlled the city of Jaffna, public outcry in the Tamil population led Prabhakaran to establish special envoys not only to propagate the LTTE's message, but also to provide a means of redress among Tamils for LTTE excesses in 2000. While the Tigers have no scruples over utterly ruthless tactics in Sinhala areas, in Tamil communities the LTTE visits the families of Tamils killed by LTTE security services, publishes obituaries, and provides compensation to Tamils who have property confiscated by the LTTE.⁷³

The Tigers have targeted the SLA, and especially the officer corps, in some of their propaganda. Occasionally the LTTE will distribute leaflets or bulletins that are directly addressed to members of the SLA. One such letter reads:

As we walk the path of national liberation, our death will acquire dignity and meaning. But yours will become insignificant. . . . Do not die labouring for the foul campaigns of the ruling class. Do not lose your integrity and your humanity, so that those who rule us may prosper. It is only when you take up arms on the side of the oppressed Sinhala workers and peasants against the state of Sri Lanka that we could speak the language of friendship.⁷⁴

RAND interviews with the U.S. Embassy indicate that the SLA suffers from a severe officer shortage, most likely the result of a combination of LTTE propaganda campaigns and targeted assassinations of officers.

Tiger tactics are varied and complex. They will engage the Sri Lankan military conventionally, with

ground, air, or sea elements, when they are confident of the outcome or are provoked. The sea element, called the Sea Tigers, is believed to have some 3-4 thousand members with six ships, primarily small, fast, attack craft. It is believed that the air element, the Air Tigers, was originally organized by a former Air Canada employee, Vythilingam Sornalingam, now deceased, with the intention of launching suicide operations against buildings with microlight aircraft packed with explosives, though they have yet to attempt such attacks.⁷⁵ The Air Tigers have exhibited a conventional capability, raiding the Colombo airport with two aircraft believed to have taken off from airstrips built in the Mullaitivu jungle near Trincomalee.

In terms of asymmetric warfare, the LTTE engages in shootings, bombings, and suicide operations across the country, even in the capital city of Colombo. The Black Tigers are the dedicated suicide bomber contingent of the LTTE. Suicide bombings are an integral component of Tiger campaigns, and future bombers are revered among recruits and typically recruited from populations that have been physically harmed by the Sri Lankan security services.⁷⁶ Evidence indicates that the Tigers have relied heavily on female suicide bombers who frequently face less scrutiny by security services or who may pretend to be pregnant so as to hide explosive devices on their persons. Members of the Black Tigers who undertake attacks are memorialized annually in the Maaveerar Thinam, or Great Hero's Day celebration. Notable assassinations by the Black Tigers include Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne, Naval commander Vice Admiral W. W. E. C. Fernando, and Minister of Industries and Industrial Development C. V. Gooneratne. Since July 1987, the

Black Tigers have carried out an estimated 200 suicide attacks in India and Sri Lanka, dwarfing the number of attacks carried out by better-known groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.⁷⁷

As one Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense Official noted, "Attacking Colombo has rich dividends. It makes leaders question the value of countering the LTTE. A single blast in Colombo has more value psychologically than full-scale conflict in the north and northeast."⁷⁸ The Tigers often scout targets for weeks and have shown the capacity to mount complicated operations using advanced communications equipment, mines, and indirect fire.⁷⁹

Major LTTE Attacks and Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operations.

Almost all LTTE attacks and Sri Lankan government counterinsurgency operations can be generally characterized as indiscriminate and brutal. The war has killed an estimated 70,000 people, with thousands of Sri Lankans internally displaced. According to Human Rights Watch, the long-simmering conflict has forced 800,000 Tamils to flee the country, dramatically increasing the diaspora in Australia and the United States, but especially in India, Canada, and the UK.⁸⁰

The Tigers emerged as a serious insurgent or terrorist group in 1983. In July, the LTTE killed 13 policemen in Jaffna, spawning Sinhalese riots in Colombo. The Sinhala marauders targeted Tamils, killing an estimated 1,000 people, while the government watched. Known as "Black July" in the Tamil community, the riots enabled the LTTE, previously relegated to the fringes, to play a larger role and, more importantly, to attract recruits. They received additional material support from India,

whose population includes some 60 million Tamils, many of whom reside in the state of Tamil Nadu, the ancestral home for thousands of Sri Lanka's Tamils.⁸¹

India, however, grew alarmed as the violence intensified throughout the 1980s and reached a particularly bloody point in 1987. India sent a peacekeeping force (IPKF) to quell the violence and compel the Sri Lankan government to offer some kind of concession to the Tamils. Patrolling in mostly Tamil areas, the Indian presence managed to wrangle constitutional amendments from Colombo that offered some Tamil autonomy. The Indian presence, however, caused a great deal of friction within Sri Lankan society, sparking an additional rebellion of Sinhalese nationalists in the south of the country. The Indian government thus faced a Sinhala nationalist rebellion in the south and a separatist Tamil rebellion in the north and east.

The IPKF found itself fighting the LTTE, one of India's former clients, instead of peacekeeping. While the IPKF temporarily dislodged the LTTE from Jaffna, depriving the Tigers of their headquarters, training facilities, munitions factories, and weapon stores, the Indians suffered considerable losses. Severely undercapitalized, Indian communication gear and guns were outclassed by the LTTE's more modern gear and AK-47s. Further, many Indian units were undermanned by as much as 50 percent.⁸²

IPKF soon discovered why the SLA had had so many problems stamping out the Tigers. The LTTE quickly adapted its tactics following the loss of its base in Jaffna, striking the Indians whenever it proved most profitable for the Tigers. For instance, the Indians were forced to traverse the narrow Elephant Pass in order to get from the nearby port to Jaffna City, thus

providing the LTTE with an inviting target. When the IPKF learned to identify and disable Tiger roadside or semiconcealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the LTTE buried high explosives beneath the blacktop, making it nearly impossible to detect the makeshift mines.⁸³

Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa, believing that the unpopular Indian intervention had unwittingly unified Tamils and Sinhalese, asked the IPKF to leave. When the Indians left, the LTTE filled the power vacuum in the eastern regions and was actually able to take control of some of the weaponry left by the IPKF.⁸⁴

Following the failed intervention, the Tigers mounted some of their most successful operations, earning their reputation as adept suicide bombers. In May 1991, an LTTE suicide bomber killed the Indian Prime Minister responsible for the intervention, Rajiv Gandhi. Two years later, another suicide bomber killed President Premadasa. His successor, Chandrika Kumaratunga, unsuccessfully sought a negotiated settlement. When the effort flagged, Kumaratunga shifted strategies, still seeking a negotiated settlement with the Tamil people while attacking the Tigers. Though the LTTE succeeded in sinking two Sri Lankan Navy vessels during the intensified fighting, the government was able to reassert its control over Jaffna.⁸⁵

Between 1996 and 1999, the Tigers launched a series of attacks, both conventional and asymmetric. In early 1996, the LTTE bombed the Central Bank in Colombo, causing hundreds of casualties. Another significant bombing took place in February 1998 when the Tigers hit the important Buddhist Temple of the Tooth in Kandy. In 1999, a pivotal year, the LTTE killed a moderate Tamil parliamentarian, tried to kill President

Kumaratunga, and launched a massive conventional attack that recaptured the all-important Elephant Pass, killing an estimated 1,000 Sri Lankan soldiers. The attack on the president, however, had the unintended consequence of boosting her popularity, enabling her to win the 1999 election.⁸⁶

In 2001, the LTTE seized Sri Lanka's international airport, a particularly galling attack in the eyes of the Sri Lankan government, given its proximity to Colombo. The airport attack is regarded by some as the worst act of terrorism in aviation history. The same month, India's External Affairs Minister Jeswant Singh pledged a \$100 million loan to Sri Lanka to offset somewhat the economic impact of the unpopular conflict.⁸⁷ Still, the Sri Lankan president's party failed to win the December 2001 elections, with the United National Party's (UNP) candidate, Ramil Wickeremesinghe, winning the post of prime minister.

The new prime minister sought a ceasefire which eventually went into effect on February 22, 2002, leaving the government in control of major towns while the LTTE controlled rural areas in the east. The agreement, however, allowed the Tigers to open political offices all around the country, a measure they exploited to the fullest—they continued to recruit, establish protection rackets, and kill moderate Tamils. Furthermore, the agreement was heavily opposed by Sinhala nationalists who believed that it was a step on the road to granting Tamil independence—and it failed to give President Kumaratunga a role in the peace process.⁸⁸

The ceasefire—overseen by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) comprised of 60-70 representatives from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland—was able to halt major attacks

until 2005. The peace talks, begun in Thailand in 2002, and later continuing in Oslo, lasted six rounds, which very early highlighted the unwillingness of both sides to reach a compromise. The Tigers essentially wanted to establish their rule over the north and east before engaging in substantive talks. In addition, the LTTE demanded that the government close down its high security zones and allow free passage of Tamil ships. Sri Lanka flatly refused to budge on these two issues. The only substantive agreement reached by the two sides was over human rights – neither wanted alleged violations on both sides investigated.

Despite the underlying unwillingness of either side to compromise, Prabhakaran indicated in late 2002 that the Tigers might be willing to give up their goal of an independent state. He stated:

We are prepared to consider favourably a political framework that offers substantial regional autonomy and self government in our homeland on the basis of our right to internal self-determination...[but if our] demand for regional self-rule is rejected we have no alternative other than to secede and form an independent state.⁸⁹

While the statement appears to look favorably on some form of federalism, it was never clear that what Prabhakaran envisioned would have been acceptable to the central government, much less to the Sinhalese nationalists. In any case, the LTTE pulled out of the talks in 2003, demanding the establishment of an interim administration it called the Interim Self-Governing Administration (ISGA). The ISGA would have enabled the Tigers to set up a quasi-government in the north and east, with negotiations to resume after 5 years. This proved more than the Sinhalese majority and President

Kumaratunga could stomach. She accused Prime Minister Wickremesinghe of endangering Sri Lanka's national security, dissolved parliament, seized control of the defense and security apparatus, and called for new elections.⁹⁰

The Tigers were unable to capitalize on the disorder within the government due to their own internal problems. Long known for extreme internal discipline, rivalry between LTTE intelligence head Pottu Amman and an eastern commander, Colonel Karuna, led to Karuna establishing his own Tamil group. Prabhakaran resorted once more to force in trying to destroy Karuna, pushing the colonel into the arms of the Sri Lankan government in 2006. The loss proved to be a significant one – Karuna provided extremely valuable intelligence to his former enemy. Despite the turmoil in both camps, an unexpected catastrophic event momentarily cooled hostilities.

An Opening? The December 2004 Tsunami.

On December 26, 2004, a massive tsunami caused by the subduction of a tectonic plate under the ocean floor swept across Southeast Asian waters. The tsunami inundated coastal areas, killing approximately 35,000 Sri Lankans and devastating Tamil areas. For arguably the first time since independence, the government did not stand idly by while the Tamil population suffered. The Sri Lankan military played a large role in delivering relief supplies to affected Tamil areas and undertook a number of rescue missions as well.

Though the Tigers attempted to downplay the government's efforts and sought to control the flow of all aid into their areas through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a cooperative body comprised of

both Tamils and Sinhalese was created to oversee and coordinate relief efforts. The Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) represented a real opportunity for the government to work collectively with the Tamil people. Joint committees consisting of government representatives, Muslims, Tamils, and the LTTE would oversee the relief efforts and provide feedback, oversight, and recommendations for priority projects.⁹¹

This promising initiative was short-lived, however, as the powerful Sinhalese nationalists once again served as spoiler out of their concern that such cooperative efforts ran the risk of establishing a *de facto* Tamil state. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party quit the coalition government with the UNP in June 2005 because of such fears. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court sounded P-TOMS' death knell by ruling that aspects of the proposed administration were inconsistent with the Sri Lankan constitution.⁹²

The efforts of the Sinhalese nationalists and the court ruling were poorly timed and unfortunate. Had P-TOMS not been struck down, it would have forced the Tigers' hand. They would have faced an organization with greater international legitimacy than their own TRO and would have had to decide whether to join it or possibly be marginalized. Further, the joint administration envisioned by P-TOMS was exactly the kind of cooperative effort that many within the Tamil community wanted out of the government. Eviscerating it before it even got off the ground likely strengthened the position of the Tigers and eliminated a cooperative effort that might have proven to be a model for further reconciliatory initiatives.

Major Attacks and Counterinsurgency Operations after the Tsunami.

The election of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse on November 25, 2005, led some to believe that a breakthrough in the peace process was possible. The president seemed committed to bringing about an end to the conflict in his campaign rhetoric. Yet Rajapakse owed his political success to Sinhala nationalists in the city of Hambantota and to an understanding with the ultranationalist Jatika Hele Urumaya (JHU) and Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) parties.⁹³ These forces would not tolerate the kind of peace process the LTTE would agree to, and it is likely that the combination of Colonel Karuna's defection and the devastation wrought by the tsunami led these nationalist forces to believe that the Tigers were vulnerable and that an intensified campaign might finally quell them. Though the two sides continued to talk throughout late 2005 and early 2006, the violence gradually escalated.

In December 2005, two LTTE activists were killed, followed by the death of 14 government soldiers and 16 sailors in separate attacks. Gunmen killed a parliamentarian from the Tamil National Alliance in Batticaloa and then five Tamil students in early January 2006. In April, the LTTE bombed a market in Trincomalee, and a female suicide bomber attacked the army headquarters in Colombo, nearly killing the army commander. Sinhalese riots broke out following the Trincomalee, and the Sri Lankan government reverted to its characteristic sluggish behavior in the face of Sinhala violence. May saw a huge conventional battle when the LTTE seized control of a water control point in Mavil Aru. The government responded with massive force, and the LTTE unsuccessfully counterattacked at

Mutur. A massacre of all of the indigenous employees of a French aid organization took place in Mutur, with SLMM accusing the government of having perpetrated the killings.⁹⁴

The next significant conventional battle took place in August 2006, when LTTE forces were able to defeat government forces and retake Jaffna. An October counterattack on Jaffna by the government failed miserably—not only were the government forces thrown back, they suffered 133 killed and some 200 wounded. The Tigers answered both unconventionally and conventionally, with a suicide bomber hitting a bus of naval personnel and LTTE ships firing on Sri Lankan naval vessels in Galle Harbor. It is believed that since mid-2006, some 1,000 LTTE fighters have been killed, with an undetermined number of SLA casualties. The Sri Lankan military estimated that defense spending in 2007 would reach \$1.29 billion.⁹⁵

In early 2007, hostilities continued to intensify. On March 26, the Air Tigers utilized small aircraft to bomb the Katunayake Air Force Base. The Sri Lankan Navy engaged a component of the Sea Tigers on March 29, allegedly sinking a number of their vessels. The LTTE responded a day later with a mortar and artillery attack on Batticaloa. On April 4, the Sri Lankan Air Force bombed a Sea Tiger base in Puthukkudiyiruppu.

Problems with the Sri Lanka's Counterinsurgency Efforts.

As the events described above make quite clear, Sri Lanka has been overly reliant on a military solution to the LTTE insurgency. In its military operations, it has often caused excessive civilian casualties, enabling the LTTE to capitalize on the deaths by utilizing its

advanced and responsive public relations arm to effectively tar the central government. In one incident in November 2006, SLA artillery batteries hit a camp for internally displaced people in the Batticaloa district, killing 47 and injuring approximately 100.⁹⁶ As a result, such groups as the Asian Human Rights Commission have repeatedly criticized the Sri Lankan government for military and police operations that violate the 1994 Sri Lankan Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Acts.⁹⁷

Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists have criticized the Prevention of Terrorism Act for leading to the mistreatment of suspects and captured insurgents. Amnesty alleged that Sri Lankan security services have beaten suspects, suspended them upside down from the ceiling, forced pins under detainees' fingernails, and applied ants and chilies to parts of the body.⁹⁸ The International Commission of Jurists released perhaps the harshest condemnation, stating:

The provisions of the Sri Lankan Terrorism Act are not only objectionable from the human rights point of view but it is doubtful that the Act is effective in controlling terrorism . . . since 1979, when the Act was adopted, terrorism had not declined but rather increased in the Northern Tamil area. Increased police and army surveillance of the population have not curtailed violence but seemingly stimulated it. This experience is similar to that of some other countries which have attempted to control terrorism by armed force rather than dealing with the fundamental factors contributing to the recourse to violence.⁹⁹

Interviews of former and current Tamil insurgents indicate that the indiscriminate brutality of the SLA does as much to recruit for the LTTE as anything else. In some

cases, fighters from former rival Tamil organizations ended up fighting for the LTTE despite Prabhakaran's brutal destruction of these rival groups. One fighter, only 22 years old, fought for the LTTE even though the Tigers imprisoned him and brutally eradicated TELO, the rival Tamil organization he originally belonged to. When queried about why he joined the Tigers, he responded, "The reason I fought for the LTTE was not because of any love for the Tigers. In fact, I hate them. But we—I and my friends—did not want Tamil people to suffer at the hands of the SLA."¹⁰⁰

While large military operations and brutal interrogations have negatively impacted the civilian populace in the northern and eastern regions, the everyday actions of the SLA do much to anger the Tamil people and turn them against the central government. Daily measures such as roadblocks exacerbate tensions and contribute to the Tamil sense that the Sinhalese government is besieging their community. As C. Christine Fair, a RAND area expert, argues, "These blunt instruments have proved counterproductive. They have alienated the Tamils and have provided fuel for the LTTE assertions that Colombo is anti-Tamil. Moreover, in the view of [a Ministry of Defense official] these actions have been so provocative that some Tamils may have become anti-state as a consequence."¹⁰¹

Some scholars and analysts point to the periods of negotiation between the LTTE and the central government as positive steps toward decreasing the animosity between the Sinhala and Tamil communities. Yet even these negotiations have proved problematic. The Norwegian-led negotiations had the unintended consequence of legitimizing the Tigers as the representatives of the Tamil community to the exclusion of other Tamil groups.¹⁰²

Periods of negotiation, particularly from 1989 to 1990 and 1994 to 1995, led to a mystifying relaxation in security measures by the Sri Lankan government. While the LTTE has often argued for the removal of some measures during negotiations, the government eased security measures to such a degree as to allow LTTE infiltration throughout the southern portion of the country, including Colombo. Once more, whenever there is a lull in Tiger attacks, there is a tendency on the part of the government to assume that the capability of the LTTE has been degraded and that the threat has been reduced.¹⁰³ Thus, it appears that the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency campaign can swing wildly from one extreme to another, from heavy-handed indiscriminate military operations to a shockingly minimal security presence. As one analyst noted, "Sri Lanka's maladaptive response to the LTTE's guerrilla and terrorist campaign has contributed to the strengthening of the LTTE both on the island and overseas."¹⁰⁴

Even when the Sri Lankan government has offered a measured response, Sri Lanka's understanding of security remains overly based on passive military activities and presence as opposed to proactive and adaptive procedures, tactics, and good intelligence. As one observer notes, "In Sri Lanka, the notion of security is highly correlated with the presence of men with guns rather than enhanced security practices and procedures."¹⁰⁵ More soldiers standing around a potential target is viewed as an effective defense against LTTE activity, despite the fact that this does little to interdict Tiger operations and may present them with an inviting target.

Furthermore, there is little evidence that the Tamils trust the government either in the negotiations or in

other efforts to integrate the Tamil community. As Dr. Peter Chalk, another RAND expert on Sri Lanka, observes, "There is still a large sense of grievance amongst the Tamil community, and there's still a perception even amongst members of the Tamil groups that have now made peace with the government that the government's really not sincere in what its doing . . . to address . . . perceptions of alienation [and] perceptions of discrimination."¹⁰⁶

This mistrustful perception of an anti-Tamil bias within the government, coupled with past incidents of military abuse or killing of Tamils, has created a shortfall in the number of Tamils who are recruited to the government security services. The SLA has had little success in penetrating the LTTE or in recruiting intelligence assets, in part due to this lack of Tamils sympathetic to the central government.¹⁰⁷

Much like the U.S. efforts in support and stability operations, Sri Lanka is plagued by a lack of coordination between the military and the civilian components of the government in its fight against the LTTE. Sri Lanka's approach has often been described as "ad hoc," with one former Deputy Inspector General of Colombo stressing the need for integrated psychological operations and civil affairs teams in order to combat the effective Tiger propaganda campaign and to provide tangible economic development in the local community. Overall, "there is a need for multiinstitutional cooperation and coordination."¹⁰⁸

Similar to the United States, Sri Lanka has had difficulties optimizing its intelligence operations and providing the appropriate intelligence consumers with what they need in a timely fashion. There is evidence that the police and the military units in LTTE areas that most require actionable intelligence often do not get

what they need from the central agencies in Colombo. The agencies appear reticent or incapable of providing the field units with what they need quickly.¹⁰⁹

International pressure is another important component in the struggle against the LTTE. As has been documented, the Tigers acquire much of their funding and weaponry from abroad, and much of the international efforts against the LTTE has focused on cutting the inflow of both. Yet international actors have ignored the underlying ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka, failing to acknowledge that long-term peace will be achieved only if the grievances of the Tamil community are assuaged within the political system.¹¹⁰

Lessons for the U.S. in Support and Stability Operations.

Sri Lanka's counterinsurgency efforts since the 1970s reveal at least three important lessons that can be applied to U.S. interagency efforts in support and stability operations: (1) the vital importance of understanding the target nation's history and culture; (2) the need to implement joint administration of relief and development efforts so as to build trust between a central authority and minority populations; and (3) the usefulness of engaging in security operations that are based less on firepower and more on cementing personal relationships between security forces and local populations.¹¹¹

With regard to the first lesson, understanding a country, a region, a people's culture and history can do much to prevent missteps in support and stability operations. The Sri Lankan case reveals how this can occur *even within a country*. Despite being cohabitants on the same island since the 3rd century B.C., the

Sinhalese and Tamil communities subscribe to different accounts of their shared history and are often ignorant of one another's culture. The 1972 constitution and the national flag are but two examples of culturally resonant measures implemented by the Sinhala majority government that inevitably led to clashes with the Tamil minority. While these policies, as well as others cited not only by the Tamils but by minorities like the Muslim community, were implemented by extreme Sinhala nationalists intentionally to subvert minority identity and culture, the policies required the tacit or outright support of less extreme Sinhala parties and members of parliament. Had these moderate Sinhala elements had a better understanding of Tamil history and culture, they may have curbed or blunted the efforts of the extreme nationalists, minimizing or eliminating the grievances that led to a violent Tamil reaction.

The United States can see in retrospect the missteps it has made in Iraq and Afghanistan ensuing from a lack of understanding of culture and history. In Afghanistan, certain tribes have proved willing to harbor the Taliban and have frustrated U.S. and coalition efforts to build widespread support of the Karzai government outside of Kabul. Yet Afghan history shows that the central government has usually exerted little if any control on distant provinces, where warlords and strongmen asserted their authority.

In Iraq, a number of U.S. military and civilian missteps might have been avoided with a better understanding of Iraqi culture and history. De-Ba'athification by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) went too far and too deep, forcing the firing of thousands of bureaucrats who could have been used to staff the retooled ministries. The policy removed many

Sunnis, fueling the perception that the government was biased in favor of the Shi'ites. A proper understanding of the nation's political history would have revealed that belonging to the Ba'ath was often a requirement for government employment and that thousands joined simply to survive within Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The mass firings, coupled with little hope of finding alternative employment, contributed to the resentment within the Sunni community that led to the rise of the insurgency. In terms of culture, the reliance by the U.S. military on mass detentions and nighttime raids on suspects' homes, frequently resulting in the males in a household being flexi-cuffed, searched, and questioned in front of their families, showed a lack of regard for the significance of honor within Arab culture. Such activities humiliated an untold number of Iraqi males, building resentment against the U.S. presence and inducing an unknown number to join the insurgency or Shi'ite militias. A better understanding of Arab culture likely would have led to modified tactics that bolstered the U.S. mission in Iraq instead of undermining it.

This does not mean that every U.S. military commander or agency official needs to seek a Ph.D. in Afghan or Iraqi history. But they must at least acquire an understanding of the major factors and cultural norms that have a significant impact on the two societies. Anecdotal stories suggest that some officials within the civilian agencies and military have recommended that their subordinates read T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph* as a means to gain a better understanding of Iraqi culture. These subordinates would be better served reading the works of subject area experts and talking with Arabs and Afghans, preferably prior to deployment. Such knowledge

would allow officials, soldiers, and policymakers at all levels to ensure that their day-to-day actions conciliate rather than alienate the local population, and equip themselves to question operations or programs that do the opposite.

The second lesson for U.S. support and stability operations is to realize the importance of joint relief and development projects as a means to establish trust between minority populations and the central authority. In Sri Lanka, the Post-Tsunami Operational Management System, P-TOMS, fashioned a role not only for the Tamils, but also for the other minority communities in overseeing relief efforts in conjunction with Colombo following the December 2004 tsunami. P-TOMS promised to empower members of the Tamil community outside of the LTTE, undercut the Tigers' own relief organization that sought to monopolize the distribution of aid in Tamil areas, and give other minorities a voice, thereby building a foundation of trust between the central government and the minority communities. Unfortunately, the short-sighted Sinhalese nationalists torpedoed what would have been a significant challenge to the LTTE by not supporting P-TOMS. Hearteningly, Sri Lanka's president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, may be grasping the importance of joint relief and development projects—in May 2007, he announced that 12,000 Sri Lankan villages would receive massive allocations of funds for development, with the program to be overseen by Provincial Councils in coordination with the central government.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the relief and development projects have been undertaken by U.S. military provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), by individual commanders utilizing Commander's

Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) where possible. In the short term, this is vital for establishing credibility within the local populace for the efforts of the international community and the Iraqi and Afghan governments. In the mid to long term, if these efforts do not gradually acquire an Iraqi or Afghan face, especially following the much-lauded elections and transfer of sovereignty, these efforts may actually undermine the credibility of the central government. This is because continued aid from outside sources usurps one of the central roles of national government, thereby casting doubt on its legitimacy and efficacy. Moreover, it casts doubt on the longer-term goals of U.S. support and stability operations.

The third lesson from the Sri Lankan experience is the impact that personal relationships have in counterinsurgency and support and stability operations. Sri Lanka's best efforts at countering the LTTE were those that were less marked by military violence, focusing instead on using the security services, with a lower profile, to expend real effort in building better relations with the local population. The former Senior Deputy Inspector General of Colombo, Merrill Gunaratne, introduced vigilance committees (VCs) during his tenure. Essentially, Gunaratne divided the city into 75-100 household units and appointed a Sri Lankan police unit as a liaison with these households. The households formed a representative body, somewhat reminiscent of a neighborhood watch, which met with the police on a regular basis. Two to three police units formed a subsector and reported to a subsector chief. Several sectors made up a zone which reported to the head of the zone. These zone heads then reported directly to the Deputy Inspector.¹¹²

Over time, the police units, which retained the members and were not rotated out, and VCs developed mutual trust. The households began to provide the police with local intelligence and reported the appearance of suspicious figures. Admittedly, the VC program was plagued by problems, but these were largely the result of police units receiving only rudimentary, if any, training in such basic intelligence activities as surveillance, as well as the central intelligence agencies withholding intelligence from the police units. Overall, in the words of Fair, "Sri Lanka's brief experience with integrating [the central intelligence agencies] as well as with community policing (i.e. vigilance committees) appeared to enhance Colombo's ability to interdict LTTE operations."¹¹³ Sri Lanka restarted the vigilance committees concept on January 8, 2007.

In U.S. support and stability operations, the rotation systems in place in both the civilian agencies and the military make establishing trust within the local populations difficult. There are countless stories in Iraq and Afghanistan of military leaders who established good relations with the local *loya jirga*, that is, village leaders or community elders, working with the individuals and institutions who were more than willing to report on insurgent movements and to bring grievances forward that otherwise might fester. Yet, when these agencies and units rotated out, in some cases while the local populace pleaded that they stay, these relationships were interrupted and frequently not reestablished with new personnel. Formerly placated areas became dangerous again. These relationships take a long time to cement but are invaluable in pacifying an area and gathering intelligence. Under the prevailing system, civilians rotate out after 90 days, while military personnel leave after anywhere from a couple of months to a year, severing the bonds of trust with the local

population and giving them little reason to work with their replacements. Fair, commenting on VCs, wrote, “[The success of vigilance committees] also requires that officers not be transferred (transferring personnel would forfeit the accumulated local intelligence and undercut the entire effort).”¹¹⁴ The same can be said for U.S. support and stability operations. Longer rotations are certainly not popular, but if the United States is to be successful in such operations, maintaining relationship continuity between the civilian/military components and the local population is essential.

Sri Lanka’s experience fighting the LTTE is typically studied through the lens of counterterrorism instead of counterinsurgency. Yet it is clear that there are a number of lessons that can be applied to U.S. support and stability operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond. The United States, its allies, and the local governments it attempts to rebuild must be cognizant of the history and culture of the population, must seek to establish joint relief and development projects, i.e., between the central authority and minority populations so as to establish trust and legitimacy, and must be willing to deploy the same personnel for an extended period of time to build trust in the local community. Such efforts are difficult and cannot be successful overnight—but they hold promise of increasing the effectiveness of interagency efforts in support and stability operations everywhere.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

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4. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

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9. Wickramasinghe, p. 29.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

30. Ponnambalam, p. 3.

31. Wickramasinghe, p. 171.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

35. Ponnambalam, p. 72. The 1978 version of the Sri Lankan constitution expressly stated that the flag must have a lion prominently displayed.

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37. Wickramasinghe, p. 173.

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40. Ponnambalam, pp. 4, 174.
41. Wickramasinghe, p. 188.
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44. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
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57. Mackinlay, p. 77.

58. Van de Voorde, p. 186.

59. Mackinlay, p. 78. It is not clear why this is the case.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

61. Swamy, pp. 99-102.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

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65. Mackinlay, p. 70; and Van de Voorde, pp. 191-192.

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67. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

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69. Mackinlay, p. 70.

70. *Ibid.*

71. Fair, pp. 31-32.

72. Aryasinha, pp. 34-35.

73. Mackinlay, p. 73.

74. Quoted in Ponnambalam, p. 221. This letter contains more Marxist jargon than some of the more recent letters, as it was delivered in 1983.

75. Fair, p. 29. These cadres allegedly trained in the UK, France, Switzerland, and Australia.

76. Mackinlay, p. 75.

77. Van de Voorde, pp. 187-188.

78. Quoted in Fair, p. 47.

79. Mackinlay, p. 77.

80. Zissis, p. 3.

81. ICG Report, p. 3.

82. Fair, p. 21.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

84. ICG Report, p. 4.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

87. Aryasinha, p. 39.

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103. Fair, pp. 44, 50.
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108. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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111. I believe that within the relevant Iraq literature, there is a growing consensus on these three points, though they may not be made explicit. See Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, New York: Penguin Press, 2006; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, New York: Pantheon Books, 2006; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006; George Packer, *The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2005; Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*, New York: Times Books, 2005; Bob Woodward, *State of Denial*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006; and Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*, Westport: Praeger, 2003.

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PART III:
**LEARNING, INNOVATION, AND NEW
INITIATIVES**

CHAPTER 8

THE EXQUISITE PROBLEM OF VICTORY: MEASURING SUCCESS IN UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

James J. Wirtz

One of the great ironies of the George W. Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003 is that international counterproliferation efforts had largely shut down Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs by the late 1990s. In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the international community, under United Nations (UN) auspices, had put concerted diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the Ba'athist regime. Inspectors from the United National Special Commission, often referred to as UNSCOM, toured weapons facilities, destroying weapons and equipment. They also collected documents while monitoring the activities of Iraqi scientists and officials. Admittedly, UNSCOM inspections often raised more questions than they resolved, but the pressure of inspectors on the ground had curtailed any significant effort to restart chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons production. A decade of international sanctions limited the resources Saddam Hussein could devote to WMD. More importantly, these sanctions demonstrated a degree of international vigilance when it came to clandestine Iraqi efforts to stockpile materials needed for its WMD programs. Over a decade of continuous overflights, punctuated by concerted counterproliferation strikes in Operation

DESERT FOX, also helped to curtail Iraq's WMD program. As strange as it may sound, the fundamental mistake made by the Bush administration on the eve of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was its failure to recognize that U.S. policy had succeeded. Iraq lacked a significant WMD program.

This failure of net assessment on the part of virtually the entire academic, intelligence, and policy community highlights a significant issue when it comes to the conduct of all sorts of foreign and defense policies, including Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. It is difficult to measure progress in any type of unconventional operation because observers lack the theoretical, policy, or organizational benchmarks needed to assess the success and failure of current policy. There is no accepted theory of SSTR operations to guide policy or to judge progress; moreover, these types of operations usually attract attention only in the aftermath of a crisis. Operations are often undertaken in an ad hoc manner, while supporters and critics alike are left wondering how best to judge progress or anticipate looming failure.

This chapter will highlight the obstacles the U.S. Government faces when it comes to devising measures of effectiveness for unconventional operations. It explores the theoretical, policy-political, and bureaucratic dimensions of this process of net assessment, explaining why it is so difficult to generate valid judgments about the impact of national policy in ongoing strategic interactions. At the heart of the issue lie the facts that the U.S. Government is not well-equipped to undertake net assessment, and that all types of unconventional operations receive only sporadic attention. Knowledge exists, but there is no

institutionalized way to harness this information in a constructive manner. For better or worse, policy assessment in these types of matters is largely a political, not a military, policy, or academic issue.

The Theoretical Dimension.

The absence of an accepted and well-understood theoretical paradigm usable to organize all types of SSTR operations creates the fundamental challenge for those attempting to assess the success or failure of ongoing operations. In other words, it is hard to judge progress without a compelling explanation of the sources and appropriate remedies for instability. It is difficult to determine if one is moving toward desired objectives without some idea of how the achievement of intermediate goals contributes to overall success. Policy can only be as good as the theory behind it, and the theory is not particularly good.

Several factors contribute to a lack of satisfactory theory when it comes to SSTR operations. Scholarship associated with efforts to restore stability to war-torn areas tends to be inconsistent in purpose, responding at times to either academic or political fashion, and often to both. Sometimes it is academically fashionable and politically acceptable for scholars to be associated with supporting the war effort. In the 1950s, for instance, the study of "political development" was an important topic in the field of comparative politics as scholars responded to the wave of decolonization that was sweeping the globe. These studies became increasingly politicized, however, as the Cold War migrated from Central Europe to the "periphery." For a while, the *threat* of nuclear holocaust was overshadowed by the *actual* "wars of national liberation" that swept Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Vietnam debacle discredited the idea that the U.S. Government was capable of fine-tuning diplomatic, military, and economic instruments sufficiently to undertake political development at the point of a gun. The U.S. domestic social and political upheaval produced by this failure inevitably undermined the entire body of research associated with “nation-building.” Policies and the underpinning research which were related to political development came to be seen as synonymous with imperialism, cultural hubris, and intellectual arrogance. Moreover, scholars interested in the more practical issues related to force and diplomacy were ostracized for a “nontheoretical” approach to their work. For many so-called “gate-keepers” in academia, the study of practical political, military, and economic issues was unseemly. Still today, policy relevant research remains unlikely to be appreciated by university tenure committees, which are disposed to value more theoretical pursuits.

This abandonment of the study of political development also was mirrored by the military, which took a variety of steps to reorient its doctrine and force structure following the fall of the regime in Saigon to communist forces. A “never again” school emerged, especially within the U.S. Army, which identified counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts as detrimental to the interests of the United States in general and the U.S. military in particular. Senior officers came to believe that counterinsurgency operations placed their institutions at risk because they tended to be open-ended and costly, and were not supported by the American public. Several steps were undertaken to detach the very support units useful in SSTR operations—engineers, military police, civil affairs personnel—from active duty forces. This

reorganization would force Congress and the White House to activate the Reserves or National Guard before undertaking anything other than minor operations, and left the active duty force virtually incapable of carrying out anything but the most rudimentary stability operation. The so-called Weinberger and Powell doctrines placed these earlier personnel and organizational decisions in a policy context by identifying a set of stringent operational and strategic requirements that should be met before the United States employed military force.

Now that the United States is engaged in critical SSTR operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and occasional high profile relief operations (e.g., the relief expedition launched in the aftermath of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami), the pendulum has again swung to a position favoring political and intellectual stability operations. A host of national and service policy documents now highlight the importance of SSTR operations in U.S. foreign and defense policy. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, for instance, states that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.”¹ The 2006 *Navy Concept of Operations* also highlights the role of stability operations that may “involve providing humanitarian and civic assistance to the local populace. . . . [A]ctivities may include the provision of health care, construction of surface transportation systems, well drilling, construction of basic sanitation facilities, and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.”² Joint Doctrine has been created to integrate the efforts of U.S. and allied units in the conduct of stability operations and to integrate stability operations into an overall campaign plan.³ Also, a

recent Defense Science Board Study has identified a host of organizational, management, planning, and personnel reforms that could be undertaken to improve the ability of U.S. forces to undertake SSTR operations.⁴ Stability operations are clearly now high on the U.S. policy agenda.

Yet, that this new-found interest in SSTR operations comes so late in the game — years after U.S. forces became heavily engaged in critical stability campaigns — is *prima facie* evidence of the lack of attention the topic often receives from academics, strategists, and policymakers. And without clear theoretical understanding of stability operations (i.e., an explanation of how diplomatic, military, economic, social, and political initiatives can be harnessed to produce stability), it is virtually impossible to assess ongoing operations. This is so because, without a theoretically informed strategy to guide SSTR operations, it is difficult to generate meaningful benchmarks when it comes to assessing progress toward restoring normalcy and democracy in a region torn by violence or natural disaster. Thus, the first stumbling block encountered in the effort to undertake a net assessment of ongoing stability operations is the simple fact that scholars, soldiers, and policymakers alike lack a clear and shared understanding of how stability operations actually produce stability. Academic efforts at theory construction related to SSTR strategies are spotty, and they have not yet produced the basis for an accepted and effective approach to stability operations.

The Policy-Political Dimension.

The absence of a theoretical understanding of and a clear strategic approach to SSTR operations does not

alter the fact that policymakers will respond when confronted with threats. They will “muddle through,” so to speak, devising policies that address contemporary priorities or that match cultural biases and political demands of the moment. Amitai Etzioni, however, argues that this sort of muddling through often leads to disaster, as policymakers adopt a shotgun approach to security-building by attempting to address a host of social, economic, and political issues simultaneously. By contrast, Etzioni argues that “security first” should be the guiding principle behind any type of stability operation. According to him, “security commands moral preeminence.” In his view, the primary goal of stability operations should be to restore law and order so as to allow people to live in peace, with a reasonable expectation that their families and property will be protected: “Not to be killed, maimed, or tortured is the most basic of human rights. Significantly life precedes both liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence’s lineup of the purposes for which government is instituted.” Once security has been provided, in Etzioni’s view, political, economic, and social reforms can proceed apace.⁵ Putting nonsecurity objectives (e.g., democratic reform) ahead of restoring some semblance of law and order is likely to doom security efforts to failure. Moreover, Etzioni suggests, there is little that is quick or simple when it comes to stability operations.

Etzioni is highly critical of the U.S. policy that rapidly eliminated the Ba’ath party from power after U.S. forces occupied Iraq. Removing Ba’athists from positions of power meant the elimination of much of the social and governmental infrastructure of Iraq. Over 100,000 Iraqi civil servants, doctors, and teachers were fired from their positions, often because of their relatively low-level membership in the Ba’ath Party.⁶

Greatly worsening the situation was the U.S. decision to disestablish the Iraqi Army, a decision that promptly left over 400,000 officers and soldiers unemployed.⁷ This military talent served as a ready recruitment pool for ethnic militias, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups who benefited from the chaotic conditions that quickly spread across several urban centers in Iraq. From Etzioni's philosophical and theoretical perspective on stability operations, the Coalition's efforts in Iraq were more than unsuccessful. They actually were counterproductive because they had the net effect of reducing the security enjoyed by the Iraqi people.

If one accepts, for the moment, Etzioni's concept for approaching stability operations, two critical policy issues emerge that directly influence the process of net assessment. The initial issue involves the effort to reconcile any coherent approach to stability operations with the domestic politics of intervention. In other words, do policymakers have to minimize the challenges of SSTR operations in order to foster public support at home for the operations themselves, and then go on to attempt a quick, simplistic solution to what is an extraordinarily complex problem?

Theodore Lowi offered an important observation nearly 40 years ago about this same pattern in policymaking: threats and solutions to international problems need to be oversold to gain any traction in American politics.⁸ A paradox thus emerges when it comes to the politics of stability operations in the American political context. On the one hand, major SSTR operations cannot be undertaken without political support, but a realistic assessment of what is actually involved in these operations, for example, Etzioni's approach, is unlikely to generate much political

enthusiasm. On the other hand, if politicians do manage to convince their constituents that intervention is imperative and relatively straightforward, they might not gain the political backing and patience to undertake the complex, nuanced, and costly operations called for by Etzioni. There does seem to be an inherent mismatch between the relatively low level of political support for major stability operations and the relatively high cost of realistic plans to create stability in regions torn by natural and man-made disasters.⁹

An additional issue raised by Etzioni's analysis regards assessing the impact of mistakes of omission and commission while undertaking stability operations. Are stability operations in Iraq doomed because of the decision to destroy the Iraqi army and government before having viable replacements available? Is the deterioration in the situation irretrievable, or is it possible to revitalize the new regime in Baghdad? Can the successes of the surge be sustained? Once again, the issue of what is politically possible and operationally desirable comes into play. Politically, there remains a good deal of pressure to simply withdraw from Iraq, a predictable eventuality, especially as the expectations of a "cake walk" fall victim to the realities of ethnic and religious conflict.

But other options exist. Douglas Macdonald, for example, has identified "bolstering" and "quid pro quo" as strategies that can be used to strengthen beleaguered governments.¹⁰ Macdonald favors the quid pro quo strategy, that is, future economic and military support would be tied to evidence of progress or meaningful efforts at political reform and compromise on the part of Iraq's elected officials. But a good case can also be made for the bolstering strategy, under which the Iraqi government would be given all possible support

and aid because their apparent lack of progress is not due to a lack of will, but to a lack of capability. Regardless of which policy is most appropriate in an operational sense—"withdrawal," "quid pro quo," or "bolstering"—it is clear that each requires a different degree of political support.

Thus, the second stumbling block to an accurate net assessment of SSTR operations is that they cannot be treated as a simple matter of public policy. Instead, they are a highly charged political issue. Their overall success is likely to depend on more than just the coherence of the strategic plan or the expertise with which it is executed. The most important factor governing success is likely to be the degree to which political support is forthcoming, and how well elected officials and military planners fine-tune military operations to match political expectations.¹¹ The U.S. military learned this lesson on the battlefields of Vietnam: tactical success on the battlefield could not compensate for a lack of domestic political support for the war effort. SSTR theory and strategy must not be created in a political vacuum, but must be designed with the requirement for gaining and retaining political support in mind. Any net assessment of the effectiveness of stability operations has to incorporate an estimate of the political impact of military operations on the home front.

Bureaucratic Politics.

Military organizations are highly selective when it comes to the weapons they procure and the way they fight. They are deeply influenced by their operational/strategic "essence"—an agreed-upon body of concepts that informs members about organizational culture

and missions. Essence is a shared image of what the organization is all about. Sometimes the essence, and the culture that reflects it, is even embodied in a defining battle—the Battle of Midway for the U.S. Navy, Little Round Top for the U.S. Army, and the first Gulf War for the U.S. Air Force. Organizations embrace missions that reflect their organizational essence, defending their roles, missions, and operational domain against rivals. Organizations are unlikely to notice strategic or technological developments that do not affect their domains. U.S. Air Force officers, for instance, are unlikely to care whether or not the U.S. Army or the U.S. Marine Corps possesses a superior armored vehicle.¹²

The notion of service culture is well-understood. Nevertheless, little thought has been given to the way organizational behavior and preferences can influence efforts to evaluate progress in unconventional operations. Organizations are likely to stick with their preferred capabilities and doctrine regardless of the particular demands created by the international crisis or situation—this is the insight offered by Graham Allison concerning the impact of bureaucratic SOPs on the foreign and defense policies of states.¹³ Organizations react thus because they actually prefer to employ specific capabilities and doctrines and because they are prepared to undertake only what really amounts to their specialty operations. In a sense, any correspondence between the needs of the moment and the capabilities offered by the organization is largely a matter of coincidence. Because the organization cannot (and prefers not to) change capabilities quickly to meet an emerging situation, honest evaluation of its strategies, capabilities, and performance risks calling attention to the fact that it is only marginally prepared to meet the current exigencies. Organizations qua organizations

have little interest in honest net assessments—evaluations of how their preferred capabilities and procedures address likely contingencies. If these kinds of net assessments are deemed necessary, members of the organization are always ready to reassure inquisitive outsiders that the situation is well in hand.

In fact, from an organizational perspective, there is little upside in terms of any effort to determine effectiveness in current or potential contingencies. If existing standard operating procedures and procurement and personnel policies are found wanting, calls for organizational change and reform strike at the very “essence” of the organization itself by threatening cherished missions or by allowing outside organizations to poach on organizational domains. Surprisingly, policy success can sometimes rebound to the detriment of the organization. Without exception, when asked what would happen if their organization achieved a too-quick and too-easy success in its acknowledged domain, experienced bureaucrats universally respond the same way: “our budget would be cut.” Spectacular success with little effort would lead elected officials to believe that objectives could have been achieved with fewer resources and that it was therefore time to reallocate resources towards more pressing objectives. Moreover, since officials tend to judge progress based on trends and not final results,¹⁴ which by definition are rarely known, a sharp decline in budget would suggest to all concerned that an organization is in decline, disfavor, or disarray.

In effect, the organizations charged with undertaking SSTR operations have at best a limited interest in evaluating progress in stability operations—this is the third obstacle to effective net assessment.¹⁵ Honest appraisals of organizational performance

risk undermining political and financial support for programs held dear by the organization. Perversely, success is not particularly welcome either because it carries with it the prospect of budgetary reductions. It is unlikely that organizations will develop measures of effectiveness that call into question the version of their own identity to which they are obsessively attached.¹⁶

Conclusion: The Politics of Assessment.

Even if we were equipped with good theory, good politically attuned strategy, and cooperative bureaucracies, the effort to evaluate progress in stability operations would be greatly facilitated by a proper institutional setting. In other words, one might expect that net assessments and programmatic evaluations would be undertaken by an independent agency. With the possible exception of the Congressional Research Service, which makes some effort at programmatic evaluation, no such agency exists within the U.S. Government to assess national strategies on a grand scale. Although military officers, aided by a myriad of quantitative measures, rarely leave a stone unturned in searching for better tactics and operational doctrine, there is no Department of Policy Evaluation. There is no real effort to undertake overall net assessment when it comes to current engagements.

This observation might produce some degree of disbelief and consternation; in theory one might expect that there should be some independent analytical cell to evaluate public policy. The intelligence community comes to mind, but Sherman Kent, who has studied the U.S. strategic intelligence community, has ruled out any likelihood of intelligence analysts evaluating “blue team” policies or, for that matter, of deliberately couching their estimates in the form of net assessments.¹⁷

Academics can assess current policies, but their efforts are limited by government secrecy and their own political or intellectual agendas. One might also hope that the news media would provide some important assessments of the success and appropriateness of ongoing policy and not simply pander for market share by highlighting the latest escapades of obviously inebriated or stoned Hollywood celebrities.

One is left with the distinct impression that assessments of any public policy, but especially efforts as complex as stability operations, are inherently political judgments. Or, to put it another way, in the absence of clear theory, strategy, and policy, assessing SSTR operations remains largely within the realm of politics. And, as a political issue, the nature, practice, success, and failure of SSTR operations are hotly disputed topics. Would members of opposition political parties be willing to acknowledge previous successes if they occurred while the other side was in power? Would the George W. Bush administration have been more willing to continue with the mere containment of Saddam Hussein if containment had been less associated with the previous Democratic administration? Although there is much interest in SSTR operations, little real effort is given to the assessment of what actually constitutes progress in virtually all types of stability operations.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Department of Defense Directive, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," Directive Number 3000.05, November 28, 2005.

2. *Naval Operations Concept*, 2006, p. 19.

3. *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations*, Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, December 2006.

4. Defense Science Board, *Transition To and From Hostilities*, 2004 Summer Study, Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004.

5. Amitai Etzioni, *Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 1-4.

6. David Phillips. *Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco*, New York: Westview Press, 2005, p. 145.

7. Etzioni, *Security First*, p. 23.

8. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority*, New York: Norton, 1969.

9. Donald Snow would describe this threat as an “interest-threat” mismatch. See Donald M. Snow, *When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Forces*, Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000.

10. Douglas J. Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

11. Gil Merom has suggested a similar political-policy disconnect when it comes to explaining why the weak sometimes defeat more powerful adversaries. According to Merom, democracies fail to enforce their will against weaker adversaries because a gap emerges between state policy and public sentiment toward the war effort, a gap that widens into a chasm of domestic unrest when governments attempt to cover up the material, human, and moral costs of war. When individuals judge that the objectives at stake are really not worth the cost, support for the war effort wanes. Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

12. Morton H. Halperin with Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC:

The Brookings Institution, 1973; and Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

13. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed., New York: Longman, 1999.

14. Scott Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.

15. Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: U.S. Performance in the Vietnam Conflict*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.

16. Systems analysis was introduced by civilians in the Kennedy administration's Defense Department to undertake the net assessment and cost-benefit analysis needed to cull unnecessary programs, which often mirrored organizational preferences and traditions. In that sense, the story of the so-called "Whiz Kids," the applied mathematicians who were brought in to control the uniformed military, supports the notion that outsiders are more likely to undertake accurate programmatic assessments than insiders. Systems analysis, alas, was better at identifying unnecessary weapons than in tracking progress in unconventional operations. See James J. Wirtz, "Systems Analysis," in Peter Karsten, ed., *Encyclopedia of War & American Society*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006, pp. 812-815.

17. Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946.

CHAPTER 9

THE FAILURE OF INCREMENTALISM: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

Scott R. Feil

Introduction.

A definition of insanity has been circulated portraying it as a condition wherein an individual or an organization continues to do the same thing over and over again while expecting a different outcome. Unfortunately, much the same can be said for U.S. Government foreign and security operations after 1990. Changed conditions and different objectives have been pursued using organizations and procedures left over from the Cold War. More specifically, we see an ossification of organizations and procedures emplaced and modified since the National Security Act of 1947. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the breakup of the Soviet Union, interventions in the Balkans and Somalia (and nonintervention in Rwanda), escalating terror attacks before even September 11, 2001 (9/11), the advent of globalization, etc., various studies and commissions observed that the “world had changed,” and the U.S. Government was changing to accommodate the new realities. Contrary to these reports, however, the government has continued to operate with core processes and organizations designed in the 1950s. In attempting to resolve interagency coordination issues at the “seams” where those issues occur and where momentum in current operations like the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq has been

dissipated, recent initiatives (such as National Security Presidential Directive [NSPD]-44, Department of Defense Directive [DoDD] 3000.05, Transformational Diplomacy, the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the recent search for and selection of a National Security Council Deputy to be the “war czar”) are bound to fail without corresponding initiatives to transform the foundations of U.S. foreign policy. Any new initiatives must encompass a redesign of how foreign policy is developed, how it is articulated and implemented by the Executive Branch, and how it is understood and supported by the Congress. The problems faced by the current administration are simply the most recent and visible manifestations of organization and process deficiencies that have plagued the U.S. Government for many years. Examination and characterization of the challenges facing interagency coordination reveal areas where improvements can be made.

Defining the Problem.

Lack of coordination between agencies as a significant shortcoming and deficiency in government operations has been identified in studies and analysis addressing both national security and foreign operations. These studies, after examining historical cases and future requirements, recognized the changed circumstances and future context within which the U.S. Government would operate to achieve objectives and secure U.S. interests. Some made recommendations on restructuring the organizations, authorities, and processes through which America developed and implemented foreign policy. As holistic approaches to foreign policy issues have become more prevalent,

the government has moved forward in small steps to redress shortcomings in interagency coordination.¹

The most public of the early studies was the Commission on National Security 21st Century, popularly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission.² Particularly remembered for its prescience regarding terrorism, the commission sought to come to terms with the changes in the world after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and made recommendations stemming from a recognition that the U.S. Government had been organized (through the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent revisions) to implement the policy of containment articulated by George Kennan and adopted in the late 1940s as a response to the Soviet Union and the expansion of communism. The Structure and Process Addendum to the study was a comprehensive review of national security organizations and processes. Few of the recommendations were adopted, as the nation responded to fiscal pressures and strategic intellectual arguments that militated against immediate or comprehensive change.

The fiscal pressures on security spending were evident in the form of calls for a "peace dividend," that is, to shift investment from the buildup in the Defense Department to domestic programs.³ Moreover, there were allegations that conditions obtaining subsequent to the fall of the Soviet Union were going to persist and that instead of a mere temporary halt to global conflict, the triumph of liberal market economics and representative government represented a successful "end of history," in the words of Francis Fukuyama. In the face of altered priorities and lack of a sense of urgency, the U.S. Government effectively adopted such attitudes as "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," or "dance with the one that brought you." In studies

and commentary, the observation was made that the United States could continue its preeminence, if not dominance, in the international spheres of politics, security, economics, and cultural influence. Marxism-Leninism was discredited as an alternative paradigm for analyzing or organizing global behavior of states and populations. All that was needed were some forays into areas of the world where market capitalism and representative government had yet to take root (the Balkans and the remnants of the Soviet Union), and much of the transformation of the world along lines commensurate with American principles, organizations, and processes would be complete. The “New World Order” described by President George H. W. Bush at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 could become a reality.⁴ In light of the bright future for the United States predicted in the early 1990s, it was easy to believe either that no change was necessary, or that time was available for reflection and analysis of what changes in U.S. interagency coordination processes and organizations might be appropriate. The “strategic pause” was brought to an abrupt end on 9/11.

While the Hart-Rudman Commission was not successful in prompting deep change in American structures and processes, the general observations and estimates of future conflict were validated at least in the short run by other analyses of the international environment and the conduct of various international and transnational actors.. Other actors and entities, of course, still adhere to organizing principles that pose a continuing threat to participatory government and liberal market economics.⁵ Throughout history, systems of international order, however organized and operating, face countervailing theories of organization and practice upon which nation-states

and other organizations may base their behavior. Radical terrorists operating under a veneer of religious justification are only the most recent blip in the long continuum of history. The Caliphate and the spread of the umma represent a countervailing set of principles upon which to base global organization and rules for interaction. While Islamic radical terrorism is one manifestation, recent developments in Latin America illustrate that there continue to be movements and ideologies (vestiges of communism and other evolutions) that oppose the principles upon which liberal government, market economics, and free social organization are founded. The rise of China, a “peer-competitor,” forms a more traditional, symmetrical potential challenge to the United States.⁶ Whether the United States should prepare for the more traditional, symmetric threats of the mid and far future, or focus efforts for change on addressing more immediate challenges, is an open question. The struggle against radical Islamic terrorism has been characterized both as a fundamentally different struggle in terms of tactics, and as a conventional ideological struggle.⁷ The possibility of alternative futures complicates the efforts to achieve more effective and efficient interagency coordination.⁸

Challenges to Improved Coordination: Constituency, Culture, Resources.

In an environment of such ambiguity and dynamism, creating more effective, efficient, and measurable government performance is an imperative if the United States is to retain its ability to achieve national security goals. In the subset of foreign operations encompassing reconstruction and stabilization activities, however,

the challenges to better interagency coordination arise primarily from two interrelated *domestic* sources. First are organizational culture differences, which manifest themselves most clearly in the different approaches taken by military and civilian agencies, but that is not an exclusively Department of Defense (DoD) versus “everybody else” distinction. Culture both reflects and influences organizational processes and how the organization sees itself, its members, and customers/ outside stakeholders. Cultural differences exist *within* agencies between those responsible for emergency assistance and those responsible for long-term assistance, and *between* agencies based on their foreign and domestic responsibilities. The challenge posed by organizational culture can be overcome, however, and there have been excellent examples of interagency coordination between agencies on the “civilian side of the Potomac.”

The second domestic source of failure to achieve interagency coordination improvement is the increasing disparity in resources between the military and civilian departments. This influence distorts the application of substantive expertise through differences in abilities to generate the wherewithal and the mechanisms to apply it. In a dynamic set of circumstances, the agencies that have the most robust and flexible methods for applying resources tend to get more, and their ability to expend them with even a modicum of accountability compared to their rivals tends to make “power accrue to power.” “Those that have, get,” is an old saying that applies to the disparity in resources for overseas reconstruction and stabilization that exists between DoD and other departments.⁹

The cultural and resource differences are mutually dependent. Organizations with a foreign focus,

operational capabilities, and detailed planning and resource management systems that are adopted as a result of culture often do well in making the case to the Office of Management and Budget and to Congress to gain resources. Those that receive larger and larger resource allocations often develop the kind of organizational culture that can apply those resources. Organizations without a culture of direct management and implementation of large programs, or those that do not have robust overseas implementation operations, are not in a position to interact effectively in the planning or execution of reconstruction and stabilization operations. These differences are illustrated in Table 1.

	Robust Program Management and Implementation Capability	Less Capable Program Management and Implementation Capability
Primary Overseas Policy Responsibilities	Dept of Defense	Dept of State
Primary Domestic Policy Responsibilities	Dept of Homeland Security and Other Civilian Cabinet Departments	

Table 1. Responsibilities Focus and Management Capabilities.

The concept of “constituency” underlies the differences portrayed within this table. Where there is a domestic constituency for operational capability, it exists. DoD, with 1.2 million active duty personnel, reserve components, local armories, and a significant procurement and operations budget spread over

hundreds of political jurisdictions, creates a domestic constituency and fulfills overseas responsibilities. Many of the civilian cabinet agencies with domestic responsibilities have large budgets and also serve millions of voting constituents. The Department of State, however, has the primary overseas policy responsibility coupled with a relatively minuscule domestic constituency and a budget that is oftentimes executed and implemented by others – such as DoD or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). As examples, the Department of State determines Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing (FMS/FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) priorities. This is appropriate, as those programs are both builders and indicators of American bilateral relationships; thus the department with lead responsibilities to articulate American foreign policy should determine those priorities. But DoD executes those programs and spends the money to deliver the goods, train the foreign personnel, provide the seats at the War Colleges, etc.

Where there is no domestic constituency, Congress has been slow to provide authorities and resources. This is where a big difference exists between DoD and the civilian departments, but that difference can be reduced with renewed and refocused congressional and executive branch oversight and cooperation. The challenge is twofold – both resources and management capacity are needed – and solutions should seek to move more civilian departmental capability into the top left cell in Table 1. Civilian agencies with a domestic focus and culture need to recognize and seize the opportunities to support foreign operations, while the Department of State needs the wherewithal (both resources and processes) to be able to execute its responsibility as the lead department for foreign policy.

The organizational culture that results from and reinforces a domestic vs. overseas focus constrains agencies whose expertise is now in demand for overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations. Operating overseas has long conditioned the military to develop the capability to deploy anything and everything required for operations, from engineers who build roads and bridges to veterinarians who oversee food production, storage, and preparation, to medical and power generation capabilities. While not all these assets, comparable to everything necessary to run a large city, are in the active component, the military can access a wide range of capabilities within the reserve. This system serves the military well, but it tends to “crowd out” comparable civilian capability in the early stages of reconstruction and stabilization, when the environment may not be totally secure (even when there may be some civilian capacity to support operations).¹⁰

Domestic operations, which may be compared to overseas reconstruction and stabilization, are disaster relief and consequence management, as in the response to the terror attacks on the United States and to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, wildfires, floods, and tornadoes. Under these domestic situations, there is much more interagency and intragovernmental (federal, state, and local jurisdiction) interaction. Much of this capability is based on the Stafford Act that established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the successive national response plans (NRP) that have evolved as a result of that act and the homeland security legislation that succeeded 9/11.¹¹ The Emergency Support Functions in the plan are assigned to cabinet level and other national agencies for provision of resources and program/

project implementation during domestic crises and recovery. However, as shown in the difference between the response to the attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania in September 2001 and the response to Katrina, resourcing these functions relies to a certain extent on the support capability of current infrastructure. The 9/11 attacks, while devastating, were relatively localized, so that surrounding infrastructure (communications and transportation networks, hospitals, power generation, etc.) were able to respond. When the infrastructure across a wide area was unavailable (under water), only the military (including the U.S. Coast Guard) had the types of equipment necessary to provide basic requirements, as in the case of the naval vessel providing potable water.¹² It was possible to marshal military resources to support civilian requirements in a domestic setting. The reverse relationship, where civilian agencies can either support or lead a large operation overseas, is far less certain.

For overseas reconstruction and stabilization, there is no legislation and no plan comparable to the domestically oriented Stafford Act that directs Federal cabinet level departments to plan, prepare, and execute implementing operations. NSPD 44 and DoDD 3000.05 attempt to direct coordinating efforts in this regard, but do not have the stature or support from Congress to be implemented to the same level of detail as the NRP. To be fair, it did take approximately 17 years from the passage of the Stafford Act to the adoption of the first Federal Disaster Response Plan (FDRP).

The variability of constituency thus directly affects which authorities and capabilities are available for conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations. Where a domestic constituency is concerned, there

are few barriers to bringing government capabilities to bear. Both military and civilian capabilities are authorized and available for use, and their use is guided by a detailed plan and practiced procedures for integration of the effort. Where there is no domestic constituency, one sees a significant gap in capabilities that can be developed and brought to bear. One also sees that due to the routine focus of the domestic civilian agencies, there are no standing procedures for accessing, deploying, and applying their significant talent and resources to foreign reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The resource disparity manifests itself in ways that skew policy and program implementation. Planning compatibility, coordination, and operational implementation suffer because of the difference in resources applied to any given function. Some examples follow, which generally compare DoD to the Department of State, the lead cabinet department for foreign policy. This is not meant to disparage the Department of State, but this comparison does illustrate that it is at present woefully underresourced and lacks the organizational culture and processes in place to be able to fulfill its leadership role.

There are over one million personnel in the uniformed services. Within the Pentagon, 23,000 people work on what is essentially planning and strategy development. DoD's total obligation authority over the past 3 years has risen to over \$700 billion. Within the Department of State, there are approximately 6,000 Foreign Service officers. USAID, part of the Department of State that implements both emergency relief and long-term development projects, has about 2,000 full-time government employees. The Department of State and USAID budgets for foreign operations total

approximately \$25 billion. The Department of Justice, an implementing partner with the Department of State for programs in training and mentoring court personnel, investigators, and police in its International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT), can deploy several hundred government personnel on long-term assignment and contractors on shorter-term tasks.¹³ The labor pool available to civilian agencies to deploy overseas therefore is significantly smaller, by several orders of magnitude, than the military labor pool.

One program that best illuminates the difference in monetary resources available to the departments (here using State and DoD) is the Commander's Emergency Response Fund. This fund is designed to give military commanders on the ground the authority and resources to fund high-impact projects at local levels for the indigenous populace during military operations. It cannot be used for garrison support, military operations per se, operation and maintenance of military equipment, etc. During FY2006 and FY2007, the authorized limit for this fund for DoD was \$500 million. In FY2005 it was \$854 million.¹⁴ In disbursing the funds for activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, military commanders at the brigade and battalion level were often given authority to fund single projects at the \$50,000 level and at \$100,000 with additional justification. The U.S. ambassador to a country, under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, has the authority to disburse \$50,000 in his country per emergency. These authorities were used during the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, which meant that military commanders had significantly more funds

at their immediate disposal than the ambassadors to the affected countries. Congress eventually authorized significant resources (\$654 million for tsunami, earthquake, and avian flu relief) to be managed by the Department of State.¹⁵ But the differences are stark. Military commanders, at a lower, decentralized level, often have immediate access to significant funds, while the U.S. ambassador has few dollars immediately available, and often has to wait months for supplemental appropriations.

A second resource issue illustrating that “power accrues to power” is in the area of foreign military assistance. It had been within the Department of State’s purview to manage and set policy, while DoD executed the bulk of the program, usually in terms of education and training (IMET) and procurement of military equipment and related material and training (FMF and FMS). In pursuit of the objective of rapidly enhancing the capabilities of partner militaries to combat terrorism, \$200 million was also given directly to DoD for similar activities related directly to combating terrorism. This funding is commonly referred to as Section 1206 funding.¹⁶ Subsequently, DoD requested that the authority be made permanent and that it be authorized to ask for continued funding in subsequent budget years.¹⁷ So what may exist in the future are two funding streams, which may operate on different priorities, that may complement each other, but will surely lead to overlaps, competition, and mixed signals to bilateral partners and added coordination burdens between the two departments.

Finally, the ability of the Department of State (taken as the most visible example of resources not matching requirements) to meet agreed commitments illustrates how resource constraints impact interagency coordination. The new “surge” strategy for Iraq was

predicated on establishing additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout the country, with significant State Department personnel staffing to provide leadership and subject matter expertise. This program was agreed to by the Secretaries of State and Defense. However, due to the lack of surge capacity at the Department of State and USAID, DoD was asked to fill 40 percent of the 300 positions on a temporary basis, until contractors were identified and funding provided. The military personnel selected were to have skills such as city management and agriculture—clearly not military core competencies.¹⁸

Within the executive branch, there have been two general approaches to facilitating interagency coordination with respect to foreign operations. Without the benefit of an interagency planning construct such as the NRP, the executive branch has either relied on a strong organization and/or personality in the role of the national security advisor, or designated a cabinet level lead agency and directed other departments to support within a specific issue area.¹⁹

Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the National Security Council (NSC) adopted an organization and process model that unsurprisingly closely resembled the military staff functions of plans and operations. There was a Planning Board and an Operations Control Board (OCB). The Planning Board developed issue papers and positions for consideration by the statutory NSC. Decisions were made by the President who participated regularly in weekly meetings. The decisions were then passed to the OCB, responsible for follow-up with the departments and agencies responsible for implementing decisions. It should be noted that the NSC for the first 13 years (under Presidents Harry Truman and Eisenhower) was staffed with career civil

servants. President John Kennedy shrank the staff, made it more “intimate,” and chose to staff it with a larger proportion of political appointees. Subsequent strong NSCs existed under Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, but relied on personality rather than process to control the departments and agencies.

Under President Nixon, Secretary of State and NSA Henry Kissinger was the undisputed leader of the government foreign policy establishment, wielding tremendous power. This de facto authority was evident in the arrangement for a time in which Kissinger was simultaneously the NSA and the Secretary of State. In the Reagan administration, the NSC was powerful not because of the personality or favored position of the NSA, but because it was given operational control and resources to run foreign policy from the White House. The Iran-contra arrangements were one of the results that led later administrations to avoid giving the NSC operational missions or resources.

Contrary to the “strong NSC” method of coordination, other presidents (most recently George W. Bush) have relied on the NSC as a policy formulation element responding to short- and mid-term challenges, rather than a planning or operational coordination body. Coordination responsibility has been delegated largely to single cabinet departments or agencies to lead in certain issue areas, with other departments in support. This can result in bureaucratic turf battles and confusion as DoD and State wrestle with foreign policy and operations, while domestically the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice try to work out their jurisdictional and resource relationships.

The most visible example of this arrangement has been the designation of DoD as the initial lead agent for reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and

Afghanistan. There is some merit to this approach, as, in the absence of a functioning U.S. embassy in the countries for a period of time, it made sense to have DoD continue as the lead element, providing “unity of command” or effort until the Department of State could field a capable management team within a functioning embassy. However, the resident expertise in the Departments of State, USAID, Justice, Treasury, etc., was not mobilized appropriately to assist in the planning or execution of reconstruction and stabilization operations in either country. Ad hoc arrangements at the top levels of government led to trial-and-error learning as well as ad hoc arrangements at the operational, tactical, and local levels, where interagency coordination nodes proliferated without initial standards, processes, manning, or well-defined responsibilities. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs, the most visible example), Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, and Joint Interagency Task Forces illustrate by their varied performance and effectiveness the point that the civilian agencies are not structured, resourced, or manned to participate on a sustainable basis with the military in overseas operations. Without structured processes and organizations that are culturally prepared for interagency coordination, ad hoc arrangements are often doomed to failure for the simplest of reasons, such as manning and training.²⁰

Current Initiatives and the Need for Fundamental Change.

Initiatives to redress the lack of interagency coordination processes abound. Some are designed to fix current shortfalls in policy development and implementation, while others seek long-term fixes

through education and personnel development. The difficulty in gaining acceptance for substantive and radical reform stems from bureaucratic and organizational imperatives. Most of the steps taken so far to improve interagency coordination suffer from a lack of overall government perspective. Each proposal emanating from an organization involved in interagency policy development and implementation seeks to fix “interagency coordination” from the individual organization perspective, optimizing that particular department’s capabilities to interact with other departments. The combination of these efforts replicates the original problem in that individual organizations are seeking optimizing behavior, while no authoritative entity exists that seeks to optimize the overall government function. Such an authoritative entity would, by definition, constrain and suboptimize the individual cabinet level departments’ and other agencies’ functions in order to achieve greater overall effectiveness and efficiency. All agencies want the interagency to work better—so long as the interagency process optimizes their organizational priorities and protects their prerogatives. This perspective is illustrated by looking at the substance and the timing of proposals and initiatives.

In 2004, in the wake of hearings on post-conflict planning that began in 2002 and continued through Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership introduced the first version of a bill designed to improve both interagency coordination and civilian agency capacity to engage in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Called the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (hereafter referred to as the Act), it was introduced by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), then the

committee chairman, on February 25, 2004.²¹ The Act called for additional staffing, resources, policies, and procedures that would give the Department of State and other civilian departments the wherewithal to engage in such operations, and prescribed authorities and processes for establishing the civilian lead in such operations. The Act was not passed, but repetitive introduction in subsequent sessions led to an updated version that was passed in the Senate in 2007.²²

The Act gathered some momentum, but the executive branch appeared to have sought, for substantive, procedural, and political reasons (not partisan, but institutional in the relationship between Congress and the White House) to steal a march on such an initiative. After meetings at the NSC, the Department of State issued a memorandum in May 2004 that established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with approximately 38-45 personnel detailed from the Department of State, USAID, DoD, and other agencies. The memorandum and notation of the office acronym specifically indicated that the Coordinator would report directly to the Secretary of State.²³ Emerging concepts for coordinating U.S. Government actions in reconstruction and stabilization paralleled the military levels of effort at the strategic (national), regional (combatant command or operational), and local (military task force or tactical) levels. The national level node, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), is organized as needed at the level of a Policy Coordinating Committee and is to be chaired by the Coordinator and the Assistant Secretary of State for the regional bureau with jurisdiction over the country in question. At the regional level, specifically to interact with the military Regional Combatant Commanders, a

Humanitarian, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Team (HRST, now called an Interagency Planning Cell [IPC]) provides additional interagency substantive expertise (in addition to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group already at the headquarters) for planning and operational coordination. Finally, at the local (country and subcountry level) Advance Civil Teams (ACT) supplement the embassy (if present) or act as a U.S. Mission to coordinate all U.S. Government activities. ACTs are established at the country level and at subordinate regional/provincial levels within the assisted country.

Subsequently, the department ran into difficulty securing funding and authorizations for permanent staffing growth to support the office. There is resistance in the Congress to growth in the size of the Department of State and other departments that require additional staffing to meet reconstruction and stabilization requirements, even on an infrequent basis. Accordingly, civilian departments have to leave functions vacant while personnel are deployed on these operations, and all of those functions have domestic constituents who demand services. To support immediate start-up operations on a reconstruction and stabilization mission, S/CRS requires funding that is rapidly accessible and flexible in purpose. Such funding is commonly referred to as contingency funding, and Congress has been particularly reluctant to provide such funding, preferring complex and lengthy reprogramming and supplemental actions which provide Congress opportunities for direction of purpose, oversight, and accountability. This, of course, constrains operational capability to meet dynamic requirements for immediate and flexible funding in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Procedurally, as the S/CRS staff made significant progress in developing coordination concepts and nodes at the national, regional, and local levels, it still suffered from being positioned as an interagency node within a cabinet level department with the authority to coordinate activities among departments but not to direct them. Most importantly, the office lacked funding and had to secure a transfer of funds from DoD to continue operations. Finally, the office's efforts to establish a civilian reserve response corps that could provide robust interaction with other government, international, and local partners, staff the ACTs, and provide program and project management expertise and implementation, has not been funded to date.

Without congressional authorization and appropriations, S/CRS found it difficult to cut through the existing relationships and get participation from other agencies. With respect to DoD, S/CRS found itself engaged and often overwhelmed by DoD demands for participation. Department requirements for periodic and routine interaction; Combatant Command exercises and experiments; concept development; and expertise requests from Special Operations, Civil Affairs, conventional units, etc., overload the ability of S/CRS to establish priorities and respond to or initiate coordination. One senior staff member in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs informed the author in 2004 that the Pol-Mil Bureau receives requests for over 100 personnel to participate in military exercises every quarter.²⁴ S/CRS experiences proportional demands for its staff time.

DoD did not sit still and wait for S/CRS or the NSC to capture the agenda for reconstruction and stabilization. U.S. Joint Forces Command established a close working relationship with S/CRS, including

and supporting them through a number of exercises and experiments that contributed to their concepts and process design efforts. DoD began working on revising its reconstruction and stabilization operations doctrine. In 2006 and 2007, S/CRS and JFCOM were able to reach agreement on S/CRS leading a series of experiments and exercises that will establish their capability to lead the interagency members.

DoD developed internal guidance to redress shortcomings in its ability to marshal resources and develop expertise in reconstruction and stabilization operations. In November 2005, DoD published Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations." This directive placed stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations on a par with combat operations. It directed the department, commands, and military departments to develop capabilities and training for such operations. While acknowledging that civilian agencies are often best suited for such efforts, under certain conditions (namely, dangerous security environments) the military has a role to play in all the activities necessary to start and then support such operations. The directive recognized the importance of military-civilian teams and charged the department with continuing to develop the capabilities to "lead and support" military-civilian teams.

Interestingly, the publication of DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 preceded the White House's release of National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," in December.²⁵ This directive was the first official document from the executive branch that codified the U.S. Government (as opposed to individual

department) approach to the subject matter. The NSPD charged the Secretary of State and, through him or her, the S/CRS Coordinator, with 12 important functions including coordination of the execution of legal responsibilities by several departments, development of strategies for countries at risk and detailed policy options for consideration by the NSC, development of mechanisms for coordinating the efforts of the entire U.S. Government, coordinating with DoD and international partners, working with the Department of the Treasury on financial and economic tools, assembling lessons learned, and instituting a civilian response capability.

Questions can legitimately be raised about the way the various authorities were developed and how cabinet level guidance would have to be revised to accommodate presidential directives. Moreover, despite public statements that S/CRS was critically important and its function was central to improving government capability, the administration did not aggressively fight for funding for the office, and the office was vacant for much of the spring of 2006. The original Coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, left the office in January 2006. After several months while the Deputy Coordinator labored alone, Ambassador Tim Carney served as an interim until the new Coordinator, Ambassador John Herbst, reported for duty from his previous post as Ambassador to Ukraine.

DoD and the Department of State have also initiated programs to train more personnel in interagency coordination, but without an established overarching authoritative process, these training programs focus on the capabilities of individual departments and current ad hoc organizations and processes.²⁶

Benchmarks and Models.

The situation can be remedied, however, with appropriate top-level decisions, support from Congress, and a rigorous effort to establish benchmarks for measuring organizational success and whether interagency coordination works. There are examples within the government which can serve as models for interagency coordination and which illustrate the two cardinal prerequisites for effective and efficient coordination—authority and resources.

The first example is the Joint Interagency Task Force-East (JIATF-East), one of two involved in the counterdrug effort.²⁷ These task forces bring together domestic and foreign policy agencies and departments with various authorities, thus providing effective counterdrug operations based on core competencies, authorities, and resources of the respective agencies. JIATF-East, for example, has members from DoD, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and others. Additionally, it enjoys cooperative support from several nations, including naval support from European nations with territorial possessions and long-term relationships with countries in the Caribbean. In this organization, each participating agency is able to rely on specific authorities and brings resources (manning, aircraft, naval craft, field agents, etc.) to the effort. The JIATF is commanded by a U.S. Coast Guard officer who bridges the divide between DoD and the Department of Homeland Security. In carrying out interdiction operations, the personnel in the JIATF take lead roles at certain stages of an operation based on their organization's authorities and the conditions.

For example, military resources may be placed in the service of civil law enforcement and interdiction authorities under certain circumstances. Various agencies' representatives will then take charge of the operation at specified times and under appropriate rules until duly constituted civil legal authorities make an apprehension or interdiction.

Another notable model for change is the National Wildfire Coordination Group.²⁸ This group is chartered by two cabinet departments with seven different Federal agencies that have firefighting responsibilities on Federal land. These departments recognized that coordinated operations were crucial. The Coordination Group formed substantive working groups from all agencies as collateral assignments. In the "off season," these working groups establish and revise procedures for operations contained in the Fireline Guide Book, which contains descriptions of standardized teams, standard operating procedures, and planning factors, and has a contact list including international agreements with partner nations for coalition fire fighting on public lands and disaster assistance. USAID adapted the Fireline Guide Book as the basis for its Foreign Operations Guide. The Fireline Guide Book contains the operations procedures, standard team descriptions, roles, and capabilities for the operational organizations that are established to fight fires (base camps, teams, etc). The Guide Book integrates a system of job descriptions, training manuals, and programs so that any of the 70,000 Federal firefighters can apply for training to increase professional capabilities under the Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS). The IQCS links personnel, training, and status, and records all the certifications of all the firefighters. The IQCS is linked to a Resource Ordering and Support

System (ROSS) that provides real time access to standardized teams that can be notified and deployed with equipment throughout the country on request.

The working groups established under the National Wildfire Coordination Group charter work continuously to update and revise procedures, training, and logistics operations. Training is conducted on line or in residence at one of ten regions established by the departments, and is funded by the home agency. In other words, someone from the Bureau of Land Management in New Mexico might take training on line from a regional center on the east coast. The training might be conducted by the U.S. Forest Service. Additionally, the system and guide set forth agency contact information and general procedures, and the guide has an appendix with the international agreements and organizations that the U.S. Government may coordinate with when fighting fires in areas where international coordination is appropriate.

These two examples have some lessons for interagency coordination in reconstruction and stabilization operations. First, there must be authorities, direction, and commitment from senior leaders. Second, resources must be appropriated and allocated to the effort, and personnel must be available for frequent and routine training, predeployment training, and operations. Third, only those elements that can bring resources (people, funds, equipment) to the operation are in the coordination process.

The examples offer insights and models for possible adaptation for the reconstruction and stabilization challenge, but are not panaceas. Their mission set is much more narrowly focused. The interagency reconstruction and stabilization challenge is significantly more complex in manning, training, accessing, and coordinating

the range of skills and venues necessary for effective and efficient reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Change.

It is to be hoped that this volume and similar efforts will help create the necessary momentum for change, and that the United States will not wait until another catastrophe occurs to undertake decisive action.

Changes must be made within the legislative and executive branches that are focused on effectiveness and efficiencies in policy development and implementation on the ground. Streamlined authorities, available and flexible funding, and trained and ready personnel are the keys to better interagency coordination.

The National Security Strategy must drive cabinet department budgets to provide funding for interagency coordination, staffing, and activities. There must be commensurate department level implementing authorities and processes, with equivalent and compatible planning and implementing processes and organizations. There must also be a cadre of deployable civilian experts resident within tasked departments and agencies.

Policy development, tasking, accountability, and management systems designed to optimize achievement across the government must be implemented, even if they result in suboptimizing component government organizations. This approach is significantly different from the current system, where subordinate organizations optimize their own capabilities at the expense of the overall government mission.

The tasked government employees in the civilian agencies must be subject to deployment and performance of implementation duties on site – not just coordin-

ation and program management from offices in Washington. The gutting of USAID and the dissolution of the U.S. Information Agency are cases in point. The challenges are not insurmountable, but they require top-down guidance, commitment, resources, and a thorough restructuring of government service models that are appropriate for 21st-century challenges. They must replace the current organization and processes, which originated in the Cold War 50 years ago and were designed to fit a situation that no longer exists.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*, New York, Harper Collins, 1997, while addressing Vietnam from a different perspective, recounts the difficulties in coordinating U.S. policy during the years 1963-65; Jeffrey Gage, "Saluting Suits: A Case for Military Subordination to Civilian Command during War Termination," Newport: Naval War College Joint Military Operations Department, 2005; Steven Schrage, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "Combating Transnational Crime and Corruption in Europe, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations," October 30, 2003, cited at www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/25755.htm. For changes to the National Security Council organization made by the current Bush administration, see www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/542/IA_Process_in_Bush_Admin,_NSPD-1.ppt. One of the most ambitious current public investigations is the phased study conducted by Clark Murdock and Michelle Flournoy, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005. The three-volume report is available at www.csis.org/isp/bgn/. Lack of interagency coordination has been identified as a critical inhibitor to achieving coherent, effective U.S. policy development and implementation. See "Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign," Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, December 15, 2006, 109th Congress, 2nd Session; see also the reports from the Special Inspector General

for Iraq Reconstruction at www.sigir.mil/initiatives/lessonslearned.aspx; and post-mortems on planning and implementation for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially the three-volume series on the Bush administration by Robert Woodward, *Bush at War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002; *Plan of Attack*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004; and *State of Denial*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006.

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3. Steven Kosiak and Elizabeth Heeter, "Post-Cold War Defense Spending Cuts: A Bipartisan Decision," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2000, cited at www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/H.20000831.Post-Cold_War_Defe/H.20000831.Post-Cold_War_Defe.htm; Benedict Clements, Sanjeev Gupta, and Jerald Shiff, "What Happened to the Peace Dividend?" Washington, DC: The World Bank, cited at www.worldbank.org/fandd/english/0397/articles/040397.htm.

4. Michael Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meanings and Implications*, Cambridge University Press, 1992; Lea Brilmayer, *American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One Superpower World*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, New York, Avon Books, 1992; President George Herbert Walker Bush, "Toward a New World Order: Address to Joint Session of Congress," September 11, 1990.

5. The most controversial of these analyses is contained in Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996. However, earlier scholars identified the trends in hegemony and empire that presaged a challenge to a world system based on American principles and unipolar organization. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981. Gilpin wrote at a time of heightened tension between the United States and the USSR, but placed the confrontation in the context of the rise and fall of dominant powers.

6. Kevin Pollpeter, *U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship*, Arlington, VA: RAND Project Air Force, 2004, available at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG143/; Thomas S. Szayna, Daniel Byman, Steven C. Bankes, Derek Eaton, Seth G. Jones, Robert Mullins, Ian O. Lesser, William Rosenau, *The Rise of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2001, available at www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1346/.

7. George Bush, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror: Address to the Military Officers Association," Washington, DC: The White House, September 5, 2006, cited at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060905-4.html.

8. Brian Nichiporuk, *Alternative Futures and Army Force Planning*, Arlington, VA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2005, available at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG219.pdf.

9. James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, New York: Basic Books, 1989; Edward P. Djerejian, Chair, Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, *Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World*, Report Submitted to the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, October 1, 2003, especially Chapter IV, pp. 57-68. For an example of the disparity in resources, see David J. Kilcullen, "New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict" cited at *EJournal*, a web based publication of the Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs at usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0507/ijpe/kilcullen.htm See recommendation number 3. Kilcullen says that there are more people in military bands than there are Foreign Service Officers. While this is an interesting and attention-grabbing data point, more relevant is the fact that there are thousands more civil affairs officers, foreign area officers, and others with relevant language and technical skills in the military than in the Foreign Service.

10. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004, available at www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/S&R_book/S&R.pdf.

11. Robert T. Stafford, *Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as Amended, and Related Authorities*. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 2007, available at www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf; *National Response Plan*, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2004, updated May 2006.

12. See "Warships: International Fleet Review," Hurricane Katrina Special Report, September 6, 2005, cited at www.warshipsifr.com/hurricane_special1.html.

13. Kilcullen; Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives; Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, "Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2005," Vols. I-A (January 2006) and I-B (April 2006), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006.

14. See note 13, Legislation on Foreign Relations, Vol. I-B, pp. 698-699.

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

17. Walter Pincus, "Taking Defense's Hand Out of State's Pocket" *The Washington Post*, July 9, 2007, p. A13.

18. Karen DeYoung, "Military Must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs," *The Washington Post*, February 8, 2007, p. A18; and Glenn Kessler, "Iraq Reconstruction Teams Delayed at State Department," *The Washington Post*, April 13, 2006, p. A19.

19. The official (and fairly objective) history of the NSC (compiled by the Department of State historian) is located at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html.

20. The author was in Baghdad in November-December 2003. During that time, the Coalition Provisional Authority manning documents indicated approximately a 55 percent personnel fill. The average tour length was just over 3 months, when the stipulated tour length was to be 6 months. The resulting holes

and underlap meant that projects proceeded in lurches and lulls, depending on staff officer presence to manage the program and interact with counterparts in the CPA, U.S. Government, coalition, and Iraqi government. Recent briefings from DoD indicate that on 9/11 there were less than 15 joint headquarters elements in the department. Today there are over 60. While some are temporary (established for inaugurations, the Olympics, etc.), most of them, in the emphasis to partner with civilian agencies, present demands for interagency coordination and participation from civilian agencies that do not have the manpower to provide adequate sustainable staffing. See the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, "Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 6, Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group," June 2004, cited at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jwfcjam6.pdf. See also Reinaldo Rivera, *The Joint Interagency Task Force Conundrum: Cooperation Among Competitors, Is Harmony Achievable Through Trust and Understanding?* Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2003, available at www.stormingmedia.us/37/3755/A375514.html. For information on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, see the Department of State web site at www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/c21830.htm, and United States Institute of Peace reports: Robert Perito, "The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified," Washington, DC: USIP Special Report 152, October 2005, at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.html; and Michael Dziedzic and Colonel Michael K. Seidl, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan," Washington, USIP Special Report 147, August 2005, at www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.html. On the inability of the Department of State to meet staffing requirements in furtherance of the "surge" in Iraq, see DeYoung; and Kessler.

21. Senator Richard Lugar, "The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004: Floor Statement," Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 25, 2004. Text of the bill is available at thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.613/.

22. This authorizing legislation passed the Senate unanimously. Action continued to gain appropriations to accompany the authorities contained in the authorization.

23. Executive Summary of NSC meeting. Website at *www.state.gov/s/crs/*.

24. Comment made to the author in spring 2004.

25. National Security Presidential Decision 44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," Washington, DC: The White House, December 7, 2005, available at *www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html*.

26. DoD has several venues for interagency training. Some is incorporated into professional military education. The Interagency Transformation, Education, and Analysis Program at the National Defense University conducts training, concept development, exercises, and liaison with many U.S. Government entities and the Washington policy community, *www.ndu.edu/itea*. The Foreign Service Institute, the Department of State training center, also conducts training in the effort to prepare Department of State and other government personnel with an emphasis on operations at U.S. Embassies, *www.state.gov/m/fsi*. There is also an evaluation of FSI at *www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/summary/10004631.2006.html*.

27. JIATF-East information was taken from a JIATF J-5 brief provided by Colonel Robert Nossov, USA, the J-5, and website at *www.jiatfs.southcom.mil*.

28. NWCG information can be found at *www.nwcg.gov*. Its model for training and managing interagency government personnel has been proposed for adaptation for interagency and civil reserve response capacity to S/CRS.

CHAPTER 10

INTERAGENCY REFORM: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME

Robert B. Polk

I will offer a few thoughts from two perspectives on changes we need to make to our National Security System; first, my perspective from Iraq in 2003 as a multiagency implementation planner working directly for both Jay Garner in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and Paul Bremer in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); second, my perspective from the last 2 years cultivating ideas about wider U.S. Government reforms needed to improve U.S. competency in national security matters both at home and abroad. Except where specifically noted, the ideas expressed here represent my own and are not intended to reflect anyone else's or that of any institution with which I am presently affiliated.

My experience in Iraq, like that of many others, was unexpected and short-noticed. I joined the first civilian-led organization going in to rebuild Iraq only 3 weeks before it deployed. At the time, I was an active duty Army officer in civilian clothes chosen for my experience in planning. I was the most junior member of the core team by far. After a quick self-assessment upon arrival in ORHA, I asked that I be reassigned as deputy to a more senior official because I suspected the work would require more seniority than I had at the time. My request was denied, and the rest, as they say, is history.

The stories are many, and some quite interesting, but if one has kept up even on the margins, he or she

will probably have a good sense of the challenges we faced and the mistakes we all made. At my level, I knew many of the policymakers fairly well and had routine contact with them, but I did not advise on or orchestrate policies. My job, in which I was finally successful once ORHA was replaced by the CPA and we formed a proper planning office, was to bring all the real experts together to form a workable whole-of-government implementation plan for policies. After 10 months, we had such a working plan. I left Iraq with my head held high a few days after I briefed the last major changes to this plan to an assembled group consisting of the entire Coalition leadership in the Green Zone.

My time in Iraq was full of the usual mood swings typical of those in a combat zone, including the highest of highs and the lowest of lows. Even though I was not a front-line soldier this time around, I did experience the sense of loss from losing close friends and the survivor's guilt over being alive after a close call where others were not so fortunate. As powerful as those experiences were at the time, in the end the greatest value of my experience came later, in the afterglow of calm reflection. During that reflection, I came to realize that my time in Iraq had given rise to clearer insights into certain important aspects of a national security system that had failed us. Specifically, my thoughts coalesced with regard to our effort to integrate ad hoc interagency teams given great responsibilities but little authority and almost no capacity to get the job done. My retrospective conclusions stripped away any pretensions I might have once held that our government could quickly field a competent, coherent national security bureaucracy. Here following are my candid thoughts:

- As a government, we are awash in complex solutions, but we do not yet understand all

the roots of the problems we face in our own country, let alone those in foreign countries where we choose to intervene.

- We have not yet fully validated our first assumption in intervention philosophy and management with our most important constituent—the American people. The assumption is that we will be doing more, not less, of these and similar interventions in the future.
- We still persist in defining desired end states in measurable and concrete terms rather than accepting that simply changing from an old *process* to a new *process* may be the best we can hope for. We still persist in making bold predictions of success. I believe in truth in advertising. If regime change is itself the big goal in the next intervention, then perhaps all we should promise is regime change, not stabilization and a democratic paradise. I am not saying that delivering less is good, but if it is the truth and it is all we've got to offer, then perhaps we would make different decisions—and promises—in the first place.
- We unnecessarily couple our national prestige and honor with lofty and unobtainable goals such as democratization, even when the situation demands a fresh perspective and a change in course. In other words, we are rigid in our approach to change in a regional environment that is mostly fluid and largely beyond our power to shape.
- We do not yet have a U.S. Government self-image or sense of identity as a true interagency team functioning together at the capital, regional,

and country/field levels as one. We do not yet have the will to match sufficient resources with problem-solvers in the field.

- We do not yet, as Americans, embrace prevention of foreseeable problems. We are much more prone to take risky, spectacular action to get the horse back in the barn (crisis response) than to maintain the patient, enlightened vigilance to keep him from escaping in the first place. We are not yet concerned enough as a society to demand that our elected officials underwrite a more balanced set of tools, both soft and hard. As a result, our presidents have limited options to choose from when facing sticky situations abroad.
- We do not yet realize the atrophying effect of the exponential growth of the Department of Defense (DoD) over the past 50 years on the rest of the interagency, and we certainly do not know what to do about it. We do not yet have an acceptable forum and methodology to bring about the necessary and comprehensive changes to the system.
- Finally, we do not yet realize that change usually does not come from within. It usually takes external agents to make things happen. Moreover, we do not yet realize that change will be measured in terms of decades, not months or even years.

The foregoing are only a few of my thoughts as channeled from my experiences in Iraq. They really stirred me up. After considering what to do about all this, I decided to retire from my 20-year career in the military and throw all my efforts behind an effort to reform the civilian-led interagency. I was encouraged by

the atmosphere of reform and the ongoing efforts inside the public and private sectors both in Washington, DC, and in other capitals of our most active international partners. I was not, however, convinced that any of these efforts would ever get beyond addressing parts of an unassailable whole.

I have since come to the view, however, that there may indeed be a realistic vehicle for achieving an authentic holistic approach to multiagency endeavors. That vehicle is the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). A little over a year ago, I met and am now fortunate to consider myself a senior advisor to Jim Locher, who as a former Assistant Secretary of Defense was the chief architect of the Goldwater/Nichols Act of 1986. This Act unified the five military services into a single DoD team. Locher has a history of bringing about large organizational change successfully and against all odds. He and I found ourselves to be fellow travelers and have since created, along with a few other key and committed colleagues, the PNSR.

The PNSR is an independent, nonpartisan, whole-of-government project designed to study the underlying problems preventing the U.S. Government from formulating and executing a coherent national security system. Its recommendations are intended to be enshrined in a new National Security Act to replace the last one dating back to 1947. Its findings will focus on mechanisms, not policy, at the level of government between, but not including, the President and the Cabinet departments. Both the legislative and executive branches will share equally in this reform. If successful, we hope that it will continue in a future phase to lead reforms inside the constituent departments themselves.

The Project has attracted the support of the office of the Senate Majority Leader and office of the

Speaker of the House, as well as the interest of one Republican House leader. Other notable congressional members, both Republican and Democrat, have joined a bicameral effort to fully fund the PNSR by the end of 2007. Additionally, some members of Congress have expressed interest in holding hearings to help begin the processes of attention-getting, familiarization, and education on the key issues and obstacles to reform. The Project has maintained an active dialogue with the National Security Council (NSC) staff. We have key officials, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ready to support fully our efforts once the NSC determines the proper roles for the Joint Chiefs to play. We have 13 working teams, with a combined strength of over 160 pro bono experts from a number of the most prominent think tanks and universities already working on issues for the study. Finally, we have a stalwart group of senior advisors like Brent Scowcroft, Wesley Clark, Norman Augustine, and Newt Gingrich to keep us straight and offer guidance as needed.

Our effort is in dead earnest, and the possibilities for success, including the chief objective of writing into law a new National Security Act, are very real. But the scene is Washington, and we will need all the help we can get. I hope those reading this chapter will consider the possibility of encouraging their U.S. Senators and Representatives to support our cause.

The PNSR was borne of necessity. Hear it from Jim Locher himself:

The U.S. national security system is broken and we have compelling evidence from 9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hurricane Katrina that this is true. Yet, the problem has been longstanding, occurring almost imperceptibly over the past 40-50 years. It has not been a problem of any one administration, political party, or set of leaders and

the problem has defied solutions for decades. A number of projects have tried to reform various aspects of the problem and have fallen short. What is different today is that the magnitude of recent setbacks has created great urgency and a broad consensus in the national security community to make the needed fixes.

You may ask what is the problem exactly. There are two problems really: First—Our departments in the executive branch are unable to look horizontally across the interagency to act as a team. More complex, rapidly-paced national security missions now require more timely and effective integration of the expertise and capabilities of many departments at once. Today, these departments and agencies remain too stove-piped, with strong barriers to integration including a lack of common procedures and limited shared education and training, all leading to the creation of ad hoc organizations and planning during crisis. For example, we can observe that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is being handled in the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, Treasury, and Homeland Security, plus many elements of the Intelligence Community, to name only a few. Yet even today, we cannot work across departments to produce unity of effort in policy formulation, planning, and execution on this important issue. Consequently, we see departments increasingly more concerned with inputs to reinforce their own cultural biases and less concerned on measuring the success of their outputs to the greater good. In the end, the U.S. government must begin to think like an interagency and not like separate departments.

Let me cite some of the major problems that are undermining just the reconstruction and stabilization aspects of our national security system: there has been no formal shifting of resources to permit civilian departments and agencies to develop the required capacities; the lead agency concept has repeatedly proven to be ineffective; each department continues to pursue its own agenda; differing agency cultures and mistrust dominate and thwart incentives for a more integrated approach;

there are no organizational or personnel incentives to serve in reconstruction and stabilization operations; Congress continues to send mixed signals on funding such new capabilities; no single, tangible congressional constituency exists for transagency reconstruction and stabilization issues; and poor cross-agency information sharing persists.

The second general problem in need of radical reform is the inequity of funding distribution amongst the departments and agencies. Let me offer one astonishing anecdote to make this point. There are 6,000 Foreign Service officers in the entire DoS while there are over 11,000 lawyers alone in the DoD. What does this say about the need to rebalance our budgeting priorities? These same inequities have led to the creation of weak expeditionary cultures incapable of effectively deploying and performing implementation missions abroad. One great example some of you may have heard of recently was the State Department's inability to man Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. The DoS has, instead, requested that the DoD fill in the missing bodies with military personnel. This, on the dawn of our 5th year in Iraq.

So what to do about it? Every long journey begins with the first step, and our first step will have to be taken in both mind and spirit. We will need to get our heads and hearts fully into the idea of radical change first, and this begins with admitting that there is a problem of significant proportions. If, for argument's sake, one buys into Locher's statement that there is such a problem, then the next step is to internalize the mandate for change. Readers can determine for themselves whether what they have heard and seen recently in America, and indeed around the world, infuses them with any sense of urgency. Next, we need to build a coalition of supporters and advocates who share a compelling and attractive vision of where we

need to go. We will speak of this vision later, but first I want to speak of the advocates.

The most important advocates for radical change reside within the U.S. Congress, but they do not all know it yet. As the legislative heart of this democracy, the Congress is, in my opinion, actually more than an equal partner to the executive branch when it comes to reforming our government. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress its authorities and responsibilities in Article I, while the Presidency is described subsequently in Article II. Moreover, it is the Capitol building that occupies the place of honor at the head of the National Mall. I believe the Founding Fathers designed this scheme deliberately and so charged the Congress literally and figuratively with the chief responsibility for ensuring effective national governance across its breadth and depth and providing oversight as it deems necessary. The power of the people's purse remains the true catalyst for change. Moreover, long-term changes should not be subjected to backing and filling at the whims of revolving administrations and political personalities. Consequently, it is law, complemented by executive policy, that must instigate and perpetuate new and radical government modification.

It is thus safe to say that the Congress must be the centerpiece for any radical reform of the U.S. Government. In spite of tremendous efforts, however, Congress has increasingly less time or institutional capacity to devote adequate attention to the myriad of high-priority issues on its plate, let alone to tackle such sweeping requirements as large-scale governmental reforms. It is therefore equally clear that for Congress to even begin to grasp the full extent of the task that lies before it, it must be educated on the nature of such reforms. The PNSR has begun this process informally

and hopes to continue during full congressional hearings in the near future.

It is important to acknowledge that in this effort to educate on government reform, Washington is already inundated in recommendations from key institutions and individuals in the form of testimony, books, reports, blogs, articles, studies, and the like. Yet none of these efforts alone has provided the kind of broad education, consensus-building, in-depth analysis, or political inducement that will be necessary for radical change. In most cases, these efforts lacked enough buy-in within the wider U.S. Government interagency team in Washington, let alone within the American citizenry, to bring about anything more than piecemeal tinkering. This result has led to what I call an era of micro-reforms, a little bit here and there originating from narrow stove-piped interests.

Educating Congress and the wider interagency community also includes building agreement on the fundamental problems truly lying, at the heart of the matter. Many so-called “important” problems of today are, in fact, only symptoms of those authentically earth-shaking problems lying down below the tectonic plates. Even more vital, we have to identify and clearly describe the root causes of these deeper problems.

The education of Congress as our primary change agent will also require articulating a new understanding of many aspects of the current world in which we live. Getting a sense of this new world, I believe, begins with acceptance that ours is now, for better or for worse, a world of interconnectedness. We, as part of that world, are simply one system in a system of systems. When one begins to look at a problem such as civil-military Stability and Reconstruction Operations (S&R) in venues around the globe, or at national security

within the international arena, one quickly realizes that it may be impossible to change one part of this connected system without addressing changes to other parts of other systems. In other words, the environment is interconnected in more ways than immediately meet the eye, and we must deal with all relevant connections to effect lasting and coherent reforms.

With the Department of State (DoS) and the DoD struggling to make progress on these and other issues, one might think that the NSC would step in with added clout to ensure that a competent and functioning interagency is ready to respond to the President's wishes. However, that isn't the case. With a few notable exceptions, the NSC has chosen over the past decades to act as the President's advisory council rather than to oversee the management of the interagency. As a result, the departments are bereft of a team concept, and have little interdepartmental consensus on problems, causes, or the systems environment. Left to their own devices, the departments struggle to make meaningful progress on policy but are utterly incapable of producing lasting cross-departmental reforms.

The appointment of a War Czar is just the latest symptom of an unworkable system bursting at the seams. In all fairness, with the executive branch's good-faith attempts to reform from within, to include creation of the Homeland Security and Intelligence Departments along with several other lesser known reorganizations, the NSC's passivity with regard to integrating the interagency may have reflected its conclusion that the final solutions would need to come from even broader approaches led from the outside. It is unlikely, however, that this very tired NSC will have the stomach for any such outside approaches at the close of the Bush tenure.

Making matters even more difficult, the supposed apostles of the Chief Executive's political will, the 3,000-plus Presidential political appointees spread throughout Washington, are rarely allowed to think in terms of long-term change or systems thinking awareness. They are instead expected to run things today, period. The typical measure of success for a political appointee is often how responsively he or she manages the immediate priorities of the President. Moreover, many of our cabinet secretaries have historically been former chief executive officers (CEOs) whose very natures are to be competitive rather than collaborative. Perhaps a new model for a cabinet secretary might usefully be contemplated.

In addition to Congress, the Presidential candidates themselves deserve special attention as potentially powerful advocates in this coming season of change, so that they too need to be educated. As both the future head of government and the heir apparent to ownership of the principal "bully pulpit," the next President should have much to say about these proposed reforms. Through campaign debates and jousts with the news media, the process of education has already begun. It is hoped that through their campaign statements to the electorate, these candidates will help build momentum at the grass roots level for radical change.

The challenges of educating and recruiting our coalition of change and overcoming the inertial forces embedded in the current political system overall are daunting but surmountable. The next challenge—creating a compelling vision of where we want to go—may be just as important and difficult. We begin the visioning process by reviewing the character and content of that venerable phrase and namesake of the entire effort—"National Security."

What is National Security exactly? We certainly cannot reform it if we can't define it. National Security ranks right up there with Democracy and Freedom as America's sacred touchstone values, and we are coming up with some interesting new approaches to how to think about it. For example, if one were to think of all the national security issues as being held in a single basket, one could see that this basket might be filled with an incredible number of issues ranging from terrorism to the education of our children. But if we were to separate those issues into different baskets according to some criterion for prioritizing, then we might begin to think more creatively about a system for addressing each of these different baskets with a properly discriminating degree of emphasis instead of treating every single security need as if the sky will fall if it is not lavishly funded.

If those baskets were to be arranged in some order of importance from least to most, one could then start to see a distinction forming between those issues for which the U.S. Government should be most organized to handle and those that might not deserve the same amount of attention. For example, if we assume that one of the prioritizing criteria is the frequency of a particular National Security challenge, then one might think about arranging our more permanent national security structures, budgets, personnel programs, planning capabilities, etc., to address these most persistent issues. We might also think of arranging less permanent or more nimble structures, budgets, personnel programs, and planning capabilities for dealing with the less frequently recurring issues.

Such an arrangement of dedicated organizational structures to address the most persistent concerns while maintaining more versatile structures for the

shifting involvements of a more transient nature exists today within parts of the government and the private sector. In the military, this concept is called Modularity, and the Marines are a living testament to its value. In the corporate world, it is called Mass Customization, and no one does it better than Toyota. No matter what you call it, Modularity or Mass Customization, it is a worthy transformational idea but one whose ramifications would be seen as highly threatening by today's entrenched government bureaucracies.

Let me stir the pot a bit more with my next visioning idea. I want to move from structuring organizations and institutions to the subject of people and leadership. I believe that non-DoD government civilian leadership with corresponding authority to make decisions and vector resources on behalf of the entire U.S. Government *in the field* has waned in recent crises almost to the point of extinction. If one buys into the idea that the field is where we create in the hearts and minds of foreigners the first and perhaps most lasting impression of ourselves as Americans, then he/she can see that the conspicuous absence of civilian leaders is crucial. There are many reasons for their absence, not least of which is the decades-long ascendancy of the professional military as the chief widget in our Presidents' national security tool box. For a number of well-intended reasons, the DoD has created a presence that pervades foreign interventions with a capacity far outstripping that of any other U.S. department or agency.

This particular issue is very important. It has resulted in a steady decline in non-DoD civilian leadership as measured by who makes the decisions and who has and can apply or distribute resources. As a result, we must reexamine this leadership challenge

to develop new roles and authorities for civilians in crisis environments. Reinvigorating the government's civilian roles would also, in my estimation, reconnect the American people more unambiguously to their civilian policymakers and policies in the field in more tangible and accountable ways. Because of the major impact of leadership on all future systems, without this one change and all the benefits that would flow therefrom, interagency reform in the National Security arena may never be fully realized.

Consequently, in the reformed milieu, empowered civilian leaders must emerge capable of prosecuting to the fullest extent their responsibility to represent what is best about America, regardless of the risks involved. It is the civilian who is the chief custodian of everything free citizens hold dear. Yet, even the venerable Ambassador has found it hard to maintain his/her presence at the table. This has created the unintended consequence of reinforcing a DoD juggernaut while undermining the confidence of the U.S. Government civil servant to take on these missions and lead in a way the military is willing to follow. In sum, the roles and responsibilities of civilians must be at the center of our reform efforts.

It is true that few positive U.S. examples of what I am suggesting exist. However, this lack should not preclude a presumption of new possibilities. There are sound principles upon which we could build such a new cadre of civilian leaders. We need to discover these principles and their underlying values and then determine the appropriate strategies for implementing such a new American vision for its civil servants.

Another unintended consequence of this lack of civilian leadership is the creation of the myriad and ambiguous so-called "transition points" during foreign

engagements at which control is to be handed off from the military to civilians. These are points that civilians should never have relinquished to the military in the first place. Eliminating such transition or hand-off points by retaining responsibilities firmly and continuously in the hands of civilians would be a major triumph of efficiency and a development welcome to a redefined and refocused interagency machine.

To support this emerging civilian cadre, new civilian and military cultures will have to take root. For example, the primacy that the military places on “doing” is a powerful element of its culture, and the U.S. Government civilian will have to develop a similar capability. A “doing” culture possesses aspects of organizational energy at all levels from strategic to tactical, but it boils down to ensuring that the sum total of those processes and actions will achieve direct effects on its intended recipients *in the field* whether foreign or domestic.

Make no mistake, the notion of a more robust civilian authority in the field where it counts would have ripple effects backwards and forwards throughout the whole of government in Washington. The creation of new career paths, promotions schemes in the interagency community, and reform of purposes and structures throughout the national agencies themselves are but a few of these potential effects. It will also take a paradigm shift in the way we fund our national security team. Yet, even a modest percent of the DoD budget reallocated to other key departments and agencies, perhaps the cost of one carrier group, would provide a thousand-fold increase in the current application of other U.S. Government instruments of peace and security.

Another vision of the kind we have in mind with the PNSR can be shown by example. This particular

hypothetical example is most often used by Jim Locher to illustrate the tremendous breadth of the study effort. The private sector learned years ago how to organize and manage its resources in order to stay competitive. It learned that problems often present themselves in ways that demand a team approach rather than one based on stovepiped, or independent, subordinate elements. Yet, instead of doing away with the stovepipes, e.g., the traditional human resources, operations, and finance offices, altogether, they simply added horizontal teams to their organization. These teams might align to a specific function of, say, customer satisfaction or product quality control. This new horizontal team concept was so-named because it provided a place for members from across the other stovepipes to come together horizontally and participate in solving a common problem together.

The DoD used some of the same reasoning to create its horizontal teams called the Combatant Commanders. The military had observed that the five services were increasingly stressed by coming together time and again in ad hoc ways to respond to world problems. It came to realize that a permanent institutionalized team concept was required. And just as the private sector did, instead of eliminating the stovepipe services, it simply added the horizontal team. The Regional Combatant Commanders became the locus where the DoD stovepipes came together from across the five services to address world problems such as relief efforts, stabilization missions, and war itself, as a team.

In the business world and in the DoD, formalizing the horizontal team approach also changed the long-standing power and influence of the venerable stovepipes. The horizontal chiefs became more

influential than the stovepipe chiefs because the stovepipes served only to train and equip the horizontal teams. The horizontal teams became the new doers and the favorite sons of the greater organization. For example, during a crisis, the President directs all military actions around the globe by speaking directly to the Combatant Commanders rather than through each of the five service chiefs, even though they all wear four stars on their shoulders. The five service chiefs became the supporting elements, not the leading elements of this arrangement.

This has been a positive development in organizational design for both the DoD and the international business community. One may now see a possible extrapolation from this concept into the wider U.S. national security system. For example, one can now imagine a government wherein the cabinet secretaries act simply as the resource providers while newly created horizontal team chiefs become the new doers responsible directly to the President in time of crisis. In fact, it is hard to imagine a huge government in a world full of untidy concerns such as GWOT, nonproliferation, counterdrug trafficking, pandemic health relief, and stability operations that *lacks* a horizontal team approach to solve these problems.

The stovepipes simply cannot keep up anymore, and new leadership alone cannot make up the difference. The time is now at hand for the U.S. Government to consider a more wholesale adaptation of the horizontal team approach to its national security system. As always, this will require an equal adjustment in the congressional oversight and funding functions, but nothing short of this will ever allow the emergence of a bureaucracy capable of bringing full coherency to national security strategies of future Presidents.

Of course, election season is upon us, with an administration tired and on the ropes. However, as reported by my colleague who has been working the Hill for us on these and other issues, several members from both parties believe that the timing may be exactly right for the following reasons: (1) the White House and the Congress are of different parties, setting the stage for a resolution where no party agenda completely dominates. The soil is thus fertile for change, with everything now on the table; (2) for the first time in 50 years, neither the president nor the vice president is running for office, thus leaving party members in the Congress free to take a more independent path on issues such as reform; (3) many members of Congress are running for President, and seeking an issue ripe with promise for giving them a distinctive edge; and (4) the threats to national security are urgent and palpable in the minds of the American people now, with expectations high that future attacks are likely.

Of course, as always, one alternative is to do nothing. If that occurs, here is the likely scenario. A new administration takes office and within 3-6 months will consider the previous administration's blunders to have been mostly about leadership. It will convince itself that the new leadership can remedy the problems, or at least should be given that chance. At about the 2-3 year mark, it will begin to realize that the problem is systemic and that it will take more than just leadership to solve it. Accordingly, the administration will use the only tool it has at hand, issuing Presidential Directives to the Executive Departments to make small piecemeal adjustments.

History tells us that these future political appointees heading departments will learn, as scores of their predecessors learned, that the Presidential Directive is

often virtually nugatory because it lacks the power of the purse behind it. Departments thus ultimately bow to their budgetary masters in Congress. History also tells us that few, if any, Presidential Directives ever survive beyond the term of that President. At about the 5-6 year mark, if the administration is still in office, it will finally come to the realization that the problems are of a nature such that they exceed the healing capabilities of the Presidential Directive and will begin to consider external assistance to bring about the radical systemic changes necessary for the system of systems to get on track. By this time, however, it departs office, leaving the next administration to start the whole stultifying process over again.

And so the seasons for potential change in both the Legislative and the Executive Branches come and go like comets in their distant orbits. Fortunately, however, we now understand the larger issue so that a resolution lies in mustering the will to act upon what we know. There is much to be done, and we must never allow our national adversaries' fanatical sense of urgency to dampen our own sense of urgency for doing the necessities. We must act now. That is why the Project on National Security Reform must succeed. I hope that readers will join us in this vital cause.

CHAPTER 11

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: INTERAGENCY RHETORIC AND CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION

Amanda Smith

The importance of civil-military communication and coordination is widely acknowledged and vigorously pursued. But is it effective and functioning as intended? The new counterinsurgency (COIN) field manual, FM 3-24, states, "[T]he integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial, and calls for 'a formal command and control system'."¹ However, is the rhetoric that outlines the systems for such integration articulated in a clear manner and calculated to ensure compliance?

In the past 15 years, the U.S. Government has had the opportunity to test its answers to these questions on several occasions. Conflicts of a dynamic nature such as those in Somalia and the current conflict in Iraq have demanded that prompt and adaptive strategies be communicated from the interagency to the military in an effective and consistent manner. Policy directives, such as Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56) and National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), have attempted to lay out the procedures for meeting this need, but have proven to be reactive and, at times, ambiguous and contradictory. The present analysis examines leadership theory and practice by assessing theories of communication and assessment, as well as the government experiences with conflict that have influenced the formation of these two key documents. The purpose of this research is to achieve

understanding of communications theory and practice; review relevant case studies of lessons learned; and offer recommendations for improving interagency effectiveness. As one senior U.S. Government official stated, "Good interagency won't save bad strategy."² The present analysis suggests, however, that no matter how good or bad the strategy, there is no hope for successful implementation if the strategy and policy are not clearly communicated. Clear statements of policy are essential for an effective interagency process.

Effective interagency coordination and cooperation are a *sine qua non* for successful government-wide involvement in stability operations. The multidimensional nature of support and stability operations (SASO) demonstrates what is referred to as "marble-cake governance." According to authors Robert Klitgaard and Gregory Treverton, the U.S. Government is experiencing a transition "from layer-cake governance, where different tasks are taken on separately by different sectors (public, private, nonprofit), to marble-cake governance, with new forms of partnerships across sectors at all levels."³ This transition has not been seamless, however, and the challenges are manifested in the current tensions between the Departments of Defense and State.⁴ The demands of SASO require that interagency rhetoric and communication clearly advance the coordination lying at the heart of successful interagency policymaking processes.

Theory In Action.

It is not surprising that Washington policymakers often lack the time to analyze the theoretical basis for rhetoric and policy. Nevertheless, a large body of

literature that addresses the theories of communication, coordination, and networking is available to guide policymakers. Organizational, rhetorical, and communications theory offer the opportunity to examine political communications processes at a fundamental level. Bureaucracy and interagency politics usually influence the communication and coordination processes, which are outlined in official documents. However, for analytical purposes, it is valuable to distinguish these influences from what the theories themselves have to offer. We can then see more clearly how official rhetoric for communication and coordination can best be implemented to achieve effective results.

For instance, complexity theory provides a fresh way to look at how an organization conducts self-assessments. The strength of the theory, when applied to government organizations, is that it takes into account the inevitable change and adaptation that are necessary to characterize government organizations. According to Philip Salem, "complexity theory describes the interactive and evolutionary processes of organizational development."⁵ While the theory addresses change within an organization, it does so without making the subjective determination of whether the change is good or bad.⁶ When applied to a dynamic interagency process, this theory allows an organization to install the mechanisms for institutionalizing the process of future change. The aim is to arrive at a culture that welcomes constructive change rather than fears it.⁷

While complexity theory stands apart from other theories due to its focus on change, it also builds upon other forms of assessment which may be used in an organization. *Structural assessment* assumes that analysis within an organization can be done at a

point in time and will produce recurring and repeating assessments by means of formal feedback loops that are built into the permanent structure of the organization. *Functional assessment* ties activity to outcome in a manner linking communication with its psychological impact. Functional assessment does not take into account variables such as quality or quantity, only psychological impacts and perception. Finally, *process assessment* is based on information gathered over time and may include analysis of structural and functional areas, but often strongly prioritizes stability.⁸

While these theories address key elements of assessment, Salem feels that they do not adequately account for the dynamic nature characterizing organizations of today.⁹ The undeniable dynamic nature of SASO and the complexity of the interagency process demand a theory that can be applied in times of change and adaptation. The assessment today may be dramatically different tomorrow. Therefore, Salem's complexity model posits that change and adaptation are no longer exceptions or events which dramatically change the manner in which an organization assesses itself. Rather, change is a norm addressed in a cyclical fashion representing only "points in the flow."¹⁰ Essentially, change becomes a repeated and anticipated by-product of the organization's activity. The change is expressed in an endless stream of small shuffles rather than rare and broadly spaced giant bounds.

In Salem's *complexity model*, differences in perception and assessment are embraced. No two evaluations of the situation are the same. Therefore, evaluations are used only as a tool with which to further assess the point at which events occur, because these points are more useful for understanding than the event itself. Noting the point at which the change occurred allows

for assessment in communication from a top-down and bottom-up manner because change can occur at anytime and at any point in the hierarchy.¹¹

Salem's theory is useful for understanding interagency communication and coordination because it addresses two key elements of governmental coordination: change and adaptation. These two elements are the norm, not the exception, and events occur at different levels of the hierarchy. The rhetoric of U.S. Government official documents needs to embody a flexibility reflecting the evolving nature of member organizations and addressing the demand for flexibility at all levels, not just in Washington and not just in the field. Whether or not current official documents recognize this need will be addressed later.

While adaptive assessment is necessary in SASO, it is not sufficient simply to tailor communications in a manner that adapts itself to change. Communication must also be used in a manner which takes into account the people addressed. Institutional policy and procedure often make it difficult for an organization to do so—the policies and procedures result in faulty rhetoric that fails to take account of the needs of an audience. More specifically, “the traditional communication texts rely on social psychology to the neglect of cognitive psychology, and they emphasize matters of style and format over considerations of audience, context, purpose (particularly when there are multiple or tacit objectives for a given document)” and seek to reach an audience that is “influenced, manipulated, or informed according to design.”¹²

In government agencies, bureaucratic policy and procedure often dictate the rhetorical form and manner. Style and format are, of course, useful and necessary, but should not be given priority over

careful contemplation of the time and the audience.¹³ Communication should be tailored not in an effort to conform to rules and guidelines, but rather in an attempt to be transmissible effectively, accurately, and deliberately. These requirements necessitate a different approach to rhetoric that take into account the concept of social knowledge.

Social knowledge refers to a “zone of relevance” which addresses the fact that different groups will react to rhetoric in different manners based upon the experiences and knowledge of the specific group.¹⁴ This principle can be applied to the interagency process where it is important to ensure that communication and rhetoric are designed in a manner which takes into account the varying social knowledge and cultures of the agencies involved. If interpretation *within* an organization can vary, it most certainly can vary *between* agencies with different missions and social knowledge.

Interagency Communication and Decision Processes.

Building upon communication and assessment theory addresses the intricacies of communication and coordination within the interagency itself. They reflect an understanding of the dynamics at work within the government and seek to address communication issues and challenges without taking a specific event or issue into consideration. No value judgment is made regarding the quality of the strategy or policy.

Although shared interpretation between agencies arguably improves over time, there are still challenges to interpreting mission and objectives,¹⁵ given the inherently different cultures and social knowledge

of the agencies. When interagency officials gather—whether it be to discuss the drafting of policy documents or strategy—gaining consensus, across the board participation, and understanding is often quite difficult. Also, each agency brings to the table different views, perceptions, and understanding which render problematic the development of rhetoric that creates common interpretation.

Varying social knowledge among agencies hinders coordination efforts.¹⁶ Social knowledge manifests itself in preferences, interpretations, and strategic outlooks. Despite communication patterns that “tend to change over the life cycle of a crisis, becoming more structured over time as formalized, issue-specific chains of command (within both [State and Defense] departments) are clarified,”¹⁷ the goal should be to construct command documents for the interagency team as efficiently as possible from the beginning. The first, and perhaps most important, issue arising from differing social knowledge is that of differing terminological interpretation. Rhetoric varies among agencies, creating a situation in which meanings vary due to variations in organizational culture.¹⁸ Such variation can potentially create a climate in which the wording of a prescriptive document is agreed upon but interpreted differently. For example, the Department of Defense (DoD) may interpret the phrase “by all means necessary” differently from the State Department.

Varying social knowledge is a symptom of the inherent difference between agency missions in a common endeavor: “To overcome significant differences . . . collaborating agencies must have a clear and compelling rationale to work together.”¹⁹ Manifestly, the State Department and DoD have very different individual missions which translate into

different approaches to rhetoric formation. Even if strategic goals are understood, agreement upon the rhetoric articulating that strategy may not be possible. Vicki Rask points out this disconnect in recalling the “State Department’s and the NSC [National Security Council] Staff’s implicit demand for ambiguity and flexibility [which] clashes with Defense’s explicit drive for clarity and precision” in orders issued to soldiers on the ground.²⁰ This functional difference leads Defense officials to express outrage at the perceived vagueness of the State Department’s call for DoD assistance, and frustration on the part of the State Department at Defense’s demand for precision and its “unyielding” attitude.²¹ Disagreements such as these lead to disgruntlement and thwart constructive debate.

The struggle between the cultures of the State Department and DoD is not confined to Washington. As the President’s personal representative, the in-theater ambassador is responsible for “exercise[ing] full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in [the country], except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander. . . .”²² Coordination efforts between agencies in the field require understanding the objective and mission as well as the culture of the other organizations. An adaptation of a chart included by Dr. Gabriel Marcella in the *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy*, which highlights some of these key differences and how they affect the military and civil agencies’ perceptions of the other, is shown in Figure 1.

Military Officers	Foreign Service Officers
Physical action more important than written word	Written word essential for diplomacy
Doctrine is important	Doctrine is not important
Focus on end states, plans, and courses of action	Focus on the process without a specific end state expected
Core functions conducted by lower level officials (i.e. enlisted personnel and NCOs)	Core functions conducted by officers
Dislike of ambiguity	Ambiguity is ok
Leadership is composed of career military officials	Leadership is a mixture of career F.S. officers, politicians, academics, etc.
Diverse aspects of SASO are of growing importance	Diverse aspects of SASO are of growing importance
Focus on training	Training is not the focus
Officers oversee large numbers of personnel	Officers oversee others in their core area (i.e. political, economic, etc.)

Figure 1. Comparing Military Officers and Foreign Service Officers.²³

When agencies are wary of what they take to be the misguided traits and outlooks inherent in another's culture, not only will debate be jaundiced from the start, but unhealthy work-arounds may be implemented which impede the flow of correct information. The *Iraq Study Group Report* recognized the need for a free flow of information and opinions, calling for "an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Counsel, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation."²⁴ When practices

such as these are not encouraged and adhered to, then there arises hoarding of information where “expertise [or dialogue] is traded for secrecy.”²⁵ It becomes more tempting to reason that other agency representatives lack the need to know.

These practices can lead to seriously incomplete information which, in turn, causes breakdowns when it comes time to put strategy and rhetoric into action. A senior DoD official has stated, “[The] key is for all the principals to have the perspective across the board and to understand the whole issue.”²⁶ This is easier said than done. If there is a lack of coordination at the principal level, then leaders cannot understand the whole issue, and communication with lower ranks becomes impossible. And if it is impossible for leaders to communicate clearly within their own organizations, there is certainly no hope of clear communication at the operational level among organizations. A lack of clear communication will destroy the coordination objectives and missions of SASO.

A final challenge to interagency cooperation is the memory of “how it’s always been done.” A State Department official said, “For everyone who wishes to walk through the gates of the future, the path is blocked by 10,000 guardians of the past.”²⁷ The U.S. Government is urgently trying to adjust to the demands of SASO but finds itself struggling. Since combat operations are historically run by the military, it is easy to default to the military when combat is a possibility. But the very nature of DoD’s mission in counterinsurgency warfare makes the military ill-equipped to handle all of the challenges of SASO.

The interagency must constantly battle the temptation to default to military plans and simply “adapt” old plans to fit new challenges. This temptation

is destructive to the needs of SASO as there is a tendency to rely upon the military “because they’ve done this before,” while at the same time acknowledging that what has been done in SASO before has not always been effective.

In a results-oriented agency like the military, contingency plans abound and may often be deferred to in time of crisis simply due to their existence and apparent applicability. Such a default preempts any effort to develop firm coordination based upon a commonly understood strategy and to develop clear rhetoric which will allow those strategies to be implemented at the operational level.

Before moving on to an analysis of the current official documents stipulating the methods by which the interagency must function and communicate in SASO, let us examine key historical cases which have helped to bring the interagency process to where it is today.

The United States in Support and Stability Operations: A Historical Perspective.

After World War II, the United States began its involvement in what is widely considered its first truly large-scale attempt at SASO when it occupied and rebuilt Germany and Japan. Since 1945, there have been 55 “peace operations,” 41 of which began after the end of the Cold War.²⁸ These conflicts, or operations, have been called many things, including peace operations, nation-building, and support and stability operations. U.S. participation has been a constant and will likely continue to be so for this nation for many years to come. In fact, according to James Dobbins, “nation-building . . . is the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only superpower.”²⁹

In post-World War II Germany, the United States assumed the role of “stabilizer” and “rebuilder.” Historical documents reflect the challenges of this role from the start. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, established on April 1, 1946, was tasked with a variety of coordination and oversight functions.³⁰ Soon after, the office came to a fuller realization of the complexity of its task. In response to shifting organizational frameworks, the G-5 acknowledged on August 29, 1945, that the dynamics of the situation in Germany were new and challenging for a conflict-focused military. Specifically, it noted that “certain matters will continue to require combined coordination by some other agency. . . . Displaced Persons operations should not be considered as a peculiarly Military Government function.”³¹

In an organization which had spent the previous several years focused on military victory, the new objective of stability through rebuilding, providing humanitarian assistance, and reestablishing governments proved immensely challenging. In fact, a working paper prepared during the Clinton administration acknowledged, “No civilian organization, however, could match the Army’s ability to organize and impose stability in an environment as desperate as that of postwar Germany.”³² The United States realized that it was involved in a new type of operation, one which demanded coordination and clear communication among agencies to achieve the common objective of stability. Despite great efforts over the years, the process by which the interagency coordinates still remains relevant, as evinced by the many SASO operations since World War II and the current conflict in Iraq.

Postwar Germany demonstrated the challenges of interagency coordination in its infancy. However, this

model varies from many of the operations in which the United States has since participated, in that the Allies were the occupiers and temporary government in Germany. Subsequently, the United States has had to operate as an outside force with a shorter-term mission. Somalia is an example of such a situation, which provides a more representative case for understanding the challenges posed by SASO and which must be overcome for success. Somalia was a learning experience because it occurred prior to the issuance of Presidential Decision Directive-56, the document that attempted to establish the lines of communication and control to be used by the interagency in future support operations. Let us glance at Somalia in greater depth.

Civilian/Military Communication Prior to PDD-56: Lessons from Somalia.

Somalia was an eye-opening experience for the United States and the world.³³ The United States was forced to move beyond its battle-driven strategies of the past and confront a new kind of conflict head-on. What it learned and experienced in Somalia in those early years of the 1990s has deeply impacted the manner in which the U.S. Government looks at conflict. The various phases of the conflict demonstrated repeated attempts to “get it right” and “wrap it up” as quickly as possible. The failure of this attempt is enshrined in the minds of many Americans with the brutal images appearing in the film and book, *Black Hawk Down*. Somalia taught the United States the potential dangers of “peacekeeping,” which in turn created a narrow window of tolerance by the American people for SASO. This sentiment further created a demand that if the United States gets in, it must get it done right and get out.

In 1991, competition for power erupted into conflict in the African nation of Somalia. Major General Muhammad Said Barre was overthrown as national leader, resulting in a struggle for power among the clans. In the midst of the chaos and conflict, two prominent figures rose to the top and competed for power: General Mohamed Farah and Ali Mahdi Mohamed.³⁴

Food and water shortages compounded the suffering created by the conflict itself. Somalia typically receives less than 20 inches of rain annually. However, abnormally low levels of rainfall for many years had created a drought in much of East Africa in the early 1990s. This drought plagued Somalia, leaving the nation with little food and water. In fact, in some areas these basic necessities were not obtainable at all.³⁵ By the early months of 1992, some 500,000 Somalis had died from starvation, and hundreds of thousands more were in danger of the same.³⁶

In April of 1992, the world responded to the humanitarian crisis in East Africa. The United Nations (UN) Security Council approved Resolution 751, which authorized the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I).³⁷ Fifty observers and 500 light infantry soldiers were sent to Somalia to lend assistance, but failed to stave off famine. In response, President George H. W. Bush ordered the U.S. military to support UNOSOM I's mission through Operation PROVIDE RELIEF which commenced on August 15, 1992. This Central Command (CENTCOM)-organized response was commanded by Brigadier General Frank Libutti, U.S. Marine Corps, with the mission to "provide military assistance in support of emergency humanitarian relief to Kenya and Somalia." Its objectives were to "deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team

(HAST) to assess relief requirements in Kenya and Somalia; activate a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct an emergency airlift of food and supplies into Somalia and Northern Kenya; and deploy four C-141 aircraft and eight C-130 aircraft to Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya, to provide daily relief sorties into Somalia to locations that provided a permissive and safe environment.”³⁸ It was an expansive mission from the start.

UNOSOM I and Operation PROVIDE RELIEF failed, and on December 4, 1992, with the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 794, President George H. W. Bush announced the beginning of Operation RESTORE HOPE under the command of Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC. The U.S. role in the conflict expanded dramatically at this point, as it would now lead and provide military support to the multilateral United Task Force (UNITAF).³⁹ While the overall strategic objectives of this new operation remained humanitarian and stabilizational, the CENTCOM mission statement was revised and expanded to read:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs [nongovernment organizations] in providing humanitarian relief under UN auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.⁴⁰

The operation proved to be relatively successful as the 38,000 troops, of which 28,000 were American forces, were able to increase stability and security and mitigate starvation in many areas.⁴¹ However, despite

the continued U.S. emphasis on the importance of fulfilling the operational mission, which included the handoff of the effort from U.S. command to UN-led peacekeeping forces,⁴² the initiation of what came to be known as UNOSOM II was repeatedly postponed. Opposition from UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, who desired a complete demilitarization of the rival clans operating in the area and a "from the top down" rebuilding of the nation's infrastructure prior to transition from a U.S. to UN-led operation, slowed the progress of the transition.⁴³

Many of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's concerns were addressed in the third phase of combat which commenced on March 26, 1993, with UN Security Council Resolution 814. UNOSOM II's mandate expanded again to include many of the objectives that Boutros-Ghali wanted for the U.S.-led UNITAF to address. Under UNOSOM II, the objectives included, "[T]he requirement . . . to disarm the Somali clans; . . . rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of a member state; and . . . building a secure environment throughout the country."⁴⁴ Also, whereas UNITAF focused on the southern region of Somalia, UNOSOM II was focused on the entire country.⁴⁵

Most importantly, the expanded objectives included many that the international community had wanted the United States to lead in the previous phase. The United States, however, was not the lead nation in the third phase. A UN peacekeeping structure under U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, who functioned as the representative of the Secretary General, was established in Somalia, and the United States provided only logistical support.⁴⁶ According to Lawrence Yates, "Combat operations of a limited or irregular nature may be necessary at some point after stability

operations are well under way.”⁴⁷ This proved to be true, as threatened warlords responded to coalition efforts with attacks. The deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers on June 5, 1993, and the deaths of 18 American soldiers on October 3, 1993, weakened U.S. resolve, leading to President Clinton’s decision to remove U.S. forces in Somalia by March 31, 1994.⁴⁸

Communication was a severe problem in the Somalia conflict. In fact, one senior official referred to the conflict simply as one big strategic communication problem.⁴⁹ The conflict was pivotal in altering U.S. attitudes toward SASO. Jennifer Taw states, “U.S. military commanders have . . . attempted since Operation RESTORE HOPE to limit the extent of their involvement in such activities [humanitarian and civic action] to the absolute minimum.”⁵⁰ Clearly Somalia was a learning experience for the agencies involved.

The brief summary above illustrates that Somalia was indeed a “learn as you go” situation. Toward the end of the U.S.-led UNITAF mission, the interagency representatives had the opportunity to assess the situation and determine the way ahead. When Boutros-Ghali pushed for the United States to disarm the violent clans and begin infrastructure reconstruction, the interagency was wary of attempting to do so. The United States recognized the potentially volatile situation and the disastrous outcome that could ensue should unity of command be lost. The interagency players needed to find an acceptable way to inform the UN that the United States was already accomplishing the mission of UNITAF, though not without difficulty, and that a hasty escalation to knocking clan leaders’ heads together could be courting disaster. By subsequently allowing UNOSOM II to be undertaken, the United States forfeited both the progress that was being made

and compounded the difficulties of the situation by allowing the mandate to be unrealistically expanded. If the situation were already tenuous, it certainly was not stable enough to radically expand the mission.

This decision highlights a common problem. Jennifer Taw states, “[C]ivil-military and civic action operations are often considered implied tasks, required for establishing a stable and secure environment as well as valuable for force protection.”⁵¹ Under UNITAF/Operation RESTORE HOPE, the U.S. military was only to provide a secure environment and assist UN/NGOs in humanitarian efforts. The control provisions of the mission itself were confusing, stating that direction would come from NCA and USCINCENT, but that assistance in humanitarian efforts would be conducted “under UN auspices.”⁵² Did this language imply that the U.S. forces were to provide security while assisting the UN/NGOs with the help of the UN? It is very unclear who was helping whom. The military naturally wants to do what it does best: perform combat, provide security, etc. In the case of Somalia, there was a very fuzzy line between where the U.S. contribution was to end, and the UN and other external humanitarian assistance was to begin.

As the objectives were met, the U.S. military undoubtedly began to feel the pressure of the UN to expand its mission to state-building and other activities outside of its mandate (“mission creep”). Lacking further instructions, the U.S. Army was left with a disconnect concerning what exactly it was to provide. It appears that in the case of Operation RESTORE HOPE, the issue was that of ambiguous language and a lack of direct instructions from the U.S. Government.

If the U.S. military is to lead, its mission needs to be clearly communicated to the field commander.

This problem appears to be widespread. One UN Commander said, "None of the political leadership can tell me what they want me to accomplish. That fact, however, does not stop them from continually asking me when I will be done."⁵³ As Taw observes, "For the Army, this tension between short-term and long-term goals is mirrored in the internal debate over how much humanitarian assistance the Army should provide."⁵⁴

In multilateral efforts, the U.S. Government needs to clearly state what missions and tasks are expected of the U.S. military. U.S. civil-military communication must be maximized when cooperating with other nations because outside input and coordination will serve only to further obfuscate an already cloudy U.S. strategic picture. Clear delineation of responsibility is essential, presenting another challenge for the interagency process. However, even if lines of responsibility are drawn, ambiguous rhetoric can seriously impede clear and correct interpretation of strategy and responsibility. Just as the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia was unclear due to nebulous instructions, U.S. forces today face the same challenges in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

Ambiguous and unclear rhetoric can be a challenge at all levels and in all situations. Most importantly, reform must start at the top. In Washington, where top-level officials are involved in interagency coordination, the effort for clear understanding must be a priority. After Somalia and subsequent conflicts like Haiti and Kosovo, the U.S. Government came to realize the need for a comprehensive document that outlined the manner in which support and stability operations would be conducted. This document, Presidential Decision Directive-56, and its successor, National Security Presidential Directive-44, provide prime examples of how rhetoric and poorly coordinated

language can produce varying interpretations and consequently varying approaches to the conduct of an operation.

In large bureaucratic endeavors such as those involved in interagency coordination, documents must be especially clear and easily understood in order to achieve the intended effect, i.e., effective coordination and communication within the interagency in support and stability operations. Perhaps the inspiration for PDD-56 was merely a rare and sudden flash of bureaucratic insight, or perhaps it was the cumulative frustrations of Somalia;⁵⁵ nevertheless, PDD-56 would attempt to meet this challenge and repair the many communication challenges that had plagued the U.S. Government up to that point.

The Drafting of PDD-56.

According to the *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook*, “‘Success’ in complex foreign crises requires that the interagency simultaneously address all aspects of a crisis--diplomatic, political, military, humanitarian, and social--in a coordinated fashion.”⁵⁶ Intricate coordination such as this demands that all agencies involved have an understanding of the strategic objective. Official documents for communication are perhaps the most central and tangible representation of that understanding.

PDD-56, issued in May 1997, attempted to establish clear lines of interagency coordination, supervision, and communication for the new type of conflict in the post-Cold War security environment.⁵⁷ It represented an attempt to explain “key elements of the Clinton Administration’s policy on *managing* contingency operations.”⁵⁸ It was PDD-56 that first attempted to

institutionalize many of the promising policies and procedures and incorporate lessons learned from within Washington and from the field.⁵⁹

Several key assumptions affect the interpretation of PDD-56. First, the document assumes that complex contingency operations will continue in the future. The document, however, was drawn up as a reaction to the experiences of recent conflicts such as Somalia. Nevertheless, the document tries to strike a balance between the past and the future with a second goal that future operations will be conducted in coalitions if at all possible.⁶⁰ By definition alone, this assumption requires a heightened level of diplomatic involvement.

Considering the stinging experience of Somalia, it is not surprising to see the attention PDD-56 devotes to limiting military involvement. PDD-56 notes that "in many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S. Government response will incur the involvement of only nonmilitary assets," and that "U.S. forces should not be deployed in an operation indefinitely."⁶¹ These statements taken together seem appealing to both the civilian and military. The first statement demonstrates a clear plan-oriented goal, which appeals to the planning needs of the military. The second statement acknowledges the process aspects which are welcomed by the State Department.

While the policy may be relatively clear, the connotations of words such as "response" can be very different, e.g., they may be taken to mean operations by the military and negotiations by the State Department. Such a dual interpretation can lead to an unintended reliance upon the military during crisis when time is limited, because the military is often more likely to have contingency plans prepared for a variety of situations. However, the document appears to acknowledge

this tendency with its effort to “reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways.”⁶²

The document thus attempts to limit military involvement in complex contingency operations whenever possible; nevertheless, it likewise acknowledges the importance of integration and coordination during the planning processes of the conflict. Integration helps “identify appropriate missions and tasks, . . . develop strategies for early resolution of crises, . . . accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation, [and] integrate all components of a U.S. response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level.”⁶³ Toward the latter part of the document, usage of military terms such as “operations” and “mission” become more prevalent, almost to the point of losing the dual interpretation found at the beginning of the document. This creates an unclear and inconsistent meaning.

But the ambiguity of terms is once again corrected when the document addresses the role of functional management. PDD-56 establishes the role of Executive Committees (ExComms). An ExComm is formed from members of the Deputies Committee, but may include more organizations that are not typically included in the NSC structure. ExComm, in turn, acts as functional managers for specific elements of the U.S. Government response (e.g., refugees, demobilization, elections, economic assistance, police reform, public information, etc.).⁶⁴ While the document calls for this concept of functional management to be used in future operations, it is difficult to discern what method will be used in the delegation process. PDD-56 requires that

the Deputies Committee make these assignments, but does not discuss how these determinations are made. This adds an element of confusion to political-military (pol-mil) planning.

Pol-Mil Implementation Plan and Rehearsal.

PDD-56 calls for a pol-mil plan to be developed through an integrated process. The goal of the plan is “to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation.”⁶⁵ The plan is to first designate the functional roles of ExComm (through a process undefined), which will, in turn, develop specific parts or sections of the plan. The sections will then be analyzed and coordinated “among all relevant agencies” and then integrated into a final product.⁶⁶ Although there are many requirements of the pol-mil plan, the basic concept of delegation, then decentralized drafts followed by coordinated discussions, and finally decentralized execution enables each agency to focus on its functional role.

This method has benefits and shortcomings. The greatest potential benefit is that each agency, if delegated to perform agency-appropriate tasks, is able to develop its section of the plan in a language that reflects the social knowledge and culture of that specific agency. However, the shortcoming is that much of the detailed understanding runs the risk of being lost in debate and later reflected in unclear language. Conversely, the fruitfulness of the debate may be minimized due to a perception of rigid ownership of “areas of specialization.” If one agency has been delegated the task of forming the plan for a certain area, then the perception is that it must be the inviolate authority on that topic area.⁶⁷

After the plan is developed, PDD-56 calls for a plan rehearsal. The goal of the rehearsal period is “simultaneously rehearsal/reviewing [of] all elements of the plan.”⁶⁸ The ExComm is to present the various elements of the plan before the operation is launched or as soon as possible after its initiation, “before subsequent critical phase[s] during the operation, as major changes in the mission occur, prior to an operation’s termination.” Following the operation, there is to be an after-action review.⁶⁹ While this incremental review process is conceptually beneficial in theory, it becomes unrealistic during support and stability operations, which may occur with little or no prior notice.

Training.

Emphasis on training is a key strength of PDD-56. The document calls for yearly training (if not more frequently) of mid-level managers. During the training, the officials are given the opportunity to better understand the process of pol-mil plan development, plan implementation, and relevant past experiences.⁷⁰ Training properly includes forums for open discussion and reflection, and for clarification of the “intentions” regarding missions, tasks, coordination, delegation, responsibilities, and accountability. Also, there is provision for continuity and progression in training if at all possible. The goal of the training is to continually build a foundation of managers who are well-equipped and knowledgeable of the plan’s intentions. If different managers are trained each year, the project runs the risk of losing its key strengths of consistency and development. The process should ensure that trained leaders are continually “brought up to speed”

and retrained on the strategies and intentions of the ExComm, while also introducing new mid-level leaders to the training process. This process would help to ensure consistency of understanding which is absolutely critical in SASO.

Expected/Intended Outcomes of PDD-56.

As a comprehensive document, PDD-56 faced many challenges. The Clinton administration needed to institutionalize key policies that would take account of the challenges encountered in conflicts like Somalia. As a “first shot” at developing methods for assessing and responding to conflicts, the document was commendable. Ambiguous terms such as “response,” “mission,” and “operation” had value because they appealed to the different agencies by presenting phraseology conducive to the different social climates of the organizations; however, it also presented an ambiguous intention. Moreover, while the allocation of elements of the plan to different agencies allowed for specialization, it could also stifle debate. Overall, the key strengths of PDD-56 were also its greatest weaknesses; diversity allowed for broad appeal but diminished consistent understanding. In any event, PDD-56 was never truly implemented as written.⁷¹ Thus with a new administration came another attempt at remedying the communication challenges which still plagued the U.S. Government. The development of NSPD-44 was an attempt to modify PDD-56 through a new approach to the seemingly intractable problems posted by SASO.

NSPD-44: Transformation of Communication.

PDD-56 represented the U.S. Government's first attempt to manage and coordinate the efforts of various government agencies in support and stability operations through a policy directive. Admittedly, the world in which NSPD-44 was drafted (2005) was far different from the pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11), world in which PDD-56 (1997) came into being. The time difference perhaps reflects the key distinctions evident when comparing the two documents: NSPD-44 focused on security, while PDD-56 focused on managing conflict. Under NSPD-44, the U.S. Government not only had to address the challenges of support and stability operations, but also had to confront new threats to U.S. security. However, the scrapping of PDD-56 in favor of a new document may simply reflect the political reality that each new administration comes into office with a new broom to sweep clean the "mess" left by the previous regime. Nevertheless, NSPD-44 was a renewed attempt to streamline strategic communication and coordination between the agencies of the government. Unfortunately, it failed to remedy many of the rhetorical ambiguities that had plagued PDD-56.

PDD 56 versus NSPD 44: A Comparison.

NSPD-44 is very different from PDD-56 on many levels. The first difference is the later document's focus on security: "*The purpose of this Directive is to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from*

conflict or civil strife.”⁷² While the intention of PDD-56 was ultimately to enhance U.S. security, it did not expressly make such a declaration. The second key difference is NSPD-44’s focus on preemption. Whereas PDD-56 states that the document is expressly for “interagency planning of future complex contingency operations,”⁷³ NSPD-44 speaks of the need “to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.”⁷⁴ This difference expands the policy mandate of the interagency to include potentially any type of conflict.

A final key difference between the two documents is NSPD-44’s designation of the Secretary of State (with the option of assistance by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) as the “focal point” of these types of efforts.⁷⁵ While this appears on the surface to be a clear mandate, a moment’s analysis reveals that “focal point,” far from delineating responsibility for control, is actually a metaphor drawn from the physical science of optics, where it refers to the site at which lensed rays converge (or deviate). As we shall note below, such wording, and the elaboration on it, does not settle matters. Moreover, one can see that the policy guidance of the document creates a much broader mandate for action while at the same time blurring the lines of responsibility between the State and Defense Departments.

NSPD-44 calls for the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”⁷⁶ Again, while this may seem clear at

first, one must consider that the document addresses an extended collection of conflicts which may or may not include a heavy military component. This inevitably carries a potentially large responsibility for the military. The authors of the document appear to recognize that fact midway through, stating, "The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict."⁷⁷ Once this guidance comes into play, however, any centralized coordination by the Secretary of State as the "focal point" is compromised, and an ambiguous line of authority again prevails.

Allowing unclear lines of authority and communication are mistakes easily repeated, as seen in the case of Somalia. The U.S. military's relative success during Operation RESTORE HOPE prompted the UN to hastily expand the mandate of the operation while concurrently shifting the authority and centrality of the operation away from the military. This proved disastrous. The unclear designations of authority within NSPD-44 risk repeating this failure. While the document may rightly place authority for support and stability operations in the hands of civilians, it does so half-heartedly while simultaneously expanding the scope of operations which may fall under civilian authority. History has shown that simultaneous unclear transition of authority and expansion of mission produce ambiguity which in turn inhibits clear strategic communication and coordination.

Key Language.

The language used and the policies presented within NSPD-44 are very different than those presented in PDD-56. This is because PDD-56 focused on detailed

process, while NSPD-44 focuses on harmonization and preemptive planning. Despite the document's mandate for the Secretary of State to be the "focal point," which has already been discussed, the document also states that coordination between the civilian and military actors is "to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict."⁷⁸ Because NSPD-44 is a policy document meant to give direction to separate members of the interagency process, one must assume that members of these various organizations will not be poring over the document in the same room together at all times. Therefore, interpretation of the rhetoric is necessary to receive the message. For instance, if the document reads that the State Department is in charge, but must harmonize its efforts with planned or ongoing DoD operations, it is highly likely that someone at the State Department would take away a different message than someone at DoD. In this particular case, the word "harmonization" is in question. What does this really mean? Essentially, it depends upon who is reading it.

The nature of bureaucracies is to claim authority over whatever occurs within its jurisdiction or turf. When reading NSPD-44, it is highly likely that an official in DoD may understand the reference to "harmonization" as an indication that the State Department must reconcile its plans with what the military already has planned. In other words, while the State Department may be the "focal point," it will always be placed in a position where it must adapt its plans to mesh with the existing military plans, such as in the conventional phases in the war in Iraq. In such a case where there is substantial if not preponderant military involvement, it could be concluded that the State Department must always defer to the military

because it is the military's job to have operational and contingency plans in place for virtually all parts of the world and every situation. Conversely, a State Department official reading NSPD-44 may read the word "harmonize" to mean that DoD must tailor its plans to accord with the diplomatic design of the Secretary of State. One can see how a dual interpretation of a single term can produce entirely different interpretations of the same passage.

The drafters of NSPD-44 may well have envisioned the problems that the language could create. Such a realization may have sparked the designation of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). Whereas PDD-56's ExComm members were to be explicitly tasked with individual responsibilities, NSPD-44 designates only the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization as the chair of the PCC. Beyond that, no clear divisions of labor are established.

Some may argue that all it takes is a clear understanding among senior officials to remedy the problem of multiple interpretations. That may, in fact, be the intended function of the PCC. However, NSPD-44 does not make that clear. It may be the point of this document to provide a concrete written policy directive to be used throughout the interagency as supplemented by verbal understandings at the highest levels. However, in large bureaucracies such as those within the U.S. Government, a senior cabinet or agency leader cannot ensure that the entire organization has the same understanding of a document as that of the person at the top. Therefore, reliance upon the written word is an integral part of successful operations. And, as has been shown, the written word of these documents thus far has often been insufficient to produce uniform interpretation among the agencies.

Expected/Intended Outcomes of NSPD-44.

When drafting NSPD-44, the Bush administration was already deep into the Iraq War and had gained a better understanding of the complex nature that this “new” type of conflict presented. However, the perception that the conflict was “new” may have hindered the intended outcome of the policy document. In an effort to acknowledge the need for civilian support, the military being unable to meet all the challenges that the conflict posed, the authors of NSPD-44 attempted to provide a “bridge” for transition. They intended to place authority in the hands of the civilians to begin the process of a civilian takeover of aspects of the conflict. However, the document was not able to start that process because it did not clarify how the ongoing action would be coordinated. Since NSPD-44 failed to designate a way to establish the transition of authority to the civilian agencies, it is now caught in a holding pattern in which the military must retain increased authority in SASO due to the “hot” wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Perhaps NSPD-44 will find more success in future support and stability operations. If the directive is implemented from the beginning of the conflict with the State Department as the “focal point,” there may be a greater likelihood that the processes are interpreted in the intended manner. However, if a conflict is ongoing, the directive has little chance of success owing to unclear rhetoric and perceived contradictions.

A final interpretive difference that may influence the future impact of the document is how the State Department and DoD interpret language dealing with preemption. Civil contingency planning and

military contingency planning are very different in nature. As has been previously discussed in Gabriel Marcella's cultural comparison, the State Department prefers flexibility and open options while DoD dislikes ambiguity and uncertain end states. Therefore, the contingency plans that the two organizations develop are going to be very different in nature. If a developing conflict becomes a crisis with a suddenness that catches officials by surprise, as is typically the case, it will be natural for the U.S. Government to defer to military plans owing to the likelihood that they will be more complete, thought-out, and, above all, resourced. No other federal agency has the military's capacity and supporting culture for planning in terms of organization, people, resources, education, training, and experience. One thing that the military and policymakers have in common is their constant quest for certainty. It is reasonable to expect that for the immediate future military contingency planning will offer a higher degree of certainty than will the Department of State.

NSPD-44 and DODD 3000.05.

Only a few days before NSPD-44 was formalized, DoD issued Directive 3000.05. While the present analysis in no way posits that the DoD document was intended to override or contradict NSPD-44, it does appear to have its own problematic interpretive aspects. The present analysis will examine the possibility that DoDD 3000.05 may have formalized its interpretation of NSPD-44 in an effort to preempt future interpretational difficulties with the interagency.

DoDD 3000.05 begins by establishing some key definitions. Stability operations are "military and

civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.” Military support in this context is defined as “Department of Defense activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction, and transition (SSTR) operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.” A key declaration in the document is that stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities.” Another is that “many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”⁷⁹

While the major part of the document deals with the responsibilities of the various DoD Under Secretaries, the document does stipulate that “assistance and advice shall be provided to and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, as appropriate, for developing stability operations capabilities.”⁸⁰ Interestingly, despite the fact that DoDD 3000.05 and NSPD-44 were released at practically the same time, they address the issue of coordination from seemingly contradictory standpoints. While this does not appear to be an overt attempt to be deviant or contrary, it does reveal an unclear understanding of the policy presented in NSPD-44 by creating rhetoric that happens to match the natural inclinations of DoD itself. When interagency-wide directives fail to provide clear language to dictate the policies and communication patterns which should be institutionalized within each organization, what are the individual agencies to do? The answer is that they conjure individual

“clarifications” intended to be objectively accurate but which are inevitably colored by their own subconscious solipsism.

Summing Up.

The value of the written word is indisputable. It serves as the medium in which to ensure consistency of thought and concrete visual representation of a government’s policy decisions. However, consistency of thought often does not translate into consistency of interpretation. The United States Government consists of scores of organizations and departments possessing uniquely different missions and cultures. This makes the efforts of the interagency process comprehensive and richly heterogeneous, while at the same time creating potential impediments which, if unacknowledged, can degrade effectiveness.

The past 60 years have demonstrated that the United States, as a world superpower, is in a unique position. Instability within foreign nations, weak leaders, and cultural conflicts have generated a need for a new type of combat, one with a dynamic nature demanding expertise from the full range of U.S. agencies. The culture of the military alone or the culture of the State Department alone is not sufficient to provide a pathway to success. Somalia demonstrated the delicate balance needed between military might and civil humanitarian efforts. The failures of Somalia also dramatized the need for clear strategic communication and coordination. Without a clear understanding of who will do what and who is in charge of what, the agencies are left responding to dynamic crises on their own, rather than joining in a truly unified and integrated team effort.

As discussed, to develop a plan for executing support and stability operations, the Clinton administration issued PDD-56. The exhaustive nature of the plan provided the kind of detail that the military craves. It also acknowledged the need for the civilian agencies to step up and take over in many areas that had previously been occupied by the military. However, the directive also used rhetoric that proved to be ambiguous and unclear, which may account for the plan's incomplete implementation despite several SASO operations in countries such as Kosovo.

In the wake of 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and a realization that the current interagency processes were not achieving the U.S. Government's strategic objectives, the Bush administration also attempted to put interagency communication and coordination on a sounder footing, with NSPD-44. However, because the Iraqi and Afghanistan conflicts were already in progress, the language of the document proved to be unclear and at times almost self-contradictory. Agencies were left to their own interpretation, suggesting that DoDD 3000.05 may have been a partial attempt to institutionalize national policy in a coherent manner though appealing mainly to the military culture.

Clearly, inadequate rhetoric is a problem in interagency efforts. Theories of communication and of interagency dynamics indicate that the struggle to keep debate fresh and alive, and the ability to clearly communicate intention, are not easy feats. However, if the U.S. Government is to be more effective in support and stability operations, it must take advantage of all of the strengths the interagency has to offer. To do so, it must present a united front. And, in order to present a united front, it must operate from a common understanding of policy.

A Way Forward.

Under current directives, coordination and communication patterns will probably not improve. The present analysis, however, has laid the basis for recommendations concerning development of future directives that coordinate the interagency process for support and stability operations effectively, and for development of phraseology to assure that rhetoric is interpreted as intended. This analysis will also offer a way forward, that is, suggestions for understanding and resolving problems that continue to arise in implementing policy under the current NSPD-44.

The interagency must develop an awareness of the varying organizational cultures that each agency brings to the table. These cultures affect interpretation. The term interagency in and of itself carries an implication of the necessity for understanding multiple principals and agents. Just as it is important for the United States to understand the culture of the other nation when communicating or negotiating, it is important for the various U.S. agencies to understand the differing cultures each brings to the interagency process. Understanding differing communications patterns is critical to arriving at a truly comprehensive approach and should not be unthinkingly devalued or overlooked in the rush to issue guidance, even in crisis situations.

When agencies seek to coordinate the rhetoric of a document in a manner appealing to all, the interagency must question how each stakeholder is interpreting the rhetoric. Again, the use of the term "response" can be interpreted very differently among, for example, the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and DoD. Therefore, merely

selecting words which appeal to all is not sufficient, because words can have different denotations and certainly different connotations.

The interagency must assure that all relevant stakeholders understand the implementation patterns of the various agencies. If the interagency process determines that a certain strategy demands that Objective X be attained, leaders must realize that the manner in which the various organizations will go about attaining that objective are very different. For example, if the objective is securing a particular village in Iraq, the agency leaders must realize that their approaches are inevitably going to vary, given their differing organizational cultures. While it may seem obvious to say that the objective of "security" may be achieved in a different manner by the military than by USAID or State, the issue is much more complicated than that. Timelines and the willingness to accept flexibility and satisfactory end states are likely to be very different. There must be an understanding of these interpretational issues prior to embarking on a joint effort or there will inevitably be confusion, frustration, and less effective results.

Officials of the various agencies must take the time to establish a common understanding of strategy and objectives at the highest levels. If the officials in Washington are able to create a climate of common interpretation, then they will be more likely to disseminate consistent interpretations to their respective organizations, thus creating a climate of enhanced coordination both operationally and tactically.

Since it is highly likely that the United States will continue to be involved in support and stability operations, the agencies must develop a policy for co-

ordination and communication that clearly establishes a commonly interpreted process for carrying out policy and strategy. A new directive should be formulated that approaches support and stability operations from two perspectives: one that addresses specifically how to proceed in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and one that addresses more generally how SASO should be approached in the future.

NSPD-44 has demonstrated the challenges that arise when a directive is drafted in the middle of a conflict. It is difficult to make the shift of authority when a new organization is put in authority while the old one is in the midst of completing the very operations that will inevitably be affected by such a shift. It is equally important for the civilian agencies to have a role in this type of conflict. Therefore, any new directive must acknowledge these necessities and problems by catering to the needs of each agency while improving the process overall.

Any new directive outlining the policies for coordination and communication in the interagency must address necessary rhetorical and policy-development structural changes. It must include clearer rhetoric. By implementing the theoretical concepts of complexity theory, a new document should embrace the idea that, to a certain extent, different interpretations are natural and can be a good thing (so long as they are resolved) and that change is inevitable. A new policy directive must have built into it provision for adaptation. As complexity theory acknowledges, change is inevitable and should be included as a characteristic of the situation at hand rather than an interruption. Also, change can occur at any level, making it necessary for clear yet dynamic lines of communication to be in place for both top-down and bottom-up communication.

This realization will fundamentally change the rhetoric used in a new directive.

Paradoxically, a new directive must be able to embody a line of communication that is consistent and flexible. For example, while the role of civilian agencies is critical in support and stability operations, something may change in Iraq all of a sudden at the tactical level demanding that the military re-take temporary control over the execution of a "civilian" operation. If change is feared, the result will be chaos. However, if provision for change is built into the directive, then it will be clearer as to when the military should be in authority and when it should relinquish command back to the civilians. A 2005 Government Accountability Office report states, "Collaborating agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be led."⁸¹ While it may be desirable for interagency documents to be short and succinct, clarity and thoroughness must not be sacrificed in the name of brevity. More clearly established lines of authority and coordination will require that terms such as "response" and "harmonization" be more thoroughly fleshed out rather than assuming that in times of crisis a common understanding will miraculously emerge.

In a perfect world, the bureaucracy of the U.S. Government would allow for a situation in which every officer of each department would be able to meet personally with the Secretary or head official of that organization to discuss the goals, objectives, and intent of an operation. Of course, that is not possible in the world we have. Therefore, the agencies must rely upon the written word to convey these messages. But how are the many organizations as outlined in NSPD-1⁸² to develop a common rhetoric which appeals to the

organizational culture of their various agencies? While it may be possible for the leaders of these organizations to come to a common understanding while meeting together face to face, it may very well be impossible to find language that will mean the same thing to an Army general as it does to an Ambassador.

The structure of policy development for SASOs should be changed. The rhetorical purposes of documents must come to be shaped "by contingencies specific to the organization in question."⁸³ Moreover, technical writers within agencies must remain "conscious of and accommodate the idiosyncratic constraints imposed by their organizations in the production of technical documents, as well as the expected constraints of subject matter."⁸⁴ The leaders of the interagency organizations gather together to discuss policy issues precisely because they each bring a different expertise to the discussion. It is vital that this expertise and organizational cultural understanding not be dissipated as the various agencies try to "harmonize" and "coordinate" the rhetoric to be used in policy.

Of course, harmonization and coordination are indeed essential, and debate to achieve them should not be neglected. However, the entire purpose of these activities in Washington is to set the stage for coordination in the field where strategy is put to work. In an effort to make coordination "seamless," the upper levels of the interagency must not "harmonize" the language of these policy documents to such an extent that they no longer hold interpretive value for the individual organizations.

The U.S. Government should return to a system in which the organizational climate and expertise of the various agencies are validated and articulated. By focusing on what each organization brings to

the effort at the highest levels, the agencies have a better chance of seeing true coordination in the field. Organizational climate can be enhanced and utilized to the fullest by allowing each organization to draft a version of the policy directive using language which will be commonly interpreted by the people of that organization. This does not mean that each organization drafts its own policy and operates without the knowledge and coordination of the others. Rather, it takes advantage of the expertise of the agency heads and their understanding of their organization's culture and uses that knowledge to draft phraseology which will be understood clearly and consistently.

The agencies must take advantage of committees such as the PCC and ExComm, so that they all sing from the same sheet of music. For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates should be able to sit in the same room, speak, debate, and reach an understanding of the policy objectives for the interagency. In turn, they can then draft a specialized directive which uses language conveying that message to their organizations without diluting coordination at the highest levels. Conversely, if they come to a verbal understanding and try to compromise on language and draft a document in the hope that it will be commonly interpreted, their chances of maintaining that high level of understanding sharply decline.

The U.S. Government should rely upon the creativity of its leaders, allowing them to exercise their cultural knowledge and experience. Written instructions and policies are critical, but must be drafted in a way that allows for proper interpretation and implementation. This may not be possible when tens of authors are present, all trying to agree upon a single word that will

mean the same thing to all of their organizations. By relying upon differing organizational expertise at the highest levels in Washington, the agencies' hopes for successful communication and coordination (from top-to-bottom and bottom-to-top) will actually increase in the field.

In brief summary, the recommendations of this analysis are broken down into those that should be implemented under NSPD-44 and those that should be considered when a new interagency coordination directive is drafted. Under NSPD-44:

- The agencies must develop an awareness of the varying organizational cultures which each agency brings to the table and how each culture affects interpretation.
- The agencies must develop an understanding of how organizational culture affects implementation patterns by the various agencies.

Considerations for the future:

- A new directive for interagency coordination in support and stability operations must include clearer rhetoric.
- Clear rhetoric is established by relying upon organizational expertise at the highest levels. Each agency should develop an implementing directive containing rhetoric commonly interpreted by that specific agency rather than one common document containing vague and ambiguous language.

Conclusion.

Support and stability operations do not appear to be a transient phenomenon. This type of conflict will likely plague the United States for many years to come. Past conflicts, such as Somalia, have demonstrated the need for interagency coordination and for U.S. and international military and civilian agencies to be involved in the effort. Additionally, conflicts such as Somalia have demonstrated how difficult it is to communicate clearly and coordinate effectively among high-level organizations in Washington and New York and implementers in the field. Theories such as complexity theory by Philip Salem and the governmental interaction theories that Vicki Rast addresses, allow us to look at these types of conflicts in an objective manner by separating ourselves from the discussions of whether a certain strategy is good or bad. These theories also allow us to understand the obstacles to cooperation that are inherent in organizations, in light of the differing cultures, missions, and preferences. Disagreements are unavoidable and can actually benefit the interagency process since it is absolutely critical that the U.S. Government have a variety of strong inputs to rely upon when resolving the demands of complex civil-military operations.

Given the challenges that Somalia and other conflicts have posed, the past two administrations have issued directives that institutionalize a process by which interagency coordination and communication are conducted. However, the rhetoric of these documents has proven to be inadequate or contradictory. Unclear language has allowed for multiple interpretations and failed to acknowledge that the interagency is composed of very different elements, each with its own organizational culture.

For U.S. Government policies and strategies in support and stability operations to be successful in the future, the processes that underpin interagency interactions must be improved. Drawing upon the expertise of the organizations and treating their differences as strengths rather than weaknesses will create a climate more conducive to the drafting of policy that meets the immediate needs of the situation. Interpretation determines whether rhetoric is clear or not. The National Command Authorities, by ensuring that directives are interpreted as intended, correctly and from the beginning, provide a far better chance for the interagency to implement national strategy successfully. Clarity must begin at the top.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, 2006, Section 2-1 and 2-2, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.

2. Senior U.S. official, Bush School Interagency Symposium Discussion, April 5, 2007.

3. Robert Klitgaard and Gregory F. Treverton, "Assessing Partnerships: New Forms of Collaboration," in John M. Kamensky and Thomas J. Burlin, eds., *Collaboration: Using Networks and Partnerships*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, p. 22.

4. Thom Shanker and David S. Cloud, "Military Wants More Civilians to Help in Iraq," *New York Times*, February 7, 2007.

5. Philip Salem, "Assessment, Change, and Complexity," *Management Communication Quarterly*, Vol. 15, 2002, p. 448.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 443-444.

7. See Donald M. Bradshaw, "Creating a Change-Receptive Organizational Culture," in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., *Building*

and Maintaining Healthy Organizations: The Key to Future Success, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, January 2001, pp. 41-68.

8. Salem, pp. 443-444.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 444.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 445.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 446.

12. Mary G. LaRoche and Sheryl S. Pearson, "Rhetoric and Rational Enterprises," *Written Communication*, Vol. 2, 1985, pp. 265-266.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Teresa M. Harrison, "Frameworks for the Study of Writing in Organizational Contexts," *Written Communication*, Vol. 4, 1987, p. 9.

15. National Defense University, *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook*, 2003, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/interagency_mgt_crisis_ops_2003.pdf, accessed April 18, 2007.

16. Although the interagency comprises many different agencies and organizations, this analysis will typically use the State Department and DoD as examples which embody the key debates and differences present within the interagency. It is not the intention of this analysis to suggest that other members of the interagency do not bring their own cultures and strengths to the table. Rather, it was necessary, for the purpose of brevity, to select two or sometimes three agencies to use as examples.

17. Major Vicki J. Rast, *Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia*, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004, p. 178.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

19. "Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies," Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2005, p. 11, www.gao.gov/new.items/d0615.pdf.

20. Rast, p. 179.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Gabriel Marcella, "National Security and the Interagency Process," in J. Boone Bartholomes, ed., *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, p. 251, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/front.pdf, accessed March 31, 2007.

23. Adapted from Gabriel Marcella, *ibid.*

24. James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, et al., *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 2006, www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_Group_report.pdf, accessed April 15, 2007.

25. Rast, p. 180. For example, Major Rask uses the analogy of a bottle when describing how information is often shared at interagency meetings. She states that when agencies gather they often bring the debates and discussions of their respective organizations with them but leave them capped as if they were in the bottle. The representative is present and has brought the information, but it is not shared.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

27. *Ibid.*

28. James Dobbins et al., *America's Role In Nation-Building: From Iraq to Germany*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003, p. 55.

29. *Ibid.*

30. "Organization of Military Government in US Zone in Germany," March 7, 1946, Document number 313856, Property of the William Clinton Library in Little Rock, Arkansas.

31. "Note By AC of S, G-5 Division SHAEF," August 29, 1945, Document number 316943, Property of the William Clinton Library in Little Rock, Arkansas.

32. Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, "Nazi Victimization and the American Response," undated, Property of the William Clinton Library in Little Rock, Arkansas.

33. Since the focus of this chapter is the civil-military communication processes of the U.S. Government, analysis will focus on U.S. involvement, communication, and strategy and will address the international community only when necessary for clarification or explanation.

34. Dobbins, p. 55.

35. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, CCRP Publications Series, 1995, p. 8.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

42. Dobbins, p. 59.

43. Allard, p. 15.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Dobbins, p. 59.
46. Allard, p. 15.
47. Lawrence A. Yates, "The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005," Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper No. 15, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, p. 28.
48. Allard, pp. 16-17.
49. Retired Senior DoD Official, Bush School Interagency Symposium Discussion, April 5, 2007.
50. Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other than War: Implications for the US Army*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997, p. 10.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Allard, p. 13.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
54. Taw, p. 10.
55. Retired Senior DoD Official, Bush School Interagency Symposium, April 5, 2007.
56. *Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2003, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/interagency_mgt_crisis_ops_2003.pdf, accessed April 18, 2007.
57. For the purpose of this analysis, interagency coordination will be defined as "the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective." FM 3-24, 2006, Section 2-10, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf.

58. The White House, *PDD/NSC 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, 1997, clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc2.html, accessed March 31, 2007.

59. William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. Kline, "Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 2000, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1824.pdf, accessed March 31, 2007.

60. *PDD/NSC 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, 1997.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*

67. Rast alludes to this problem in stating, "There's very little discussion among people—they come to the table with a set of views that are 'deployed' but not discussed." She also discusses the protective attitude for certain areas which can develop among agencies. Rast, pp. 180-181.

68. *PDD/NSC 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, 1997.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*

71. Retired Senior DoD Official, Bush School Interagency Symposium, April 5, 2007.

72. The White House, *National Security Presidential Directive/*

NSPD-44, 2005, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html, accessed April 15, 2007.

73. PDD/NSC 56: *Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, 1997.

74. *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, 2005.

75. *Ibid.*

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.*

79. DoD Directive Number 3000.05, 2005, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corresp/pdf/300005p.pdf, accessed April 15, 2007. While the document itself is classified, one can request access by contacting the Director, Executive Services, and referring to document control number OSD 75774-04.

80. *Ibid.*

81. "Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies," Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, October 2005, p. 17, www.gao.gov/new.items/d0615.pdf.

82. *National Security Presidential Directive 1*, Washington, DC: The White House, 2001, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm, accessed April 15, 2007.

83. Teresa M. Harrison, "Frameworks for the Study of Writing in Organizational Contexts," *Written Communication*, Vol. 4, 1987, p. 4.

84. *Ibid.*

PART IV:

**LEADERSHIP, EDUCATION, TRAINING,
AND DEVELOPMENT FOR INTERAGENCY
OPERATIONS**

CHAPTER 12

BRIDGING THE GAP: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN-MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

Robert H. Dorff

Introduction.

We begin with some simple observations and assumptions. First, in complex interagency operations such as contemporary Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSRT) operations, the quality of the people involved and their ability to lead will make the difference between success and failure. The leadership skills required will come most often from indirect rather than direct skills. The ability to build understanding and support will grow out of clear expression, logic, and persuasion; rarely will the ability to command be possible or desirable. Second, in contemplating SSRT operations, we must be able to identify the capabilities we need in any specific situation and then identify where those capabilities in fact reside (not where they *should* reside). That means we must understand the full range of requirements for constructing an appropriate response, from the immediate short-term efforts involved in crisis intervention to the most long-term requirements of building security and stability. Third, we must have both the organizational framework and the leadership to coordinate and focus those capabilities in a strategic way to accomplish strategic objectives. Since those capabilities should and will reside in a diverse combination of agencies, organizations, and

even countries, we must develop leaders who can work effectively in a joint civilian-military, and multinational realm. Yet these are hardly simple and easy-to-meet requirements. Later in this chapter we will return to this issue of how we go about developing the kinds of leaders likely to be needed in the future. We turn now to a discussion of the nature of the problem and our recent experiences.

Background.

Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the strategic environment was transforming, coming to confront the United States specifically and the West generally with a set of security challenges different from those we had faced during the Cold War. The National Security Act of 1947, itself a product of a then-newly emerging strategic environment, had provided an architectural framework that generally proved successful in helping us steer through the postwar period. But as the Cold War ended, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new challenges from failing states, international organized crime, and terrorism, as well as several natural and humanitarian disasters, generated a growing need for kinds of responses different than those traditionally employed under the existing architecture and strategic framework. Incident to what were initially called “peace operations,” a relatively new range of capabilities (means and the ways to use them) came into the security lexicon. Today, under the rubric SSTTR, these capabilities are becoming as much a part of the core competencies required in security and defense policy as the TRIAD and mutual assured destruction (MAD) were under the strategy of containment. What are the implications?

One of the first implications was that policy guidance had to be developed for the new types of operations and the capabilities that would be needed. In late 2005 two documents were issued that now comprise the essential policy guidance for SSTR operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," issued on November 28, 2005, and National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," issued on December 7, 2005, provide the official policy guidance for the military role in SSTR and the interagency efforts to coordinate across all elements of national power. Consequently, the guidance and concepts contained in these two documents must be understood and applied.

In addition to these foundational documents, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), through its Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and in collaboration with the Department of State (DoS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), published "U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation," a conceptual document laying out a draft interagency planning process for SSTR operations. Further, according to reports that began appearing in 2006, DoD and State Department officials were supposedly seeking funds for a new entity ("Center for Complex Operations") charged with synchronizing military and civilian efforts to rebuild troubled states and fight unconventional wars. As if all this weren't enough, nearly 3 years into the war in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) recommended that S/CRS be designated as the "primary point of authority

within the U.S. government”; that DoD “develop complementary plans and programs pursuant to DoDD 3000.05 [coordinating] military responses with S/CRS”; and that such plans and programs “integrate S/CRS personnel and initiatives into exercises.”¹

This last point drawn from the SIGIR “lessons learned” in Iraq is especially important for the subject addressed in this anthology, namely, the implications of these kinds of operations for the interagency process. Obviously, it is important to work on better organization and coordination within the U.S. interagency process at the national level. This chapter argues, however, that the more critical need is to get beyond the facile notion that interagency integration per se should be the predominant focus. Rather, we must recognize that it is real-world, on-the-ground integration of capabilities that must occur. To address such ongoing 21st-century security challenges, we need jointly (meaning civilian and military) developed concepts, doctrine, training, and execution. We also need organizations that can work in this stabilization space specifically as agents to help “bridge the gap” between the capabilities that can and should reside primarily within military organizations, and those that can and should reside primarily within civilian organizations (civilian agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the like). To date, especially in the United States but in other countries as well, the military has taken on more of the responsibilities and generated the capabilities to provide what is needed on the ground.²

While it is a good thing that the military has been willing and able to step up, the broader point here is that such ad hoc approaches to developing capabilities and applying them represent a fundamental flaw in overall

security strategy, a flaw that must be addressed by both organizational reform and a more complete resourcing of the comprehensive strategy that is required. As the military has moved out front in responding to the needs generated by these new kinds of security challenges, civilian actors have, in fact, fallen behind. And it is this growing divergence that generates the title of this chapter, "Bridging the Gap."

Recent Experience.

Much has been learned since the initial phases of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), but nowhere has that learning been more rich and robust than in the area of SSTR operations. That learning has also been very painful, in no small part because we have largely had to make it up as we went. In the period immediately following the early phases, it became apparent that no effective process existed for dealing with SSTR in fragile states and postconflict or postdisaster environments such as Iraq. This was due at least in part to the fact that while the documents identified above provide policy guidance at the national level, a gap has emerged between such strategic-level guidance and operations in the field. Deciding who should be participating in Washington, DC, interagency meetings is important, but the real challenges always occur on the ground. Although there has been a significant overall improvement in our understanding of the need for jointly coordinated and executed civilian-military SSTR operations, much of what we do in this area continues to be ad hoc, improvising as we go.

The dangers inherent in such an approach can be illustrated in one example drawn from the early stages of the Iraq conflict and reconstruction efforts.³ Faced

with the reality of a large number of then unemployed Iraqis and mounting piles of trash in neighborhoods, coalition forces hired Iraqi civilians to pick up and remove the trash. On the surface this seemed like a good thing to do for all the obvious reasons (the trash needed to be picked up, and it put the civilians to work, which also allowed them to earn some money). But the lack of experience with and knowledge of such operations by the military, coupled with the absence of effective coordination with civilian agencies and personnel who had that experience and knowledge, led to what could have been an avoidable set of mistakes. First, little thought was given to what the pay scale should be, and whether there were any local “providers” who could help organize the effort. Second, no systematic assessment of the local power structures and informal leadership networks was conducted. Third, the coalition forces became as a consequence the de facto “local power.” While this may not at first appear problematic, it is a prime illustration of what happens when the military and civilian components of SSTR operations are not effectively coordinated. Had the funds been distributed through the networks previously identified as having the past record and future potential to serve as effective, stable, local power bases (political, economic, and informational), the distribution of funds to complete the trash removal could have been linked to legitimizing these local leaders and capabilities in the eyes of the local citizens. Moreover, those local leaders would have known, and in collaboration with U.S. civilian advisors could have established, pay scales that reflected realities on the ground. Overpayment undermined local market forces, and the haste to “put Iraqis back to work” led to an important opportunity being lost (or at least

delayed) to rebuild indigenous capacity. The point is that, from an overall strategic perspective, inadequate attention was paid to how the need to remove the trash presented opportunities to use military funds available to align the goals of (1) building local political capacity; (2) producing an immediate and longer-term positive economic effect; (3) contributing to security goals by addressing the “idle hands” problem of unemployed locals; (4) sending a strong positive public relations signal that could promote good will; and (5) building local network infrastructure (not to mention just cleaning up the neighborhoods).⁴

This example is not intended to place blame on the military forces and their commanders. Rather, it is intended to point out that good intentions are not enough. Knowledge and experience across the entire range of means and ways to employ them are fundamental to achieving stated ends or objectives. We can also find many examples of civilian actions making the work of the military much more difficult and dangerous than it needed to be. The bottom line is that we have to figure out how to integrate and coordinate civilian and military capabilities, not just at the interagency level in Washington, but even more importantly on the ground at the local level where it matters most—and where it can have the greatest impact.

The 21st Century Strategic Environment.

I have argued elsewhere that the strategic imperative for the 21st century is the “good governance deficit.”⁵ In my view, the most likely, though not exclusive, source of threats and challenges to our security will emanate from those states and regions in which the

absence or weakness of legitimate governance prevails. The behavior of those states and the individuals and groups who nominally govern them, especially those nonstate actors who can exploit the weakness or near absence of effective governance, are where we will find the ongoing security challenges of this next strategic moment. And in the tasks related to promoting effective legitimate governance, we will also find the opportunities for shaping the future strategic environment. Unfortunately, when viewed from this perspective, the serious problems of the moment do not go away even with the establishment of relative security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, the near future is likely to hold more of the same kinds of “small uncomfortable wars” that many tend to see as aberrations. In my view, they are the new norm.

The most important implication of this view and its relationship to SSTR is the need to recognize our true long-term and over-arching strategic objective, i.e., “promoting good governance.”⁶

Unless we wish to continue to play in perpetuity an inevitably losing game of “whack-a-mole,” we must figure out how to address the broadest problems that generate threats to our security such as terrorism, organized criminal activity, and insurgencies. Addressing these threats effectively will no doubt continue to require the United States to maintain a robust military capability. But because the underlying sources of these threats are not purely military in nature, our responses must engage the full spectrum of elements of power in a coordinated, strategic application of resources. We must also be able to exploit opportunities to shape the strategic environment and address underlying issues before they become threats and challenges. At a minimum, these mandates

necessitate figuring out how to identify the right kinds of needed capabilities; discovering where they reside or where they should reside in the event we must generate them; developing those capabilities to the levels required; organizing those capabilities in a coherent and cohesive way; and applying them in the field effectively and efficiently. If that is what we need to do strategically, what are the potential challenges and impediments to strategic success? Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, there are many. But for the purposes of this chapter, I will in the pages that follow concentrate on the three broad problem areas that pose the greatest challenges.

Challenge No. 1: Analyzing the Causes of Threats and the Capabilities Needed to Address Them.

First, we have yet to cast a broad enough net when it comes to searching out the underlying causes of the threats we face and hence the types of capabilities we need to address them. We know we need to fight and kill terrorists that intend to do us harm. But how do we perform the intermediate tasks such as reducing the number of terrorists and limiting their freedom of operation? In short, if we can systematically increase the scope and reach of effective and legitimate governance in the target state, we will accomplish both of these intermediate tasks—we will reduce the number of terrorists, and we will also empower more effective antiterrorism mechanisms (e.g., people who do not want terrorists operating next door to them). This means we must find ways to engage all strategic actors, not just the military, in the overall effort. And it means mustering the will to resource those actors and the capabilities they possess. For example, we can

talk all we like about having a “civilian reserve corps” that can deploy in this SSTR world, but it will remain only talk until the country decides to put the resources into the effort to identify, recruit, train, and maintain this corps, which won’t be easy. At the moment, there is little indication that the will exists to pay the tab. Similarly, we need to think about the numbers of people and the new kinds of skills that are needed in the State Department, USAID, the intelligence community, and so on. Internationally, the United States must come to grips with the stark realities that we need allies across the globe to engage with us, and that this will be a herculean challenge to our powers of persuasion, given the current conditions and prevailing international sentiment toward the United States.

Challenge No. 2: Repairing our Organizational Deficiencies.

The second challenge we face is restoring organizational coherency. At one level, perhaps the easiest one to deal with, we must find new ways to organize the capabilities we have and how they are employed. For example, we need to figure out how to effectively mesh the military and nonmilitary components, especially when it comes to operating in nonpermissive or even permissive but still very dangerous environments. This may require developing concepts and doctrine for integrated and coordinated military-civilian operations; ideally, such integration and coordination would occur through the detailed and thorough training and exercising together of both civilian and military personnel once the concepts and doctrine are developed. In fact, some of that is occurring today with the Provincial Reconstruction

Teams.⁷ However, because of constraints in manpower and time, it is unlikely that the U.S. Government will achieve either the “civilian reserve corps” that the SIGIR recommends or the additional military personnel at anywhere near the needed levels to support lengthy, in-depth, joint training deployments. Clearly, the next best thing is to develop the concepts, prepare the doctrine, and then train jointly in conformance with that doctrine in the next best way – exercises that occur prior to and concurrently with deployment to an area of responsibility (AOR), and which can be conducted through web-based or other distributed learning techniques. This would allow both the civilian and the military participants to learn more about each other and how they think and operate, and about the critical interactive effects and necessary integration and coordination required for achieving strategic success.

Also needed is a new kind of civilian organization, most likely and necessarily drawn from the NGO community: the “gap bridging” NGO. The “gap bridging” NGO is one with the personnel possessing the knowledge, expertise, and willingness to work closely with the military, government, and other civilian participants in these complex operations. Moreover, it means working in the two “spaces” that typically define the SSTR environment: the “battlefield space” and the “humanitarian space.”⁸ The battlefield space is generally the domain of the military, for obvious reasons. But in these modern 21st-century conflicts, even that space has become more complex, and the role there for nonmilitary expertise and actors has also grown. Similarly, the traditional conception of the humanitarian space has had nonmilitary actors playing the dominant role. But here, too, complex SSTR operations have brought a blurring of the former

sharp line and hence of the distinction between roles/missions for civilian and military actors. But certain distinctions remain—in organizational culture, in how the different actors perceive the problems and the potential solutions, and in how they work. For example, some humanitarian actors would sacrifice their own security and effectiveness were they perceived by the local people to be working too closely with the military, so they must retain their sharply delineated identity. As for the military, it continues to train primarily, though no longer exclusively, for operations involving the threat or use of force, generally lethal in nature, in nonpermissive environments. Although the military has taken on a much broader set of responsibilities and adapted to many of them quite well, it is questionable at best whether this is a desirable and sustainable approach to dealing with these new hybrid realities on the ground. It seems more appropriate to identify and develop the skills in a specialized NGO whose personnel are comfortable working in both spaces, dealing with the dominant actors in each, and helping to bring about cooperation, coordination, and ultimately integration of efforts across them. Military personnel will need to continue to broaden their skill sets and leadership abilities, but so too will civilian personnel, perhaps even more so than their military counterparts. For it is in the area where the two spaces overlap that the most critical determinants of strategic success or failure in SSTR, will reside.

A final point on the organizational front: the most challenging of all requirements is the very likely need for a completely revamped national security architectural framework. Time and space do not allow for elaboration here, but the time has almost certainly come for a radical review of the way our defense establishment

broadly construed is organized to conduct national security in the 21st century. The current architecture, originated with the National Security Act of 1947 as a response to the then-emerging Cold War strategic environment, and now reflecting 18 years of post-Cold War improvisations and ad hoc adaptations, is simply not responsive to the fundamentally changed strategic environment prevailing today.⁹

Some contend that the Goldwater-Nichols reforms and the creation of a Department of Homeland Security represent the successful adaptation of organizational structure to a changing strategic environment. In reality, however, we have adopted the procrustean expedient of contorting 21st-century security threats, challenges, and opportunities to make them fit into 20th-century organizational boxes. Thus, here in year 2007 we still haven't identified the capabilities we need, determined where they do or should reside, and organized them in our strategic thought and in our operational modus operandi to address the new strategic situation. How then can we ever expect to succeed while clinging to the same obsolete organization (and structural bias) that produced our present analytical and conceptual deficiencies in the first place? An objectively executed top-to-bottom and zero-based organizational review may determine that, in fact, we have the organizational architecture more right than wrong, though I would be more than a little surprised at such a finding. But it seems undeniable that the need to conduct such a review and assessment is growing every day. How we organize (whether in business, the military, sports, or national security) should be a reflection of the assessment we have conducted of the strategic environment, since that is what strategy demands. A determination to "march on" with the old architecture simply because that is

what we have has been a formula for strategic failure in all of those same arenas.¹⁰

Challenge No. 3: Developing Leadership for a New Strategic Environment.

The third great challenge we face lies in the realm of leadership. The only glue that will hold all our designs together—or the absence of which promises continued failure no matter how well we do in analysis and organization—is the presence of strong leaders at all levels. Fundamentally, we need people with the intellectual, experiential, and interpersonal skills to work across the “gap” between the military and civilian actors and their capabilities. They must be people who can provide such all-important leadership less by the direct than by the indirect means so commonly associated with the interagency process generally. This is a truly joint world (military and civilian, not just militarily joint), and our strategic efforts must reflect that world. They must also be multinational and coalitional. Our civilian agencies, including the NGO and IGO communities as well as traditional governmental actors, and our military will need to develop both internal and external leadership skills. With respect to the external, leaders must be able to bridge the various gaps externally to achieve the kind of operational effectiveness and unity of effort that contributes to strategic success. The nature of the assignments our personnel receive, the bases for promotion and advancement, the truly joint exercising and training mentioned earlier, and the ability to deploy as joint, integrated, capabilities-based teams are surely central to the kinds of leaders we need to develop in the years ahead. We need to align all of these

developmental steps, and our professional education systems, to produce this very special leadership for the not-so-distant future. Whether we can do that remains to be seen. What is apparent is that in the absence of effectively addressing the three great challenges treated above—astute analysis, organization, and especially leadership—it is highly unlikely that as a nation we will adequately adapt to the security requirements of the 21st century.

Conclusions.

We conclude where we began with the observation that SSTR operations require different kinds of capabilities, integrated in ways different from the traditional national security protocol, and hence different kinds of leaders who can bridge the various military-civilian gaps identified in this chapter. We must seriously rethink and develop the kinds of capabilities we need and then provide the full resources necessary for fielding them. We must develop the concepts, doctrine, and joint predeployment training that are required. And we should incorporate them into our professional education curricula while simultaneously working to enhance the military and civilian interaction in those curricula. An idea whose time may have come in this regard is that of a Civil-Military Training and Reserve Center.¹¹

It is perhaps simplistic, though probably not inaccurate, to suggest that 21st-century security threats, challenges, and opportunities, and hence our responses and actions, will be much like the interagency process writ large. We must come to grips more fully with the requirements to integrate rather than stove-pipe, to develop operators with multidimensional skill

sets that cut across the semiautonomous, narrowly functional agencies that dot the organizational landscape. We must develop and move to the front the kinds of leaders who are not only comfortable but effective in such operations. And we must engage the broader international community. In the absence of such reforms, the interagency process will continue to resemble a symphony with each musician playing his/her own arrangement. In such a case, the 21st-century security environment is likely be even less forgiving than in the recent past. This is because our adversaries, growing daily more sophisticated in conjuring effective asymmetric responses to our power, will certainly discover a way to exploit our interagency disarray.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. See, for example, "Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management," Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, January 2006, p. 46, available at www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/Lessons_Learned_Feb16.pdf.

2. This is certainly true in Iraq, but it is much more general than that. Examples are our own domestic experiences with Hurricane Katrina and a growing array of international cases that include humanitarian and natural disaster responses like Darfur and the 2004 Tsunami, and continuing efforts in Haiti. The U.S. military especially has assumed a wide range of responsibilities ranging from leading PRTs and training law enforcement officers, to providing medical assistance and community assistance. A point worthy of discussion but beyond the scope of this chapter is whether the military has assumed these roles out of a desire to expand its reach or because no other actors or agencies stepped up to the plate.

3. The outlines of this example are taken from a 2006 interview with a former senior USAID official who served in Iraq.

4. I understand that the money was provided through the

Commander's Emergency Response Team (CERT) funds. The argument here is not that CERT capabilities and in this case funds are undesirable. Rather, the point is that we can do a better job of achieving overall long-term strategic objectives even through short-term responses like this if we have the various instruments of power effectively coordinated and communicating on the ground when and where the need arises. At a minimum this can be addressed by more comprehensive training for military units prior to their being deployed in such situations, a point addressed later in this chapter.

5. Robert H. Dorff, "Failed States After 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?" *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 6, Issue 1, February 2005, pp. 20-34.

6. "Good governance" includes not just political institutions, but norms and patterns of interaction among the people (governed and governors) and effective socio-economic systems.

7. For example, this author has personal knowledge of one company, Creative Associates International, Inc., that is currently participating in the design and execution of this "joint" PRT training.

8. This distinction draws on work done by Creative Associates International, Inc., while the author was employed there as part of the Creative Center for Security and Stabilization (C2S2). See the company website at www.caii.com.

9. See David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, New York: Public Affairs, 2006; and Douglas T. Stuart, "Ministry of Fear: The 1947 National Security Act in Historical and Institutional Context," *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2003.

10. One current effort in this area is the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). See Robert B. Polk, "Interagency Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has Come," Chapter 10 in this volume. See also the PNSR website now publicly accessible at www.pnsr.org.

11. To become an effective reality, such a Center would require the physical space for the joint training to occur. Moreover, participating departments and agencies would require an increase in personnel, especially on the civilian side, to staff the center and allow for people to rotate out of field assignments and into professional education training assignments. Those requirements would hardly be easy to meet.

CHAPTER 13

TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERAGENCY

James M. Smith

Introduction.

The strategic dimensions of military operations have been broadening for many years, and the potential for actions with strategic effects has also been migrating steadily down the rank structure of the U.S. military. President John F. Kennedy, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, gave explicit voice to the strategic requirements of officers down to unit-level operational field commanders and ship captains in his remarks to the 1963 graduates of the U.S. Air Force Academy.

Your major responsibilities, of course, will relate to the obligations of military command. Yet, as last October's crisis in the Caribbean so aptly demonstrated, military policy and power cannot and must not be separated from political and diplomatic decisions. . . . We needed in October--and we shall need in the future--military commanders who are conscious of the enormous stakes involved in every move they make--who are aware of the fact that there is no point where a purely political problem becomes a purely military problem--who know the difference between vital interests and peripheral interests--who can maneuver military forces with judgment and precision as well as courage and determination--and who can foresee the effects of military moves on the whole fabric of international power.¹

Just as President Kennedy identified the broadened requirements for leadership and officership at the unit/ship command level in the multidisciplinary security environment of the Cold War, General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, called for the development of a strategic perspective in the junior officer ranks in the late Cold War and across the transition into the post-Cold War international security environment.

We need strategists. In the Army and throughout the services. At all levels. We need senior generals and admirals who can provide solid military advice to our political leadership, and we need young officers who can provide solid military advice--options, details, the results of analysis--to the generals and admirals. We need military strategists, officers, all up and down the line, because it takes a junior strategist to implement what the senior strategist wants done, and it (usually) takes the input of juniors to help a senior strategist arrive at his conclusions.²

If the era that General Galvin directly foresaw—the experience of Operation DESERT STORM and peace operations from Africa to the Balkans—marked the advent of the “strategic lieutenant,” then today’s experience of extended asymmetrical conflict and the concomitant stability and support operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq has brought the age of the “strategic corporal.” The complexity of today’s conflicts, the expanded arena of joint and coalition operations, and the blending of traditional and nontraditional requirements of multiagency and nongovernmental partnerships mark new challenges for professionals across the full range of national security organizations.

This transition and its changing requirements for leadership on the military side were recognized in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Pursuant to this Act, both specific education on the context and content of joint operations and specific experience by assignment to a joint billet became prerequisite to any position of senior leadership in the military services. Guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid down minimum curriculum requirements for military officer education from precommissioning to the flag-rank capstone level. Concurrently, both service and joint doctrine development, which form the foundation of training, exercises, and planning, expanded the emphasis on joint operations. Both skills and knowledge were covered, and the results during the ensuing 2 decades have been striking. Joint attitudes and operations have indeed markedly advanced.

In light of the expanded focus on interagency operations specifically exemplified in contemporary stability and support operations, and from the Goldwater-Nichols model, studies have suggested an interagency education system, individual interagency education courses, interagency exchange assignments, and a range of related activities. These impulses have come together in the May 17, 2007, "Executive Order: National Security Professional Development" calling for the establishment of a cadre of national security professionals from across the Executive Branch of government, via a program to be defined in a "National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals."³

In line with that program, this chapter selectively summarizes the author's experiences with U.S. Air Force (USAF) leader development and with homeland

defense and security workforce development that seem particularly relevant to generating skills, knowledge, and strategic leadership for the national security interagency. It addresses skills—specific actions and tasks comprising the skill set required for certain categories of operations—that form the basis for training, preparing and testing doctrine, and actual field operations. These skills are especially vital in stability and support operations involving multiple government (and nongovernment) agency team efforts. The chapter then moves from specified skills sets to the development of more general areas of knowledge, competency, and perspective required to plan and manage stability and support operations. This latter area of developmental concern comprises the core of educational efforts for the interagency setting. Finally, the chapter briefly addresses military approaches to senior and strategic leadership development—entailing knowledge and perspective in scope, depth, time, and structure—as a potential source of ideas for the interagency’s own structures for developing strategic fluency among interagency senior leaders.

Skills, Knowledge, Perspective, and the Interagency.

The identification of stability and support operations skill sets is a relatively straightforward, if extensive, task. This task can be (and is) accomplished primarily in two ways. The first is to rely on experienced individuals to determine the individual skills, the level of competence required for each, and the preferred mix of training and experience required for certification. This is the “master/expert inventory” approach, involving stipulation of a formal mix of training and supervised experience leading to certification. The

second way is the “after-action report/end-of-tour interview” approach used across the military services to build skill matrices for planning and training, and for operational doctrine development. Both of these methods address the “what do we do, and how do we best do it” questions.

One example of the master/expert inventory approach occurred in the first phase of the U.S. Air Force “Developing Aerospace Leaders” review of officer career development in 1999. A committee of mid-ranking officers, drawn from a range of functional specialties, sequestered themselves and developed an extensive list of tasks (in the hundreds) that they saw as best corresponding to an ideal contemporary USAF officer skill set. The lessons-learned approach can accomplish the same outcome, but from the compilation of multiple individual inputs rather than the product of committee collaboration. It should be noted that these inventories will most likely generate lists of tasks rather than skills, and must therefore be translated further for direct application in designing training programs.

These two approaches are very useful in scoping out changing operational requirements, manpower needs, and planning and training requirements within a particular agency conducting the skills inventory. However, they do not normally address cross-agency inputs or specifically address interagency issues or dimensions. At a minimum, existing inventory methods should be amended to seek data on cross-functional and interagency skill requirements. For now, given the limits of data already gathered, only a meta-study of multiple individual agency inventories and review by an interagency expert panel could disclose the relevant inputs for interagency stability and support operations

skill set requirements. If such a mid-level interagency expert panel is established, it should also inventory the focus and content of the individual agency training programs for cross referencing. Areas of commonality, uniqueness, and essential interdependence can then be specified and addressed in training, education, and other areas of interagency workforce development.

As useful as such inventories can be for operational planning and for training, the effectiveness of the interagency process, interagency operations, and particularly the management and leadership of these efforts can be effectively enhanced only through education and experience on the part of those involved. Training provides the skills and improves the performance of tasks, i.e., *doing*, but education and experience provide context and perspective, i.e., *understanding* and *valuing*. Overall direction of the multiple tasks and incorporation of the results in an orchestrated program require much background, context, and foundational understanding. The cognitive context for understanding stability and support operations should be geographical—global, regional, and national—and also political, historical, and cultural. It should also highlight organizational context and culture, including the structures and dynamics of the interagency and international processes.

The training/education program should be designed around the central competency sets that characterize stability and support operations. An interagency review of tasks and skills, and certainly of the interaction of organizational efforts in realizing those tasks and skills, must aggregate them into a much smaller and focused set of essential competencies for stability and support operations, including competencies in understanding, managing, and leading interorganization efforts.

There is no magic number of competencies or unique structural framework required, but the systematization must be logical, and must be manageable by curriculum designers. A few examples drawn from personal experience will clarify this point.

In the Developing Aerospace Leaders case, taking the list of literally hundreds of tasks/skills that the committee of experts had isolated, I attempted to adapt it into a document manageable for educational purposes. After a frustrating attempt at educationally useful aggregating, however, I restarted from scratch, finally coming up with six *categories* of essential officer knowledge. I then broke out each of the six into several core *competencies* that would characterize a fully qualified air and space professional in the 21st century.⁴ The result was a list of approximately 40 *competencies*. The tasks and skills—now titled *components* in this three-tiered construct—became relevant subunits of these *competencies*. Arrayed in an extensive matrix, the taxonomy described above could then be used to structure and guide training based on grouped *components* as well as an education program design around *categories* and *competencies*. The matrix could also be scaled in terms of relative degree of desired expertise for any given *component* or *competency* based on military rank or level of participation in the process (entry, junior, mid-level, senior). Finally, the matrix could show which *competencies* and *components*, at a given level of expertise, could be attained through training, through education, or through specific experience. In short, it offered a complete template for force development.

A somewhat similar template was developed in that same time frame (1998-2001) by the USAF committee coordinating commissioning education qualifications

for the entire National Guard officer training system, which embraced the USAF Officer Training School, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the U.S. Air Force Academy, in order to establish a common set of core competencies. Still another such template was the Air University's Master Plan to coordinate professional military education curricula content for the junior, mid-career, and senior officer programs. Finally, a similar template was crafted for the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Officer Professional Military Education Program guidelines for joint education programs in all the services. These were all rank-scaled and program-scaled templates that ensured educational attention to specified essential competencies, skills, and knowledge.

Today in the homeland security arena, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and elements of the Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC) are creating similar competency sets as guides for education. In 2005, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a veteran emergency management official reissued a paper, based on his experience, identifying the "Top Ten Competencies for Professional Emergency Management" to guide post-secondary education program design efforts.⁵ A related initiative, this one inventorying existing emergency management courses to determine common/best practices and materials, has been undertaken under auspices of the FEMA Higher Education Project.⁶ Experience and common education practice can provide useful inputs to development of education and training programs, but must be examined continuously for applicability in light of changing operational characteristics and interagency dynamics.

HSDEC efforts in the spring of 2007 focused on assembling faculty experts from existing homeland

defense education programs at the community college (first responder education), undergraduate (operational-level manager education), and graduate (program leadership) levels for review and analysis. As of this writing, a community college workshop has been held at which quality standards for five areas of core curricula were identified, instructor qualification standards were discussed, and a list of 11 common curriculum outcomes (competency areas) was developed.⁷ A similar workshop was held to address undergraduate curriculum development. It undertook development of consensus on target skill sets and outcomes, and it also developed a list of 10 curriculum outcomes or competency sets.⁸ Common outcome lists/competency sets are very useful in designing compatible education programs across the interagency, and should be adapted to provide specific focus on interagency coordination and cross-organizational management.

Strategic Leader Development for the Interagency.

Training provides the requisite skill sets to accomplish the tasks needed for operational effectiveness in stability and support operations. Establishing task and skill requirements and developing training programs that address those requirements within the context of interagency applications will greatly advance the effectiveness of interagency operations in the field. Expert analysis of those requirements, of common and best practices in interagency operations, and of training programs across the agencies involved, are all vitally important. They contribute to the specification of competency sets that systematize task and skill sets within their larger operational and strategic contexts

and guide curricular development for education programs and for targeted experience that will enhance interagency program management and leadership. Such workforce development efforts together provide the “doers” for effective operations and junior to mid-level management. This cadre of able and experienced workers and managers also provides the “bench” from which enhanced interagency leadership can be selected and developed.

Senior leadership development programs both within the Department of Defense (DoD) and outside of DoD but attended by DoD leaders have formed a foundation for the transition from operational application and oversight to strategic direction and management within the U.S. military. The senior service and joint staff colleges, as well as senior leader development programs at the Kennedy School, Maxwell School, and elsewhere, all contribute to an enriched knowledge base and context, as well as establishing cross-service and interagency networks of similarly placed senior officials. However, they do not automatically nor on their own provide for a developmental leap from senior management to true strategic leadership.

Acquiring competency in strategic leadership for the interagency—that is, for operationally and organizationally complex, often ill-defined missions within multiple and shifting contexts, all as part of a dynamic strategic security environment—transcends any one course, school, experience, or assignment. Strategic leadership extends well beyond simply senior leadership. The award of senior rank and status does not automatically convey the breadth of perspective and depth of vision requisite of strategic leadership. Strategic leadership embraces a way of thinking, not a position

or office. It involves the attainment of deep functional expertise across the range of task sets involved in the interagency enterprise, insightful interorganizational and multiple contextual understanding, and nuanced ability to relate to others in a way that inspires loyalty and motivates functional effort.⁹

Senior leader education, of course, plays an important role in strategic leader development, particularly capstone experiences which provide “the icing on the cake” for this process. Such education must put a premium on cross-functional and cross-organizational content, must address interagency operations in broad scope and time, and must provide opportunity to polish one’s capacity for critical rethinking and entertaining broadened perspectives. It must address a brand of leadership comfortable with broad national security strategic planning and strategic applications. Acquiring skills and capacities of such elevation requires a continuum of rising-level experience across years of development, far predating the assumption of senior rank. As General Galvin put it:

We need to agree that strategy is not an “elective” of the later years of an officer’s career—that work in this field needs to begin early. The lieutenant does not have to be a strategist, but he must be aware that what he is absorbing will contribute to a knowledge of tactics and operational art constituting milestones on the way to ability in the field of strategy.¹⁰

We need to provide framework knowledge and perspective from early in the career so that experiences and advanced knowledge can meaningfully be processed into deeper insight and can begin to establish interagency perspective and vision.

Three “models” of successful strategic leadership development, drawn from U.S. military practice, are representative of this development. First, and perhaps the most continuously successful and visible model, is the Lincoln model. U.S. Army Brigadier General George “Abe” Lincoln established the knowledge and experience of assignment to the faculty of West Point’s Department of Social Sciences (affectionately known as “Sosh”) as his favored launching pad for strategic leader development. (Of course, the Sosh route is not the sole route—General Gavin taught in the English Department, General Norman Schwarzkopf in the Mechanics Department—but the principles of selection are the same.) Army leaders nominate their best young officers for USMA faculty assignment upon completion of company command. After a highly competitive review, the “cream” of this group are selected to join the faculty after graduate study in rigorous and prestigious civilian graduate programs. For selected and particularly promising participants, this experience can go beyond the master’s degree and bring the officer to the faculty in “all but dissertation” status. General David Petraeus, for example, who taught Sosh, later completed his Ph.D. at Princeton.

Given the universities at which they study, these young officers also establish early networks with rising leaders from across American society. Upon arrival at West Point, they teach an undergraduate course in their discipline, sharpening their applied knowledge of their field. They also serve as faculty advisors to cadet activities ranging from debate to Model United Nations, as well as to cadet summer programs that span the globe, broadening their perspectives and gaining applied and varied leadership experience as well. Moreover, they have ample opportunity to research and write, through

individual or service programs, departmental research institutes, or formal fellowships.¹¹ Upon completion of the faculty tour, these officers are well prepared to gain further insight through continued professional education (intermediate service school or equivalent) or to apply their advanced knowledge and skill through assignments leading to command or significant staff experience. A wide cross-section of strategic leaders of the Army, government, and business started their journeys as part of the "Lincoln Brigade."

In contrast to General Lincoln's focus on officers at the junior captain level, USAF Major General Robert Linhard directed his attention to officers beginning in the mid ranks (generally major), paving their way to strategic leadership with extensive mentoring and experience. General Linhard held important positions at Strategic Air Command Headquarters, the Air Staff and Joint Staff, and the National Security Council staff. He actively screened, selected, challenged, and mentored officers through assignment to his staff and then with malice aforethought stretched them well beyond their comfort zones. In selecting from among those with the best career records and commander recommendations, he sought four qualities: (1) ability to engage the "other" (particularly suited to the interagency), (2) integrity, (3) adaptability, and (4) zest for knowledge. He actively sought "organizational deviants" who were not afraid to push the envelope or think outside the box. He engaged them in research and staffing on the toughest and most ill-defined strategic issues of the day. He also worked through his senior staff to "protect the kids," making sure they did not suffer career damage for daring to challenge institutional orthodoxy. "Linhard's kids" have been represented in the highest and most visionary strategic leadership posts of the Air Force.¹²

Of course, senior service leaders have long hand-selected and mentored their bright, promising subordinates. However, USAF General Bill Creech made this practice a science. His model involved careful selection, mentoring, and grooming of rising strategic leaders up through fairly senior command. For General Creech, selection was more than screening performance reports. He demanded a detailed analysis of potential even for senior commanders, and he consulted long, hard, and penetratingly with his subordinate commanders prior to his decision on their nominees for entry into his “program.” Within the entire competitively selected pool, active mentoring was practiced as if the commander were planting seeds from which excellence and expansive vision could grow. This mentoring, however, was also a further screening device, as only a very few were then selected for the final grooming via command at the colonel level. Success there would then launch these leaders toward the highest service strategic leader opportunities, this during the critical period of transformation following Vietnam.¹³

Training, education, and leader development for the interagency is not unlike the same processes designed to enhance effective jointness in DoD. Building leadership for complex interagency stability and support operations is also not unlike building integrated effectiveness in homeland security. These processes as outlined above have worked and are working in those two establishments, and they can work for the interagency as well. In this chapter, I have proposed career “cradle-to-grave” attention to building deep and broad knowledge of the interagency and stability and support contexts and cultures. From such a foundation, a true interagency perspective can begin

to emerge. The “strategic corporals and lieutenants” today may thus become the visionary trainers and leaders of tomorrow, the “bench” of experience and knowledge underwriting our nation’s security.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. Cited in Richard F. Rosser, “Foreword: The Study of American Defense Policy,” in Mark E. Smith III and Claude J. Johns, Jr., eds., *American Defense Policy*, 2nd Ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968.

2. General John R. Galvin, “What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist?” *Parameters*, Vol. XIX, No. 1, March 1989, p. 2; reprinted in *Parameters*, Vol. XXV, No. 2, Summer 1995.

3. “Executive Order: National Security Professional Development,” Washington, DC: The White House, May 17, 2007.

4. The categories were leadership, operations, strategy, organization, technology, and perspective—all with specific aerospace-oriented competencies defining their individual focus and scope. Joint and coalition dimensions were addressed within the competencies and components, but interagency was not yet included in early 2000.

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7. Lance Robinson, “After Action Report,” HSDEC Community College Curriculum Development Workshop, Colorado Springs, CO: Pikes Peak Community College, April 12, 2007.

8. HSDEC, "Undergraduate Homeland Security Curriculum Development Conference Summary," Richmond, VA: Virginia Commonwealth University, March 20-21, 2007.

9. These three attributes of strategic leadership—comprehensive multifunctional proficiency, inclusive geostrategic and crossorganizational vision, and charismatic interpersonal relations—are common threads across several studies of military strategic leadership. See Howard D. Belote, *Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command*, CADRE Paper No. 7, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, July 2000; Richard A. Chilcoat, *Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 1995; James M. Smith, "Expeditionary Leaders, CINCs, and Chairmen: Shaping Air Force Officers for Leadership Roles in the 21st Century," *Aerospace Power Journal*, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter, 2000, pp. 30-44; and Leonard Wong *et al.*, *Strategic Leadership Competencies*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2003.

10. Galvin, p. 10.

11. The Army's Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis and the Combating Terrorism Center are both located within the department. During this author's tenure as a USAF exchange officer in Sosh (1987-93), junior faculty members won Council on Foreign Relations Fellowships, White House Fellowships, and other similar prestigious opportunities.

12. See Institute for National Security Studies Workshop Report, "Capturing the Legacies of Major General Robert E. Linhard and Brigadier General George "Abe" Lincoln," McLean, VA, October 27, 2004. Also, telephone interview with Colonel (USAF, Retired) Peter Engstrom, one of "Linhard's kids," September 2004.

13. See James C. Slife, *Creech Blue: General Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces, 1978-1984*, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, October 2004, especially pp. 94-98.

CHAPTER 14

LEADERSHIP EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR THE INTERAGENCY

Brian Polley

The nature of the international security environment has radically changed over the past 15 years. No longer is the United States threatened directly by a large traditional military armed with strategic missiles, and no longer is the primary danger posed by nation-states and their leaders. Instead, we currently face enemies who have no home country, respect no international borders, and disregard traditional rules of warfare. Because the threats to national security have changed, it is self-evident that our strategies and preparations for dealing with them must change accordingly.

The need for change is reflected clearly in military doctrine and official government policy, from Army field manuals all the way up to the President's National Security Strategy. These documents and others recognize that today's conflicts call for a renewed focus on nontraditional operations, especially support and stability operations.¹ Because of the nature of the enemy and the asymmetric warfare tactics he uses, the type of conflicts the United States is now engaged in requires a different government structure, a different military strategy, and a different type of leadership.

One of the most important goals laid out in the National Security Strategy, and one that is necessary if Americans are to live in a secure international environment, is promoting democracy in countries where authoritarian governments persecute their own peoples. Democracy promotion, and building a

state institutional structure such that democracy can be sustained, requires a stable environment relatively free of internal violence and foreign conflict. Support and stability operations are those in which the United States and its allies engage to provide that stable environment and allow the citizens of target states to build democratic institutions and establish the rule of law.

The boundaries between the roles of the military and civil society have become blurred in support and stability operations. Success in present conflict and contemporary post-conflict environments along with those of the future requires close cooperation between military and civilian agencies. Support and stability operations are necessarily interagency in nature—they cannot be successful using military means alone. One of the most challenging aspects of coordinating interagency efforts in these operations is the leadership, that is, how men and women direct others effectively in post-conflict environments. A number of important questions relate specifically to leadership issues:

- How is leadership defined in military and civilian contexts?
- How should various agencies communicate with each other in conflict and post-conflict environments?
- How should the agencies and stakeholders involved decide who is in charge of a task or operation?
- How can we prepare men and women to fill leadership roles and solve difficult problems in dangerous environments?
- How can various agencies improve the way they educate and train leaders to align goals and work together?

In order to successfully create a stable and lasting peace in support and stability operations, it is imperative that the United States do several things better. Most importantly, it needs a set of standard, coherent leadership training programs to equip interagency officials with the tools necessary to function in complex, dangerous environments in which a number of different organizations are represented and have a stake in the outcome. Coordination and teamwork in these kinds of operations are too often ad hoc and reactive; the U.S. Government should make interagency teamwork part of its *preparation* for post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping.

To describe the functions and responsibilities of leaders in interagency support and stability operations, I will first discuss relevant interpretations of leadership, and in particular how it is generally defined by the U.S. Government in military and civilian contexts. Second, I will summarize various programs and practices currently used by U.S. Government agencies to develop leaders and prepare them to work on interagency teams. Next, I will critique these programs and describe what tends to make some of them more successful than others, and what aspects of them remain worthwhile. Finally, I will discuss my overall findings and outline several recommendations for implementing successful practices in leadership development. By following this progression, we can better understand the roles and responsibilities of leadership in coordinating interagency teams in conflict and post-conflict environments.

Defining Leadership.

An analysis of roles and functions of leadership in interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare

must begin with a discussion of the various definitions of leadership in military and civilian contexts, and a brief history of leadership theory's development. Human beings have always been interested in understanding leaders and the qualities that enable effective leadership. According to political scientist James MacGregor Burns, leadership is "one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth."² Thousands of years ago, Confucius sought to define the nature of the relationship between leader and follower. Plato considered leadership at the highest levels, idealizing the "philosopher-king" as the model for a perfect republican system of government. Later, Plato and his followers established the Paideia in early Greece, a school and forum for discussing leadership and how best to develop it. In the 16th century, the Italian Niccolo Machiavelli wrote his famous discourse on the more practical aspects of leading kingdoms and principalities. These are only a few of the hundreds of influential thinkers across human history who have considered leadership to be an important concept and have contributed to the intellectual discourse on the topic.

For many of these influential thinkers, leaders are understood to be a select few individuals who have the good fortune to be born with characteristics required to inspire and motivate. According to this "great man" theory of leadership popularized in the 19th century and still somewhat prevalent today, "there are only a few, very rare, individuals in any society at any time with the unique characteristics to shape or express history."³ The great man theory, while worthy of consideration, cannot be used to create leaders and therefore has little use as a scientific theory.

The modern scientific study of leadership can be traced to German and French psychologists and

sociologists in the latter half of the 19th century.⁴ Psychology and sociology have been leading fields in the development of leadership theory, but disciplines as varied as political science, history, military science, education, philosophy, management, public administration, anthropology, and biology have made significant contributions as well.⁵ Over the past century, the study of leadership has become increasingly scientific and quantitative, especially beginning with the emergence of Frederick Taylor's "management science" concept around the turn of the 20th century.⁶ Taylor disputed the commonly held assumption that fundamental interests of employers and employees are necessarily at odds with one another, arguing instead that the interests of the two groups are actually one and the same—that prosperity cannot exist for the employer unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the employee, and vice versa.⁷ Often applying his analysis to sports as well as "soldiering," Taylor believed it meant that both workers and management should train and develop each employee in the organization, regardless of rank, to reach that employee's full potential. His scientific framework directly challenged the great man theory, since it entailed a system in which leaders are trained to organize workers for efficient production, rather than a system in which exceptional leaders are sought out from among those someone else has trained.⁸ Furthermore, he applied scientific management principles to all different kinds of human activities, from the simplest tasks to complex endeavors in large organizations. Military scientists have been influenced by Taylor's scientific management principles for decades, finding that his framework has much to offer in preparing leaders to cooperate in support and stability operations.

The mid-to-late 20th century saw a proliferation of leadership theories, when many distinct interpretations arose to complement or compete with great man and scientific management theories. For example, Philip Selznick and others taking a sociological approach to leadership define it as a specific type of work or function within an organization, not as something special or glorified. Leadership is defined by the demands of a social situation, and who should become a leader depends on the requirements of an organizational task. Leadership is a relation existing between people in social situations, and therefore we can expect to see different leaders emerge in different situations.⁹ The sociological approach also holds that leadership is not necessarily performed by those in high places or positions of authority, and that leadership is dispensable and unnecessary in some situations.

The “business approach” to leadership exemplified by John Kotter echoes the sociological approach’s tenet that leadership is nothing mystical or mysterious, but rather is a system of actions largely about coping with change, as opposed to coping with complexity.¹⁰ Since today’s business environment is more dynamic and more volatile than ever before, the quickened pace of change has demanded a corresponding increase in leadership agility. While Kotter argues that leadership and management are distinct concepts, he points out that they are complementary and that both are required in a successful business.¹¹ The business approach to leadership, while not *obviously* applicable to interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare, provides a useful addition to other frameworks of analysis we will consider.

Perhaps the most relevant for our purposes is the political science approach as represented by its most

prominent theorist, James MacGregor Burns. According to this approach, leadership is best understood as a relationship between leaders and followers; it is exercised when someone uses “institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”¹² To proponents of this approach, an important distinction exists between true leaders and mere power wielders: power wielders exercise their authority and demand obedience, disregarding any desires or goals of their respondents. Leaders, on the other hand, work to motivate others to realize goals mutually held by *both* leaders and followers. Like power, leadership is relational and purposeful, but a leader is a particular kind of power holder — the kind who induces followers to willingly act for certain goals, needs, and aspirations shared among themselves and their leader. It is this approach to understanding leadership that adds the most value to an examination of how to prepare men and women to cooperate effectively in dangerous conflict and post-conflict environments, especially on interagency teams where different values and goals may be represented.

These theoretical approaches vary in the degree of emphasis placed on personal attributes of individuals versus situational factors in determining the quality of leadership. They also vary in the degree to which they consider ethical decisionmaking to be a defining feature of good leadership, a distinction important to an analysis of leadership in support and stability operations. This distinction enters most prominently in the debate over the relative merits of *transactional* versus *transformational* leadership, the two categories many theorists agree are the fundamental leadership styles that all leaders display to some degree, but tend to use

more of one or the other in their “defining moments.”¹³ Transactional leadership generally involves contingent reinforcement, where followers are usually motivated by leaders’ promises, praise, and rewards and are corrected by negative feedback, threats, or disciplinary action. Essentially, leaders react to whether or not their followers carry out what leaders and followers have “transacted” to do. Thus, transactional leadership can be understood as execution of a sort of contract between leaders and followers; it is a somewhat impersonal and formal relation grounded in a worldview of self-interest. Telling the truth, keeping promises, distributing what is due to others, and using valid incentives and sanctions are all important aspects of transactional leadership.¹⁴

Transformational leadership, on the other hand, is based on more than self-interest. It tends to inspire a more realistic concept of the self – one that is connected to others whose welfare may be more important than one’s own. This concern for others’ welfare is a key component of government service. In transformational leadership, moral obligations are grounded in a broader understanding of cultural and social norms and beliefs.¹⁵ Lying within the political science school of leadership, transformational leadership enjoys as its most prominent theorist our familiar James MacGregor Burns, who argues that leadership is best when it is both transactional and transformational—it is based on a set of agreements or bargains, under conditions where both leaders and followers are transformed. To be transformational, a leader must be morally uplifting; he raises himself and his followers to higher levels of morality through leadership.

Transformational leadership contains four main components, each being important for leaders who wish to elevate themselves and their followers to higher standards.¹⁶

1. Charisma, or idealized influence—transformational leadership is envisioning, confident, and sets high standards for emulation.

2. Inspirational motivation—transformational leaders provide followers with meaning and challenges for sharing commitments to goals.

3. Intellectual stimulation—transformational leaders encourage followers to think critically, and allow them to question assumptions and generate new and creative solutions to problems.

4. Individualized consideration—transformational leaders treat each follower as an individual and as an end in him/herself, never as a means to an end. The leader provides coaching, mentoring, and growth opportunities, always working to develop followers into leaders. Transactional leaders tend to worry only about their followers' dependence. The bottom line of transformational leadership is that followers identify with their leaders and their leaders' goals. Rather than simply obeying orders, followers want to emulate their leaders and grow into leaders themselves.

A final distinction bears mentioning—that between *authentic* transformational leadership and *inauthentic* or “pseudo-transformational” leadership. All aspects of leadership (both transactional and transformational) have ethical dimensions, and whether the behavior of leaders is authentic or inauthentic is of critical importance. Organizations need authentic transformational leaders who raise the organization's ethical standards; who are persuasive, not manipulative; who capitalize on elements of both transactional and transformational leadership to increase the effectiveness of both.¹⁷

All of these theoretical frameworks have played a role in shaping the literature on leadership in military and civilian government organizations. Since our focus

is on interagency cooperation in support and stability operations, our analysis must consider the history and development of military doctrine on leadership and where these frameworks fit.

The U.S. Army first became acutely aware of leadership as it worked to shift from the small professional army of the interwar era to the expanded structure required in World War II.¹⁸ There have of course been leadership training and instruction programs in the U.S. military throughout its history, but they were greatly expanded during this time.¹⁹ The Army and other branches began enlisting help from the civilian academic community, especially psychologists, to identify and develop junior leaders. In the academic community, the 1940s saw a shift from management science to an emphasis on human relations, producing a corresponding shift in emphasis within the military community.²⁰ For the Army, leadership and ethics historically have been topics that go hand in hand. The years during and after World War II saw an enormous proliferation of books, journal articles, and classroom instruction on these topics. The rapid growth in literature and instruction on ethics and leadership continued in the 30 years between the late 1960s and 1990s: by 1998, the U.S. Army War College Library holdings reflected 1,670 titles in these two fields.²¹

The perceived crisis in leadership during the Vietnam War led to still another resurgence of emphasis on developing ethical leaders. Of the three presidents most closely associated with the war, one commander-in-chief was assassinated, another chose not to run for reelection, and another was forced to resign. This pattern, coupled with seismic shocks like the 1968 My Lai massacre, encouraged a wholesale reevaluation of military leaders and leadership development

techniques, the Professionalism Study commissioned by General William Westmoreland in 1970 being a prime example.²² The efforts were a success, stimulating a dramatic growth in military professionalism and the trust engendered in the U.S. Army as an institution – probably more so than in any other army in the world during the period between the end of the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War.²³ The most obvious evidence of the rise of military professionalism and the corresponding rise in public approval of the military can be observed in the tremendous respect and trust shown by the American people (as well as other peoples) for the U.S. military during and after Operation DESERT STORM in 1990-91. Confidence in the existence of high ethical standards and effective leadership in the military may have been at an all-time high after that first conflict in the Persian Gulf.²⁴

Several crises in the 1990s struck a blow at this restored confidence in ethical military leadership, including sexual misconduct in the Navy; violence at Fort Bragg; and numerous charges of racism, sexism, and homophobia.²⁵ The response to these incidents, led by then-Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, eventually became known as “Character Development XXI.” It sought to reexamine military leadership training policies and eliminate some of the biggest weaknesses. At the same time, an effort was underway at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to revise Field Manual (FM) 6-22, the Army’s main leadership manual. The primary goal was to have a set of leadership ideals that also included an iteration of core values for the military.²⁶ FM 6-22 is a model for similar documents in other branches of the armed service and thus deserves consideration in its own right.

The most recent revision of FM 6-22, published in October 2006, was written under the direction of then-Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker. The document applies to Army personnel at all levels, its main functions being threefold: (1) to define what leadership means in the Army; (2) to outline leadership roles and requirements; and (3) to provide a general description of how to develop leadership within the Army.

According to FM 6-22, there are three levels of leadership, each with its own set of challenges and competencies: direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership. Common to all three levels, however, is the Army's "warrior ethos," an attitude integral to the life of a soldier. An ideal Army leader at any level has a strong intellect, a commanding physical presence, professional competence, high moral character, and serves as a role model to others.²⁷ Finally, part of being a good leader in the Army is also being a good follower.

FM 6-22 describes Army leaders in a three-part framework, based on what leaders should BE, what they should KNOW, and what they should DO. In other words, leaders' behavior (what they *do*) emerges from who they are (*be*) and what they have learned (*know*).²⁸ The BE aspect of leadership comprises the values and attributes that shape one's character, i.e., the internal and defining qualities that are intrinsic and thus present at all times. As defined by FM 6-22, an Army leader is "anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization."²⁹ The KNOW aspect of leadership

refers to the knowledge that leaders should use based on personal experience and formal instruction. Army leaders should have a general knowledge of military tactics, technical systems, organizations, management of resources, and the tendencies and needs of people.

Character and knowledge are not enough for effective Army leadership. The DO aspect of leadership refers to leader actions and is directly related to a leader's influence. The act of leadership, according to FM 6-22, is "the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization." This definition mirrors the political science approach, including specifically transformational leadership, since leadership is seen as a relationship between people that improves leaders, followers, and the organization as a whole. What leaders should do can be broken down into three constituent parts.³⁰

- Influencing—getting people, including Army soldiers, civilians, and multinational partners, to do what is necessary. Influencing is about providing purpose, vision, direction, and motivation.
- Operating—actions taken to influence others to accomplish missions and to set the stage for future operations.
- Improving—capturing and acting on important lessons of ongoing and completed projects and missions. Improving includes developmental counseling, stressing team effort, and focused learning.

It is important to note that FM 6-22 and similar documents on military leadership doctrine divide

leadership into three functional levels: direct, operational, and strategic. Strategic-level leadership, in particular, parallels conceptually some of the theoretical frameworks mentioned earlier and should be addressed separately. Strategic leadership essentially means leadership “at the highest echelons of organizations”;³¹ it is concerned with the big picture and overall organizational goals. Examples of strategic leaders are easy to find in both military and civilian organizations: General George Marshall, Henry Ford, and Lee Iacocca are a few of the better-known strategic leaders.³² Case studies of these men and other people like them raise the question of whether strategic leaders are *born* or *made*; to join their ranks, must one be born with exceptional leadership potential, or is leadership something that can be acquired through learning? This is an old debate that juxtaposes the “great man” theory of leadership, which holds that leaders are exceptional people by birth, against the sociological and political science approaches, which hold that leadership is contextual and learnable. Most leadership experts and psychologists agree that there is a dynamic interplay between innate ability and external factors across every person’s life, and that leadership, like most other human traits, *can* be learned and developed. A fundamental assumption of FM 6-22 and military leadership theorists rests on this claim that there are learnable competencies essential for being an effective strategic-level leader.³³ Civilian government agencies generally share this assumption, and it is to their leadership development programs that I now turn.

Just as military organizations have programs for identifying and developing potential leaders, so do civilian government agencies. Government organizations—including the Department of State,

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—all have their own protocol for finding and training those men and women within their ranks who have the most leadership potential. OPM is historically something of a lead agency in defining leadership in the U.S. Government, and thus will be my primary focus.

OPM sees itself as the government leader in designing and delivering educational and leadership development courses and programs.³⁴ It has three locations across the country offering formal in-residence leadership education, and it also custom designs leadership training programs based on the needs of particular client organizations. Aside from formal leadership education, OPM also offers the Presidential Management Fellows program designed to identify and recruit talented individuals with master's degrees and doctorates. Another OPM initiative is the "Leadership and Knowledge Management System," which focuses on identifying and addressing an agency's leadership competencies so that continuity of leadership is ensured, the knowledge is shared throughout, and an environment of continuous learning is created. The custom-designed training and consulting services OPM offers, tailored to individual needs of client organizations, include succession planning and development, management development and certification programs, development of strategic collaborative partnerships, and consulting services that fit other agencies' needs.

In assessing potential leaders and identifying those who might meet government agencies' prerequisites for advancement, OPM's main assessment tool is called OPM Leadership 360.³⁵ Leadership 360 focuses on six

Executive Core Qualifications:

1. Fundamental Competencies—interpersonal skills, written and oral communication, integrity/honesty, continual learning, and public service motivation.
2. Leading Change—creativity and innovation, external awareness, flexibility, resilience, strategic thinking, and vision.
3. Leading People—conflict management, leveraging diversity, developing others, and team building.
4. Results Driven—accountability, customer service, decisiveness, entrepreneurship, and technical credibility.
5. Business Acumen—financial management, human capital management, and technology management.
6. Building Coalitions and Communication—partnering, political savvy, and influencing/negotiating.

USAID also has literature on effective leadership and development programs, particularly in the context of coordinating interagency efforts abroad.³⁶ It has created formal instruction and other programs to help train men and women to be effective community leaders in poverty-stricken and post-conflict areas all over the world. For example, USAID representatives provided nation-building training for town council members in Sierra Leone, imparting knowledge about leadership, public service, accountability, acceptance, and teamwork.³⁷ USAID has coordinated similar leadership training programs in Guatemala, Vietnam, and other countries, involving Americans as well as foreign nationals. Programs like those of USAID and OPM offer valuable lessons to all organizations involved in interagency efforts, particularly those in dangerous environments and support and stability

operations. Civilian agencies are often successful in identifying and selecting those men and women who have the potential to lead others in novel, challenging situations.

Although many parallels exist between civilian and military leadership needs, there are a few important differences that bear mentioning. These differences suggest that caution is necessary in comparing military and civilian leaders. First, civilian leaders, in most cases, do not have the “unlimited liability contract”³⁸ that military officers have; while civilian jobs in post-conflict environments and support and stability operations are certainly dangerous, military leaders are the ones most often targeted by enemies and are therefore in near constant mortal danger. A second difference to consider is the general officer personality factor, meaning significant personality differences between the typical military leader and the typical civilian leader. For example, military officers are often described as the “aggressive adventurer” type. Compared with the typical civilian manager, they also tend to have a higher need for control, stronger manifestations of dominance, greater comfort with data than with intuition, and higher scores on an “achievement through conformity” scale.³⁹ All of these characteristics can be very positive in certain contexts, but some evidence suggests that they can all have drawbacks as a leader moves from the tactical/operational to the strategic level.

A final important difference between military and civilian leadership demands is the necessary but sometimes troublesome “warrior ethos” mentioned earlier. The warrior ethic of authoritarian rule and unquestioning loyalty can serve to “rationalize leader behaviors that are situationally inappropriate.”⁴⁰

One example may occur when a leader's style and preference for centralized control result in poor decisionmaking because he or she cannot gain access to all relevant information. The issue military leaders face is maintaining the warrior spirit while simultaneously allowing for change, agility, creativity, and self-awareness—the very characteristics required of an army engaged in counterinsurgency warfare and support and stability operations.⁴¹

Armed with all this knowledge, both theoretical and practical, the various agencies in the U.S. Government that are involved in support and stability operations face the challenge of designing a practical and efficient system to identify potential leaders, place them in positions to gain experience, formally train them to lead others, and work closely with leaders from other agencies who often do not share all the same goals, values, or competencies. This is a difficult task, one various agencies have struggled with for years.

Training Leaders for Interagency Cooperation.

In support and stability operations, there is traditionally a common tendency to place too much emphasis on the military aspects of securing victory. The U.S. Army, in particular, often shoulders the lion's share of the burden for maintaining a secure environment and allowing reconstruction and capacity building after a major conflict. The problem, though, is that the Army is only one aspect of American power that should *complement* and *support* other elements of national power in order to achieve desired objectives.⁴² In other words, military effort is only one factor in the equation, while support and stability operations, necessarily interagency in nature, require all the factors and actors. Thus the military must be able to work

with civilian agencies to achieve a broad spectrum of goals. Working with civilian agencies in these kinds of conflicts requires more than just coordinated action—it requires *synchronization* and a pervasive unity of effort across the political, military, economic, and psychological spectrum.⁴³ In low-intensity conflicts and counterinsurgency operations, nonmilitary resources often play a far greater role in achieving victory than do military resources. This is true at all levels, from overall strategy down to ground-level tactical decisions. This reality poses challenges to even the best military leaders since it requires an understanding and appreciation for the elements of national power other than military, which are generally not the military's main areas of expertise. The bottom line is that the military aspects of low-intensity conflict cannot be separated from the political, social, and psychological.⁴⁴

Of all the challenges leaders face when training to work on interagency teams, several are particularly noteworthy because they are especially difficult to overcome. First, the lack of a common lexicon hampers communication in theater and in coordination of training efforts.⁴⁵ The fact is that representatives of different government agencies do not always mean the same thing when using the same terminology. For example, the word “counterinsurgency” does not necessarily mean the same thing to a Foreign Service officer as it does to an Army officer. The same applies to commonly used terms like “nation-building,” “security,” “policing,” “democracy promotion,” and “regime change.” Even the word “terrorism,” used frequently in the news media as well as in support and stability operations and leadership training, is defined differently by various agencies of the U.S. Government.

A second important problem in training leaders for interagency cooperation is even more obvious: the lack of a common vision and shared strategic goals. Agencies often train leaders differently because they seek different ends once in theater in post-conflict environments.⁴⁶ All agencies have their own defining interests (especially *political* interests), and these interests are not always shared by all members of an interagency team. The result is too often a kind of turf battle, or a tug-of-war, to decide which piece of the operation is for which agency, who answers to whom, and who has ultimate authority to make decisions. While this kind of struggle can involve representatives of many government agencies, it tends to happen the most often between the Department of State and the Department of Defense (DoD).⁴⁷ Personalities can end up playing a large role in determining who takes responsibility for various operational aspects, and this is not necessarily the wisest or most efficient way of deciding who is to exercise responsibility. Besides pure personality factors, other considerations, such as which agency has the highest-ranking member participating on an interagency team, can determine leadership roles. Whichever agency's representative is closest to the President may take charge; one's clout on an interagency team tends to diminish with increasing relative distance from the President. Though this is how leadership positions are *usually* determined on interagency teams in post-conflict environments, strong evidence suggests that the process does not *have* to work this way. During the many interagency efforts in the Clinton years, these kinds of teams often showed deference to field experience rather than proximity to the President in a number of cases.⁴⁸ In Bosnia, for example, U.S. Army and other military personnel often

followed the advice of or delegated responsibility for important decisions to American civilians or United Nations (UN) officials. This experience holds lessons for present-day U.S. Government interagency teams and leadership selection/development.

A final important problem interagency teams face when delegating tasks and setting priorities is the lack of shared training or educational experience of many team members.⁴⁹ Interagency teams are often created ad hoc, with agency representatives perhaps sharing little or no common training or related experience. Contrast this with the general practice of the military services, where the practice is to form teams with lengthy postings and coordinate the mission *before* deployment. Throughout the interagency process, personnel and thus perspectives are far more foreshortened as Foreign Service officers, USAID personnel, and others may have briefer individual postings and rotate assignments more frequently. In the State Department, for example, personnel posted to difficult locations (especially those in post-conflict or reconstruction environments) rotate in and out after periods sometimes as short as 3 to 6 months. When one Foreign Service officer finally begins to understand a team's dynamics and mission goals, he or she might be replaced with someone brand new. Leadership is especially challenging when the team membership is in constant flux and incorporating new faces commonplace. A better model would have interagency teams assembled and trained together before deployment.

In today's efforts at interagency cooperation in support and stability operations, there are two main types of training and education programs: institutional education, and interagency participation in military training programs. The institutional education

comes in curricula at the service academies, in ROTC programs at colleges and universities around the country, and in classroom instruction at places like the Federal Executive Institute and the Management Development Centers run by OPM. Curricula at the service academies and ROTC programs are often designed with the interagency process in mind, and the men and women in them are trained from the beginning for possible work on interagency teams. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) receive similar training for interagency work in their own academies and schools.⁵⁰ OPM's Management Development Centers offer a broad range of formal instruction and course work for civilian government leaders, covering such topics as Bridging Organizational Cultures, Collaborating Across Organizational Boundaries, Developing High-Performing Teams, and a number of specially-tailored leadership seminars.⁵¹

Interagency participation in military training programs is another way government organizations prepare leaders for the unique interagency challenges of support and stability operations. This kind of less formal educational instruction happens at a number of military training centers and reserve bases, for example, at the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. These programs actually partner military units with other government agencies to train them together, and they operate here in the United States as well as in theater. An example of this kind of program might be an FBI criminal forensics expert visiting a combat training center to help train military police in forensic science before deployment. These interagency training programs are almost exclusively governed and coordinated by

DoD—other agencies rarely do anything similar on a comparable scale. A partial explanation for DoD’s near monopoly on informal interagency leadership training is that it simply has the resources and funding to make the programs possible—other agencies often cannot afford them.⁵²

Model Practices in Leadership Development.

Decades of research and theory have created a large body of literature on the topic of leadership development and education. This literature reflects a variety of philosophical backgrounds and academic disciplines, but a large portion of it applies directly to development programs for civilian and military government organizations involved in interagency operations. Army regulations and military doctrine, for example, have proven very useful in providing lessons on how to lead teams and how to develop capable leaders, and these lessons usually apply to nonmilitary organizations as well. In general, military leadership development is considered a career-long process that involves “professional experience; formal professional training and education; and self-study, assessment, and reflection.”⁵³ The military generally operates from the assumptions that effective leaders are made, not born, that leadership is a skill set that can be developed over time, and that specific competencies exist that are essential for effective strategic leadership.⁵⁴ Based on these assumptions, the U.S. Army and other military branches have created and revised doctrine that outlines a number of specific institutional requirements for maximizing leadership potential of officers and NCOs. These are as follows:

- *Give aspiring leaders early opportunities for varied responsibilities. Specialization is important,*

but the best leaders will be trained to lead comfortably in a number of different situations and roles. The U.S. Army does this as well or better than most large organizations.

- *Have clearly communicated standards for what it means to be a good leader.* This is about having practical guidelines and a well-developed and actively-implemented system of monitoring. The U.S. military tends to do this well, but not in all cases. The corporate world seems to understand this principle better, in terms of being serious about setting management standards and establishing appropriate style, mentoring, and measurement of results.⁵⁵
- *Provide feedback often and create a formal mentoring system.* The corporate world tends to do this better than the military, by formally pairing junior and senior leaders in mentor/mentored relationships. It takes a great effort to reduce institutional discomfort with providing and accepting feedback. It might be worthwhile for military organizations to institute a formal mentoring system—though mentoring and coaching have been part of the Army's strategy for some time, their use tends to be uneven and localized.
- *Have a system in place that measures organizational attitudes and climate.* This means having a formal system for recording morale, mission focus, clarity of procedures and expectations, effectiveness of communication, trust in leaders, perceived level of discipline, support for initiative and innovation, and fair treatment of all personnel.⁵⁶ This is essentially an easy and inexpensive way to monitor employee feelings

and attitudes and alert leaders to issues before they become problems. According to many retired and active military officers, the military falls short on this approach compared to the business world.⁵⁷

- *Train leaders in assessment methods, or in how to judge the effectiveness of other individuals and groups.* Neither the Army nor large corporations seem to do this very well. Too often, top management *assumes* that leaders know how to evaluate performance of others when this is not actually the case. This is a more difficult measure to implement, but it is not impossible: the Office of Strategic Services made extensive use of assessment methodology during and after World War II, and today there is an extensive literature on assessing leadership capabilities in personality psychology and related academic disciplines.⁵⁸
- *Use many sources of input for promotion decisions.* The corporate world is far ahead of the U.S. military in implementing this principle. Essentially, it means that the decision for promoting or passing over an officer should not be based exclusively on his supervisor's assessment—peers and subordinates at all levels should have input as well. In other words, use “360-degree” input as well as the standard top-down assessment for promotion decisions. Personality and leadership assessments agree that some leadership traits or characteristics cannot be reliably observed from above; specifically, many aspects of transformational leadership, discussed earlier, are difficult to assess from higher in the organizational

hierarchy. Examples of such aspects include articulating a motivational vision, inspiring teamwork, providing intellectual challenge, treating subordinates as individuals, being open to new ideas, modeling moral behavior, and demonstrating a willingness to subordinate oneself to the mission.⁵⁹

- *Formalize a system that promotes continuous learning.* This practice is one of the most important: too many organizations and government agencies provide initial training and then leave personnel to suffer the consequences of time and memory loss on the important educational aspects of that training. The military and the U.S. Army in particular tend to be better about this practice than most large organizations, including those in the corporate world. The Army expresses and then demonstrates a commitment to encouraging education throughout an officer's military career. Understanding this principle of continuous learning allows an organization to "marshal [its] intellectual and operational resources to facilitate learning from [its] individual and collective experience."⁶⁰

In many ways, the U.S. military is actually ahead of other public agencies and private sector corporations in terms of developing human resource potential, which is partially explained by the fact that the military has at its disposal larger access to the full range of behavioral, cognitive, and social sciences. Knowledge of these disciplines in the military is somewhat scattered, but vast. To build on these already existing competencies, U.S. military organizations should bear in mind institutional commitments to growing individuals out of compassion as well as concern for operational competence.⁶¹

Support and stability operations, and any operations in post-conflict environments, necessarily involve the various civilian agencies and not just the military. Developing leaders is a task not limited to the Army, but instead is a goal that must be shared across the spectrum of U.S. Government agencies. To be sure, the Army must be involved in the process of defining the nature of the peace; diplomats, aid workers, and other government civilians must therefore have an awareness and understanding of the military capabilities in any post-conflict situation.⁶² This is an extremely important requirement, but not always adhered to; soon after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took over in the early part of the post-conflict phase in Iraq, for example, one senior CPA official observed that “the civilians in the Coalition generally had no knowledge of military organization, and thus no idea of which parts of the military might either assist them or need to know what they were planning. The civilians didn’t know whom to call.”⁶³

In order for all to be effective together, civilian government workers must have an understanding of military capabilities beyond the pure application of force. Leadership development programs in civilian agencies should consider how best to integrate political and economic goals with those goals the military works toward, so that all aspects of national power are aligned and moving in the same direction. Legislation like that proposed in March 2007 by Senator Daniel Akaka of Hawaii is an excellent example of a step toward coordinating interagency training and efforts in theater. If it becomes law, Senator Akaka’s bill would encourage management and supervisory training for all government agencies, training which today varies across organizations and is inconsistently implemented.

The bill would require agencies to provide training during a manager's initial year on the job and mandatory follow-up training every 3 years after that.⁶⁴ It would give public sector managers a clearer understanding of leadership roles and responsibilities and re-focus leaders on institutional goals shared across the U.S. Government. Furthermore, coordinating leadership training across civilian government agencies would provide excellent opportunities to integrate leaders into joint training programs with military units and other interagency teams. Lawmakers proposed similar legislation in the past, but it foundered in committee — passing the current bill would be a step in the right direction, providing an impetus for integrating goals in Washington and in post-conflict environments abroad.

While the military is ahead of other large organizations in implementing some important principles of leadership development, certain nonmilitary government agencies have their own well-developed competencies that offer lessons to their counterparts in other areas of government. For example, the intelligence community generally communicates best from Washington to the field, and also seems to be most prepared to work closely with interagency teams.⁶⁵ This strength of intelligence agencies is telling, since gathering good intelligence is one of the single most important (and most difficult) aspects of fighting counterinsurgencies or low-intensity conflicts. With the challenges they face, intelligence services' success could provide important lessons for other government agencies that are less effective in sharing information.

The Department of State has developed its own set of core competencies that might be useful for other organizations to learn from. While Foreign Service

officers from the State Department are often stretched thin and lack sufficient numbers in theater, they frequently have regional or functional expertise in particular areas. Other government agency personnel, both military and nonmilitary, could improve performance by recognizing the expertise of their State Department counterparts and trying to combine knowledge to further overall operational goals, both in training programs and in the active operational environment.

Given these model practices in leadership development, all U.S. Government organizations participating on interagency teams have opportunities to improve on core competencies and achieve a more positive impact in support and stability operations environments. Considering the knowledge accumulated in the body of literature on leadership theory, the experiential knowledge of various government agencies, and the problems that the interagency process has experienced in recent years, a number of important steps are possible that could streamline that process and improve the overall functioning of the U.S. Government in Washington and abroad.

Applying Leadership Knowledge to the Interagency Process.

First, the interagency process would be significantly strengthened if the U.S. Government sought to *develop a common lexicon or vocabulary* on the topic of support and stability operations. Government agencies should collectively decide on some formal definitions for key terms, including interagency, counterinsurgency, support and stability, interoperability, nation-building (and state-building), and terrorism.

This common lexicon should be developed with participation from the whole spectrum of government agencies involved in overseas operations. It should then be formalized, published, and made available to everyone. There are a number of workable alternatives regarding who should take responsibility for creating such a formalized shared vocabulary. One possibility is a stronger National Security Council (NSC) with a new mandate to coordinate this project. This does not mean the NSC would become an *operational* entity, only that it would have a new and slightly broadened mandate. Another possibility is giving responsibility to a new interagency task force or policy team created in Washington. It would be given the authority to develop a formalized “dictionary” or list of terms that would ultimately be used by all agencies participating in support and stability operations, however defined. Either of these options falls short of creating something entirely new or hiring a set of new people — they simply shift resources slightly to reflect changing priorities. Either would be more effective with active support from the president.

A second change the U.S. Government should make to improve the interagency is to *increase the frequency and number of joint training exercises* with both military and civilian participants present. There are far too many people in government today who have never heard anything about training people for work on interagency teams; the dearth of interagency training opportunities results in a fundamental lack of knowledge of how one can traverse a professional atmosphere in which he/she must represent the interests of an agency as well as the mission of the U.S. Government writ large.⁶⁶ There are certain programs existing today that patch together interagency protocols, but they are created almost

entirely on an ad hoc basis—after problems arise and quick action is necessary—and in theater instead of in the United States. “Institutionalized ad hockery”⁶⁷ will not meet today’s security challenges; we need interagency teams that are assembled, trained, and practiced together *before* deploying overseas. These teams should include representatives from the whole spectrum of government agencies—not just DoD, State Department, and USAID, but also CIA, Department of Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and the U.S. Information Service. All of these agencies have different areas of expertise that can strengthen interagency teams when they face challenging situations. Other agencies should be represented on the teams as necessary.

The training programs that assembled interagency teams experience together must simulate as closely as possible the actual environment that may be encountered in the field, especially when they will be sent to a country with an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign. Simulations are necessary in order for team members to experience something akin to what the military calls “reinforcement of competence,” or to the learning process that takes place in an officer’s mind during his peacetime training followed by the period of active service. Realistic simulations make the transition to actual dangerous scenarios easier; once in theater, personnel take the step from being a leader in peacetime to a leader in war, experiencing a “renewal of competence.”⁶⁸ Military and civilian training that simulates the actual reality in theater makes the step from the training situation to the combat (or post-combat) environment as small as possible. It is important to offer good training opportunities to all who serve abroad, but it is especially important for those who will serve as leaders and commanders because not

only do they have to know and understand their own tasks, but they also must safely command and control the actions of subordinates. These training simulations are also opportunities for the best leaders to practice some of the leadership competencies discussed earlier, for example, the transformational leadership style within the Army's "Be-Do-Know" framework.

A recent example of interagency training insufficiency occurred in the U.S. experience using Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, especially from 2003 to 2005.⁶⁹ There was usually no team building for groups except in theater, and there was no standard implemented training regimen for operating in the interagency environment. PRT staffing was sometimes haphazard and did not necessarily match the needs of individual teams. Team members often shared no common understanding of the main goals and challenges of their missions. Some other countries have used a more successful model in Afghanistan. Specifically, German and British PRTs were usually assembled and trained before being deployed to Afghanistan—sometimes as much as 6 months in advance. Once in theater, these interagency teams were able to draw on common training experience to coordinate tasking and work cooperatively to accomplish their missions.⁷⁰

It should be noted that while more joint training is very important, it is also usually desirable to have one agency (or even one person) with ultimate authority to make the final call on tough decisions; joint training for interagency teams does not necessarily suggest that all agencies have equal decisionmaking power. To illustrate, one of the main problems with peacekeeping operations (which, like support and stability operations, necessarily involve the interagency) is that more people show up than can contribute to the effort

efficiently. In Bosnia in the mid-1990s, for example, UN peacekeepers were joined by a group of American civilians who wanted to teach the Bosnians Spanish as part of the peacekeeping effort.⁷¹ Initially, the UN soldiers allowed them to stay and help, even though there is simply no reason for Bosnians—whether Muslim, Serb, or Croat—to learn Spanish. This was basically a failure of leadership: some headquarters or organization should have used its authority to say no to this group in order to keep the mission focused.

In some ways, the recommendation for increased joint military-civilian training implies “militarizing the interagency,” an idea first suggested by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 in 1997.⁷² However, it does not imply that the military should take complete charge of interagency operations; rather, it means that the structures and functions of interagency teams should operate more like the military, with a clear chain of command and someone in ultimate command who delineates which agency is responsible for each task in accomplishing the broader mission. It also means creating clearer lines of communication and eliminating structural obstacles to information sharing.

A third recommendation for improving leadership in the interagency is for the U.S. Government to *create a formal, centralized knowledge management system*. The problem addressed by this recommendation is that every new presidential administration—at least every 8 years in other words—appears to come into office thinking that it faces totally unique challenges and that it is somehow the first administration to ever deal with many of the problems that require interagency cooperation. In other words, the new administration comes in thinking it must reinvent the wheel. There is almost never any sense of exploiting lessons learned

from the past, or looking to previously documented knowledge and literature; each administration tries to “carve its own trail” in counterinsurgency and other interagency challenges.⁷³ This adversely affects U.S. support and stability operations as well as peacekeeping operations that the United States participates in.

Ironically, there is a body of knowledge out there on things the United States tends to do well, for example, recruiting international police as it did in Bosnia and Haiti, and on things that other countries we could partner with do well.⁷⁴ There is also information available that outlines strengths of particular agencies and how their personnel might be used most effectively in particular operations. The problem is that this information is never consolidated or organized in any coherent and meaningful way, never systematically filed and stored, and never advertised, so that government officials arriving on the scene may never know it exists or how to access it. For them, such information might as well not even exist, for there is no formal proactive institutional memory with which to train new leaders.

This is a problem some have labeled “institutional memory loss,” meaning the U.S. Government collectively forgets that it has engaged in similar operations in the past and has sometimes been successful. Even if the American government has not been successful, oftentimes some other government (or other agency, or other army) *has* been successful in the past. And even if past efforts were not a success, such information should be made available to newcomers so they can avoid the mistakes of the past or avoid adopting ill-advised measures to make them work. The challenge is to organize and institutionalize this knowledge base and experience so that it can be tapped in future operations and used in future leadership education programs.

Conclusion.

In current and future low-intensity conflicts, or counterinsurgency warfare, the United States will be successful only if it is able to utilize all political, economic, and psychological options at its disposal. The challenges of these operations are unique, requiring interagency cooperation from the level of small teams in theater all the way up to the highest levels in Washington. The role of the military must be defined based on how the United States can best apply its military capability in synchronization with other elements of national power—we need to build capacity in the military as well as civilian agencies.⁷⁵ So far, we seem to have been most successful at increasing the capabilities solely of the military; soon after the invasion of Afghanistan, “99.9 percent of the resources in country were controlled by the Department of Defense.”⁷⁶ Adequately funding the military is essential, but since “the humanitarian space and the battle space overlap,”⁷⁷ overall mission goals are best served by funding civilian agencies as well. Military leaders must coordinate with the country team in order to achieve synchronization of military and political will, especially when it comes to planning and resourcing. Faulty planning in support and stability operations is a national problem, with civilian agencies including State Department and USAID needing to be better funded in order to meet the challenges they are sure to face.

To implement these changes successfully, the United States needs bright, thoughtful, well-trained leaders who understand leadership theory and are motivated to cooperate with representatives of other

government agencies so as to bring the full hard and soft power of the United States to bear. In today's counterinsurgency operations, there is something lacking in the interagency process—that thing is very likely effective *leadership*. To better prepare leaders of interagency teams, the United States needs a set of standard, coherent leadership training programs and evaluation methods that address three main problems: the lack of a common lexicon across the spectrum of government agencies; insufficient joint training with both military and civilian agencies present; and the lack of a formal knowledge-management and knowledge-sharing system.

By implementing these changes and coordinating planning and resource allocation, the United States can enjoy greater success in future counterinsurgency and support and stability operations. Some of the most important reforms have to do with leadership—how we train and educate people and how we equip them to align civilian and military goals determine how successful we can be in furthering U.S. interests in strategically important areas of the world.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. "Support and stability operations" is the term most often used in today's conflicts. A number of other terms have similar meanings, including "low-intensity conflict," and "counterinsurgency warfare." Subtle differences in terminology can have meaningful consequences, a point I will return to later, but for now I will use these terms synonymously.

2. James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978, p. 9.

3. Robert A. Fitton, *Development of Strategic Level Leaders*, Washington, DC: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, 1993, p. 2.

4. Fitton, p. 4.

5. Georgia Sorenson, "An Intellectual History of Leadership Studies: The Role of James MacGregor Burns," College Park, MD: The Burns Academy of Leadership, University of Maryland, 2003.

6. Fitton, p. 5.

7. Frederick W. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911, p. 2.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

9. Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 23.

10. John P. Kotter, "What Leaders Really Do," *Harvard Business Review*, 1990, p. 37.

11. Not all theorists in the business camp agree with Kotter that distinguishing between leadership and management is useful; some fall more in line with my position, which is that leadership and management are so closely related that distinctions are practically meaningless. Management theorists David Whetten and Kim Cameron, for example, argue that differences in management and leadership today are so small that they are negligible.

12. Burns, p. 18.

13. Bernard M. Bass and Paul Steidlmeier, "Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior," *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999, p. 184.

14. Bass and Steidlmeier, p. 184.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

18. I primarily focus on the Army here because it is the most useful case study in leadership development programming. Other military services have experienced similar transitions.

19. John W. Brinsfield, "Army Values and Ethics: A Search for Consistency and Relevance," *Parameters*, Autumn, 1998, p. 70.

20. Fitton.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

22. Brinsfield, p. 71.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

27. Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile*, October, 12, 2006.

28. Framework developed by retired Brigadier General Howard Prince and others of the West Point Behavioral Science and Leadership Department. It is adapted from university and leadership research based on the original words "cognitive, behavioral, and ethical," but was simplified in order to be used at all ranks in the Army.

29. FM 6-22, p. 1-1.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3.

31. Fitton, p. 4.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

34. Information on OPM taken from its website, *www.opm.gov*, accessed February 5, 2007.

35. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, "Optimizing Organizational Performance Survey Services," *www.opm.gov/hr/employ/products/survey/leadership360.asp*.

36. From USAID's website, *www.usaid.gov*, accessed February 5, 2007.

37. U.S. Agency for International Development, "Sierra Leone Leadership Training Breaks Barriers," *www.usaid.gov/stories/sierraleone/ss_sierraleone_council.html*.

38. Walter F. Ulmer. "Military Leadership in the 21st Century: Another 'Bridge Too Far?'" *Parameters*, Spring, 1998, pp. 4-25.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

41. These characteristics have proven important time and time again—for the British during the Arab Revolt and World War I in the Middle East, for the French in Algeria, and for the United States in Vietnam and Iraq, to name a few examples.

42. Donald R. Morelli and Michael M. Ferguson, "Low-Intensity Conflict: An Operational Perspective," *Military Review*, November 1984. This sentiment has been echoed more recently by military veterans with interagency experiences, including John Nagl and David Petraeus.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

45. Brigadier General Daniel Bolger, interview with author, February 26, 2007. General Bolger has extensive experience leading interagency teams, including close cooperation and training with Iraqi soldiers during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and in his current post at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

46. Linda Jamison, interview with author, March 22, 2007. Jamison also has a great deal of experience operating in interagency environments, most notably in her service during peacekeeping operations in the Clinton era. She is also an expert on leadership training and currently serves as Dean of the Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.* The best examples of this occurred in Bosnia and Haiti, when U.S. Army personnel, even at the highest levels, sometimes deferred to the more experienced Foreign Service Officers or UN peacekeepers in tactical decisionmaking.

49. Bolger.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Office of Personnel Management, "The Federal Executive Institute and the Management Development Centers," www.leadership.opm.gov/Courses/Index.aspx.

52. Jamison.

53. Fitton, p. 2.

54. Ulmer.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

57. *Ibid.*

58. See, for example, the works of Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, Sam Gosling, and William Ickes, to name a few. These theorists come from a variety of backgrounds, but generally agree that personality and leadership potential can be assessed reasonably accurately, and furthermore that individuals can learn to be more accurate in their assessments.

59. Ulmer, p. 13.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Morelli, p. 9.
63. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, "Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management," January 2006.
64. Brittany R. Ballenstedt, "Lawmaker Renews Push to Improve Management Training," *GovExec.com Daily Briefing*, March 23, 2007.
65. Bolger.
66. Jamison.
67. Senior Institute for Defense Analyses Official, "The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions," Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6, 2007.
68. Klaus-Richard Bohme, "The Only War They Had: A Study of Low Level Tactics in the Vietnam War," Stockholm, Sweden: The University of Stockholm History Faculty, undated.
69. See Carlos Hernandorena, Chapter 5 of the present book.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Jamison. She was actually present in Bosnia when this group arrived.
72. Senior Official, U.S. Army War College, "The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions," Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6, 2007.

73. Jamison.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Senior Official, U.S. Army War College.

76. Senior Official, Office of the Secretary of Defense, "The Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions," Research Symposium, Texas A&M University, April 5-6, 2007. This is an exaggeration used to produce a desired effect on the audience he was speaking to.

77. See Robin Dorff, Chapter 12 of the present book.

CHAPTER 15

THE INFLUENCE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS ON THE ARMY PROFESSION AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Chris Cline

The Army bears the brunt of stability operations on the ground. This is so despite a deeply rooted cultural bias against such operations within the Army profession as embodied in the Army's officer corps. According to this cultural bias, traditional combat operations are the Army's premier mission while stability operations are the responsibility of civilian agencies or specialized units such as civil affairs, military police, and special operations forces. National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense (DoD) Directive-3000.05 (DoDD-3000.5) have challenged this traditional mindset, forcing the Army profession to confront how it will incorporate stability operations into its repertoire as a core mission.

There is of course the related—and possibly more difficult—question of how to adapt the Army culture as a whole to this new operational dimension. Stability operations are complex, with a large interagency aspect. While the Army plays a vital role, many aspects of stability operations cannot occur without the integration of civilian government agency support. It is the responsibility of civilian agency leaders, or more specifically public managers in government, to develop and carry out a multitude of programs within stability operations. Recent events in Iraq have demonstrated that U.S. Government officials, as public managers, need to reevaluate their methods and practices in

light of resource and capability shortfalls. Achieving success in stability operations may require both the Army officer and public manager to examine what knowledge and skills are necessary along with what changes, if any, both groups must make to cultural attitudes, beliefs, and practices.

Understanding what knowledge and skills are essential to operational success requires an examination of the elements comprising the Army profession and public management as well as possible challenges both cultures face. This chapter attempts to examine these aspects in five broad thematic areas. The first deals with the practices linking the Army profession and public management in counterinsurgency and nation-building. Their respective cultures are also examined. The second looks at the importance of NSPD-44 and DoDD-3000.5 for establishing stability operations as a U.S. national security concern and for creating knowledge and skill requirements for the Army profession and public managers. The third focuses on the manner in which the Army profession and public management have approached, or should approach, stability operations, including necessary knowledge and skill sets. Insights from highly respected authorities on the Army profession and public management are also included. The fourth highlights areas of concern and interest for both the Army profession and public management regarding approaches to stability operations, along with knowledge and skill development. Finally, the fifth thematic area is devoted to presents findings, recommendations, and conclusions.

The Army Profession.

The Army's officer corps consists of the practitioners of what is known as the Army profession. Unfortunately, for those outside the Army and even for many officers, the notion of the Army profession is often misunderstood. What makes the officer corps' work a profession, and what impact does this have on the role and expertise of the Army officer? To develop proficiency in the necessary skill sets required for stability operations, the Army's officer corps must first understand what it means to be a professional.

Dr. Don Snider, a retired Army colonel and civilian professor at the U.S. Military Academy, has spearheaded many of the latest studies on the Army profession. According to Snider, the Army can be viewed as a large bureaucratic organization and a profession. He notes that at times the Army's bureaucratic nature overshadows its commitment to military professionalism. This overshadowing of professionalism is the result of decades of organizational and bureaucratic tendencies gaining precedence and priority over the purely professional. This phenomenon has produced an organization focused on efficiency rather than effectiveness, he argues. He advocates return to an Army where professionalism dominates elements of bureaucracy. To achieve that goal, the officer corps must first understand what makes them part of a profession.

In the classic work, *The System of Professions*, Andrew Abbott outlines four characteristics inherent to a profession: knowledge, tasks, control, and jurisdiction. *Knowledge*, or more specifically the academic knowledge system of a profession, provides for legitimation, research, instruction, and timely innovation.¹ *Tasks*,

defined in the profession's cultural work, are any problems open to expert service. *Professional controls* include schools to train professionals, examinations to test them, licenses that identify them, and a code of ethics to assure that professionals practice their craft up to standards.² A profession must also claim or assert its dominance over a *jurisdiction*, the boundaries of knowledge and expertise of the profession. This claim requires professions to ask society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive rights with social acceptance and forms of legitimating responses from society.³ Abbott refers to jurisdiction as the link between a profession and its work, an entity with a culture and social structure.⁴

Army Professionalism Defined.

A set of established tasks is essential in considering the Army as a profession. Those tasks can be seen in the components of the Army's operational concept of full-spectrum operations: offense, defense, stability, and civil support.⁵ This operational concept provides the foundation for all Army doctrine. Based on Abbott's theory, Snider and his research team drafted what they considered to be the negotiated jurisdictions of the U.S. military professional (Figure 1). External and internal jurisdictions exist, with the external primarily serving the Army's client, American society, and internal jurisdictions serving the profession itself. The four external jurisdictions consist of major combat operations, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and homeland security. The Army has competition within these jurisdictions from such outside professions as the other military services, other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private contractors.⁶




Figure 1. Negotiated Jurisdictions of American Military Professions.⁷

Developing expert knowledge itself, and developing Army professionals with that expert knowledge and expertise, comprise the two internal jurisdictions. There are four subsets of expert knowledge: military-technical, moral-ethical, political-cultural, and human development.⁸ Figure 1 shows how these clusters of expert knowledge correspond to the four identities of the Army officer: warrior, leader of character, member of profession, and servant of country. Expert knowledge and expertise are credentials that sources outside the Army try to develop as well. As a result, the Army encounters competition within the internal jurisdictions from such sources as Army retirees and private corporations hired for contracting work.⁹

The 2003 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report.

In 2003, the Army released the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report. The original mission of the ATLDP was to focus on contributing to the Army's transformation campaign. However, as over 13,500 officers began to provide their input, it became evident that a major focus on Army leaders themselves was needed. The findings demonstrated that officers failed to understand fully the Army service ethic and concepts of officership and professionalism. These findings echoed Snider's findings. While officers demonstrated strong support for the foundations of the Army service ethic—pride in their profession, commitment to the Army and its values, and belief in the essential purposes of the military—the full implications of what it means to be a member of the Army profession proved esoteric in the minds of respondents, lacking clear definition and reinforcement throughout an officer's career.¹⁰

Perhaps an even more important finding was that the requisite leader competencies must thrive “in a complex environment marked by the challenge of high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in stability operations and support operations.”¹¹ Backed by voluminous officer comments, the study found that the Army's educational experience failed to provide officers with the knowledge and skill sets needed for proficiency in today's operating environment. The changing operational environment, with the increased requirement for proficiency in full-spectrum operations, reflected a number of inadequacies in the officer education system (OES). Officers perceived that the OES was failing them. The study found that OES

did a good job teaching branch technical and tactical skills, but did not sufficiently teach combat support and combat service support officers the basic combat skills necessary for leading and protecting units in full-spectrum operations. The study concluded that while there was increased emphasis on battle command within the education system, the Army needed to add stability and support operations to the OES.¹²

The Role of the Public Manager.

Just as many officers are unaware of their responsibilities as members of the Army profession, public managers and interagency officials involved in stability operations also need to understand their roles and responsibilities. The redefinition and clarification of Army missions and the requirement for interagency involvement call not only for the Army profession to understand what knowledge and skills are expected from them, but also for public managers to understand their own roles. Public managers play an important role in the government bureaucracy and the interagency process as a whole. Unfortunately, many in society look upon the bureaucracy with disdain, failing to realize that bureaucracies are essential and inevitable. Examining the traits of an effective manager will shed light on the professionalism needed within the bureaucracy to improve individual and organizational performance in stability operations as a whole.

An effective public manager, regardless of his or her particular position or responsibility, must possess the temperament and skills to organize, motivate, and direct the actions of others in and out of government towards accomplishing public purposes. Additionally, like managers in the private sector, public managers

direct the allocation of scarce resources for achieving specific goals. Being a successful public manager involves comprehending exactly what public management is just as membership in the Army's officer corps involves understanding what makes the military profession a profession. Public management has three dimensions. Laurence Lynn, a public management professor at Texas A&M University with extensive experience in government and academia, describes these three dimensions as structure, craft, and institution, which translate to "management," "manager," and "responsible practice."¹³

Public management was originally conceived as a structure of governance to provide a means for limiting and overseeing the exercise of state authority in agencies and departments. In terms of structure, public management exhibits the elements of lawful delegation of authority and external control over the exercise of delegated authority. It is the means of striking a balance between capacity and control, which is a controversial aspect of public management. Failing to create this balance often results in tensions in the field of public service and in failure to achieve needed public management reform. Finding the ideal balance in such requirements as formal controls over managerial discretion, "letting managers manage," holding public managers accountable for their performance, degree of adherence to formal rules and procedures, etc., are always problematic.¹⁴

In recent decades the focus on public management as a craft involving behavioral skills and intellectual ability has intensified. Public management literature often characterizes successful public managers as understanding and able to master problems; having imagination; being skilled at working effectively with

interest groups, legislators, and members of the agency; possessing the ability to make effective arguments; and being inclined to act. The idea of craft postulates that public management will be only as effective as public managers are able to master their craft.¹⁵

The concept of responsibility is integral to identifying public management as a self-regulated institution. As an institution, public management provides guidance to public managers and allows them to understand the need to practice their craft under a regime of values and ideals. In essence, public institutions establish standards of professionalism.

Managerial Responsibility.

Aside from being well-versed in the established directives and governing documents of the current administration, public managers should be students of the U.S. Constitution as well. Unfortunately, many within government are not truly conversant with the fundamental strictures of the Constitution. Understanding the Constitution and the role that public management plays in government helps the public manager understand his/her responsibility to government.

What constitutes responsibility in the sphere of public management? In the book *Madison's Managers*, Anthony Bertelli and Laurence Lynn set down what they consider to be the four axioms of responsibility as derived from constitutional values and seen in the classical literature of public administration: judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability. These axioms help the public manager operate within the context of the separation of powers, allowing the legislative, executive, and judicial to properly share powers.

According to Bertelli and Lynn, these axioms are not a classification of managerial functions like planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, budgeting, etc. Nor do they purport to be qualities of action such as efficiency, effectiveness, professionalism, responsiveness, flexibility, consistency, stability, leadership, probity, candor, competence, efficacy, prudence, due process, etc.¹⁶ The difference is that judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability are fundamental to constitutional governance through adhering to James Madison’s ideal of administrative discretion. See Figure 2.




Figure 2. Dimensions of Public Management and Axioms of Responsibility from Bertelli and Lynn.

Judgment, synonymous with autonomy and discretion, is considered fundamental to a constitutional scheme in which important authorities are delegated to the executive. Public managers must exercise their discretion wisely since it often determines the level of action taken on a matter of public concern. Public managers must also exhibit balance and prudence in their decisions in order to avoid corrupting the constitutional process through acting on behalf of their own self-interests or the interests of particular groups or ideologies. Instead, their goal is to identify and resolve inevitable conflicts among interests. In terms of rationality, Bertelli and Lynn contend that the default position for public managers motivated to fulfill the constitutional scheme should be reasonableness in their actions and decisions. Finally, balanced and rational judgment leads to accountability and responsibility, the "entire purpose of public management as an institution among the separate powers."¹⁷

Implications of DoDD-3000-5 and NSPD-44.

In December 2005, the White House issued NSPD-44 to address the management of interagency efforts in reconstruction and stabilization. In NSPD-44, the President designated the Department of State to be the lead department in such efforts, acting specifically through the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. That office serves as overall coordinator of stability operations and establishes workable relations with all relevant U.S. agencies to "prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities."¹⁸ The Secretary of State is also required to coordinate stabilization efforts with the Secretary of Defense so as "to ensure harmonization with any

planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”¹⁹ Perhaps the most significant element of NSPD-44 is that it acknowledges, legitimizes, and institutionalizes stabilization and reconstruction activities as being integral to U.S. national security.

The issuance of DoDD-3000.05 in November 2005 was also significant in that, along with NSPD-44, it affirms stability operations as a significant element of our total defense posture. Dr. Douglas Johnson believes that so far as national security is concerned, this directive could “be one of the most important documents of this decade.”²⁰ Stability operations, defined by DoD as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States,” is now considered to be a core U.S. military mission that requires the *same priority as combat operations*.²¹

Given these policy directives, Army professionals and department/agency managers must come to understand the importance of stability operations and their role in establishing the peace that ultimately represents victory in war. Part of this understanding includes new expectations and assigned tasks. DoDD-3000.05 states that stability operations “are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values.” As part of the immediate goal, establishing this order entails providing the local populace with security, restoring essential services, and meeting the necessary humanitarian needs. The long-term goal of stability operations is helping the target government develop a capacity for providing essential services, a viable market economy, the rule of law, democratic governmental institutions, and a robust civil society.²²

To achieve the immediate and long-term goals, the directive assigns three major tasks:

- Rebuilding “indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment”;²³
- Reviving or building the private sector, “including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure;”²⁴ and,
- Developing governmental institutions representative of the people.²⁵

While DoDD-3000.05 acknowledges that many tasks that fall under stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals, it makes clear that the U.S. military must be prepared to perform all necessary tasks in the event that civilians are unable to do so. The question then becomes: What skill sets do Army professionals need to develop to become proficient in stability operations, particularly if the military has to perform them alone, and what skill sets do public managers need to develop for application when the security situation and/or agency availability permit entry to the theater?

The Army Profession and Stability Operations.

Traditionally, the U.S. military has regarded conventional warfighting as its premier mission. However, the Army’s most recent experiences have demonstrated the need for the profession to embrace stability operations as a core mission. DoDD-3000.05 is a landmark document in that it firmly emplaces stability operations within the military’s core missions.

No longer are the tasks associated with “Phase IV” (post-conflict stability operations) the unqualified responsibility of other government agencies and NGOs. The military can no longer concern itself solely with winning the war, but with winning the peace as well. But as important as stability missions are and despite the explicit assignment of such missions as a core Army mission by the Army’s civilian masters, the concept may be a difficult task for many in the Army profession to accept and come to terms with.

Dr. Lawrence Yates, a former specialist in stability operations at the Combat Studies Institute, notes that despite the Army’s participation in more stability-type operations than conventional wars since 1789, the institutional Army has still continued to maintain its emphasis on warfighting until very late in the game.²⁶ As an example, Yates refers to the opening paragraph of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (2001), in which it declared, “Fighting and winning the nation’s wars [are] the foundation of Army service—the Army’s nonnegotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation.”²⁷ He also notes a prevailing attitude that follow-on stability operations are seen to be “someone else’s job,” either that of civilian agencies or specialized military personnel such as civil affairs, military police, engineers, medics, lawyers, and special operations forces.²⁸

While maintaining the ability to discriminatively destroy the enemy’s military capabilities remains crucial and should not be questioned, many officers debate what exactly falls within the boundaries of warfighting and ultimately war-winning. Army participation in post-combat stability operations is common when instability prevents the immediate withdrawal of military forces; however, many Army

professionals are reluctant to accept and fully embrace stability operations as a core mission. Some of these traditionalists argue that combat troops would sacrifice warfighting skills and their warrior ethos if stability operations became a core mission.²⁹ Any general officer or civilian leader who seeks to make stability operations a core mission of the military in deed as well as word will have to overcome and transform a deep-seated, traditional mindset as to the Army's proper role, according to Yates.³⁰

Yates and Snider agree that the Army's officer corps should accept stability operations as a core mission and not question whether or not it has a place in the Army's jurisdiction. That sentiment is now shared by the institutional Army as evinced in emerging doctrine and publications. Post-conflict stability operations are and always have been a part of the profession's expert knowledge. As Snider chides, "Shame on us [the Army's officer corps] for not knowing it."³¹ History contains innumerable examples of the Army conducting stability operations: building and securing the frontier's infrastructure, pacification campaigns in the Philippines, establishing stability in Mexico and the secessionist South after the Mexican and Civil Wars, respectively, and in post-conflict Germany, Japan, and South Korea.³² Snider believes it is the cultural bias Yates describes that allowed counterinsurgency doctrine to wither and our civil affairs capabilities to atrophy.

Even if the officer corps wholeheartedly comes to accept stability operations as a core mission, there will still be questions concerning the Army's role. Should the Army be completely responsible for operations or subordinate to another agency or interagency task force? More than likely, the military will indeed stay and

bear the brunt of stability operations because there is a tendency for other agencies, which lack the necessary resources, not to get involved. Michele Flournoy, former senior advisor in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) International Security Program, explains that when the military is asked “to undertake these kinds of missions without adequate civilian partners, they get stuck with mission creep and no exit strategy. . . . [But] in the short term, they have to step into the breach.”³³ According to Snider, if the Army considers itself a profession, then it should be willing to step up and take the lead. Snider believes that DoD is the only agency funded well enough to carry out operational missions abroad.

Despite the views of Snider and others that the Army profession should be responsible overall, there exists a competing view that the State Department should take responsibility for a significant part of stability operations. NSPD-44 supports this view in granting the State Department oversight of stability operations. Snider contends, however, that the State Department is responsible for manning embassies and, like other government agencies, is not funded for or capable of leading or taking part in support and stability operations (SASO). While the State Department may supply knowledgeable experts on the ground to assist with the political and diplomatic aspects of operations, they should not be expected to carry out the operational aspects of such missions or bear the overall responsibility. NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), however, will always be involved since they have the ability to do operational work.³⁴

The Public Manager and Stability Operations.

Stability operations affect the missions and tasks public managers are going to have to face. As the lessons learned from Iraq indicate, public managers play a significant role in the planning and implementation of personnel management, overall operations, contracting, auditing, and various reconstruction programs to include institution-building. Unfortunately, many public management miscues have been receiving a disproportionate share of the attention. Examples include staffing issues such as those reported in the *Washington Post* on February 24, 2007. The U.S. Government contracted the job of promoting democracy in Diyala, a province northeast of Baghdad, with a Pakistani citizen wholly unfamiliar with democratic procedures. Further, the U.S. officials put Diyala's Border Patrol commander in charge of the management of reconstruction projects despite his having no reconstruction experience.³⁵

Laurence Lynn has stated, "The best thing to do for stability operations is to believe in stability."³⁶ These words reinforce the need for public managers not only to do their job as it pertains to stability operations, but also to believe in the necessity of post-conflict stability itself. This belief in the mission and its importance is the first step to ensuring successful operations. An administration, department, or agency that does not take seriously the role of post-conflict stability will very likely fail. Once government officials, as public managers, come to believe in their mission and tasks, they will begin approaching operations with the appropriate management skills and make the right things happen.

Required Knowledge and Skills.

Conducting stability operations, whose distinguishing trait is complexity, is not an easy task. It involves issues ranging from politics, to networking, to communications, to name only a few. The Army professional has to consider all the elements involved in stability operations which are not normally considered part of the traditional military repertoire – political, financial, social, economic, and humanitarian challenges. Professionals have to educate themselves on what is required to effectively carry out the roles and responsibilities expected in such a complex core mission. No longer can military professionals concern themselves only with combat effectiveness; they must be concerned with the means of achieving stability in a region. In short, the professional needs to learn to think and act in ways that authentically reflect the profession's expertise in stability operations.

Thinking Like a Strategic Leader.

The path to gaining the required expert knowledge for the Army professional is to begin thinking like a strategic leader.³⁷ Professionals need to begin by asking themselves, "What requisite knowledge and skills do I not have?"³⁸ They need to understand the map of expert knowledge and its jurisdictions as they pertain to the profession.³⁹ Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the profession to develop this required knowledge. Moreover, the Army's mission and requirements necessitate strategic leaders who can work across political, agency, ethnic, religious, cultural, and national boundaries. Fortunately, one can learn how to work across boundaries through self-development and institutional development.⁴⁰ See Figure 3.

Stability Operations Considerations

Doctrine:

How should doctrine address the distinctions between stability operations conducted during war as opposed to similar operations conducted during peacetime? What principles should apply? How and when should interagency participation be integrated? How should planners integrate available allied forces, peacekeepers, or international police units? What is the best way to incorporate lessons learned from emerging experience and expertise?

Organization:

How should the Army organize itself to best fulfill the tasks associated with stability operations? Is there a possibility for the creation of specialized units? Would multi-tasking existing organizations to perform stability operations in conjunction with combat operations and other tasks prove too much to handle? Should the same command carrying out combat operations be responsible for stability operations? At what organizational level should planning for stability and combat operations take place and should the same or different organizations be responsible? Are soldiers who have just completed combat operations best suited for initial stability operations and providing for public security until the creation of a local police force can take over responsibility? How should other government agencies and service providers such as NGOs, allied forces, and international organizations be factored into planning and execution?

Training, Leadership, and Education:

What additions or modifications must be made to training and leader development systems to produce Army professionals adept at stability operations? Is the training provided at the pre-commissioning and basic training levels adequate for subjecting new soldiers to the realities of both stability operations and warfighting? Are the tasks required for proficiency in stability operations addressed throughout a leader's career? Are realistic stability operations scenarios played out in the Army's combat training centers?

Material:

What are the material demands for stability operations? Within the zone of conflict, what are the sources for supplying the basic needs of the population? Which materials provided for unit sustainment can be used to aid stability operations? What local assets will most likely be available to assist? Given the requirement for Army units to exercise restraint and discrimination in potentially hostile environments, are there any material or technological solutions which could provide assistance in such conditions? Can the Army preposition material required for stability operations in theaters of operations? Is there a need for deploying additional support units such as transportation and medical to handle civilian requirements post-conflict?

(Continued on next page)

<p>Personnel</p> <p>Do Army personnel systems meet the flexibility and fidelity requirements for identification and assignment of personnel and units needed for stability operations? Is the right mix of individual specialties available to the Army? Do the active forces possess enough personnel ready for immediate deployment? Are specialists in the Reserves such as civil affairs and military police readily available in sufficient numbers for deployment and sustainability over multiple deployments? Does the personnel system track stability operations skills among reserve members along with relevant civilian specialties such as an infantryman with police, local government, and construction experience?</p>

Figure 3. Five Considerations for Stability Operations by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement.⁴³

Public managers play a crucial role in the planning phases of operations and must thus demonstrate creativity and the ability to conceptualize. Public managers need to think of every potential scenario and contingency in an attempt to control events after the train has been set in motion. Although Lynn refers to this as “common sense public management,” it is sometimes overlooked. Lynn cites an instance when he was a member of the National Security Council (NSC) Staff during the Vietnam War. Henry Kissinger handed him the war plan for a projected invasion of Cambodia, telling him, “I want to know everything that can go wrong; I want to know everything that has not been thought about or is not being thought about in that plan; I want to know everything you can think of that I [Kissinger] should be able to possibly anticipate and help the President anticipate.”⁴⁴

While he considers that situation a “pretty small-scale effort,” Lynn and his staff spent several days going over the plan to think of every possible scenario, such as refugees, intervention from the North Vietnamese

side, reactions from the Cambodians, and reactions from Cambodian allies. Questioning all assumptions in this manner is essential. Any public manager taking part in or contemplating any operation or campaign remotely similar needs to prepare for eventualities, unintended consequences, and far-out ripple effects. The public manager also needs to prepare for worst-case scenarios and risks flowing from the enemy side, and also consider scenarios that might be generated by friendly outside agencies or sources. Such preparedness becomes even more crucial as the degree of danger and uncertainty rises.⁴⁵

Building a Tool Kit.

A useful public management tool in stability operations is the ability to identify personnel who possess skills and expertise requisite for success in a particular operation. While the Army usually has such specialists at its disposal, civil affairs being a good example, most other government agencies such as the State Department do not. Consider the Diyala region in Iraq. While having overall responsibility for stability operations and reconstruction teams in that area, the State Department has no agronomists, engineers, police officers, or technicians at its disposal.⁴⁶ As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has remarked, "No foreign service in the world has those people."⁴⁷

The lack of qualified personnel and experts within civilian government agencies opens up the possibility of establishing a new public management strategy of reserve capabilities like the one the Bush administration has proposed and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has recommended.⁴⁸ The

question then becomes, "Where does this capability come from and how do we identify such personnel?" Are they part of a permanent establishment dedicated to stability operation missions or do they serve in a call-up status?⁴⁹ These are not unlike the personnel questions that Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement address concerning the Army profession. Identification of appropriate personnel, according to Lynn, must occur through professional public management.⁵⁰

The ability to identify and manage personnel is important because personnel management can have a major impact on how operations are carried out. Staffing and manning procedures must place the highest priority on acquiring qualified applicants. For stability operations, applicants must have appropriate language skills, experience in post-conflict operations, or expertise in stability-related fields. In addition, there must be a sufficient number of personnel available to carry out the duties and tasks associated with ongoing operations. Such staffing problems are evident in the rebuilding of Iraq where there is a dearth of qualified personnel to carry out the reconstruction efforts.⁵¹

In the critique titled *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management*, the Special Inspector General declares that personnel management and planning must "clearly identify current and future human capital needs, the number of personnel required to accomplish a specific mission, the specific competencies necessary, and the sources from which skilled personnel can be drawn."⁵² Public managers must ensure that such information is acquired. An interesting parallel to the need for public managers to believe in the mission of stability emerges from the following question: Should public managers also be willing to execute their tasks and missions in the

environment or theater for which they are planning? Noteworthy, part of the lack of qualified personnel in Iraq is attributable to a lack of desire on the part of agency employees to deploy to a combat zone.⁵³

Another important element of stability operations is the need to establish human service programs for the local populace. While primarily a public management task, the Army profession and all interagency officials would benefit from understanding the considerations involved in human service programs. Gordon Chase provides what he considers a framework for thinking about implementation difficulties in establishing these programs. Though this framework was intended mostly for programs in the United States, all interagency officials involved in stability operations should be aware of its elements, especially since they are applicable elsewhere.

According to Chase, the three general sources of implementation difficulties include the operational demands implied by a particular program concept, the nature and availability of the resources required to run the program, and the program manager's need to share his authority with other bureaucratic and political actors or at least retain their support, while assembling the necessary resources and managing the program.⁵⁴ Careful and thorough examination of these three sources of difficulties may help the public manager identify all or most of the problems related to various program implementations. The added dimensions of interagency involvement and potentially hostile operational environments demonstrate why public managers must plan, coordinate, and implement their management programs with far more than routine care.

The Importance of Language and Cross-cultural Savvy.

Thus far, it appears that the Army has not been able to adequately “provide post-conflict stability sufficient for strategic success in the type of wars it seems destined to face in the coming decades.”⁵⁵ If one could narrow the requisites for success in stability operations to two essential skills, what would they be? Snider strongly answers that all officers should possess language proficiency and cross-cultural savvy. These two skills, he believes, would do most to help the Army profession achieve success in the world of stability operations and interagency involvement. Lynn believes these two skills are vital to public managers as well.⁵⁶

Cross-cultural savvy is the ability to work across boundaries and understand other peoples’ mode of living. It includes not only the ability to work with non-U.S. militaries, but also the ability to understand cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, religious, societal, geographical, and political boundaries.⁵⁷ Cross-cultural savvy enables members of the Army profession to interact with a variety of actors such as Congress, the news media, tribal warlords, the diplomatic corps, and NGOs. It allows the officer to work outside of his/her traditional comfort zone and to do so effectively while being grounded in the values of his/her organization. Cross-cultural savvy is a particularly essential skill for an officer to possess as interagency involvement increases along with foreign interaction resulting from globalization.

The development of cross-cultural savvy can begin as early as the precommissioning phase. College courses in international relations, foreign language, and regional studies, coupled with internships with

other agencies and study abroad, help expand one's worldview and cultural awareness. Institutional schools can provide instruction in interagency issues along with education on specific geographical regions. During the early mid-point of one's career, a general understanding and awareness of other cultures can be further enhanced by experience on joint or multinational staffs. Additionally, congressional internships, graduate school education, overseas tours, training with industry assignments, and fellowships can help produce culturally savvy officers.⁵⁸

Going hand in hand with possessing cross-cultural savvy, an officer needs to be able to communicate with the local populace in their language. Few human interactions engender mutual trust better than the ability to speak the other person's language. Achieving success in stability operations means the Army professional must gain the local populace's trust in what they are being told. It is not enough simply to have the ability to say a few key words and phrases in the local's native language. It is not solely a matter of *verbal* understanding. It is also a matter of emotional and psychological understanding. It is about speaking and listening in a language with enough proficiency to establish an element of trust between the Army on the ground and the local populace. It is about understanding local concerns. Therefore, foreign language skills are essential to the Army professional.⁵⁹

Perhaps the best way to establish an officer corps that is proficient in the necessary language skills is to require them for commissioning. Snider believes that language is such an important skill that an officer candidate should not receive his commission until he demonstrates at least Level 3 proficiency in a foreign language. The language the officer is proficient in may

not be the right language for particular operations; however, that first language provides the foundation for the study of a second, more applicable language. Snider admits that a language requirement for commissioning would produce fewer officers, but in his view it is far more important to produce officers with the ability to communicate in a trustworthy manner than to produce a greater number with the inability to effectively communicate with target populations.⁶⁰

Possessing language proficiency and cross-cultural savvy as the foundation of expert knowledge for stability operations proves highly beneficial to the junior officer. Speaking at a conference on the impact of stability operations upon the armed forces, rear Admiral Richard Cobbold of the Royal United Services Institute remarked that the demands for comprehensive training are higher for stability operations than for warfighting. Unfortunately, no military training regimen can address every skill requirement for personnel participating in stability operations. This lack of spelled-out instruction for every situation, in Cobbold's view, encourages junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to draw upon inculcated values gained through prior education rather than procedures and tactics learned in training. This is where a solid foundation of cultural awareness and communication skills gained prior to entry in the service becomes worth its weight in gold.⁶¹

Additionally, public managers need to develop a sense of cross-cultural savvy and language proficiency parallel to that of the Army profession. One of the SIGIR recommendations regarding program management in Iraqi reconstruction efforts includes having program managers integrate local populations at all levels of planning and execution.⁶² The SIGIR found that the

most successful reconstruction managers in Iraq took the time to understand the local customs and practices. The ability to cross cultural boundaries in the target country can have a significant impact on project and program success. Of course, obtaining cultural knowledge of a target country prior to deployment is optimal.

Cross-cultural savvy is beneficial in interagency environments as well. As public managers work with other agencies to accomplish mission tasks, they increasingly need to work outside the boundaries and cultural settings of their resident agencies. Feeling comfortable in and operating within unfamiliar environments enable the manager to be more effective and establish a better communications base with other agencies. There is perhaps a greater need for public managers to possess cross-cultural savvy in the interagency sense than for Army officers because of the nature of the public manager's tasks in general, particularly at the higher levels of government policymaking and operations.

Implications of Stability Operations for Officer Education and Commissioning Sources.

As we have seen, Snider and Lynn agree that two crucial skills for operating in a foreign environment are language proficiency and a high level of cultural awareness or cross-cultural savvy. While proposed ways of developing these skills in officers include increased language study at the precommissioning level as well as instruction in the social sciences, comprehensive development of these skills ultimately involves the commissioning sources themselves.

One aspect of commissioning sources requiring assessment is the baccalaureate curriculum. Any proposed curriculum reforms, however, must face several questions. Do the three commissioning sources (Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC], U.S. Military Academy [USMA], and Officer Candidate School [OCS]) have the capacity to establish a curriculum sufficient to meet reasonable language and cultural awareness requirements within the timelines of their programs? Should there be an established academic program of study for the Army profession similar to that of other professions such as doctors and lawyers? Would an established academic program reduce diversity of backgrounds and knowledge among the officer corps? Should only select academic majors be considered for commission? Would additional requirements be needed for commissioning through OCS? Could future cadets and officer candidates entering a commissioning program be preselected for a particular specialized track or branch, taking into account preexisting academic knowledge and skills based on a foreign language spoken in the home, high school study, or work experience? Would an increase in commissioning requirements have the effect of posing additional barriers to entry into the profession?

The location and character of ROTC programs and schools need to be examined as well. Following the Vietnam era, several ROTC programs at elite colleges and universities in the northeast were discontinued. However, many new programs were established at schools in the south where 49 percent of Army, 41 percent of Air Force, and 41 percent of Navy ROTC programs are located.⁶³ Many of the new programs in the south were established at state colleges where it is more likely that participants come from the

corresponding state or region. The result, as Michael Desch contends, is a predominantly Southern cadet pool.⁶⁴ How does an officer candidate pool composed of a significant number of cadets with a particular regional background affect the cultural awareness of those future officers? Does limited interaction with students from other regions and backgrounds at schools have a significant impact on the cultivation of cross-cultural savvy? Would internships or study abroad provide sufficient outside exposure for students at such schools?

Redefining a Culture?

Is there a need for public managers to adopt something akin to a “warrior ethos” or redefine the notion of “selfless service” regarding operations in hazardous war-torn regions? Is this too much to ask of civilians? The inability of some agencies to require its managers and experts to take part in overseas operations has created shortages of personnel equipped to provide crucial stability-related services. Simply put, not many civilian agency officials are quick to volunteer for lengthy tours in the areas where stability operations take place.⁶⁵ However, their knowledge and expertise are critical to success. An agency ethos entailing a greater willingness to make personal sacrifices would be helpful to operations.

If we may continue along the same line of questions, do public managers need greater operational experience? Should public managers be expected not only to develop cross-cultural savvy and language proficiency, but also spend their early years in operational jobs? Greater operational experience early in a manager’s career may provide greater appreciation

for the managerial planning involved in operations. Should there be a separate class of public managers who possess these skills and operational experience who specialize in stability operations and interagency involvement? These are all relevant questions for public management to consider.

Contractor Involvement.

One threat to both the Army profession and public management which may arise from stability operations is dependence on contractors and civilian-owned companies. The skills and resources that contractors and outside agencies bring to stability operations are those that the Army profession and public managers must control. There will always be a need for contractors to provide expertise in narrow niches of functional expertise, but wholesale reliance on contracted knowledge that is traditionally an Army monopoly or resident in government itself is quite a different matter. The Army profession and public managers must ask themselves, "If contractor involvement ceases altogether, would we still have the knowledge and expertise to complete the mission?" If the answer is no, then new organic capacities must be created. However, if contractors must be used, it is best to establish contracts with local, i.e., indigenous, vendors, as the SIGIR recommends.

As we've noted repeatedly, a factor prompting the use of civilian contractors in stability operations is the unavailability and undeployability of government agency personnel. The SIGIR report on human capital management cites the conclusions of a United States Institute of Peace report which made the following observation concerning the Coalition Provisional

Authority (CPA) experience in Iraq: “Even if planners had correctly anticipated the difficulty of establishing stability and governance in post-war Iraq, there is simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies to mobilize large numbers of the right people quickly.”⁶⁶ Public managers must find a method for overcoming the manning challenge, or the use of contractors will likely increase. Again, a reserve capacity may be the answer, but only if deployability concerns are resolved. By default, it may very well turn out to be the case that the Army remains the go-to actor.

Length of Tours and Performance Continuity.

The desirability of maintaining performance continuity in the target country is another issue the Army profession and public managers need to examine. As a stability operation continues for a period of several years, overly brief tour lengths, as well as gaps between incumbent departure and replacement arrival, particularly among key players, can have a significantly adverse impact on maintaining performance continuity. The recurrent turnover of key personnel proved to be a debilitating factor in the Iraq reconstruction program, according to the SIGIR.⁶⁷ This problem relates mostly to civilian agencies, which lack standard deployment protocols stipulating adequate tour lengths. It was not unusual for tour lengths to be as short as 2-3 months, so that incumbents departed just when they were getting their feet on the ground.

Active-duty Army units in Afghanistan and Iraq now serve 15-month tours, while key Army personnel can serve even longer. However, tour lengths of other military services vary, with 6 months typical for the Navy, 4 months for the Air Force, and 7 months for

the Marines. The disparate military and civilian tour lengths present coordination problems along with creating difficulties in forming lasting and trustworthy working relationships. An across-the-board minimum tour length should be considered. Both groups need to anticipate this adverse factor in their planning and develop a means to resolve it.

NSPD-44 and Army Expertise.

Through NSPD-44, the President authorized the Department of State to coordinate all stabilization and reconstruction efforts overseas. How will an Army profession that considers itself expert in stability operations coexist with the new State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)? If the Army profession establishes itself as the exclusive expert in stability operations, then some challenge to the State Department's authority could easily result. At the very least, significant tension could emerge between the Department of State and DoD, particularly during planning and execution phases. How should S/CRS personnel be integrated into military plans and organization? Does the inability of the State Department to provide an adequate number of qualified personnel to regions such as Iraq bolster an Army profession's argument for primacy in stability operations? How would the situation change if S/CRS were adequately funded to carry out its missions? In the end, the agency with the greatest resources available and ability to provide trained experts will likely become the de facto leader.

The Army Taking the Lead?

If government agencies lack the ability to adequately conduct stability operations because of personnel, logistical, or budgetary constraints, then what is the best method to ensure unity of command and overall effectiveness? Would the Army as lead element in stability operations provide a better alternative than the State Department? This alternative would certainly be practical because the Army has made the cultivation of expert knowledge in stability operations a priority. Also, the Army is far better equipped and organized to handle such operations than other government agencies in terms of personnel, deployability, funding, planning capacity, and overall operational experience. Not only would Army primacy assure a smoother transition from combat to stability operations, but it would also aid in basic coordination, continuity, and management given the Army's longer tour lengths and ability to assign Army professionals to a particular region based on skills and experience.

Of course, the Army profession lacks the range of expert knowledge of stability operations necessary to do the whole job all by itself. Expert knowledge and capabilities from outside agencies are essential and should be promoted. This is where true interagency involvement is required, with subject matter experts and teams from agencies and organizations available to work with the Army and to integrate all aspects of training, planning, and execution. The Army acting alone is incapable of handling the multitude of managerial tasks as well. The knowledge and skills of public managers are required and always will be required. Public managers must thus ensure that they are prepared for stability operations and interagency involvement.

Unless other agencies reorient their organizational cultures towards embracing stability operations, to include making the sacrifices that participation in such operations entails—working in hazardous environments, lengthy tours, and frequent deployments—then in all likelihood the Army will continue to shoulder the lion’s share of the effort. DoDD-3000.05 already establishes that the military will be prepared to handle such operations whether or not support from other agencies is available. However, there is still the matter of NSPD-44, which grants the Department of State authority to coordinate all matters related to stability operations.

Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion.

Stability operations have always been and continue to be part of America’s wartime and peacetime responsibilities. The delicate and complex nature of stability operations requires personnel with extraordinary skills and expertise to be successful. Realizing this, Army officers and public managers must develop the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct successful operations. Stability operations are going to be a part of military and government operations whether military and government actors like it or not. Together, Army officers and public managers are going to play vital roles in planning, executing, and learning from stability operations.

In terms of the knowledge and skills most applicable to both the Army profession and public managers, three areas should be examined. Although representing two different cultures, the Army profession and public management can both benefit greatly from **thinking like a strategic leader** (determining what knowledge and skills are missing, finding means to supply them,

and considering all possible outcomes during planning); **cross-cultural savvy** (not just a sense of cultural awareness but the ability to work across boundaries and understand other cultures); and **language proficiency** (not simply speaking and having others understand the words, but having the ability to communicate and engender trust with the local populace). The need for these three skills becomes apparent throughout the various literature on the Army profession as well as in lessons learned from management experiences in Iraq. Snider and Lynn identify these three skills in some form or another as essential to both Army officers and public managers.

Obtaining these skills, or at least the foundations of these skills, should best begin early in careers, during the precommissioning phase of Army officer careers and during the first few years of a public manager's career. In terms of developing cross-cultural savvy, the most feasible means of accomplishing this within the officer corps is to provide exposure to other cultures through cultural immersion programs, overseas internships, and instruction in languages, world and diplomatic history, and the social sciences. A common curriculum is probably not the best approach. A menu of relevant electives in addition to precommissioning military science courses would probably be better. Cross-cultural savvy within public management may best be achieved through selective assignments for public managers in which they are exposed to operational environments and working with other agencies through internships or various interagency missions with incentives for overseas assignments. Self-development and self-study should be encouraged as a means for broadening one's boundaries and gaining an understanding of various cultures.

For Army officers and public managers to better internalize the importance of language ability, it should be tied to career progression and advancement. Higher levels of language proficiency should increase the potential for advancement and promotion. This requirement would be similar to joint experience as a requirement for advancement among senior military officers. Higher-level public management positions, particularly those with substantial interagency involvement, should also have language proficiency as a prerequisite. This requirement would provide the incentive necessary for Army officers and public managers not only to learn a language but also to take the necessary steps to develop and maintain their language speaking and reading ability.

Army officers and public managers must work not simply on their ability to think like a strategic leader, their cross-cultural savvy, or their language proficiency. They need to first grasp the importance of and their role in stability operations. The best thing for stability operations is for their executors to believe in stability. For Army officers, this is particularly important since it means overcoming a deep-rooted cultural bias which regards stability operations as “someone else’s job.”

Many in the Army continue to believe that conventional warfighting is the Army’s premier mission. However, the Army’s most recent experiences have demonstrated the need for the profession to embrace stability operations as a core mission, particularly with the publication of DoDD-3000.05 and NSPD-44. If the Army’s officer corps considers itself a profession, then stability operations become part of the Army profession’s expert knowledge and fall within its professional jurisdiction.

The officer corps must be mindful, however, not to become so overwhelmingly focused on stability

operations that members lose sight of the importance of winning wars. Warfighting is the Army's responsibility, and it must never forget it. While stability operations need to be accepted as equally important in terms of winning the war, the ability to defeat the nation's enemies militarily should never be questioned. Maintaining the warrior ethos is a vital part of this responsibility.

Unlike their effects on the Army profession, stability operations are unlikely to produce profound changes within public management in terms of developing knowledge and changing a deep-rooted mindset (with the exception, of course, of accepting deployments to dangerous overseas theaters). Interagency public managers need the ability to adapt to changing environments and instability, but the fundamental aspects of public management do not change. Public managers will need to properly and effectively manage the systems in place, ensuring that they prepare for and address every possible outcome and contingency. As in the case of an effective personnel management tool for identifying personnel with desired skills and assigning them where they will be most effective, public managers must continue to be creative and forward-thinking. In addition, the nature of stability operations and the possible involvement of other agencies will require public managers to develop their own sense of cross-cultural savvy and become comfortable not only with their own environment, but with external and international environments as well.

For public management officials, other questions require further study. As we have noted, there have been several cases, particularly in Iraq, in which public managers simply did not want to take part in operations within a dangerous environment. This revealed several staffing and manning concerns as outlined in the SIGIR

reports. In addition, civilian agencies have difficulty inducing employees to work in such environments, and in most cases there are no incentives for a worker to do so. This is an area where cultural change may be necessary. Public managers might well examine the possibility of adopting something akin to a soldier's ethos or reexamine their notion of selfless service. Another possibility may be for agencies to place a greater emphasis on having public managers work at the operational level early in their careers, making it a requirement for advancement.

An important factor in the success of stability operations is unity of command.⁶⁸ Having the Army take the lead in stability operations with the integration of expertise available from outside services and agencies may be the best means of establishing that unity of command. If the Army profession manages to establish itself as the premier expert in stability operations, while other agencies continue to lack the requisite skills, experience, resources, and operational ability, then the Army profession has no choice but to step forward as leader in such operations. The Army is already taking steps to become more proficient in stability operations. Such impetus is lacking in several civilian agencies such as the State Department.

Stability operations require an Army profession and public managers who not only understand the importance of stability operations but also understand their roles and responsibilities within those operations. Education and training programs will require adjustments. Cultural attitudes and beliefs will require examination. In the end, the Army profession and public managers will need to establish long-term development programs tailored to new definitions of warfare and security missions where multiple, diverse

players coexist and cooperate. Together, officers and public managers can make a significant impact on America's success in winning the complete war.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 15

1. Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988, pp. 56-57.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-81.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-61.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

5. The components of full-spectrum operations come from a document entitled "Doctrine Review," February 24, 2007, written by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which summarizes some of the doctrinal changes reflected in the soon-to-be-published FM 3-0, *Operations: Full-spectrum Operations*. The tasks within each component are listed as Offense: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, pursuit; Defense: area defense, mobile defense, retrograde; Stability: civil security, civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, support to economic and infrastructure development; Civil support: provide support in response to disaster, support civil law enforcement, provide other support as required.

6. Don M. Snider. "The U.S. Army Profession," in *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2d Ed., Don M. Snider, project director, Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., Boston: McGraw Custom Publishing, 2005, pp. 19-20. Hereafter, this anthology will be referred to as FAP.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-20, as adapted.

8. For the map of the Army profession's expert knowledge, see Richard Lacquement, FAP, pp. 19-20.

9. Snider, pp. 10-20.

10. Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army, 2003, hereafter ATLDP.

11. *Ibid.*

12. A summary of findings and conclusions on the officer education system from the ATLDP.

13. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., "Public Management," 2003, p. 2.

14. "Public Management," pp. 6-7.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

16. Anthony M. Bertelli and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., *Madison's Managers*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 141.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

18. National Security Presidential Directive-44, "Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization," December 7, 2005, hereafter NSPD-44.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Douglas V. Johnson II, "Implications of DoDD-3000.5," 2005, op-ed, at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=680.

21. DoDD-3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," November 28, 2005, paragraph 3.1.

22. *Ibid.*, paragraph 4.2.

23. *Ibid.*, paragraph 4.3.1.

24. *Ibid.*, paragraph 4.3.2.

25. *Ibid.*, paragraph 4.3.3.

26. Lawrence A. Yates. "The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations, 1789-2005," Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, p. 1.

27. FM 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001, paragraph 1-1.

28. Yates, pp. 21-22.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

30. *Ibid.*

31. This paragraph expresses Don M. Snider's explanation of why the Army professional should embrace stability operations as a core mission. Interview with author, March 2, 2007.

32. Yates, pp. 3-14.

33. Alice Hunt and Seema Patel, "Interview: Michele Flournoy on the Future of Stability Operations," *PCR Blog*, November 16, 2006, pcrproject.com/, accessed January 26, 2007.

34. This paragraph is based on a phone interview with Don M. Snider conducted on March 2, 2007. His answer was in response to a question about whether an Army professional's expert knowledge of stability operations would reduce the likelihood of involvement with and cooperation from outside organizations such as the State Department, the NGO community, and other government agencies.

35. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Iraq Rebuilding Short on Qualified Civilians," *Washington Post*, February 24, 2007, p. A01.

36. Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr., interview with author, March 7, 2007.

37. For good definitions of strategic leader, strategic decisionmaking, and the competencies of strategic leaders, see Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, "Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession," in *FAP*, pp. 601-623. Among the six

metacompetencies are identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. Snider believes that all field grade officers need to consider themselves as strategic leaders, Snider interview, March 2, 2007.

38. For more on expert knowledge, refer to Chapter 1, FAP.

39. Refer to "Mapping Army Professional Expertise and Clarifying Jurisdictions of Practice," in FAP, pp. 213-235.

40. This paragraph is based on the Snider interview conducted on March 2, 2007, in reference to a question about how an Army professional should approach stability operations. Snider believes that while the Army War College is making some steps forward regarding training senior officers to work across boundaries, much work is still needed in this area.

41. DoDD-3000.05, paragraph 4.1.

42. Nadia Schadlow, Charles Barry, and Richard Lacquement, "A Return to the Army's Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction," in FAP, p. 257.

43. Questions developed by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement, pp. 258-265.

44. This paragraph contains excerpts from an interview of Dr. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., by the author on March 7, 2007, at College Station, Texas.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Chandrasekaran.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management*, February 2006, p. 46, hereafter SIGIR.

49. Several aspects of the reserve force concept are outlined in

an Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State presentation entitled, "Building a USG Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations." According to the presentation, prepared by Gary Russell, the rationale for a civilian reserve includes complementing USG civilian agency capacity; cost effectiveness of "just in time" surge capability versus adding permanent USG staff; leveraging U.S. capacity with parallel international and multilateral capacity; reliability and command/control issues associated with contracting networks; the military's need for a civilian counterpart in order to phase down. Civilian reservists would be specialists in all aspects of governance and recruited from state, local, and federal governments as well as the private sector, and able to be deployed within 30 days of call-up and remain in country for up to 1 year.

50. Lynn interview.

51. Chandrasekaran.

52. SIGIR, p. 11.

53. Chandrasekaran.

54. Gordon Chase. "Implementing a Human Service Program: How Hard Will It Be?" *Public Policy*, Vol. 27, 1979, p. 391. Chase further subdivides the considerations of each program's difficulty. The manager should focus on the following dimensions of the program: the people to be served; the nature of the services to be delivered; the likelihood and costliness of distortions and irregularities that may be implicit in the program concept; and the program's controllability. As for the various resources required, the manager should consider money, personnel, space, and supplies and technical equipment. Bureaucratic and political actors requiring consideration include: the overhead agencies, other line agencies, elected officials in the same government, higher levels of government, private-sector providers, special interest and community groups, and the news media.

55. Michael J. Meese and Sean M. Morgan, "New Requirements for Army Expert Knowledge: Afghanistan and Iraq," in FAP, p. 349.

56. Lynn interview.

57. Leonard Wong and Don M. Snider, "Strategic Leadership of the Army Profession," in FAP, p. 614.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 615.

59. Snider interview. The importance of language was noted in a response to a question regarding whether or not junior officers have the necessary skills sets and expertise to effectively carry out stability operations.

60. *Ibid.* Level 3 proficiency corresponds to a rating of Superior by the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL). "Speakers at the Superior level are able to communicate in the language with accuracy and fluency in order to participate fully and effectively in conversations on a variety of topics in formal and informal settings from both concrete and abstract perspectives," American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages, 1999.

61. Peter F. Herrly, "The Impact of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations on the Armed Forces," Heritage Lecture, December 2, 2005. Rear Admiral Cobbold was speaking at a conference titled "The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations upon the Armed Forces," held in Paris, France, on June 17-18, 2005.

62. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Program and Project Management*, March 2007, p. 17.

63. Michael C. Desch, "Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the End of the Mass Army" in Peter D. Feaver and Richard Kohn, eds., *Soldiers and Civilians*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001, p. 295.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

65. Chandrasekaran, p. AO1.

66. SIGIR, p. 30.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

68. James Dobbins *et al.*, *America's Role In Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, p. xxv.

CHAPTER 16

**COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE FM 3-24
AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:
A BOTTOM-UP REVIEW**

Tyson Voelkel

Do not take the first step without considering the last.
Carl Von Clausewitz

This chapter reviews the tactical outlines of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in the light of current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as set forth in Field Manual (FM) 3-24.¹ Drawing on two vignettes, I will compare and contrast the prescriptive solutions from COIN doctrine with actions I actually experienced in Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004.²

The U.S. military is the most capable force in the history of warfare, but is it flexible enough to adapt to the paradigm shift in warfighting as occasioned by asymmetric conflict? If so, what is the best method of implementing change, and does FM 3-24 provide the guidance necessary for such change? Does the document provide solutions for soldiers conducting counterinsurgency in Iraq, especially when “the guerrilla wins if he does not lose?”³ Many strategists, politicians, and scholars believe continuation of current policies in Iraq may overstretch our military and decrease American influence on the stability of Iraq and the Middle East. The range of options for improving our military capabilities in support of COIN is considerable, but success hinges on the political will of American policymakers and our military forces’ ability to achieve tactical-level success.⁴

Overview of American Military Strategy and Counterinsurgency Warfare.

America today stands alone as the world's strongest economic and military power. The values that made for America's success in the 20th century are unchanged: liberty, capitalism, and economic liberalism drove America to find innovative solutions during the 20th century for the betterment of humankind as well as development of the most destructive weapons in history. Nation-states were the key players in the 20th century, with most of the period dedicated to a bipolar balancing act between the United States and the Soviet Union. Strategies for success focused on robust military strength, nuclear stockpiles, and economic aid packages to countries sympathetic to democracy.

Coups against the governments of recalcitrant states, organized, funded, and often led by U.S. covert operatives, were common and seen as necessary in the fight against the communist foe. The United States outlasted Soviet Union, and at the end of the Cold War it seemed the world would be safer with the benevolent United States as the Top Gun dominating world affairs.

Fast forward to the 1990s. Terrorism and rogue regimes replaced communism as the most serious threat to the United States. Humanitarian intervention dominated public discourse as the United States committed troops to Somalia and organized a multinational force to address problems in Bosnia and Kosovo.⁵ In the meantime, ethnic civil wars were erupting in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and Croatia. U.S. policy options for intervention in the 1990s ranged from Chaim Kaufmann's

nuanced embrace of external intervention in all ethnic wars, on one hand, to Barry Posen's prescriptions based on internal solutions.⁶ Policymakers struggled with what role the United States would play in these conflicts and in one case stood idly by during the slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans—raising questions about American commitment and benevolence.⁷

Issues of intervention were based on American interests. Genocide but not civil war became the litmus test for U.S. intervention. But then why send troops to the Balkans and not to Rwanda? Various theories of ethnic war pervaded scholarly discussion—some even made it to policymakers' desks, providing the intellectual fuel for the military's Stability and Support Operations (SASO) doctrine of the mid-1990s.

Slowly, U.S. policy documents revised strategic priorities for defense. Such documents include the 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Reviews* (QDR), 2002 *National Security Strategy* (NSS), and most recently the 2005 NSS.⁸ In these documents, terrorism, state failure, transnational crime, rogue states, and irregular threats replaced the Cold War threats as the main critical areas of concern for American strategy.

Ironically, however, no contemporary COIN document existed for those who would be the "boots on the ground" in these new and more prevalent irregular conflicts. Even more disturbing was the absence of any national strategy for COIN. There was a doctrinal gap in the literature and education within federal government agencies, bureaus, and leadership that spanned almost 25 years. The current COIN manual was published in December 2006, meaning the Army had no clear doctrine in the wars they were fighting before that time.⁹ As a result of this educational void, very few systems were in place at the strategic, operational, or tactical level

to provide leaders in the federal government with the tools to conduct complex post-combat operations. The 1990s seemed to confirm the need for a transformation in the military to a more agile and expeditionary force, yet leaders failed to appreciate the enormous change in the international order caused by the fall of the Soviet Union. U.S. forces continued to train on Soviet-style doctrine and designed weapon systems and strategy to defeat Soviet-style threats. The Stability and Support Operations conducted in Kosovo and Bosnia were viewed as peripheral, not the central focus of the U.S. military planning.

In 1999, I was a young Opposing Forces (OPFOR) platoon leader in Germany. Our mission was to replicate Soviet maneuver warfare against U.S. forces (BLUFORCE) training in Germany. I maneuvered 12 M-113 vehicles rigged to look like Soviet *Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota* (BMPs) fighting vehicles.¹⁰ Rotations at the Combat Maneuver Center (CMTC) focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC), with very few days dedicated to SASO. Our Soviet-replicated OPFOR vehicles and knowledge of the terrain rarely allowed the American forces to win a battle. Danish and German units fared no better against our U.S. OPFOR. The focus for the Germans and Danish military was also on HIC. Military forces were destined to remain mired in Cold War doctrine and training techniques, while rogue regimes and terrorist organizations were increasing their capabilities and global reach.

Finally, in 2000 the U.S. military started its transition to a full 4-day irregular warfare exercise at the CMTC with a focus on civilians on the battlefield (COB) and the involvement of news media and Special Forces.¹¹ Exercises were also developed to train and evaluate corps, division, and brigade systems designed by the

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). One example was the Urgent Victory Exercise, created as part of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The program, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is designed to train and evaluate senior leaders and staffs across the Army on key mission-essential tasks. In 2000, V Corps conducted the largest and most ambitious training exercise of its kind. New technology, communications platforms, and command and control systems were tested. Over 10,000 soldiers, 3,000 contractors, and 25 brigade-sized headquarters participated in simulations through long-distance linkages or were actually brought to Germany for the exercise. The focus was primarily on command and control during conventional warfare—there was no training on insurgency or guerrilla operations—but the training exercise was hailed as a success.

In 2001 and 2002, the exercise continued with a focus on command and control systems—but again no training was conducted on establishing measures of effectiveness for fighting irregular forces, despite planning at the corps level in late 2002 for a possible invasion of Iraq. Conventional operations dominated military thinking in large part because it was the core competency of senior leaders who had experienced the euphoria of destroying the Iraqi military during the 1990-91 Gulf War. War was about destroying tanks and enemy command and control systems—not about insurgencies or nation-building. Slowly, SASO and irregular warfare became more prominent in discussions at senior leader education programs across the nation and at the maneuver training sites. Training Centers in California, Louisiana, and Germany increasingly employed performance measures of SASO operations. COIN development was the natural

next step in the development of military capabilities, with the catalyst for that development being Operation IRAQI FREEDOM itself, not an earlier manifestation of vision on the part of some prescient Army thinker.

FM 3-24 Development.

Doctrinal literature for COIN operations is not new to the armed forces. The 1950s saw a serious effort focussed on developing COIN doctrine for the Army. The Combat Development Group, United States Continental Army Command, the Command and General Staff College, and Combat Developments Command were all organized to develop doctrine to better prepare the armed forces for conflicts.¹² Prior to September 11, 2001 (9/11), the military allocated resources primarily to improving conventional war-fighting capabilities. The Cold War and Gulf War became the templates for success, while Vietnam COIN lessons were not retained and institutionalized.

Since 9/11, the operational priority has changed from purely force-on-force conventional engagements to a Global War on Terror (GWOT).¹³ The U.S. war against al-Qai'da prompted Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. This operation relied heavily on Special Forces operations with impressive initial results. Both conflicts prompted strategists to reconsider what warfare would entail in the 21st century. Many authors and practitioners with experience in conducting operations in Iraq made the claim that insurgency operations would be the predominant form of military operations in the 21st century, thus highlighting the need for improved interagency operations and military training.¹⁴

In March 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was launched with the stated goal of regime change. This

operation, like Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, began with impressive conventional victories and an apparent validation of the American way of war.¹⁵ Insurgency was an afterthought in the invasion planning; at the brigade and battalion level, the goal remained the destruction of the Iraqi Army and militia forces. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a conventional campaign with conventional goals until post-combat operations were declared.

Units such as III Corps developed exercises prior to deploying to Iraq, spurring After Action Reviews (AARs) for improving U.S. Army capabilities in Iraq. In January 2004, the COIN shortcomings identified in III Corps exercises were consolidated and compiled for analysis. Next was a directive from the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth to prepare a new COIN field manual. In October 2004 the interim Field Manual 3-34 was published for use in training and leader development courses.¹⁶ From November 2004 to November 2005, extensive interviews and research were conducted on Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in an attempt to extract the most relevant data and lessons for inclusion in the final publication.

Simultaneously, key reviewers were selected under the direction of Dr. Conrad Crane. In February 2006, a COIN conference served as the “final” vetting venue prior to publication.¹⁷ But the document continued to undergo revision and analysis until June 2006, when a draft was distributed to the force, and in December 2006 COIN FM 3-24 was finally published—3 years after the invasion of Iraq.

COIN FM 3-24 contains salient prescriptions for the conduct of such operations. Taken as a whole, the manual boils the complex COIN endeavor into five imperatives, eight principles, and nine paradoxical caveats for successful execution of COIN (see Figure 1).¹⁸ Understanding the imperatives, principles, and paradoxes offered in FM 3-24 ensures that military planners will have the requisite framework to view the problems encountered in irregular warfare. However, executing operations based on this framework has proved to be problematic in Iraq, and the approach continues to foment domestic political debates and fuel discussions within the Department of Defense (DoD) regarding what course of action will lead to strategic victory in the prosecution of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and indeed whether strategic victory can ever be achieved.

Combat operations in Iraq began on March 19, 2003, with FM 3-24 not appearing until December 2006. It is difficult not to assume that some of the current difficulties in Iraq can be attributed to the lack of an updated COIN doctrine for strategic and operational planners from the beginning. It is also reasonable to assume that there was not a national strategy for combating insurgency at the outset of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Would FM 3-24 have provided the military with the proper framework to prevent the seemingly intractable situation facing the United States in Iraq today? The following firsthand account of operations in Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004 aims to provide insights into the usefulness of the doctrine and its proper implementation in DoD training and learning centers.

<p>Imperatives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Manage information and expectations. •Use measured force and discriminate actions. •Learn and adapt. •Empower the lowest levels. •Support the host nation. <p>Principles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Legitimacy as the main objective. •Unity of effort. •Political primacy. •Understanding the environment. •Intelligence as the driver for operations. •Isolation of insurgents from their cause and support. •Security under the rule of law. •Long-term commitment. <p>COIN Paradoxes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The more you protect your force, the less secure units may be. •Doing nothing in some cases may be the best response to insurgent actions. •The best COIN weapons are ones that don't shoot. •Tactical success guarantees nothing. •A tactic may work in one province but not the next.

Figure 1. FM 3-24 – Counterinsurgency, December 2006.

Operation CLEAN SWEEP, Growing pains, and the Beginning of Insurgency.

The 82nd Airborne Division is renowned for its ability to deploy rapidly worldwide within 18 hours of notification to neutralize a threat. Our brigade combat team (BCT) consisting of 3,430 paratroopers conducted a ground assault, convoy, and simultaneous tactical air insertion into Iraq on March 23, 2003. From that date until May 1, 2003, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division conducted combat operations from

Samawa to Falluja. During fierce fighting, the brigade neutralized at least 700 fedayeen, Royal Republican Guard, and militia soldiers in the battle for Samawa alone. Conventional joint operations as well as combined arms operations were second nature to the paratroopers of the 2/82nd. Losing a battle was not an option, and every minute of training and discipline were required to survive the extreme temperatures and battles with the fedayeen. Conventionally, the 2/82nd was well trained, equipped, and utilized. The brigade conducted joint operations with the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Special Forces, and the Central Intelligence Agency to neutralize the enemy threats and facilitate the regime change mission of the invasion. Every mission was conducted within the five-phase framework of the strategic Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1003V.¹⁹ From February 3, 2003, to May 4, 2003, the 2/82nd conducted combat operations over 600 miles through nine Iraqi cities before reaching Baghdad.

Morale was high. Mission success was paramount, and the brigade leadership made every effort to recognize the efforts of the unit's brave paratroopers. They were trained for direct-action conventional combat operations, and they were professionals. Every paratrooper had completed rigorous training and certifications on critical warfighting tasks at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the National Training Center (NTC) prior to the deployment—there was no certification, however, on conducting guerrilla operations.²⁰

On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq, signaling the move to Phase IV of OPLAN 1003V. The brigade moved to Southern Baghdad for SASO. Our ability to adapt from HIC to low-intensity combat (LIC) operations within hours was critical to our success.

None of the paratroopers in our brigade envisioned conducting SASO/LIC operations prior to deployment. Attention at Ft. Bragg had been on conventional skill sets and conducting a parachute assault into enemy territory and neutralizing the enemy. COIN operations were not even mentioned during the development of OPLAN 1003V or introduced into our brigade lexicon during our first 3 months in Iraq. To complicate matters, civilian leadership in Iraq was transferred from retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, then deputy at CENTCOM for reconstruction in Iraq, to Ambassador Paul Bremer. Authority shifted from CENTCOM to Ambassador Bremer for reconstruction in Iraq – to include security forces. The Iraqi Army was disbanded, and the Iraqi police force stripped of all high-ranking, experienced officers out of fear of Ba’ath Party resurgence. This single action changed our role of liberation force to one of occupation – an occupation that immediately took on the responsibility of policing Iraqi streets.

My role as a brigade staff officer during this period was simple: assist in the planning of tactical operations in Southern Baghdad to ensure the Ba’ath Party leaders and Saddam loyalists were captured or killed. This was a typical task for an infantry captain on brigade staff, especially since I had been in the job for over 13 months and had the experience of two short-notice brigade deployments. The focus of my job changed drastically when a Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC) was created by the artillery battalion commander (Lieutenant Colonel Smith). The CMOC consisted of volunteers from each of the primary organizations in the brigade combat team: artillery, air defense, intelligence, medical, legal, logistical personnel, and civil affairs representatives were all part of the new group. The group met daily to develop methods to

spur economic growth, rebuilding, and infrastructure repair/creation—tasks no one in our unit was trained to do and, frankly, not ones we thought we were responsible for. A common attitude during this period was expressed by paratroopers: “Sir, we did our job . . . we killed the enemy, and Saddam is not in power, now let’s go home. I didn’t join the 82nd to build sewage lines or get shot at while I help build a school.”²¹

The CMOC group was entirely ad hoc, and only a few had prior SASO training other than Lieutenant Colonel Smith. I was responsible for coordinating all of the CMOC operations, as well as the unit’s tactical operations. Bath showers were optional, and 24-hour days were the norm during the initial days as we drove ourselves into the ground trying to understand our new purpose.

The first CMOC meeting lasted 5 hours in a cinderblock room in 115 degree heat. Each of the members walked away from the event stupefied at the Herculean task ahead. Lieutenant Colonel Smith expected us to catalog every sewage pumping station, electric power station, school, mosque, church, and gas station by the end of the week. Despite our misgivings, we saluted with our brigade motto—“All the way—let’s go!”—and accomplished the tasks over the next week. During that period, the CMOC group spent countless hours driving the streets and alleys of Southern Baghdad. Most times we were greeted by smiling Iraqis, proud of their new freedom and excited at what lay ahead for their families. Children swarmed our Hummers trying to get a glimpse of our faces and especially our eyes. Elderly Iraqis often cried with gratitude. In all cases, the Iraqis I encountered wanted to be proud of their country and its enormous potential. It occurred to me that these men, women, and children

were very similar to those in my hometown—people who wanted to work for a living and care for their families. They wanted to be proud of where and how they lived.

The problems the newly liberated Iraqis faced were immense. Unlike in my hometown, there was no government in place to provide basic necessities for the citizens. No sewage plan, no garbage collection plan, no electricity plan, limited job opportunities, and—worst of all—no police to enforce law and order. Corruption was rampant, and looting government buildings was viewed as a right for the poorest Iraqis. The lack of infrastructural systems was a problem that would not be corrected quickly and would require more than just money or security. The Iraqis needed a paradigm shift in how to live and govern their lives. Sanctions against Iraq following the first Gulf War had left the country firmly at the mercy of Saddam and his regime. Because of Saddam's rule, most Iraqis I spoke to had no memory of national initiative or self-reliance.

Over the preceeding 30 years, they had no hope unless they pledged their unyielding support to Saddam and his regime; now, they could break free from these chains and live freely—but it would not be simple. Problems lay around every corner, and it seemed that no corrective actions the coalition took were fast enough or understood. The coalition wanted to fix everything right away—as did the Iraqis—however, the reality of the situation precluded anything from happening quickly. The gulf between the State Department and the military seemed wide, but not nearly as wide as the perception by the Iraqis of what America could do versus what America was in fact capable of doing.

One problem seems to stand out in my mind as a symbol of the massive change needed in Baghdad—the

mountainous piles of garbage that accumulated from years of no sanitation measures. Saddam's garbage collectors were paid poorly by the government, and drivers earned more from tips from wealthy Iraqis than the government salary of one dollar a day. Naturally, the poor sectors of Baghdad had no means of tipping, so the garbage trucks never made stops there. This filth left no room for children to play sports, but plenty of room for disease, crime, and poverty – perfect recruiting grounds for insurgents.

A sight I will never forget is that of children wading through sewage to pick up remnants of plastic bottles so they could use them to collect water. Looting was also rampant in the wealthier areas of our sector. The Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) gave strict orders for U.S. personnel to remain uninvolved in the presence of looters. This mandate left many of our paratroopers looking on in disbelief as Iraqis ripped the very cables out of government buildings to sell in the markets. Everything that could be stripped from walls and windows was taken during the looting, as coalition forces were ordered to stand by and “let the Iraqis police themselves” – a policy we would all come to regret in the coming months.

Witnessing these activities and the plight of many Iraqis gave our CMOC the will to continue working toward some solution in our sector. I knew we could make an impact if we could find a way to clean up the major trash areas adjacent to living quarters. The more pride the natives had in their homes, the less chance for the enemy to seek refuge or foment hatred in our sector. The main problem our units and Iraqi allies faced was scarce resources. Our brigade did not have a direct link to the other agencies operating in our sector

other than through unofficial ad hoc relationships generated by highly motivated civil affairs personnel and paratroopers. Our brigade was equipped with the requisite equipment to kill insurgents, but not to educate, train, and rebuild. The only tool we had at our disposal was our desire to accomplish the mission we were assigned. We attempted to teach democracy, train security forces, and rebuild by scrounging and improvising. We certainly were not equipped to undertake a large trash cleanup project in sector.²²

To do this job, I needed money and expertise. I received the go-ahead on the trash project from our brigade commander along with permission to use his military police detachment and Hummers. The brigade commander fully understood what activities his paratroopers should engage in during the day – rebuilding and legitimacy operations. He reiterated to commanders, “Without legitimacy, our mission will fail; go out there and shake hands, don’t break promises, and work 24/7 to figure out who the bad guys are. . . . If you don’t know who the key players are in your sector, you aren’t doing your damn job.”²³

As the operations officer for the CMOC, I had the freedom to stay in the relative safety of the compound or travel the streets of Baghdad. I chose to travel the streets and seek out the interagency personnel who could help our brigade with the mission of trash cleanup in the al-Risala and al-Shurta sectors. Within 2 days, I had located the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) office in the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) headquarters in the Green Zone. Amazingly, there was no directory of office locations or even a list of who was working in the Green Zone at this time, so finding key agency personnel to help solve problems was a matter

of chance and determination. I met with the USAID Chief of Station, and he agreed to send a team into our sector to see what could be done.

Within a week, USAID had established a Direct Assistance Reconstruction Team (DART) to assist in the project. DART teams from USAID consisted of a small handful of experts in waste management, water, logistics, medical services, and contract vetting.²⁴ A warm-up project we collaborated on included the delivery of thousands of medical aid kits to clinics in the 2/82nd sector. The DART team members were professionals and understood the importance of building credibility with the locals. They wasted little time in getting the medical and dental supplies delivered. For the trash project, we envisioned 5,000 Iraqis working to clean up trash in their local areas. USAID insisted that the idea for a cleanup come from Iraqi city council members in the sector rather than as an order from coalition troops. The 2/82nd preference was to take control of the entire operation from start to finish. We decided to try the USAID method.

The following week we held numerous meetings as the Iraqi city council members mulled over the ideas USAID presented. Eventually the council members decided they needed a project to keep the young men off the streets. This project had the potential to provide jobs and a purpose for thousands of the citizens in our sector. Providing jobs would enhance the legitimacy of the council and coalition as well as discourage potential insurgent recruiting.

After a 5-hour session with one of the USAID representatives, the council determined that it could hire 12,000 young men for the job. The estimate was far more ambitious than the USAID DART leader or I had envisioned, and we were ecstatic. The council members

would take care of advertising, hiring, documentation, and pay for each of the 12,000.²⁵ The only requirement for U.S. forces was security at various checkpoints and along the perimeter of the trash cleanup area to protect the workers. USAID agreed to ante up money for the Iraqi Council members to pay the 12,000 workers. I left the meeting with a feeling of pride and accomplishment. This was democracy at work—a group of Iraqis had freely solved a problem for themselves, and all they needed was a bit of prodding and hope. The council members immediately held a press conference. Reporters took notes on ragged tablets with stubs of pencils while the council announced the project. Singing and chanting could be heard for blocks. It was a good day for the coalition and the Iraqi leaders.

It was during this meeting that I learned that the most powerful weapon in SASO was offering hope and legitimacy to the Iraqis. Hope was the most powerful inducement these people had: hope for their families and for the future of their country. I was humbled by the effort the USAID representatives put into coaching the fledgling city council. Our paratroopers came to see the Iraqis in a different light and also learned about the importance of liberty and freedom. It was a great day—everyone walked away from the meeting feeling as though we accomplished something extraordinary.

One week later, we began Operation CLEAN SWEEP. The first day, 9,780 workers showed up and were paid that afternoon. The next day, we had close to 11,000 workers. The men came by foot, car, and donkey; some carried brooms, some carried handmade shovels, and some brought only bare hands and feet. They were paid two dollars a day. They sang and danced as they cleaned one neighborhood after another. Various news media outlets covered the success story, and word spread throughout other Baghdad neighborhoods

of the project. USAID was pleased, and decided to replicate the project on a larger scale in Sadr City in Northeast Baghdad. I made a trip to that sector to meet with coalition members, describe the success we had in Southern Baghdad, and pass on my lessons learned. USAID then implemented the project in Sadr City with tens of thousands of workers.

In the meantime, B Company of the 3d Battalion of the 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3-325) took the lead on Operation CLEAN SWEEP in Southern Baghdad while C Company 325th assumed B Company's offensive operational mission in sector. The commanders saw the positive aspects of the project.²⁶ Attacks decreased in sector, and the city council was pleased with the number of jobs they were able to create, giving them more credibility with their constituents. For many Iraqis, it was the first time they had clean fields for soccer games and other sports. Hope was increasing in direct proportion to our legitimacy and the credibility of the city council members. It seemed as though we had found a solution to SASO in Iraq.

Our unit was still conducting tactical operations at night while working on civil-military operations during the day. The tempo was fast, and it was rare for our paratroopers to sleep more than 4 hours in a 24-hour period. At this point, we still had no air conditioner units, ice, or consolidated forward operating bases (FOBs). Infantry companies were operating out of their own FOBs in our sector. We were looking forward to our pre-planned redeployment on July 4, 2003. As the date for our redeployment drew near, however, it dawned on us that we would be ordered to stay for a longer tour. The Third Infantry Division (3ID) had been extended, and now we knew that it was going to be a long, miserable summer—but none of us knew how miserable.

In early June at the brigade headquarters, we had just eaten lunch and were working on operational orders for future missions. The temperature inside the building was well over 100 degrees, and the temperature outside in the sun felt like an open flame. No one was working directly in the sun, and the Iraqis stayed indoors during the hottest parts of the day.

Our soldiers at the Operation CLEAN SWEEP site were taking breaks in an air-conditioned bus as they guarded the perimeter of the cleanup operation. Two soldiers, Specialist Gibbs and Private First Class Burns, were taking their turn cooling off in the bus when two rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) ripped into the bus, killing Gibbs instantly and severing Burns' legs and a portion of his right arm.

The report of the attack crackled across my radio. My heart sank, and my lunch began to work its way back up. My first thought was one of guilt for establishing the trash project, since the soldiers would not have been in that position if I had not set it up. I was sick to my stomach and outraged at the Iraqis for what they had done. Our unit reaction followed standard operating procedure: we established a cordon around the immediate neighborhood, searched every home in the vicinity, placed the area under strict curfew, established checkpoints, and conducted field interrogations of suspicious individuals. The morale of our unit was now low, and emotions ran high. Iraqi council members shared our disgust and did their best to calm the company commanders in the sector. USAID and other agencies stopped daily visits and came only to drop off large duffle bags of money to pay the Iraqi workers. Our paratroopers' consternation over the dangerous, perplexing environment grew with each passing sunrise.

Our 2-month deployment had now lasted 6 months, our mission had turned to civil-military operations rather than combat, and our minds and bodies were exhausted. The attack at the trash site affected everyone. Paratroopers felt disgust; State Department, USAID, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and other agencies no longer wanted to drive into our sector unless they had armed escorts. My trips into the Green Zone were increasingly viewed as jumping the chain of command in order to get work done. Agencies felt increasing concern over safety, and they were privileged to remain in the protected hallways of their palace headquarters while my men suffered the wrath of disgruntled Iraqis and uncompromising work schedules.

To further complicate matters, many of the NGOs and Department of State officials refused to meet one-on-one with Iraqis unless our soldiers searched the buildings and checked the Iraqi individuals prior to meetings. The solution was then to bring the Iraqis to the Green Zone for meetings. Insurgents needed only to document Iraqis who entered and left the Green Zone in order to target them later. Interpreters started to receive death threats, as did members of the city councils. The common assumption made at the embassy and military intelligence units was that Ba'ath Party members had gone underground to incite violence. A new term was coined for this group—Saddam loyalists.

Thus came new missions to locate, kill, or capture the Saddam loyalists in sector. A purge of Ba'ath Party members began anew. Under ORHA and later the CPA, Ba'athists were automatically considered untrustworthy and were removed from any meaningful decisionmaking roles. Coordination became more difficult, operations became more complex, and

reconstruction slowed to a snail's pace in the sector. The first improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were being used in Baghdad, and our brigade had only four armored Hummers. I would spend hours on the highway daily in a Hummer with no doors, traversing roadblocks, checkpoints, and potential IEDs to obtain funding and encourage ORHA to honor our requests for reconstruction. More often than not, the answer was, "ORHA has the mandate for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, but not the resources."²⁷

Compounding problems for the continuing trash project, many of the Iraqi workers left. Some left because of threats and some because they lost faith in the project and their countrymen. Ironically, 30 hours after the RPG attack on the bus, the two gunmen were traced to a sector outside of Baghdad. They had been hired to come into the sector and disrupt civil-military cooperation.

After we learned of the plot, our forces immediately put the word out to the Iraqi leadership and newspapers that the men who killed the U.S. soldier were not from al-Risala or al-Shurta. They were Iraqis who wanted Iraqis to fail. Within 2 days of the attack, we were back in operation with over 12,000 Iraqi workers. But there was an important difference this time: our soldiers were very aggressive toward the Iraqis and suspicious of every vehicle that came within 500 yards of the work site. The environment had changed, and it signaled a type of warfare different from the one we had been trained to fight: it came to be called insurrection.

We had officially entered the irregular warfare phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I. Two months passed before I was called back to the United States on emergency leave to care for my mother after risky heart surgery, and I was in the United States for almost

20 days. My mother survived and was in good spirits. I could have stayed longer but my place was with my men in Iraq. I made a trip to Walter Reed Hospital to see the wounded soldiers from the 82nd and saw Private First Class Burns, a triple amputee at age 19. He would receive his Purple Heart and U.S. citizenship from President Bush later in the week. His spirits were good, but what struck me the most were the pride and admiration his father held for America, for my soldiers, and for our mission. He believed with all his heart that his son had been wounded in pursuit of justice and hope for a democratic peace in the Middle East. We had a wonderful talk, and as I left he said to me, "Good luck, sir. Take care of the boys." I choked up as I walked past the rooms of wounded soldiers and family members. Some were not American citizens yet—but they sacrificed for America. I walked away thinking of how I could help prevent more of these young people from being injured or killed.

I made a pledge to myself. These men, their wounds, and their idealistic visions of American democracy would not be wasted. We had to succeed in Iraq to justify the pain and sacrifice these young people experienced. I returned to Iraq with renewed vigor and sense of purpose. Our unit would rid the streets of insurgents, rebuild my sector, and provide hope for the children of al-Risala and al-Shurta.

My experience changed the methods I used in the Risala and Shurta sectors as a company commander. The difficult part was convincing my paratroopers that brute force, large-scale operations, top-down intelligence, and technology were not the solutions for fighting the insurgency—they were simply tools that could be used as appropriate. But Iraqi attitudes had also changed. "Thank you for removing the tyrant,

now go home” had become the dominant attitude of many.²⁸ Anger, frustration, and distrust were building toward the coalition. Civil reconstruction projects had dried up, raids were turning up more dry holes than enemy combatants, and the news most of the Iraqis were getting was dominated by al-Jazeera. ORHA was failing in its information operations, and the military seemed blind to their importance. The seeds of civil war were sprouting, and we were facilitating the disintegration of the sector by our failure to understand the root of the problems. U.S. legitimacy was being compromised, and the credibility of coalition forces in Baghdad had begun to erode. Coalition forces were continuing heavy-handed raids on known or suspected enemies. Measurement of success continued to be based on conventional standards: numbers of raids and enemy killed. Offensive operations seemed to dominate senior leaders’ rhetoric and evaluation of subordinates.

What caused the erosion of legitimacy? Who was best suited to solve the problems the Iraqis faced? How do we best protect our soldiers in irregular warfare while enhancing the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government and our coalition forces? Our unit had in effect labeled all Iraqis as insurgents and alienated many of our Iraqi allies by failing to ask these fundamental questions. The answer to the questions was not more large-scale operations, more kinetic attacks, or reduced interaction with the local populace.

As a new company commander in the sector, I could see that cultural understanding within our unit was low. Cultural awareness was nonexistent, kinetic solutions were preferred over “soft power,” and the majority of paratroopers viewed their job as finished in May 2003 when the war was “won.” My first

sergeant and I instituted a cultural awareness class for every paratrooper under my command. Interpreters taught the classes. I devoted my energy during the day to finding political solutions to insurgency-related problems by meeting with business leaders, council members, and religious leaders. I rewarded soldiers and platoon leaders who excelled in reconstruction projects and interaction with school headmasters and the underrepresented areas of my mixed sector. The sector contained 250,000 Iraqis (60 percent Shia, 40 percent Sunni), 80 percent of whom were unemployed. There were 32 schools, 23 Mosques, one Christian church, two medical clinics, two markets, two gas stations, and a rag-tag collection of 400 Iraqi amputees left over from the Iran-Iraq War. The sector was large and diverse, providing ample opportunities for insurgent recruitment and attacks against our FOB. Actionable intelligence was the only method of ensuring our unit's success, but up to this point in the conflict intelligence was fed from higher headquarters to ground units for action. This commonly resulted in raiding the wrong homes, detaining innocent Iraqis, or getting involved in longstanding family or tribal disputes.

After taking command of A Company, I decided to change our *modus operandi* for gathering intelligence. We turned our intelligence operations into an integrated effort on the part of every paratrooper, establishing systems for the collection and dissemination of information within our company. We put less emphasis on firepower during raids and even employed nonlethal weapons during many operations. Tasers, rubber bullets, and foam grenades were favorites of my paratroopers – when we could get them. No longer was it standard operating procedure to blow up the doors of suspect houses with C-4 or other explosives.

Instead, we began knocking unless the threat was high enough to justify the use of explosives for forced entry. Intelligence was no longer to be spoon-fed to my unit from higher headquarters: instead we would develop our own collection techniques locally and feed intelligence up to battalion and division.

The change took time, but within a month we reduced the frequency of attacks against our compound and soldiers. We increased spending on reconstruction by two million dollars and regained the trust of the local council and many of the business leaders. Intelligence operations were so successful that the senior commander in Iraq (Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez) told his staff in a Battle Update Brief in late September 2003 that A Company, 3-325 Airborne, was setting the standard for operations in Iraq. Unit cohesion was higher than ever before, and our vision of purpose in Iraq became more sharply defined.

My paratroopers and I had come to realize that adult Iraqis were not the future of the country – the children were. If we could show them that we were there to help rather than hurt them, our unit would eventually return to Fort Bragg alive and better prepared for the next deployment. In sum, two areas of endeavor were critical to success in al-Risala and al-Shurta: first was the establishment of credible city councils, and second was local development of actionable intelligence.

Establishing Democratic City Councils within al-Risala and al-Shurta, Baghdad.

As noted earlier, on May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to hostilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, signaling the beginning of SASO. Phase IV of the operation had begun. Priorities shifted from

killing enemy combatants to protecting the local populace, rebuilding, and establishing city councils at the local level. Each company sector contained at least one city council selected from residents who met specific criteria. As of June 2003, 2/82nd City Council criteria mandated that members could not be Ba'athists, could not be former military commanders, must be high school graduates, and must be a resident of the neighborhood they represented.

In my sector of 250,000 Iraqis, we organized two city councils together comprising 23 total members from Sunni, Shi'a, and Christian backgrounds. The brigade commander insisted that women serve on the councils, so each council initially had at least one female member. After 4 months, the number of women on the councils had grown to four. The female members of my councils were strong, educated, and willing to sacrifice for the sake of their neighborhoods. I came away from interactions with them with a sense of hope for the women of Iraq and with an earnest belief that in rebuilding Iraq women would play crucial roles. Each council also reflected diverse career backgrounds, ranging from businessmen to Imams. The common denominator for all members was their eagerness to help rebuild their neighborhoods and provide jobs for constituents. Security, sewage, and electricity were the top priorities of most citizens.

Meetings initially lasted for 5-8 hours in the blistering summer heat. At this time military units were starting to receive air conditioners, but there was no money in the budget to buy such luxuries for the city councils. In typical Army fashion, we initially tried to teach democracy through the use of PowerPoint slides and visual aids. After burning up a number of projectors, we realized that the only way to make progress was

through drinking plenty of chai tea and engaging in long discussions.

Unit commanders made requests through USAID and ORHA for basic supplies and equipment for the councils to dispose. After many trips to the Green Zone, we were able to secure funding through USAID for building renovations, supplies, and salaries for the council members. Eventually we were also issued cell phones from ORHA to give to council members for communications. Progress was slow (but noticeable) during August 2003, and meetings were the weapon of choice in problem solving.

Initially, many meetings were canceled due to security conditions, conflicting missions, and even ultra-high temperatures. In time, the meetings became part of our daily lives and part of our intelligence and psychological operations. Members of these councils spent countless hours debating the best methods of moving forward, and it took considerable energy for commanders to convince the council members to make decisions. Some unit commanders, growing frustrated, delegated the task of attending and running council meetings to subordinates. Others took on the role of “mayor” in their sectors, providing guidance, directing reconstruction, and detaining suspected insurgent supporters at night.

Fundamental to the establishment of the councils was education. U.S. soldiers had no literature teaching them about democratic principles and procedures, and no representatives from ORHA to assist in the selection, training, and administration of city council members. It was not until September 2003 that I learned of an office in the palace (the Embassy) assigned responsibility to assist military units in the establishment of local governance. Once I contacted the office, it was willing

to assist in supporting my city councils. I started to receive funding and support for a district city council headquarters. An especially difficult problem to solve was the reluctance of many Iraqi men to take any kind of initiative. Common citizens under Saddam were not accustomed to making decisions or taking responsibility for local problems. This attitude was very intractable, and only time and mutual trust could change it.

In late September 2003, the councils in my sector were functioning with noticeable success. They conducted town hall meetings in which I was often the guest speaker and the person they could point fingers at and blame for problems within the sector. I was often on the receiving end of bitter language and insults, but I was never intentionally disrespected. When I spoke, the room got quiet and the city council almost always agreed with my assessments. My unit's credibility was high, and the local newspaper recognized our efforts. Electricity, sewage, and security were the top three concerns of the citizens of al-Shurta and al-Risala and thus the top priorities for my unit.

Improving security required increasing our success in locating and capturing weapons caches and those responsible for funding the insurgency. Bottom-up intelligence operations enabled my company to capture many weapons caches while building credibility with informants in the area. My compound became a haven for disgruntled Iraqis who had information to sell. The information came in a trickle at first, but I was finally able to establish myself as the authoritative point of contact for Iraqis with information to sell. I took pains to establish relationships based on trust with my informants and ensure that their safety would not be compromised. Over time, my company developed

a number of sources, informants, and a network of businesses and individuals dedicated to the coalition's success. With more successes came more information, caches, and compromised insurgents.

The toughest problem I faced was dealing with other intelligence organizations and negotiating turf wars over informant ownership. I was fortunate enough to have a battalion commander who appreciated the art of gathering intelligence from the ground up. He gave me the freedom to coordinate with special operations units in my sector and other agencies whose primary roles were gathering information and managing agents and sources.

My company was not resourced or trained to manage informants, but we were forced to learn the skill in order to prevent attacks and protect our sector. In order to pay informants under the Army system, I would have to wait weeks to receive funds. Other agencies had cash on hand and could pay informants on the spot for good intelligence. Special operations forces had available sizable amounts of cash and could pay informants immediately. My IOU had to suffice for many of the informants who came to my FOB. Occasionally it was not acceptable, in which case I was forced to spend my own money to keep from losing valuable information.

Over time, my unit developed good working relationships with the other intelligence operators in sector, and we conducted weekly meetings to share information unofficially. Although I did not always have cash to pay informants as other agencies did, I had paratroopers to take action on the information provided. By October 2003, the system was working very well. The beneficial second and third order effects of this success were paramount to maintaining

the legitimacy of my unit, and by extension the city councils in our sector. The council members also became intelligence gatherers for me, and at city council meetings I would meet privately with certain members to obtain information. They trusted me completely, and as a result they were willing to accept the risk of conducting democratic elections for their jobs.

We were the first sector in Baghdad to ask for the Coalition Provisional Authority's permission to conduct elections. We were given verbal permission to go ahead with our plan because the CPA governance representative did not think we would be ready by the new year (January 2004). Our city council members spent money on flyers, debated each other in the local council center, and developed action plans for the department of public works and local schools. In the meantime, attacks continued to wane while support for our company increased in sector. However, there were also some periods of unrest and protest.

The protests against me and my unit often resulted from broken promises. For example, an NGO once promised my city council it would provide new books and supplies to all children in elementary school. Unfortunately, the NGO ran out of money before it could deliver a single book, leaving my unit to answer to the city council. Protests outside my compound started out small, but they grew larger over time. Rather than stop the protests with force, I simply put on my gear and walked outside the gate of my compound and spoke to the mob through my interpreter. Many in the group were afraid that I would retaliate against them for the protest, and none looked me in the eye as I addressed them. I simply told them that I was proud of them for protesting and that they now enjoyed the right to do so because they were forming a democracy.

I explained the situation about the NGO's failure, and I told them I was willing to listen to them longer if they could provide me information on a recent rash of RPG attacks. I left to applause and laughter. The protest lasted 15 more minutes and dissipated.

Two days later, I had the information I needed to conduct a raid on the RPG attackers. Word of our successful capture of the RPG attackers spread quickly through the mosques and schools. We took the opportunity to conduct a psychological campaign to deter further attacks by spreading a rumor of a new weapon system that could detect and destroy anyone launching mortars or RPGs within our sector. To give the rumor further impetus, we told our city council and police chief that the weapon was top secret. That night we fired mortar illumination rounds and artillery rounds into an empty field, telling our council the next day that the new weapon system destroyed the enemy vehicle and the men setting up a mortar outside the sector.²⁹ Upon making the announcement, my interpreter and I received a standing ovation from the group. They then told me that they were ready for elections, and they wanted to know when they could conduct them.

The city council was prepared to have an election and had spent time and money campaigning. All that was left to do was for me to receive written permission from the Baghdad District Council (BDC) to conduct the election and recognize the winners at its conclusion. I was denied permission by the CPA and the BDC—despite their previous encouragement—and I had to return to the council with another broken promise. The trust I had built was beginning to erode with these broken promises and growing sectarian violence in other parts of Baghdad. Less than a week later our unit

received orders to deploy back to the United States no later than February 2004. We had less than 45 days left in country, and things were beginning to deteriorate across Iraq.

Small FOBs were being consolidated into larger FOBs across the country. The goal seemed logical: move U.S. forces out of the sectors and allow Iraqi forces to pick up more of the security and governance load.³⁰ Our company FOB was closed, with my 136 paratroopers and me moving into FOB FALCON. We now had a Post Exchange, hot showers, basketball/volleyball courts, a full gym, and air-conditioned private barracks rooms and offices. We were ecstatic, but our council was not. Members knew that the effect of our moving out of sector would impact negatively on their security.

They were right. Most units decreased the number of patrols, raids, and reconstruction projects dramatically once they moved into FALCON. The top priority for many units shifted from the Iraqis to taking care of themselves. The entitlement attitude was contagious, and it was difficult for even the most motivated paratroopers to leave the comfort and security of FALCON to brave the streets of Baghdad. It was as much a psychological victory for the insurgents as a defeat for my company, and there was little I could do about it. The relief in place operation was approaching, and my last 4 weeks were spent creating a continuity file for the unit replacing mine in sector. I met with my councils, business leaders, and informants for the last time and wished them well. Many tears and heartfelt hugs were exchanged during those final days, but the sense of hope was high. The 2/82nd left Baghdad in February 2004 after a year-long deployment. Our mission was complete, and I believe our successes far

outweighed our failures. Yet, we all seemed to sense that Iraq would take many more years to recover. We had no idea that sectarian violence and insurgency would soon engulf every aspect of Iraqi life. Eight months after returning home, we were called back to Iraq on 96-hour notice to assist in the Iraqi elections of 2005.

Comparing COIN Doctrine to Tactical Actions in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I.

With the benefit of hindsight, I will analyze the actions taken on the ground in Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I in light of the doctrinal prescriptions found in FM 3-24. The vignettes I employ are not offered to highlight the special ability of the 2/82nd or to boast about the success of any unit. Units across Iraq were learning and adapting to the environment they faced. Many had great success, while others experienced tragic failure. The question that interests me here is this: Would better COIN doctrine have caused an outcome different than the one the United States is experiencing in Iraq in 2007? In order to answer the question, I shall address two subsidiary questions. First, were any actions taken during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I counter to what is prescribed in COIN FM 3-24? Second, were any actions taken during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I like what is prescribed in COIN FM 3-24? After reviewing supporting data, I will suggest answers to these two questions.

During the conventional phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I, leaders of the 2/82nd conducted operations within the parameters of the Geneva Convention and the rules of engagement (ROE), decisively winning every engagement with the enemy. At the conclusion

of the operation, the 2/82nd had suffered 24 soldiers killed in action and 240 wounded. The majority of these occurred *after* the President declared an end to combat operations, as the insurgency began to emerge. The fundamental difference in the differing casualty rates lay in the type of war we came to be waging.

Disciplined, motivated, and well-trained soldiers can accomplish any mission assigned; however, none of the 2/82nd soldiers was trained for (or even aware of) the rising insurgency. Decisions were being made by ORHA and then by the CPA, as well as by decisionmakers at CENTCOM, that inhibited soldiers from taking action on the ground to prevent the insurgency from growing. Six critical mistakes/deficiencies are fundamental to understanding why the insurgency in Iraq gained strength despite coalition efforts:

1. Disbanding the Iraqi army in May 2003;
2. The order from CPA not to take action against looters in May 2003;
3. Slow and negligent information operations across the spectrum of the interagency, including DoD, during post-combat operations;
4. Decentralized U.S. Army command structure, with each division conducting unilateral offensive operations in its area of operations;
5. Lack of a national strategy for conducting COIN operations; and
6. Lack of concentration on COIN at training/education centers across the federal government prior to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, resulting in reliance on individual initiative and improvisation, ad hoc organizations, and an uncoordinated overall effort.

These deficiencies are addressed in FM 3-24, which warns that they are the worst possible actions an occupying force can take when fighting an insurgency. The 2/82nd's best and worst COIN practices while operating in this totally conventional doctrinal environment, i.e., a doctrinal regime lacking counterinsurgency-specific content and focus, are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

- Disciplined soldiers with a desire to positively impact their area of operations.
- No Rules of Engagement violations or criminal activity.
- Appointed a single authority – usually a dynamic, charismatic leader to interact with local Iraqi leaders.
- Brigade Commander took the lead on relationships with local Iraqi leadership.
- 2/82nd was first unit to receive funding for a consolidated district council headquarters for Iraqi citizens to voice concerns, find jobs, and report questionable activities in sector.
- 2/82nd was first unit in Baghdad to establish a weekly training session for city council members on democracy.
- Brigade Commander empowered company commanders with resources, time, and support on all civil-military operations.
- Focused on the population's needs and security.
- 2/82nd had the largest amount of reconstruction money per capita in Baghdad due to the efforts of the CMOC.
- Commanders were empowered to spend CERP funds on projects in sector (\$10,000 per week), soccer fields, job creation, and short time-span high-impact projects.
- Trained Iraqi military forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.
- Established first ICDC training compound in Baghdad.
- Established police liaisons with Iraqi police.

Figure 2. Best COIN Practices of 2/82nd during OIF I.

- Conducted too many large-unit operations:
 - 2/82nd reaction to insurgent action was always large-scale cordon and searches resulting in damage to innocent Iraqi homes, business, and morale.
 - Operations at the battalion level almost always resulted in fewer weapons caches and less information than those

Figure 3. Worst Practices by 2/82nd in OIF II.

<p>conducted at the platoon or company level, yet the preference was for large-scale operations.</p> <p>-Intelligence was usually driven from the top down rather than the bottom up, leaving much room for error. COIN intelligence operations are fundamentally driven by actionable intelligence gathered at the tactical level and fed up to the battalion for analysis rather than the conventional top-down approach.</p> <p>-No system for quick payments to informants.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consolidated all company-level forward operating bases into one large forward operating base: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -FOB mindset is hard to reverse. -Decreased the number of mounted and dismounted patrols in sector. -Decreased the amount of contact with potential informants. -Decreased the number of information operations in sector. -Decreased the rapid response time to emergency situations such as police station attacks or riots in sector. • Placed priorities on killing insurgents rather than engaging and protecting the population: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Promotion and awards were given primarily to those who had more offensive action and detainees than those with the most significant reconstruction and civil military projects. -Focus on killing led to increased collateral damage to include accidental killing of innocent civilians. • Focused special forces on raids rather than training and advising host nation police and military: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Direct action teams in sector were focused primarily on killing and detaining insurgents rather than advising and gathering intelligence. • Built and trained the host nation police and military to look just like 2/82nd: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The Iraqi Civil Defense Force and police were equipped and trained to look more like coalition forces than their own culturally accepted forces. This gave the impression that these Iraqi forces were just puppets of the coalition and therefore illegitimate. • No interagency coordination cell until days before redeployment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Without a system for commanders to interact with USAID, DOS, and other agencies, progress in sector was slowed. -All relationships with other agencies were ad hoc.
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Figure 3. Worst Practices by 2/82nd in OIF I (concluded).

COIN as a Panacea for Irregular War?

Is the American way of war doomed to fail against any insurgent movement? I do not think so. The American way of war can adapt to the new challenges posed by insurgent strategy and terrorist tactics. The most obvious fact supporting this adaptability is the new COIN manual. The manual is well-received among combat veterans of all ranks and those about to enter the Iraqi theater of operations. Better late than never, FM 3-24 is replete with practical methods for soldiers and Marines at the tip of the spear in COIN operations. Had our unit trained on these tactics, techniques, and procedures prior to the invasion in March 2003, the original transition from combat operations to COIN operations would have gone far more smoothly. FM 3-24 may not be a panacea for COIN operations, but it does provide leaders at the operational and strategic level with a framework for understanding the problem and paradoxes of irregular warfare.

Thus, is the solution simply COIN training for military forces? Hardly. The point of the 2/82nd combat vignettes was not simply to show that military forces can adapt and succeed in irregular warfare. History shows that the U.S. military is quite capable of overcoming enormous obstacles when it has the requisite support. Andrew Mack has observed that “insurgents can only achieve their ends if their opponents’ political capability to wage war is destroyed.” This observation has been validated by our Iraqi experience.

The interagency simply has to receive greater national emphasis. Resourcing, training, and cultures of the myriad agencies in the federal government must adapt to irregular warfare and post-combat reconstruction. The “alphabet soup” of agencies operating in irregular

conflicts must be better coordinated and resourced in order to provide targeted effects synchronized with military operations. Mobilization is more a function of political will than the ability to produce the bodies and materials needed to rebuild a country. Deterrence of terrorists can be effective if undertaken in conjunction with other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.³¹ The precise methods for deterring terrorist tactics and insurgent strategies are situational.

Determining those methods entails asking the right questions and then developing the right solutions from a menu of options. The only menu the military has is gradations and varieties of force. The 2005 NSS, QDR, and Presidential Policy Directive-56 formed an optimistic setting for maintaining American security at home and abroad. Two themes have pervaded all strategic literature since 9/11. These themes form the two pillars of President Bush's introductory letter in the NSS, highlighting the optimistic tone of strategic-level decisionmaking with regard to the GWOT:

[The first pillar is] promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens. Free governments do not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.

[After freedom] the second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we face—from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—

reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead.³²

Conclusion.

FM 3-34 provides highly useful guidance for military planners at all levels. Of course, there is no easy solution in the GWOT or the war in Iraq. Even now, soldiers, airmen, and Marines are engaged in the most complex environment imaginable in waging the GWOT. Even with the best intentions, actions taken by these soldiers can backfire in an instant. FM 3-34 shows an ideal version of what the military is capable of accomplishing if the mission and vision of the campaign are aligned with the training and capabilities of the force. The key to success in COIN is for our military and interagency to adapt and change faster than the enemy.

COIN operations can be successful with the proper support of the interagency. Irregular warfare is not simply a military problem with military solutions. Interagency roles are critical to the success of COIN. If my experience in Iraq is any indicator of the operational capability of the rest of the agencies in Iraq, then there is great hope as well as cause for concern. The main areas of concern along with recommendations are as follows:

1. Lengths of deployment should be brought into alignment. Current disparities allow for seams in the transition of key interagency personnel. Lengths of deployments for civilians should be similar to those of their military counterparts. The 90-day average interagency deployment is too short to make an impact.

2. Civilian agencies must find a way to arrive in theater better prepared for the culture, tempo, and risks associated with reconstruction of Iraq.

3. Interagency working groups should be established prior to deployment and continue during deployment, utilizing technology to share information and streamline approval processes for projects, intelligence, and strategic planning.

4. Key agencies involved in the rebuilding of Iraq should train with military counterparts at the maneuver training centers prior to deployments so as to educate the military and civilians on each federal organization's unique capabilities.

5. Turf wars should end upon entrance to the Iraqi theater of operations, with Congress mandating that agencies share resources, information, and expertise. A Goldwater-Nichols type of reform of the interagency would not solve all current problems in Iraq, but it would lay the foundations for successful future operations.

6. The National Security Council's role in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM should be evaluated for best and worst practices.

7. Information operations in the United States and abroad are more important during COIN than conventional operations. A complete review of standard operating procedures should be conducted to determine possible areas for improvement.³³

8. The military must adapt to the insurgency and fight COIN rather than attempt to shoehorn COIN into a conventional construct.³⁴

The political will of the American democracy must match the determination of those executing the missions in support of the GWOT. All resources

must come to bear on the problem facing the future stability of American security. The proper questions must be asked in order to identify and solve the most important problems. Just as the problem my unit faced in Southern Baghdad was exacerbated by our initial ill-conceived response to the enemy, U.S. policy should be recalibrated to avoid making analogous mistakes. My unit adapted to COIN by coming to understand the fundamental questions facing our security. We adapted in order to succeed. Adaptability is the key to winning the irregular warfare of the 21st century, and FM 3-24 does an exceptional job of offering a framework for planners to operationalize such adaptability in the conduct of COIN.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16

1. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 and Marine Corps 3-33.5., *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 2006.

2. Some names appearing in the chapter are pseudonyms.

3. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XLVII, January 1969, p. 214.

4. The military currently is attempting to transform from a Cold War conventional force to one that is capable of Full Spectrum Operations ranging from conventional warfare, SASO, catastrophic recovery/relief, to COIN operations. The interagency system, however, is still determining how best to focus in the 21st century with limited resources and even more limited legislation regarding actions taken in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). There is no strategic guidance with specific hierarchical directions for agency directors to provide long-term visions. Agencies live in a Hobbesian world where survival is based on perceived relevance. Inside the beltway, everyone is relevant.

5. Symbols played a huge role in policy in the post-Somali "Black Hawk Down" era. Seeing pictures of U.S. soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu led policymakers to make a hasty decision to pull out of the area and not get involved in the genocide in Rwanda. American power then came into question in the minds of terrorist leaders. They know we are averse to casualties and use that to foment dissent among the political body of America.

6. Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996, pp. 136-75; Barry Posen, "Military Response to Refugee Disasters," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Summer 1996, pp. 72-111. On p. 30 Posen posits that ethnic groups should enhance communication to reconcile different views of history, and advises that external forces such as those of the U.S. should provide conflict resolution rather than military security forces that may end up siding with one group. Kaufmann's entire argument is based on external forces separating the feuding groups and then protecting the underdog, using Armenia and Azerbaijan as successful examples of separation.

7. Samantha Power, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, New York: Harper Collins, p. 2002.

8. Stephen D. Biddle, "Threats to American Interests," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2005, pp. 1-44.

9. Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus and Lieutenant General James F. Amos state in the introduction to FM 3-24 that the purpose of the manual as a general approach to counterinsurgency operations is to fill in a doctrinal gap of more than 20 years within the Army and 25 years within the Marine Corps.

10. The Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota (BMP-1) was first built in the early 1960s and seen in public in November 1967 at a Red Square parade. It was called the M-1967 and BMP by NATO before its correct designation was known, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/bmp-1.htm, accessed February 24, 2007.

11. This was not a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA); it was simply an area of emphasis Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki saw as a priority for the Army. He stopped the practice of REFORGER missions in Germany and increased funding for STIX lanes geared toward irregular warfare.

12. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

13. President George W. Bush Speech, May 1, 2003, accessed at whitehouse.gov/nes/release/2003/05/images/20030501-6.html.

14. T. X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004.

15. See Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2006.

16. Interview at Fort Benning Infantry Center, Georgia, with Major Daniel Hart and Mr. Arthur Durant, Infantry Doctrine Center, April 2007.

17. Dr. Conrad Crane is currently the Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, PA.

18. "Combined Arms Center—An Engine of Change," presentation by Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, October 2006, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

19. OPLAN 1003 V, declassified on June 16, 2005, strategic operations plan for invasion of Iraq consisting of five phases—Phase I: Preparation and Complete Deployment of forces into theater 90 Days; Phase II: Attack Regime 45 Days; Phase III: Complete Regime Destruction 90 Days; Phases IV and V: Unknown.

20. The 2/82nd served as the division-ready brigade for over 6 months prior to the deployment with equipment readiness and paratrooper development and training as top priorities. Initially, the 2/82nd was preparing to conduct operations in support of

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. The 2/82nd completed live fire exercises, and a deployment and parachute assault to NTC in support of the Millennium Challenge Exercise in 2002.

21. Conversation with Staff Sergeant Congary Faison, June 5, 2003, Baghdad, Iraq.

22. The 2/82nd was under the operational control of the 3rd Infantry Division until the First Armored Division arrived in country.

23. Colonel Kurt Fuller, 2/82nd BCT commander, July 2003-August 2005. He is currently assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

24. The first successful project for our brigade was the delivery of medical supplies to our sector. The following link has a picture and description of the event, www.usaid.gov/iraq/photogallery/gallery_13/he03.html.

25. After the first week of the project, we learned that one of the council members was receiving kickbacks from a few hundred of the people he helped hire. It was customary that 10 percent of the salary would be paid to the person who got the job for them. We put a stop to this practice and privately reprimanded the council member.

26. B Company 325th commander Captain Eldridge Browne and C Company 325th Captain Joel Kostelac were combat-hardened infantry leaders who understood the importance of the USAID project in deterring young Iraqis from turning towards crime/insurgency in sector.

27. Discussion with ORHA Assistant Director for Governance, July 2003, Baghdad, Iraq.

28. Steven Metz, *Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2007. In his monograph, Dr. Metz describes the insurgency as a deadly menace that policymakers and military leaders did not expect to become involved in, and

he makes the claim that the only way for the United States to have success is to learn faster than the insurgents and focus on an intelligence-centric, fully integrated interagency that is culturally adept and capable of organizational adjustments based on the actions of the insurgents.

29. Deception operations are key to COIN. Getting inside the decision cycle of the enemy is critical to success. Our brigade commander used AH-64s and other weapons as part of our deception plans in Baghdad. Attacks always decreased after we concluded deception operations in conjunction with psychological and information operations.

30. During visits, Senator Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld praised the advances in FOB security, comfort, and predictability. Movie theaters, PXs, private sleeping quarters, four hot meals per day, huge gym facilities, and phone centers were all designed to make soldiers comfortable. FOBs had no problems with sewage, electricity, or hot water for showers. The Iraqis we were protecting were not so lucky, and resentment toward the coalition accordingly began to emerge. Furthermore, soldiers were less willing to patrol and conduct operations in sector when life was so good on the FOBs. A new term for this type of soldier was created: fobbits. The FOBs briefed well to Congress and the American public, but from a tactical perspective they were a huge mistake.

31. Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 3, Winter 2005/06, pp. 7-46.

32. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2005.

33. Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," *Military Review*, Vol. 86, No. 3, May-June 2006, pp. 13-32.

34. This is the same argument made by Andrew Krepinevich in his book, *The Army and Vietnam*. He asserts that the military in Vietnam never adapted to the insurgency, trying to fight the war as a conventional operation. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

CHAPTER 17

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? ALIGNING AND INTEGRATING THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS IN SUPPORT AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

Joseph R. Cerami

Having Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, and Paul Nitze in mind, [Senator] Jackson believed that people with experience and good judgment could surmount faulty organization, but not the reverse; no organizational gimmick could make up for the absence of public servants lacking these essential qualities.

Robert Kaufman¹

Introduction: Defining the Problem(s).

Some authorities, like Senator Jackson in the epigraph above, posit a stark difference between the importance of effective organizations and that of effective people, as if they were polar opposite choices on a reform agenda. We shall argue here, however, that effective organization and effective people are coequal in their contribution to institutional endeavor. That is to say, no effective and efficient structure will make up for poor staffers, and no wise men, even the likes of Cold Warriors Acheson, Lovett, or Nitze, can enjoy the fruit of sound policy without sound implementing organizations. Starting with the assumption that “everything changed” as a result of the international terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001 (9/11), one of the U.S. Government priorities should be a heightened awareness of the need for large numbers of both effective people and organizations.

Wise policymakers and cabinet officers have always been needed, but in this age of globalization, information, CNN and Al Jazeera, nonstate actors, catastrophic biological and nuclear terrorism, and the rest of the familiar litany of near-term security challenges—leadership solely from the top will never be sufficient given the range of tasks facing the United States in national and homeland security.² Rather, effective people at all levels working internationally and domestically in multiple public, private, and nonprofit organizations, are necessary, especially for effective interagency implementation of support and stability operations (SASO), the primary concern of this chapter.³ Management experts point out that the first step of complex problem solving is to define the problem, and they are absolutely right.⁴ To put it bluntly, without a consensus that the interagency and national security systems are broken, there will be no recognition that there is a problem to be solved, and the current unsatisfactory state of affairs will continue.

We Can Do Better: Aligning and Integrating Processes and Agencies.

Aligning and integrating the work of U.S. interagency processes and agencies are indispensable to the creative design and effective implementation of national security policy and strategy. Interagency processes and long-range planning by the U.S. Government, to include coordinating the efforts of the National Security Council as well as Defense, State, and other cabinet departments, remain major shortcomings, as demonstrated in the case studies and analyses in this volume. These studies and analyses also highlight the significance of public leadership and

management, in terms of setting strategic direction, aligning and integrating the efforts of various domestic and international stakeholders, and emphasizing performance measures.

The connections among executive leadership, policy effectiveness, and government performance are the subject of continuing research in the public management literature. For instance, the book *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, by Patricia Ingraham, Philip Joyce, and Amy Donahue, offers an insightful performance framework, finding that effective management leadership is indeed vital. The Ingraham *et al.* studies apply to performance management at all levels of government—federal, state, and local. The present volume extends the scope of public management research to emphasize interagency and international leadership. More specifically, it deals with military and civilian roles as policymakers and implementers, aligners, integrators, and results managers, or what Ingraham *et al.* call “grounded leadership.” It deals with the roles of the leaders and followers in charting the direction of and in implementing effective public policy.⁵ The public management research of Ingraham *et al.* stresses the vital role of strategic leadership and management for coordinating complex administrative systems across agencies and within government.⁶ Thus the present chapter extends the Ingraham *et al.* analysis from the federal government generally to the Washington node in particular and to the country team and international dimensions.

Ideas and Insights for Interagency Reform.

Military and civilian public managers have to think more broadly about their domestic and international

interagency responsibilities. What is to be done about the current problems facing leaders extending from the entry level all the way up to executive levels, and for managers in the new mix of public, private, and nonprofit organizations engaged in what the United Nations (UN) is addressing more broadly as governance and institution building issues?⁷ Below are five broad questions, along with ideas and insights in response, that address both the structural and personnel problems facing the United States and especially its interagency operations for counterinsurgency warfare. These questions and comments were compiled by members of the Bush School Capstone research seminar, the culminating seminar in a 2-year master's degree program in International Affairs.⁸ This semester-long study addressed the topic of aligning and integrating military and civilian roles in stability operations by focusing on the key issues. Following are summary discussions addressing each of the five: ⁹

1. What are the military and U.S. Government agencies' historical roles and missions in stabilization and reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency warfare (as drawn from case studies)?

The historical record reflects varying degrees of agency participation in stabilization and reconstruction. There was no evidence in the cases examined that, once the hot war ended, there was an automatic and immediate transition to civilian leadership and control of post-conflict support, reconstruction, or institution-building. For instance, in post-World War II Japan, the military ran operations for 7 years in a hierarchical structure headed by General Douglas MacArthur. Some thinking about a transition to civilian control was discarded after early successes became institutionalized. In other cases, the guidelines

on roles and missions were not clear. At times, an effort to be adaptable and flexible became a way to avoid addressing the difficult questions related to interagency as well as organizational responsibilities, accountability, and oversight.

Under ambiguous and dynamic circumstances, however, it is usual for the military, because of its organizational and resource capability, to fill the void. Especially in crisis situations, the tendency for existing routines and established relationships will become hard to change over time, regardless of prescribed agency roles and missions. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan provisional reconstruction teams, there were in place individual agency guidelines; yet, because of the ad hoc nature of team recruiting, lack of interagency training, and short-term deployments and operations, individual agency representatives were often unaware of their agency guidelines, responsibilities, and authority. At times, because of ongoing military conflict, civilian agencies were subsumed in actions by the better organized and resourced military components. Roles and missions under ambiguous conditions and in times of transition become especially difficult to sort out. Research did not find examples of planned transitions or orderly phasing from conflict to post-conflict to reconstruction activities.

Specific ways of providing incentives for aligning and integrating agency roles and missions may best be coupled with performance management techniques. For instance, in the evolution of provisional reconstruction teams, there were no apparent measures of success. In most cases, successful interagency operations resulted from the efforts of experienced leaders, such as military officers with Balkan peacekeeping service.

Synchronizing diverse agencies would benefit from established performance standards, with systematic accountability, reporting, and oversight processes.

2. What are the recommended ways to improve leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and missions) in the interagency coordination of military-civilian operations?

A well-supported view is that training and education programs are needed, especially prior to deployment. Unfortunately, the nature of crisis action becomes an excuse for a lack of preparedness. In fact, however, the often sudden onset of crises demands a long-term, progressive system for preparing and certifying leaders and teams for complex contingency operations. The history of U.S. Government efforts in interagency education and training is not promising. For instance, where is the interagency equivalent to the military's national training centers? It may not be an overstatement to conclude that what is needed is a massive transformational effort to create a civilian agency training and education culture. A formal leadership development process would be evolved so as to explicitly link synchronized and progressive professional education, training, assignments, and promotions within a system providing opportunities to interact in diverse agency and international contexts.

In addition, there is a need for formal interagency knowledge management processes. The architecture for an interagency knowledge or learning system should include several components such as data bases, on-line learning courses, and simulation networks; predeployment training and certification systems; individual leadership development survey and planning instruments; subject matter networks; and an interactive center for interagency lessons learned.

At the same time, the Federal Office of Personnel Management efforts to enhance individual leader develop and education should be expanded. The leadership literature stresses the need for continuous learning, constant assessments, 360-degree feedback, and progressive assignments. These efforts to foster the development of a sense of military/civilian professional solidarity, partnership, and public service are critical for interagency coordination.

The military services stress their professional ethic. Can we define and develop the concept of an interagency professional ethic that transcends natural but sometime harmful agency loyalties? The military service's efforts to move officers from branch to combined arms to joint training, education, certification, and promotion may serve as a model. A new interagency professional culture that systematically trains in accord with and promotes its ideals can extend the scope and reach of individuals positioned to improve the effectiveness and value of their agencies as well as serving the national interest in stability, support, and reconstruction efforts. Leadership can be developed over time with thoughtful approaches based on legitimate research knowledge. Shifting from adhococracy, crisis management, and firefighting to enlightened responses by a trained and ready professional interagency cadre is not beyond the reach, capacity, or imagination of the U.S. Government.

3. What are the military and civilian leadership skill sets for conflict and post-conflict environments?

Several researchers stress being able to see the nature of individual and collective tasks within the context of the strategy and operational priorities. Linked to this concern for the big picture was the need to understand interagency resource capacities and

constraints affecting achievement of unity of effort on a local, regional, country, area, and wider geographical basis. One researcher also notes the need for guidelines and standards providing a baseline for integration of interagency functions at each operational echelon, while aligning activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Baselines, guidelines, and standard procedures can be perceived as barriers to creativity and innovation, and these findings strongly reinforce the importance of flexibility and adaptability in dynamic situations. Without serious efforts to synchronize overall efforts, however, there is the open-ended possibility for endless reinvention and inefficiencies. These problems are especially pronounced in situations of high personnel and organizational turnover, where the possibilities for false creativity and wasted motion are very real. Therefore, educated, experienced, and high-performing individuals, teams, and organizations are a necessary condition for interagency effectiveness.

Communication skills are especially important for enhancing interagency effectiveness at all levels. Real concerns about overcoming turf and stovepipe pathologies cannot be erased by achieving false consensus among diverse agencies for the purposes of group cohesion and conflict avoidance. Time must be allocated for agencies to ensure that interagency communications do not obfuscate facts related to core competencies, capabilities, possibilities, etc. The attitude of "I don't speak State Department" should be the beginning of an in-depth conversation to discover the true intent and meaning of interagency written and oral communications.

The requirement for cross-cultural savvy applies to both interagency and intercultural communications.

A common lexicon for unifying understanding of key terms would improve interagency communications. While there is no substitute for face-to-face, on-scene interpersonal dealings, there is no excuse for the present lack of a common vocabulary to undergird a deeper understanding among agencies.

4. How should military and civilian agencies develop those leadership skills needed in the short term and the long term?

Systematic, progressive, and career-long leadership, education, and development focused on interagency skills must become part of the culture of the U.S. Government's military and civilian agencies. Interagency subject matter expertise and experience should become part of selected individuals' career progression and be linked to promotion and other incentives, such as advanced civil schooling opportunities at prestigious schools of public and international affairs. Research studies, reports, and publications should elaborate on interagency work, stressing its importance, its career-enhancing effects, and its critical benefits for the U.S. Government and the national interests. It is also essential to formalize mentoring systems to support nontraditional career paths that extend opportunities for interagency and international work. As previous national studies of U.S. Government performance have stressed, there is in an age of globalization an urgent need to break away from stove-piped agency education and promotion systems.

At the same time, creating a reservoir of interagency talent will have to focus on individual as well as team development. Creative solutions using on-line educational technology should provide educational support for individual and team training

and development. New and distributed educational networks that can meet individual as well as team/organizational training and educational development needs can substitute for or supplement full-time, long-term, traditional schooling. In a period of increasing demands and decreasing personnel, there is a need for more focused and efficient skill development programs.

5. Does the U.S. Government have a means for rating the effectiveness of civil-military coordination?

The ad hoc and personality-driven nature of many civil-military operations by the U.S. Government has been fairly characteristic, especially in the crisis atmosphere of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is noteworthy that the successful case of postwar Japan included more than 2 years of predeployment preparation, study, policy development, and capacity-building among several U.S. agencies. Nontraditional measures of effectiveness are needed for nontraditional missions and tasks, such as those required for successful support, stability, and reconstruction activities. What does it mean to conduct successful interagency operations over time? What standards are needed to measure effectiveness in interagency operations in a counterinsurgency context?

The metaphor of “nested bowls” for aligning and integrating the military’s strategic, operational, and tactical levels could well be useful for modeling interagency efforts to coordinate horizontally and vertically. In short, there is a need to relate local, task-oriented, mission-essential objectives with regional or national programs, priorities, resources, and oversight functions. Furthermore, all of this must be accomplished in the context of the grand strategy, viewing the U.S.

national, host country, and, in most cases, international institutional levels through a big-picture lens.

The amount of information available through modern information technologies is staggering for any organization. Aggregating efficient, real-time, and focused information for improving interagency effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations will continue to be a major challenge. A search for the “deeper meaning” of useful and actionable intelligence and information requires new ideas, new systems, and real creativity. Along the same lines, more imagination would be helpful for satisfying real information needs while countering the false creativity of allowing all agencies to go their own way so far as agency-specific information reporting and coordination documents are concerned. There is certainly a need for accurate and meaningful processes for measuring interagency communications and effectiveness. Using surveys to rate employee satisfaction along with program performance measures, e.g., “balanced scorecard” techniques for assessments of interagency processes, feedback, and opinions, is the type of step that would help in creating useful knowledge.¹⁰

Current systems developed and underpinned by agency traditions, cultures, and communication patterns all serve unwittingly to splinter common management processes into complex information, personnel, finance, accounting, and logistics systems. The effect is to undermine any potential foundation for creating an interagency culture that reins in the hydra-headed monster, unifying and integrating its impulses. Everyone with interagency experience knows that we can do much better.

Concluding Thoughts: Continuous Improvements and a Generation's Work.

The efforts reflected in the Capstone research project, the Interagency Research Symposium, and assembling of this volume have contributed to defining the nature of the problem. Much work remains to be done in improving agency and interagency structures, as well as educating and training a core of interagency civilian and military professionals. Aligning and integrating the efforts of various agencies and people from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in effective interagency endeavors remain key tasks for the U.S. Government in the years ahead. This is especially so in the case of support and stability operations.

Those of us involved in the different aspects of the effort recognize the huge national commitment it will take to effect necessary changes. The U.S. ability to provide international leadership requires adapting to and, in some measure, shaping the 21st century security environment, by both forming and implementing effective national security policies and processes, and improving organizational designs and leader development. The strategic environment in an age of globalization is sure to require our leading international coalitions, especially in counterinsurgency warfare and complex contingencies.

Providing effective national security in the short and long term depends in large part on continuing to improve current policies, strategies, and operations while initiating interagency and national security reforms. This volume provides a foundation for defining the nature of the interagency problems in counterinsurgency warfare and thus an approach for meeting these thus far intractable challenges through improved interagency effectiveness.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 17

1. Robert G. Kaufman, *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000, p. 105. Kaufman provides this insight in his discussion of Senator Jackson's Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, *Organizing for National Security*, Vol. I, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, pp. 12-45. For the role and influence of the Jackson subcommittee, see Robert David Johnson, "The Government Operations Committee and Foreign Policy during the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 113, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, pp. 645-671.

2. Even during the times of the State and Defense Department giants like Acheson, Lovett, and Nitze, there was great consternation about the ambiguities in the strategic environment, the lack of interdepartmental coordination, and internal agency malfunctioning, including turf issues and interpersonal conflicts among political, civilian, and military leaders. For a straightforward, credible, and personal account of these problems during World War II and the Cold War, see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969.

3. A reviewer of *War and Peace* points out that Tolstoy's genius was to make the commonplace not seem ordinary. Clifford Fadiman, "Foreword," in Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942, p. xxxvi, in commenting on the view of Van Wyck Brooks notes: "It is true that to make the obvious not commonplace one has to be a Tolstoy." This chapter is not arguing that genius is required to gain an awareness of the many problems in the interagency. Many, if not all, of the complex issues and proposed solutions outlined here are said to be common knowledge in the national security policy community. The point of this monograph is to collate, analyze, reassess, and record "what we all know" about the nature of the problems as well as recommended approaches for problem solving—with the purpose of building a consensus on the need for interagency and national security reforms.

4. See, for instance, David A. Whetten and Kim S. Cameron, *Developing Management Skills*, 7th Ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007.

5. Patricia W. Ingraham, Philip G. Joyce, and Amy Kneidler Donahue, *Government Performance: Why Management Matters*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 152. Ingraham notes that although her research group's extensive examination of federal and state government performance and management capacity "had not originally intended to study leadership—indeed, were advised not to do so—leadership surfaced as an important influence in the effective governments we studied." She goes on to write,

We found that strong leadership in public organizations was most often best described as a team effort, spanning political and career staff boundaries. . . . We found further that these leaders and teams had the ability and the will to move from strategic vision-setting to a very practical view of making the vision happen. This included a willingness to be involved with implementation. . . . Leadership was somewhat situational, in the sense that effective leaders and leadership teams captured opportunities for change or created them if necessary. One consistent characteristic of strong leaders and teams, however, was a sound organizational base. Understanding the organization and the management capacities it required well enough to foster and sustain effective system creation was central. We called this leadership model "grounded leadership."

6. Ingraham, pp. 20-21.

7. See www.un.org/esa/progareas/governance.html, accessed June 14, 2007.

8. The May 3, 2007, session reviewed the Capstone groups' key findings, drawn from their individual research projects, as well as their insights from participating with subject matter experts during the research symposium held at the Bush School on April 5-6, 2007. Participants at the May 3d session included Patrick Baetjer, Christopher Cline, Carlos Hernandorena, Brian Polley, Katherine Rogers, Amanda Smith, and Tyson Voelkel.

9. These research questions are adapted from a Creative Associates International, Inc. conference panel and report on "Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap," held in Washington, DC, on June 20, 2006. The conference co-sponsors were the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, and the Triangle Institute of Security Studies. The questions were refined after discussions with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.

10. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action*, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996.

GLOSSARY

ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan
CHLC	Coalition Humanitarian Cells
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DoD	Department of Defense
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FIS	Foreign Service Institute
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSO	Foreign Service Officer
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JRT	Joint Regional Team
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoEC	Ministry for Economic Cooperation
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSOP	Psychological Operation
QIP	Quick Impact Program
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SASO	Support and Stability Operation

SSTR	Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USIP	United States Institute of Peace

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ABOUT THE GEORGE BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE

The George Bush School of Government and Public Service is located at Texas A&M University in College Station, TX. It educates principled leaders in public and international affairs, conducts research, and performs service. Both the Master of Public Service and Administration (MPSA) and Master's Program in International Affairs (MPIA) are full-time graduate degree programs that provide a professional education for individuals seeking careers in the public or nonprofit sectors, or for activities in the private sector that have a governmental focus.

The MPSA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, combines 11 courses in public management, policy analysis, economics, and research methods with five electives. Students select an elective concentration in one of the following areas: nonprofit organizations; state and local policy and management; natural resources, environment, and technology policy and administration; security, energy, and technology policy; and health policy and management. A professional internship is completed in the first summer session.

The MPIA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, offers tracks in National Security Affairs and International Economics and Development. Students fashion a program of study based on two or more concentrations or clusters of related courses such as economic development, diplomacy in world affairs, intelligence in statecraft, national security, or regional studies. Satisfactory completion of a foreign language exam is a prerequisite for graduation. At the end of their first year of study, students participate in either an internationally oriented internship or a foreign language immersion course.

The Certificate in Advanced International Affairs (CAIA) program is a focused curriculum offered via distance education or through in-residence study. The program consists of 12-15 credit hours of graduate courses designed for those with limited time but a strong desire to upgrade specific dimensions of their international relations credentials. The Certificate in Homeland Security (CHS) program is offered only via distance education and intended for people who need to understand the new security environment as part of their management and supervisory duties. This program requires students to take 15 credit hours of graduate course work centered upon homeland security issues and strategies at all levels of the government and private industry.

For more information on the Bush School please visit our website at *bush.tamu.edu/*.

ABOUT THE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S. Army's center for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. It conducts strategic research and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College curriculum, provides direct analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.

SSI is composed of civilian research professors, uniformed military officers, and a professional support staff. All have extensive credentials and experience. SSI is divided into three components: the Art of War Department focuses on global, trans-regional, and functional issues, particularly those dealing with Army transformation; the Regional Strategy and Planning Department focuses on regional strategic issues; and the Academic Engagement Program creates and sustains partnerships with the global strategic community. In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around the world, including the foremost thinkers in the field of security and military strategy. In most years, about half of SSI's publications are written by these external partners.

SSI studies are published by the Institute and distributed to key strategic leaders in the Army and Department of Defense, the military educational system, Congress, the news media, other think tanks and defense institutes, and major colleges and universities. SSI studies capitalize on history and current political, economic, and military factors to develop strategic recommendations.

- Books - SSI publishes about 3-5 books per year consisting of authored works or edited compilations.

- Monographs - Policy-oriented reports that provide recommendations. They are usually 25-90 pages in length.
- Carlisle Papers - These highlight the very best of student papers from the U.S. Army War College.
- LeTort Papers - Essays, retrospectives, or speeches of interest to the defense academic community.
- Colloquium Reports - For larger conferences SSI may produce a report on the proceedings.
- Colloquium Briefs - These two-to-four page briefs are produced after the colloquia which we have conducted or helped fund.

At the request of the Army leadership, SSI sometimes provides shorter analytical reports on pressing strategic issues. The distribution of these is usually limited.

Additionally, every year SSI compiles a Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) based on input from the U.S. Army War College faculty, the Army Staff, the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and other Army organizations. This is designed to guide the research of SSI, the U.S. Army War College, and other Army-related strategic analysts.

SSI analysts publish widely outside of the Institute's own products. They have written books for Cambridge University Press, Princeton University Press, University Press of Kansas, Duke University Press, Praeger, Frank Cass, Rowman, and Littlefield and Brassey's. They have contributed chapters to many other books including publications from the Brookings Institution, Jane's Defence Group, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. SSI analysts have written articles for *Foreign Affairs*, *International Security*, *Survival*,

Washington Quarterly, Orbis, The National Interest, Current History, Political Science Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, Parameters, The Journal of Politics, Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Jane's Intelligence Review, Occasional Papers of the Woodrow Wilson Center, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, Military Operations Research, Strategic Review, Military Review, National Security Studies Quarterly, Journal of Military History, War in History, War & Society, The Historian, Infantry Magazine, The World and I, Aerospace Historian, Central Asian Security, Asian Survey, SAIS Review, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Special Warfare, Comparative Strategy, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Journal of East Asian Studies, World Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, Conflict, Diplomatic History, Airpower Journal, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Politique Étrangère, Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, and African Security Review.

SSI also conducts academic conferences to examine issues of importance to the Army, collaborating with some of the most prestigious universities in the country. Recent partners included Georgetown, Princeton, Harvard, MIT, Columbia, University of Chicago, University of Miami, Stanford, Georgia Tech, Johns Hopkins, and the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.